IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) ) WD86933 v. ) ) OPINION FILED: ) March 4, 2025 JAQUEZ LATIN, ) ) Appellant. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline County, Missouri The Honorable Dennis A. Rolf, Judge
Before Division Two: Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge, and Alok Ahuja and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judges
Mr. Jaquez Latin (“Latin”) appeals from the judgment entered by the Circuit Court
of Saline County, Missouri (“trial court”), following a jury trial in which the jury found
him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, Latin raises a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence challenge and also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his request for a mistrial. We affirm. Factual and Procedural History 1
On April 19, 2023, Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper MN (“Trooper”) 2
assisted with a traffic stop on Interstate 70 in Saline County, Missouri. The car, a Nissan
Sentra, contained three adults and a young child who were traveling from Georgia to
Kansas to Florida. Latin’s fiancée (“SC”) was driving; Latin was in the front passenger
seat; and another woman and SC’s young son were in the back seat.
Trooper detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the car, and Latin
admitted that the occupants had smoked marijuana earlier but asserted that none
remained. Having concluded that there was probable cause for a search of the car,
Trooper asked the occupants if there was anything they wanted to tell him before he
conducted the search. Latin responded that he had a bag of his marijuana inside the car
and that it was in his “care, custody and control.” Trooper’s search revealed a bag of
marijuana under the front passenger seat (where Latin had been seated) alongside a black,
semi-automatic Taurus 9mm pistol. The pistol contained one round of ammunition in the
chamber and eleven rounds in the magazine. In the trunk of the car, Trooper searched
luggage shared by Latin and SC and discovered, amongst their commingled clothing, an
extended thirty-round magazine, typically used for a pistol and containing eight rounds of
the same caliber as the ammunition in the pistol.
1 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences.” State v. King, 674 S.W.3d 218, 222 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). 2 Pursuant to the directive of section 509.520.1(5) (Supp. IV 2024), we do not use any witness names in this opinion, other than parties to the underlying litigation. All other statutory references are to THE REVISED STATUTES OF MISSOURI (2016), as supplemented through April 19, 2023, unless otherwise indicated.
2 Latin did not express surprise when Trooper informed him of the discovery of the
pistol. But none of the occupants claimed ownership of the pistol at the traffic stop, and
Latin expressly denied any knowledge of the pistol.
Latin was charged by amended felony information, as a prior and persistent
offender, with unlawful possession of a firearm. The State and Latin stipulated that, at
the time of the stop, Latin had a prior felony conviction.
At trial, Trooper relayed the events of the stop and the discovery of the pistol. In
addition, Trooper testified that when he questioned SC at the stop about who was driving
the car during the trip, SC told him that she essentially had driven the entire time,
although Latin would drive occasionally when she got tired. Conversely, Latin told
Trooper the opposite. Trooper testified that he had later determined that the pistol was
not owned by any of the car’s occupants.
The sole defense witness was SC. She testified that the pistol belonged to her and
that she had purchased the Taurus pistol and extended magazine from a private dealer in
Texas a few months before. When questioned about whether it would make sense that
she bought the gun from a dealer if the gun was lost or stolen, SC testified without
objection that a dealer “wouldn’t tell me if it was lost or stolen if they were trying to
make $350.” SC testified that she believed Latin was unaware that she bought the pistol
and that it was present in the car (next to Latin’s bag of marijuana). SC also said that she
had been sitting in the front passenger seat and had switched places with Latin just before
the traffic stop but did not move the pistol. Regarding the ammunition magazine found in
the trunk amongst clothing owned by SC and Latin, SC testified that she had asked her
3 friend—the adult passenger in the back seat—to tuck it away and that she may have
thrown it there.
During cross-examination, SC acknowledged that she had submitted a written
statement to Trooper sometime after the stop in which she had stated (1) she had no idea
there was a gun in the car at the time of the stop and (2) the gun she owned was a Smith
& Wesson handgun. Accompanying the written statement were two videos that SC
claimed showed her in possession of the Taurus pistol on the night of purchase. At trial,
SC identified the gun shown in the video as the black semi-automatic Taurus 9mm pistol
found during the stop. SC asserted that she lied to the officers at the scene when she
claimed ignorance of any firearm in the car and that she had falsely claimed ownership of
a Smith & Wesson handgun.
