In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE
) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112934 ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) ) vs. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Franklin County JESSE M. BROMWELL, ) No.23AB-CR00570-01 ) Defendant/Respondent. ) Honorable Ryan J. Helfrich ) ) ) Filed: April 1, 2025
The State of Missouri appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Franklin County
suppressing evidence in a case against Defendant, Jesse M. Bromwell. The State claims the trial
court’s order was erroneous because the evidence was seized during a lawful search after consent
was obtained from the homeowner. We reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
On March 9, 2023, Sullivan police officers identified Defendant as a suspect in a
burglary that was captured on surveillance video. Officer T and Officer C were familiar with
Defendant and went to Defendant’s known address to make an arrest. The officers were aware
that Defendant’s father owned the residence and that Defendant was known to stay with his
father. Upon arrival, Father opened the door and let the officers into the home. The officers
walked into the home and identified Defendant, shirtless and sitting in a common area. Defendant was detained. Defendant indicated that he wanted to get a shirt from a back bedroom
but changed his mind upon learning an officer would accompany him. Defendant was taken
outside of the home and placed in the patrol vehicle. When Defendant was secured in the patrol
vehicle, Officer T told Defendant he would go back inside the home, to which Defendant replied
that he did not live there.
Officer T testified that he then spoke with Father and got consent to search the residence.
Officer T searched the home while Officer C remained in the living room, conversing casually
with Defendant’s father. Officer T found multiple items in the back bedroom that were reported
missing after the burglary.
The State charged Defendant with burglary in the second degree, section 569.170 RSMo.
and stealing, section 570.030 RSMo. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in
the back bedroom, challenging the constitutional validity of that search. At Defendant’s motion
to suppress hearing before the trial court, the State’s evidence consisted of testimony from
Officer T and Officer C. The trial court found Officer T’s testimony credible and relied upon that
testimony in rendering its judgment. The court also found Officer C’s testimony reliable and
noted that it mirrored the testimony of Officer T without adding to or subtracting from it.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding the State failed to meet its
burden to justify the warrantless search on the grounds that (1) “there is zero evidence that
Defendant’s father had common authority, based on mutual use of the searched area, to consent,”
and (2) the hearsay statement of Defendant’s father would not be allowed into evidence at trial as
it is “violative of the Defendant’s 6th Amendment right to confront the witnesses brought against
him.” 1 This interlocutory appeal follows.
1 Father was deceased when the motion to suppress was heard.
2 Discussion
The State argues two points on appeal. First, the State argues that the trial court erred in
granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the issue of common authority when
the officers had reasonable belief that Father had authority to consent to the search. Second, the
State contends that Officer T’s testimony regarding the homeowner’s consent was offered to
show subsequent police conduct, not the truth of the matter asserted, therefore, it is not hearsay
and does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Standard of Review
The State is entitled to appeal any order or judgment the substantive effect of which
results in the suppression of evidence under section 547.200.3 RSMo. Appellate review of a trial
court’s motion to suppress is “limited to whether the court’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence.” State v. Nichols, 504 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). At a hearing on a
motion to suppress, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the motion should be overruled. State v. Lewis, 17 S.W.3d 168, 170 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). Our
Court considers the record made at the suppression hearing and, when applicable, at trial, and
“we review all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s decision.” Nichols, 504 S.W.3d at 759. The trial court’s ruling will be reversed only if it
is clearly erroneous. State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. banc 2016). “The trial court’s
ruling will be deemed clearly erroneous if, after review of the entire record, [we are] left with the
definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Id. “Our Court gives deference to
the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations, but we review all questions of law
de novo.” Nichols, 504 S.W.3d at 759 (citing State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc
3 1998)). Whether conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo. Lammers, at 479 S.W.3d at 630.
Point I: Validity of the Consent to Search
In its first point on appeal, the State argues the trial court erred when predicating the
judgment on a lack of actual authority because apparent authority can also be used to prove valid
consent for a warrantless search. The State contends that the search of the back bedroom was
constitutional because the police officers reasonably believed that Father, the homeowner, had
authority to consent to a search of his entire residence.
“The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution preserves the right of the people to be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Lindsay, 599 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2020). “As a general rule, searches conducted without a search warrant are
unreasonable and violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.” Lewis, 17 S.W.3d at 170.
However, a search conducted with valid consent is constitutionally permitted. Id. For consent to
be valid it must be voluntary and not induced by fraud or coercion. Id.
