IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) ) WD85893 v. ) ) OPINION FILED: ) June 25, 2024 BENJAMIN DAVID WATSON, ) ) Appellant. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri The Honorable David P. Chamberlain, Judge
Before Division Three: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges
Introduction
Mr. Benjamin Watson (“Watson”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Clay County, Missouri (“trial court”), following a jury trial convicting him of one count
of statutory rape in the first degree and one count of sodomy in the first degree, for which
Watson was sentenced to a total of forty years imprisonment. We affirm. Facts and Procedural Background1
The State charged Watson with one count of statutory rape in the first degree and
one count of statutory sodomy in the first degree (Count I and Count II). In Count I, the
State alleged that on or between September 3, 2018, and August 15, 2020, Watson
knowingly had sexual intercourse with Victim, a child less than twelve years old. In
Count II, the State alleged that, during the same time frame, Watson knowingly had
deviant sexual intercourse with Victim, a child less than twelve years old, by touching her
genitals with his mouth.
On January 31, 2022, the trial court took up pretrial motions, including a motion in
limine filed by Watson asking the trial court to exclude “any mention of allegations of
any sexual conduct or accusations made against [Watson] by others” because “[s]uch
evidence is not logically or legally relevant” and should not be admissible as propensity
evidence.
At the hearing, the State confirmed it intended to present propensity evidence from
three other people who disclosed, after Victim came forward, they were sexually abused
by Watson as children, including Watson’s sister (“V.W.”), Watson’s brother (“T.W.”),
and Victim’s maternal aunt (“Ta.W.”). The State detailed the propensity witnesses’
allegations and argued the allegations were “very similar” to the charged offenses and,
therefore, constituted probative propensity evidence.
1 On appeal from a jury-tried case, the appellate court views the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. State v. Carter, 523 S.W.3d 590, 593 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).
2 Watson argued that “all of [the propensity evidence] is prejudicial” and that some
of the allegations were “25, maybe 30 years old” and “not the same instance really at all.”
The trial court acknowledged that “every piece of evidence” carries some prejudicial
effect but that propensity evidence is allowed under “the [Missouri] Constitution and
State Courts” if “the [trial court] finds that the probative nature does in fact outweigh the
prejudicial nature.” The trial court then issued a preliminary ruling stating the propensity
evidence was “likely to come into evidence” and that Watson “should be ready to counter
that evidence or at least plan on having some of that heard.”
Following the hearing, Watson filed a written objection, which he intended to rely
upon at trial, relating to the admission of the propensity evidence under Article I, Section
18(c) of the Missouri Constitution. Having already issued its preliminary ruling on the
topic in response to Watson’s motion in limine, the trial court did not again take up the
objection prior to trial.
On May 22, 2022, a five-day jury trial commenced during which the following
facts relevant to this appeal were adduced:
Watson is Victim’s natural father. In August of 2020, Victim lived with Watson,
her stepmother, her three biological siblings, and her two stepsiblings. On August 16,
2020, Victim, who was then twelve years old, was spending the night at a neighborhood
friend’s house when she confided in her friend’s parents that “[Watson] ha[d] raped [her]
since the fourth grade.” Law enforcement was immediately contacted, and it was
confirmed that Victim would sleep at the neighbors’ house that evening.
3 Later that night, Victim’s stepmother went to the neighbors’ house and spoke with
Victim. The neighbors overheard Victim crying and Victim’s stepmother say, “[i]f you
go through [with] this, you will destroy the family.”
The next morning, a detective and an investigator with the Missouri Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) interviewed Victim and Victim’s biological siblings. Victim
recanted her allegation and stated to the detective that the most important thing was that
all the kids remain together and not go back to their birthmother. All of Victim’s siblings
echoed Victim’s statement about the importance of keeping the family together “almost
verbatim.” The detective also interviewed the step-mother who “basically said that she
didn’t believe anything had happened” and also stated that the kids needed to remain
together and not return to their birthmother. Due to the obvious similarities in these
statements, the detective wrote in his report that the family members had been “coached.”
Despite his assumption that the family members were coached, the detective did
not follow up on his hunch, nor did he order Victim to a SCAN2 clinic to undergo a
medical examination that could provide physical evidence of whether Victim had ever
been sexually penetrated.