In rebuttal, the State recalled Trooper, who testified that he asked SC to come in
for an interview regarding her claim of ownership of the pistol but that she had refused to
do so. This line of questioning then followed:
[PROSECUTOR]: At any point were you able to learn the status of the firearm that she is claiming is hers?
[TROOPER]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: What was it?
[TROOPER]: It was entered in NCIC as stolen, sorry, as lost. I contacted the owner and verified that he said it was stolen out of his vehicle.
[LATIN’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I’ll object.
(Attorneys approached the bench for conference.)
4 THE COURT: Come on up. We talked about this issue earlier.[ 3]
[LATIN’S ATTORNEY]: I didn’t ask him, I made an oral motion in limine. That’s hearsay.
[PROSECUTOR]: First of all, it is rebuttal, but she—
THE COURT: That doesn’t make any difference.
[PROSECUTOR]: She is trying to say she is the owner. And he knows otherwise.
THE COURT: It’s hearsay.
[PROSECUTOR]: I asked him what the status of it is. I didn’t ask him about the owner or any of that. I didn’t ask the owner’s name.
THE COURT: Lost, stolen, it doesn’t really matter.
[LATIN’S ATTORNEY]: I’m going to ask for a mistrial, I guess.
[PROSECUTOR]: It goes to her credibility of a witness, not the Defendant.
THE COURT: Why would you ask about it?
[PROSECUTOR]: Because of her credibility.
THE COURT: He doesn’t get to testify about her credibility.
[LATIN’S ATTORNEY]: For that matter we have a person from Texas.
THE COURT: They have no chance to cross-examine. I’m going to instruct the jurors to disregard. It’s hearsay, inadmissible.
[LATIN’S ATTORNEY]: That is fine, but that just highlights it.
(Attorneys left the bench.)
THE COURT: All right, Ladies and Gentlemen, the last comment by [Trooper] with regards to what he was told by a third person is blatant
3 During a pre-trial conference, Latin’s attorney moved in limine that the State be prohibited from presenting hearsay evidence about the gun being stolen. The trial court agreed that evidence the gun was stolen would be based on hearsay but deferred ruling to see how the evidence came in.
5 hearsay. Is not admissible and should not be considered and should be completely disregarded by you in making your decision on this case.
No further reference to the gun being stolen occurred during the remainder of the trial.
Trooper concluded his rebuttal testimony by stating that the gun shown in SC’s
videos was “not even close” to the Taurus pistol found in the car based upon the
difference in appearance of the serial numbers, the difference in shape, and the color of
the slide. According to Trooper, the gun shown in SC’s videos appeared to be a Smith &
Wesson handgun.
The jury found Latin guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. The trial court,
having found Latin to be a prior and persistent offender, sentenced him to eight years’
imprisonment.
Point I
Latin contends that a mistrial was necessary because Trooper’s hearsay testimony
that the gun was stolen was “prejudicial other crimes evidence” because it caused the jury
to believe that Latin had stolen the gun.
Standard of Review
“The ruling on a request for a mistrial is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court because it is in the best position to observe the impact of the problematic incident.”
State v. Russell, 656 S.W.3d 265, 278 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting State v. Eaton, 563
S.W.3d 841, 844 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)). This Court reviews the trial court’s refusal to
grant a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court’s ruling “is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it and
when the ruling is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one’s sense of justice and
6 indicate a lack of careful consideration.” Id. This Court reviews the trial court’s decision
“for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Marley, 598 S.W.3d 204, 215 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2020). Granting a mistrial is a drastic remedy and should be exercised only in
extraordinary circumstances. State v. Moore, 687 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).
Analysis
Missouri courts examine five factors in addressing claims where the defendant
asserts a mistrial should have been granted because of the admission of evidence of
uncharged crimes. State v. Brown, 444 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014). These
factors are: (1) whether the statement was voluntary and unresponsive to the prosecutor’s
questioning or caused by the prosecutor; (2) whether the statement was singular and
isolated and whether it was emphasized or magnified by the prosecution; (3) whether the
remarks were vague and indefinite, or whether they made specific reference to crimes
committed by the accused; (4) whether the court promptly sustained defense counsel’s
objection to the statement and instructed the jury to disregard the volunteered statement;
and (5) whether, in view of the other evidence presented and the strength of the State’s
case, it appeared that the comment played a decisive role in the determination of guilt.