Illinois v. Rodriguez established the standard of reasonableness for conducting a
consensual search. “As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent to enter must ‘be judged against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment ...warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that
the consenting party had authority over the premises?” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188
(1990) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). “Law enforcement officers may carry out
a valid warrantless search based on consent if the officers reasonably believed the person giving
consent had authority to do so, regardless of whether the officer’s belief is later proved to be
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE
) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112934 ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) ) vs. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Franklin County JESSE M. BROMWELL, ) No.23AB-CR00570-01 ) Defendant/Respondent. ) Honorable Ryan J. Helfrich ) ) ) Filed: April 1, 2025
The State of Missouri appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Franklin County
suppressing evidence in a case against Defendant, Jesse M. Bromwell. The State claims the trial
court’s order was erroneous because the evidence was seized during a lawful search after consent
was obtained from the homeowner. We reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
On March 9, 2023, Sullivan police officers identified Defendant as a suspect in a
burglary that was captured on surveillance video. Officer T and Officer C were familiar with
Defendant and went to Defendant’s known address to make an arrest. The officers were aware
that Defendant’s father owned the residence and that Defendant was known to stay with his
father. Upon arrival, Father opened the door and let the officers into the home. The officers
walked into the home and identified Defendant, shirtless and sitting in a common area. Defendant was detained. Defendant indicated that he wanted to get a shirt from a back bedroom
but changed his mind upon learning an officer would accompany him. Defendant was taken
outside of the home and placed in the patrol vehicle. When Defendant was secured in the patrol
vehicle, Officer T told Defendant he would go back inside the home, to which Defendant replied
that he did not live there.
Officer T testified that he then spoke with Father and got consent to search the residence.
Officer T searched the home while Officer C remained in the living room, conversing casually
with Defendant’s father. Officer T found multiple items in the back bedroom that were reported
missing after the burglary.
The State charged Defendant with burglary in the second degree, section 569.170 RSMo.
and stealing, section 570.030 RSMo. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in
the back bedroom, challenging the constitutional validity of that search. At Defendant’s motion
to suppress hearing before the trial court, the State’s evidence consisted of testimony from
Officer T and Officer C. The trial court found Officer T’s testimony credible and relied upon that
testimony in rendering its judgment. The court also found Officer C’s testimony reliable and
noted that it mirrored the testimony of Officer T without adding to or subtracting from it.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding the State failed to meet its
burden to justify the warrantless search on the grounds that (1) “there is zero evidence that
Defendant’s father had common authority, based on mutual use of the searched area, to consent,”
and (2) the hearsay statement of Defendant’s father would not be allowed into evidence at trial as
it is “violative of the Defendant’s 6th Amendment right to confront the witnesses brought against
him.” 1 This interlocutory appeal follows.
1 Father was deceased when the motion to suppress was heard.
2 Discussion
The State argues two points on appeal. First, the State argues that the trial court erred in
granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the issue of common authority when
the officers had reasonable belief that Father had authority to consent to the search. Second, the
State contends that Officer T’s testimony regarding the homeowner’s consent was offered to
show subsequent police conduct, not the truth of the matter asserted, therefore, it is not hearsay
and does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Standard of Review
The State is entitled to appeal any order or judgment the substantive effect of which
results in the suppression of evidence under section 547.200.3 RSMo. Appellate review of a trial
court’s motion to suppress is “limited to whether the court’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence.” State v. Nichols, 504 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). At a hearing on a
motion to suppress, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the motion should be overruled. State v. Lewis, 17 S.W.3d 168, 170 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). Our
Court considers the record made at the suppression hearing and, when applicable, at trial, and
“we review all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s decision.” Nichols, 504 S.W.3d at 759. The trial court’s ruling will be reversed only if it
is clearly erroneous. State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. banc 2016). “The trial court’s
ruling will be deemed clearly erroneous if, after review of the entire record, [we are] left with the
definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Id. “Our Court gives deference to
the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations, but we review all questions of law
de novo.” Nichols, 504 S.W.3d at 759 (citing State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc
3 1998)). Whether conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo. Lammers, at 479 S.W.3d at 630.
Point I: Validity of the Consent to Search
In its first point on appeal, the State argues the trial court erred when predicating the
judgment on a lack of actual authority because apparent authority can also be used to prove valid
consent for a warrantless search. The State contends that the search of the back bedroom was
constitutional because the police officers reasonably believed that Father, the homeowner, had
authority to consent to a search of his entire residence.
“The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution preserves the right of the people to be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Lindsay, 599 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2020). “As a general rule, searches conducted without a search warrant are
unreasonable and violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.” Lewis, 17 S.W.3d at 170.
However, a search conducted with valid consent is constitutionally permitted. Id. For consent to
be valid it must be voluntary and not induced by fraud or coercion. Id.