Fearing for Victim’s safety and the lack of intervention by law enforcement and
DSS, V.W. and T.W. contacted the detective to disclose their prior abuse by Watson
because they wanted Victim to be “taken seriously.” During their phone call with the
2 SCAN stands for Safety, Care, and Nurturing and is a clinic that is part of the Children’s Mercy hospital system. Safety, Care & Nurturing Clinic, CHILDREN’S MERCY KANSAS CITY (last visited May 16, 2024). https://www.childrensmercy.org/departments- and-clinics/child-adversity-and-resilience/safety-care-and-nurturing/.
4 detective, V.W. and T.W. urged the detective to get the children “out of [Watson’s]
house.” These pleas did not initially result in Victim’s removal from Watson’s house, but
Victim and her biological siblings were eventually transferred to their biological mother’s
custody by temporary court order, after which they began living with their maternal
grandmother and aunt, Ta.W.
At some point after this custodial transfer, Victim and her siblings were scheduled
to visit Watson when Victim started crying and told Ta.W. that something did, in fact,
happen with Watson. Victim did not go back to Watson’s house at that time. At a
second forensic interview, Victim disclosed that Watson had raped her when she was ten
or eleven years old. Victim stated she was helping Watson clean his bedroom when
Watson picked her up and took her into an adjoining bathroom, put her down on a
bathmat, removed her pants, kissed down her chest, stomach, and vagina and proceeded
to “[st[ick] his part inside of [her],” putting his penis in her “privates.” Victim stated she
cried, pushed Watson away, and told him to stop, but he held her down and then turned
her over and put his penis “in her butt.” Victim stated that Watson continued to thrust in
and out until he finally stopped and told her he needed to “clean up some white stuff off
his part and off of the floor” and that she felt something wet in her underwear when she
put it back on. Victim also relayed numerous incidents of digital penetration and oral
sex. A recording of the forensic interview was admitted into evidence and published to
the jury.
Victim also testified about the details of the rape at trial. Victim testified there
were five other people in the house when Defendant raped her, including three of her
5 siblings outside the bedroom door and two of her siblings below her bedroom in the
basement. Victim testified that she initially recanted her allegations because her
stepmother expressed that she did not believe Victim and because Victim did not want to
“tear [their] family apart.”
Watson attempted to attack Victim’s credibility by asserting a defense that Victim
was a “liar” and that she made up the rape to get back at Watson for “dress[ing] her
down” in front of her friends on the same day she told her neighbors about the rape.
Watson called Victim’s biological siblings as defense witnesses, all of whom testified
that Watson had never behaved inappropriately with them and denied hearing Victim
scream during the rape.
To corroborate Victim’s testimony, the State presented its propensity evidence.
V.W., the biological sister of Watson, was the first propensity witness called. Before her
testimony began, Watson reiterated his objection stating: “Judge, I think we’re going in
the direction of the information that I’ve already objected to, and I filed a written
objection . . . . If I don’t make my objection now, I lose it.” The trial court stated, “The
record will reflect that that objection is made appropriately and is an ongoing objection
and is overruled.”
V.W. proceeded to testify that when she was nine or ten years old, Watson, then
seventeen, “grabbed [her while she was cleaning her room], and pushed [her] against the
bed and flipped [her] so that [she] was on [her] back and got on top of [her][,] [a]nd . . .
put his hand over [her] mouth and started humping [her].” V.W. further testified that
when she was in the fifth grade, Watson pulled her underwear down and started kissing
6 her vagina and “doing stuff down there.” V.W. also testified about additional incidents
during the same time frame where Watson kissed her and touched her vaginal area while
they were sitting next to each other in the living room.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked V.W. why she did not report the
abuse earlier. V.W. testified she told her parents about the abuse but they did nothing
apart from talking to Watson about it once. V.W. testified that Watson apologized years
later “for what he did” and stated that “he thought that [she] liked it.”
The State also called Watson’s brother, T.W., and maternal aunt, Ta.W., as
propensity witnesses. Before each of their testimony about Watson’s prior acts of abuse,
Watson renewed his objection to the admission of propensity evidence. The trial court
overruled both objections.