Id.
Applying the relevant factors, the record suggests that the first factor weighs in
favor of Latin because the State deliberately attempted to solicit the testimony at issue
when the prosecutor asked Trooper about the “status” of the pistol that SC had claimed
7 was hers. The remaining factors, however, weigh in favor of finding that Latin was not
prejudiced.
Specifically, Latin objects to the singular and isolated reference by Trooper that he
had contacted the owner of the pistol “and verified that he said it was stolen out of his
vehicle.”
Latin cites to State v. Richardson, 791 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990), but his
reliance on that precedent is misplaced. In Richardson, the prosecutor, in a trial on
unlawful use of a weapon, improperly emphasized details of the defendant’s prior
conviction when he twice referred to defendant “blowing a hole in the door” while
impeaching the defendant. Id. at 886. Despite being admonished by the court, the
prosecutor in Richardson continued to question the defendant about the details of the
earlier conviction. Id. at 887. The prosecutor did not stop there; he then introduced
evidence that the gun used in the crime for which the defendant was on trial had been
stolen and inferred that the defendant had stolen it. Id. The appellate court granted the
defendant a new trial, finding that the “repeated references emphasizing the use of a gun”
were “devastating” to the defendant. Id. Here, Latin complains of a singular and isolated
reference that the gun had been stolen with no implication by the State that Latin had
stolen the gun, markedly different from the repeated references that justified a new trial
in Richardson.
The present situation is much more akin to State v. Gilbert, 636 S.W.2d 940 (Mo.
banc 1982). In Gilbert, the defendant claimed that the circuit court erred in refusing
defendant’s request for a mistrial after a state’s witness in a sale-of-controlled-substances
8 trial volunteered information that stolen guns were involved in the drug transaction,
which violated the circuit court’s previous ruling on a motion in limine. Id. at 942.
Specifically, the witness testified that he was told that the guns at issue “were stolen,”
and defense counsel objected and requested a mistrial. Id. at 943. The circuit court
sustained the objection, instructed the witness to make no further reference to the stolen
weapons, and warned that a mistrial would be declared if the ruling were violated again.
Id. The circuit court also ordered the statement to be stricken and admonished the jury
that they were not to consider the statement as it was irrelevant to the case. Id. The
Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
declare a mistrial because the statement that the guns “were stolen” did not directly refer
to the defendant’s involvement in other crimes. Id.
Trooper’s testimony that he spoke with the owner and that the owner reported the
pistol stolen was vague and indefinite and, much like the testimony in Gilbert, did not
connect Latin with the theft of the pistol. Vague and indefinite references cannot be
considered clear evidence associating the accused with other crimes. State v. Brown, 444
S.W.3d 484, 490-91 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (explaining that officer’s testimony regarding
recent “robberies at the Pizza Hut in our city” in trial for robbery occurring at another fast
food restaurant was vague and indefinite statement regarding a general event that had
happened and did not reference defendant); State v. Vincent, 59 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2001) (holding that an officer’s statement that defendant’s car was searched because
it had been taken in a carjacking did not warrant mistrial because it did not implicate
defendant as the person who committed the carjacking).
9 It is even less likely that Trooper’s rebuttal testimony that the gun was stolen
associated Latin with theft of the Taurus pistol because the jury had already heard,
without any objection by Latin, the State question SC whether it would make sense that
she bought the gun from a dealer if the gun was lost or stolen—to which SC responded
that a dealer “wouldn’t tell me if it was lost or stolen if they were trying to make $350.”
The jury, then hearing Trooper’s testimony immediately thereafter that the owner
identified the gun as having been stolen, would likely more readily connect Trooper’s
testimony to SC’s testimony about purchasing the pistol rather than conclude that the
testimony implicated Latin in the theft of the pistol. The third factor does not support
that defendant was prejudiced by Trooper’s testimony.