Illinois v. Rodriguez established the standard of reasonableness for conducting a
consensual search. “As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent to enter must ‘be judged against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment ...warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that
the consenting party had authority over the premises?” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188
(1990) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). “Law enforcement officers may carry out
a valid warrantless search based on consent if the officers reasonably believed the person giving
consent had authority to do so, regardless of whether the officer’s belief is later proved to be
erroneous.” Lewis, 17 S.W.3d at 170.
4 Defendant argues that he was staying in a separate bedroom of the house and thus had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that room. Further, Defendant argues the State failed to
meet its burden proving Father had mutual use of the bedroom in order to establish common
authority. Defendant relies on State v. Pinegar, 583 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979) and
State v. Peterson, 525 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. App. K.C.D. 1975). In Pinegar, the court found that the
defendant, who lived with his parents, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a personal
footlocker located in his room. Pinegar, 583 S.W.2d at 220. In Peterson, the court reversed the
defendant’s conviction due to a warrantless search of his bedroom, despite parent’s consent to
the search, because the bedroom was “exclusively” the defendant’s. Peterson, 525 S.W.2d at
608. However, in Peterson the state conceded “exclusivity” at a pretrial motion to suppress
hearing and did not contend that the search could be justified as a consensual search. Id.
Critically, Peterson and Pinegar both predate Rodriguez’s modification of the standard in
assessing the validity of consent searches. Lewis, 17 S.W.3d at 171. “Missouri cases subsequent
to Rodriguez have applied the ‘reasonableness’ test in determining the validity of consent
searches.” Id. Based on Rodriguez, the issue is whether it was reasonable for police to conduct a
warrantless search of the back bedroom based on Father’s consent. A warrantless search is
lawful if the third party who provided the consent had either actual or apparent authority. State v.
O’Connor, 685 S.W.3d 428, 441 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). “Under the apparent authority doctrine,
a search is valid if the government proves that the officers who conducted it reasonably believed
that the person from whom they obtained consent had the actual authority to grant that consent.”
Id. at 441-42.
We find State v. Moore and State v. Lewis instructive. In Moore, this Court found it was
reasonable for officers to search a home based on consent from a third party who officers had
5 regularly seen at the home, who had knowledge of the people within, and who was the only
person who responded to their knock. State v. Moore, 972 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Mo. App. S.D.
1998); see also Smith 966 S.W.2d at 8 (holding it was reasonable to search house with
girlfriend’s consent upon assertions that she helped purchase the property with money from
parents, lived at the address with defendant, and was knowledgeable about the property;
however, not reasonable to pry open defendant’s locked safe located within the house).
Additionally, in Lewis this Court found that evidence contained in a shoebox in the shared
bedroom of a married couple should not be suppressed because the “police’s belief that the wife
had authority to consent to the search of the shoebox was reasonable.” Lewis, 17 S.W.3d at 171.
In Lewis we noted that the State did not present evidence that the wife used the shoebox or had
prior access or control over the shoebox, however, it was still reasonable for police to believe
that the wife would have authority to consent to a search. Id.
Following well-settled law, a question we must consider is whether the State met its
burden to show the police officers had a reasonable belief that Father had authority to consent to
the search of his entire residence. “What [Defendant] is assured by the Fourth Amendment…is
not that no government search…will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur
that is ‘unreasonable.’” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183. Giving deference to the trial court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations and viewing those facts in a light most favorable to
Defendant, we are left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made as the
trial court did not address reasonableness. We find the officers acted reasonably in believing the
homeowner had authority to consent to a search of the back bedroom.
The parties do not dispute the Father’s ownership. Both officers had knowledge of Father
and testified they knew Father owned the home. The trial court confirmed in its judgment that
6 Father owned the home at the time of all events described. The parties do not dispute that
Defendant was not a joint homeowner. Officer T testified that Defendant specifically said he
“does not live there.” Father was the person who answered the door and let the officers into his
home. Officer T testified that he searched the residence after he had spoken with Father and
obtained consent. Officer C’s testimony mirrored that of Officer T. Officer C conversed politely
with Father in the living room while the search took place. The trial court found both officers’
testimony to be credible.
As in Moore and Lewis, the facts available at the time, and found credible by the trial
court, would lead an objectively reasonable officer to believe that Father had authority to consent
to a search of his residence, regardless of whether the officer’s belief is later proved to be
erroneous. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (elucidating Fourth Amendment requirement met when
officers reasonably believe they have obtained valid consent, even if that belief later proved
erroneous). As such, the trial court’s determination that there was zero evidence is clearly
erroneous. We grant Point I.