T.W. testified that about twenty years prior—when T.W. was between ten and
twelve years old and Watson was between fifteen and seventeen years old—“[Watson]
tried to stick his penis in [T.W.’s] butt.” T.W. testified that “another time[,] when [he]
was sleeping, . . . [Watson] tried to do it again and tried to kiss [him], [b]ut [h]e like
clinched [his] butt closed and turned [his] head every time, and [Watson] ended up
ejaculating on [his] butt.” T.W. testified he was aware Watson abused his sister, V.W.,
because he witnessed one incident where Watson was on top of V.W. and another
incident where Watson was on his knees in front of V.W. with his arms around her.
On cross-examination, defense counsel confirmed that T.W. never told his parents
or any authority figures about the abuse. T.W. stated he did not report his abuse after it
happened because he had seen “the way [his parents] handled it with [his] sister.”
7 Finally, the jury heard from Ta.W., who testified that “[o]n multiple occasions [in
the past], [Watson] . . . touched [her] and made [her] touch him.” She testified the first
incident occurred in the summer of 2010, when she was fifteen and Watson was twenty-
five; Watson started rubbing her thigh while they were seated together on a sofa. Ta.W.
testified that during that same summer, Watson climbed on top of her and “rubb[ed]
himself on [her]” during a camping trip, and that on a third occasion, Watson made her
touch his penis through his pants while Watson was driving. Ta.W. testified about
additional incidents when she was sixteen: one incident where Watson made her touch
his penis under his jeans; a second incident where Watson tried unsuccessfully to put his
penis in her “butt” after climbing on her while she was lying on a sofa; and a third
incident where Defendant put his penis in her mouth.
Defense counsel elicited on cross-examination that Ta.W. did not tell her father or
her sister, Victim’s biological mother, about the abuse. Ta.W. stated she did not tell the
police about the incidents at the time because she was scared and embarrassed.
At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court explicitly instructed the jury in Jury
Instruction No. 5 on how the propensity evidence could be considered:
The defendant is on trial only for the offenses charged[.] You may not find the defendant guilty only because you believe he may have been involved in or committed other offenses or bad acts in the past[.]
If you find and believe from the evidence that the defendant previously was involved in or committed other offenses or bad acts, you may consider such evidence only for the purposes stated in this instruction[.]
As to Counts I and II, if you find and believe from the evidence that the defendant previously committed other criminal acts of statutory rape,
8 statutory sodomy, or child molestation, you may consider that evidence for the purpose of corroborating the victim’s testimony and demonstrating that defendant’s propensity to commit the offenses for which he is charged in Counts I and II.
During its closing, the State went over Instruction No. 5 again and emphasized to
the jury that:
[T.D, T.W., and Ta.W.] are not the reason why you make this decision one way or the other, okay. Their purpose in testifying is about the credibility of [Victim’s] story . . . [s]o when you determine who you believe, what you believe and why, what we’re asking you to do is view their testimony in light of the fact that it makes [Victim’s] testimony credible, not whether [Watson] did that to them.
The State also emphasized the need for propensity evidence in light of the fact that there
was no physical evidence from a SCAN exam.
In his closing argument, defense counsel reiterated Watson’s position that Victim
was a “liar” and urged the jury to disbelieve the propensity witnesses because they were
“popping up” with allegations of past abuse that were “never reported . . . to the
authorities before.” Defense counsel emphasized that “[s]ome of [the allegations] were
20-plus years old. Another one was a decade or more old.”
The jury found Watson guilty of both charged offenses. On September 22, 2022,
the trial court entered judgment sentencing Watson to twenty years in the Missouri
Department of corrections on Count I and twenty years in the Missouri Department of
Corrections on Count II, with the sentences to run consecutively to each other. Watson
timely appeals.
9 Points on Appeal
In his three points on appeal, Watson argues the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing the State to introduce propensity evidence from V.W., T.W., and Ta.W. because
such evidence was not logically or legally relevant in that any probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Upon careful review, we find
no reversible error.
Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution
“The trial court ‘has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence during a
criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion.’” State
v. Ratliff, 622 S.W.3d 736, 744 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Loper, 609
S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo. banc 2020)). The trial court abuses its discretion when its “ruling
admitting or excluding evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then
before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice
and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 731
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f reasonable persons can differ about the
propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court
abused its discretion.” State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Mo. banc 2018)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court reviews the
decision of the trial court “for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error
was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Prince, 534
S.W.3d 813, 818 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 “[P]ropensity evidence is evidence of uncharged crimes, wrongs, or acts used to
establish that [a] defendant has a natural tendency to commit the crime charged.” State v.