The fourth factor also weighs in favor of finding that Latin was not prejudiced by
the testimony. Just like the circuit court in Gilbert, the trial court here promptly sustained
defense counsel’s objection to the statement and immediately instructed the jury to
disregard it. A jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions, absent any indication
to the contrary. State v. Smith, 689 S.W.3d 798, 812 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024).
Latin points to State v. Rayner, 549 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. App. 1977), to argue that the
curative instruction given by the trial court was not sufficient to cure the prejudice Latin
suffered. Rayner is, again, distinguishable. In Rayner, a police officer testified over
objections by the defendant to a post-arrest statement made by a co-conspirator
incriminating the defendant. Id. at 129. The curative instruction was not given
immediately after the statement came into evidence; instead, after the court overruled the
objection to the evidence, two more witnesses testified, and then the court broke for noon
10 recess. Id. at 131. After the noon recess, the prosecutor advised the court that the
evidence in question was, in fact, not admissible. Id. It was only at this point that the
circuit court orally instructed the jury to disregard the officer’s testimony regarding the
co-defendant’s statement. Id. Because the inadmissible testimony “clearly” implicated
the defendant and “considerable time elapsed before any attempt was made to expunge
the inadmissible evidence from the minds of the jurors,” the appellate court granted the
defendant a new trial. Id. at 132-33. This was not the problem in Latin’s case. The
statement did not implicate Latin, and the trial court promptly sustained Latin’s objection
to the evidence and immediately instructed the jury to disregard it. This was a sufficient
remedy.
Finally, Trooper’s isolated comment, in view of the other evidence presented, did
not play a decisive role in the jury’s determination of Latin’s guilt. The jury heard ample
evidence connecting Latin to the pistol to support a conviction of unlawful possession of
a firearm. Latin admitted that he had marijuana inside the vehicle, and a seven-gram bag
of marijuana, located next to the Taurus pistol, was found underneath the passenger seat
where Latin was sitting. An extended ammunition magazine for the gun, containing the
same caliber of bullets as the pistol, was found commingled with Latin’s clothing in
luggage he shared with the driver. Latin’s defense was that the gun belonged to SC, his
fiancée, but her testimony to that effect was not credible. SC only claimed that she
owned the pistol and magazine days after the stop, and she initially told Trooper that the
gun she owned was a Smith & Wesson, which she later claimed at trial to be a lie.
Trooper testified that the videos produced by SC—which she claimed showed her in
11 possession of the Taurus pistol the night she purchased it—actually showed a Smith &
Wesson gun. This evidence—and not the single and vague testimony that the gun had
been stolen sometime in the past—was evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
Latin guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm.
The trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the inadmissible hearsay
immediately after Trooper made the single, vague, and indefinite reference to the pistol
being stolen was sufficient to remove any prejudice, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting Latin’s request for a mistrial.
Point I is denied.
Point II
For his second point, Latin disputes the sufficiency of evidence to support a
determination that he possessed the Taurus pistol found under the front passenger seat
because the area was not under his exclusive control and no other incriminating evidence
connected him with the pistol.
An appellate court’s “review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 736 (Mo. banc 2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the
verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 Analysis
“The elements of unlawful possession of a firearm are: (1) knowing possession of
a firearm (2) by a person who had been convicted of a felony.” State v. King, 674
S.W.3d 218, 231 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citing State v. Fikes, 597 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2019)).
Possession of a firearm “means having actual or constructive possession of an
object with knowledge of its presence.” § 556.061(38); State v. Evans, 410 S.W.3d 258,
262 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). The rules for possession of a firearm are similar to the
rules for possession of a controlled substance. State v. McCauley, 528 S.W.3d 421, 430
(Mo. App. E.D. 2017).
A defendant has actual possession of a firearm if he has the firearm on his person
or within his easy reach and convenient control. State v. Clark, 524 S.W.3d 609, 612
(Mo. App. E.D. 2017). A defendant has constructive possession if he has the power and
the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the object either
directly or through another. Evans, 410 S.W.3d at 262. Constructive possession
requires, “at a minimum, that [the defendant] had access to and control over the area
where the [contraband] was found.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Roggenbuck, 387 S.W.3d 376, 382 (Mo. banc 2012)).