Point II: Officer’s Testimony Regarding Consent to Search
In Point II, the State contends that Officer T’s testimony regarding Father’s consent to
search the home was offered to show subsequent police conduct, not the truth of the matter
asserted; therefore, it is not hearsay and should not be subjected to a hearsay analysis. Moreover,
a statement that is not hearsay does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Defendant conceded Point II. 2 However, even if not conceded we would find the
statement is not hearsay.
2 After the State filed its Appellant’s brief, Respondent filed a brief in which he confessed error in Point II of the State’s brief. New counsel entered for Respondent then asked to file an amended brief late, which this Court denied. Counsel then filed a “Notice of Withdrawal of Concession of Appellant’s Point II in Respondent’s Brief” which was
7 Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Mo. banc 2007). Hearsay statements are inadmissible
unless the statement falls under a recognized exception to the rule against hearsay. Id. “Out-of-
court statements offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to explain and provide
context for subsequent police action are not hearsay and are admissible.” State v. Hollowell, 643
S.W.3d 329, 337 (Mo. banc 2022). Out-of-court statements admitted to explain subsequent
police conduct must only be used for that limited purpose and cannot be used as substantive
evidence to prove or establish the truth of the matter asserted. Id.
“The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that ‘[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.’” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). The Clause does not bar admission of a
statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. Id. at 59. However,
testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial are admitted only when the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. This applies even
to those out-of-court statements that might otherwise be admitted under a hearsay exception. Id.
If a statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, then the defendant’s rights
under the Confrontation Clause are not implicated. Id. at 59 n.9. “The Clause…does not bar the
use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted.” Id.
We acknowledge that in State v. Hollowell the Missouri Supreme Court found the out of
court statements of a non-testifying wife to be inadmissible because “the testimony went beyond
explaining subsequent police conduct and directly implicated [defendant] in the charged
ordered taken with the case. Because we provide reasoning in our opinion, we need not address the notice to withdraw concession.
8 offenses.” 3 Hollowell, 643 S.W.3d at 336. There, an officer testified that wife said her husband, a
convicted felon, possessed and frequently used numerous firearms that were stored in a safe in
their home. Id. at 333. This testimony was the State’s “only direct evidence presented regarding
the ultimate factual issue – possession and control of the firearms.” Id. at 338.
The case before us is distinguishable. Here, unlike Hollowell, the officer’s testimony
regarding Father’s consent to search his residence does not directly implicate Defendant in the
charged offenses of burglary and stealing, the testimony is not offered to prove the ultimate
factual issue, and the testimony is not the State’s only direct evidence. Officer T did not testify
to, nor did Father make, out-of-court statements that directly linked Defendant to the stolen
goods. Officer T did not testify to, nor did Father make, statements regarding Defendant’s guilt
or innocence in the charged offenses. Further, Officer T’s testimony regarding Father’s consent
to search is not the State’s only evidence of Defendant’s guilt. Here, Defendant was captured on
a surveillance video taken during the reported burglary, and the items reported missing from the
burglary were found in the residence.
In light of these facts, which were found credible by the trial court, Father’s consent to
search his residence explains and provides context for the officers’ subsequent conduct, and
Officer T’s testimony regarding Father’s consent was limited to that purpose. The testimony of
Father’s consent to search did not weigh upon the truth of the matter regarding Defendant’s
charged crimes. State v. Dees, 631 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982) (finding testimony
that grandfather gave officer permission to enter house and search for defendant did not go to
guilt or innocence of the defendant). Statements not offered for the truth of the matter asserted
3 “The State charged Hollowell with 15 counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm – one count for every firearm.” Hollowell, 643 S.W.3d at 333.
9 are not hearsay. Hollowell, 643 S.W.3d at 337. Therefore, we find the officer’s testimony
regarding Father’s consent to search is not hearsay and is admissible.
Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not bar the use of
statements for purposes other than the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.
Thus, the admission of the officer’s testimony regarding Father’s consent would not be violative
of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right as found by the trial court. We affirm Point II. 4
Conclusion It was reasonable for the police to search the back bedroom of the home based on consent
from Father, the homeowner. Additionally, the testimony regarding Father’s consent to search
was used to show subsequent police conduct and did not weigh on the truth of the matter
asserted. Consequently, the State met its burden, and the evidence found in the back bedroom
should not have been suppressed. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Franklin County is
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
______________________________ Angela T. Quigless, J.
James M. Dowd, P.J., and Cristian M. Stevens, J., concur.
4 All pending motions are denied.