Boss, 577 S.W.3d 509, 519 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 193 (Mo. banc
2013)). It is well established that “proof of the commission of separate and distinct
crimes is not admissible unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly
establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial.” State v. Primm, 347
S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The law permits the
State to try a defendant only for the offense for which he is on trial[,] and [t]his precludes
the State from unjustifiably introducing evidence of a defendant’s prior, uncharged
crimes or bad acts.” State v. Garretson, 598 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our country’s jurisprudence has generally prohibited the use of propensity
evidence in criminal cases. Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 281. However, the enactment of
Article I, section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution carved out an exception to this
general rule by relaxing the standard for the admissibility of propensity evidence in sex-
abuse cases involving minors. See State v. Matson, 526 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2017) (“The enactment of Article I, Section 18(c) effectively created a new
evidentiary standard for sex crimes involving minors.”); State v. Lutes, 557 S.W.3d 384,
390 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (“[I]n the context of sex crimes involving minors, [section
18(c)] unequivocally supersedes the Supreme Court of Missouri’s evidentiary rulings that
11 once prohibited propensity evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Matson, 526 S.W.3d at 158). Article I, section 18(c) currently provides:
[I]n prosecutions for crimes of a sexual nature involving a victim under eighteen years of age, relevant evidence of prior criminal acts, whether charged or uncharged, is admissible for the purpose of corroborating the victim's testimony or demonstrating the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime with which he or she is presently charged.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c).
Essentially, section 18(c) “relieve[d] propensity evidence in certain types of cases
from the absolute ban on admissibility, assuming logical and legal relevance is otherwise
established.”’ Lutes, 557 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting Matson, 526 S.W.3d at 158). Thus, we
must determine if the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the propensity
evidence was (1) logically relevant—in that it tends to make the existence of a material
fact more or less probable; and (2) legally relevant—in that it has probative value that is
not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817-18.
(“Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or
less probable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Brummett v. Burberry Ltd., 597
S.W.3d 295, 304 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (explaining that legal relevance weighs the
probative value of propensity evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant). The argument in Watson’s appellate briefing does not assert that the
propensity evidence in question entirely lacks logical relevance but rather challenges the
evidence’s probative value as part of his claim that it is not legally relevant.
B. Legal Relevance
12 Watson argues, as he did below, that the propensity evidence is too dissimilar and
too remote to have any probative value and that it is unduly prejudicial. We disagree.
“Before propensity evidence can be said to have any probative value, it must be
sufficient for the jury to conclude the defendant actually committed the prior criminal
act.” Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 288. When a defendant pleads guilty to a prior criminal
offense, this consideration is easily met because any doubt about culpability is removed.
Id. at 289. In this case, Watson was never charged or convicted of any offenses against
V.W., T.W., or Ta.W. However, section 18(c) clearly permits the admission of
uncharged prior criminal acts, and the testimony of V.W., T.W., and Ta.W. was
“specific, unequivocal, and sufficient for the jury to conclude that he actually committed
the acts alleged.” State v. Brown, 596 S.W.3d 193, 208 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020).
In considering the question of probative value, trial courts also examine whether a
defendant “actually had a propensity to commit the charged crime at the time it is alleged
to have occurred.” Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 289. Factors to consider in this evaluation
include “the similarity between the prior act and the charged act, the amount of time
between the acts, and the prosecution's need for the evidence to prove its case.” State v.
Robinson, 662 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (citing Williams, 548 S.W.3d at
289). “[A]n inference of propensity might be proper notwithstanding a significant time
lapse between the prior crime and the charged crime if the two crimes are highly similar.”
Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 289. “On the other hand, an inference of propensity might not
be proper if the prior crime and the charged crime are only somewhat similar unless the
two occurred over a short span of time.” Id. Gaps between prior criminal acts and
13 charged conduct exceeding twenty years are not too remote to have probative value as
long as requisite similarities are present. See Lutes, 557 S.W.3d at 391-92 (collecting
cases and noting a number of courts have admitted evidence of sexual assaults occurring
“over twenty years before the crime charged”).