In possession cases, where there is joint control over the area in which the
contraband is found, “evidence of additional incriminating circumstances that imply
knowledge may be required.” Id. (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Warren, 304 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)). Additional incriminating
13 circumstances that will support an inference of knowledge and control can take the form
of defendant’s easy access to the items; defendant’s close proximity to the items; finding
defendant’s personal belongings with the items; and conduct by defendant indicating a
consciousness of guilt, such as making false statements in an attempt to deceive the
police. Id. at 263. We consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether the
evidence of additional incriminating circumstances sufficiently supports an inference of
knowledge and control. Id.
Here, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that Latin had possession of the firearm. Latin’s fiancée, SC, had
been the primary driver on the lengthy road trip, and Latin was seated in the front
passenger seat at the time of the stop in Saline County. Prior to a search of the car, Latin
told Trooper that there was a bag of marijuana inside the car and admitted to the “care,
custody, and control” of the bag of marijuana. Searching under the front passenger
seat—a location that Latin had superior access to and that was readily accessible by
him—Trooper found Latin’s bag of marijuana and, immediately next to Latin’s
marijuana, the Taurus pistol.
We find State v. Glaze, 611 S.W.3d 789 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) instructive. Glaze
was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia
after a search discovered a black bag containing drugs and paraphernalia on the
floorboard in front of the passenger seat in which Glaze was seated. Id. at 792-93. The
bag also contained food and beer that Glaze reported as her belongings. Id. at 793. Glaze
asserted the same argument Latin makes here—that her proximity to the contraband
14 could not be considered incriminating evidence linking her to the contraband because she
was a joint occupant with the driver in the car. Id. at 796-97. Rejecting this argument,
this Court concluded that because the bag, which admittedly contained Glaze’s personal
belongings, was found in the passenger floorboard, it could be considered as additional
incriminating evidence linking Glaze to the contraband because she had superior access
to the contraband compared to the driver. Id. at 797.
Here, the Taurus pistol was directly under Latin’s seat in the car; it was even less
accessible to the other occupants of the car than the contraband in Glaze found on the
front floorboard. Accordingly, Latin had far superior access to the pistol than the driver
and the back-seat adult passenger. And, much like the contraband next to defendant’s
personal property in Glaze, the pistol was located right next to property—the bag of
marijuana—that Latin admitted was under his care, custody and control. A reasonable
juror could conclude that, because Latin had control of the area in which the marijuana
was hidden, he also had control over the pistol found alongside the marijuana.
Moreover, evidence that an ammunition magazine for use with the pistol and
containing the same ammunition was found in luggage used by Latin and containing his
clothing was even more incriminating evidence to link the pistol to Latin. See, e.g., State
v. Jackson, 681 S.W.3d 248, 258-59 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (affirming conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm where guns were discovered in drawer of bedroom
dresser containing personal items of defendant and also those of defendant’s girlfriend
with whom he shared a bedroom). And, Latin’s defense witness and his statements to
law enforcement about his knowledge of the Taurus pistol were moving targets that the
15 jury concluded were not credible. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630, 640-41
(Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (first alteration in original) (“[T]he factfinder is entitled to
consider a [party]’s dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.”).
Considering the totality of this evidence, a juror could have reasonably concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Latin possessed the 9mm Taurus pistol that Trooper
found under his seat. 4
Point II is denied.
Conclusion
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
___________________________________
Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge
Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge, and Alok Ahuja, Judge, concur.
4 Disregarding our standard of review, Latin recites facts in his appellate briefing in a light most favorable to his defense rather than his conviction by the jury. Likewise, he cites to precedent bearing little factual and procedural relevance to the present case. See State v. Glass, 439 S.W.3d 838 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (no evidence defendant had easy and routine access to the firearms found in a gun cabinet located in parents’ bedroom or that defendant ever used firearms); State v. McCauley, 528 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (no incriminating evidence that tied defendant to the gun found in a kitchen drawer other than defendant shared residence with girlfriend); State v. Buford, 309 S.W.3d 350 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (only evidence offered to link defendant to drugs in car was defendant’s “nervousness”); and State v. Condict, 952 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997) (only evidence linking defendant to drugs was his presence, along with several others, at the time the drugs were found). Needless to say, the cited precedent is inapposite and unpersuasive to Latin’s present appeal.