Here, while there was a significant time lapse of approximately nine to twenty
years between the prior uncharged crimes and charged offenses, the uncharged crimes
and charged offenses are very similar. All the uncharged crimes involved abuse of
family members, and nearly all the uncharged crimes took place in the family home just
as Victim alleged. T.W. and Ta.W. both described incidents where Watson pulled down
their pants and attempted anal penetration—including attempts on T.W. that resulted in
ejaculation. Similarly, Victim testified that Watson pulled down her pants and anally
penetrated her to the point of ejaculation.
There are also notable similarities between V.W.’s testimony that Watson
“grabbed [her], and pushed [her] against the bed and flipped [her] so that [she] was on
[her] back and got on top of [her][,] [a]nd . . . put his hand over [her] mouth and started
humping [her],” and Victim’s testimony that Watson held her down before turning her
over and putting “his part in her butt.” V.W. and Victim also shared accounts of Watson
kissing their genitals. Moreover, T.W., V.W. and Ta.W. were all minors or
comparatively younger than Watson when the abuse took place, in fact T.W. and V.W.
were the same age as Victim at the time the sexual misconduct took place.
Missouri courts have repeatedly deemed these types of similarities—similarities in
age, familial relationship with the accused, and similar accounts of abuse—to be highly
14 probative of a defendant’s propensity to commit the charged offense. See State v.
Shepard, 662 S.W.3d 761, 770 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (“[G]reat weight should be
afforded to the similarities in the ages of [the propensity witness and the victim] and the
fact they were not strangers to [the defendant] because it tends to show an ongoing
propensity to engage in the charged crime.”); State v. Pierce, 678 S.W.3d 115, 122 (Mo.
App. S.D. 2023) (“We give great weight to the similarity of acts and ages of the
victims.”); State v. Coyle, 671 S.W.3d 702, 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) ( “[T]he
similarities in ages of [the propensity witnesses and the victim] at the time of the offenses
against them, and [the defendant’s] willingness to engage in sexual misconduct with
victims he knows or is related to.”); State v. Robinson, 662 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Mo. App.
S.D. 2023) (“[T]his court notes the similarity of the acts to which [the propensity witness]
testified and the acts for which Defendant was charged. Both victims were of a similar
age at the time of the alleged inappropriate touching, both victims were relatives of
Defendant, and both acts involved Defendant groping the victim’s breasts.”); State v.
Brammer, 614 S.W.3d 18, 27 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (explaining that a defendant’s past
crimes were “highly probative” for showing a propensity to commit the charged conduct
where “[b]oth involved young female victims, similar body parts, and similar
accusations”).3
3 Nothing in this opinion is meant to suggest that any similarity between past acts and charged crimes satisfies the topic of probative value. As discussed, propensity evidence of acts that occurred years before the charged offense must be highly similar to be probative (i.e. shared characteristics involving age, relationship to defendant, place, manner of abuse, etc . . . ).
15 And, while evidentiary weight differs from case to case, Williams, 548 S.W.3d at
288, trial courts generally afford “great weight” where propensity evidence shows a
defendant’s abuse of minors known to him (e.g. family members) is not isolated, but
rather, ongoing over a course of years. See Shepard, 662 S.W.3d at 770 (holding “great
weight” should be afforded to propensity evidence showing a defendant engaged in
inappropriate sexual conduct with one teenage girl whom he knew in the years leading to
the rape of another teenage girl whom he also knew because it showed an “ongoing
propensity” to molest young girls); Lutes, 557 S.W.3d at 394 (noting three past crimes
twenty-one years removed involving the insertion of defendant’s penis in young girls’
vaginas had “considerable probative value” for showing his propensity to digitally
penetrate his granddaughter) (quoting Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 292).
Ta.W.’s testimony concerning Watson’s sexual abuse in 2010 and 2011,
approximately eight years after his abuse of V.W. and T.W. and approximately nine years
before that of Victim, shows Watson had an ongoing propensity to commit the charged
offenses. See State v. Peirano, 540 S.W.3d 523, 529 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018) (holding that
testimony showing a defendant molested his middle daughter approximately ten years
after he stopped molesting his sister and eight years before molesting his youngest
daughter demonstrated an ongoing propensity to molest young female family members).
Additionally, all the propensity witnesses and Victim testified to multiple incidents of
abuse rather than single isolated incidents.
The probative value was further enhanced by the State’s need for propensity
evidence to counter Watson’s attacks on Victim’s credibility, including arguments by the
16 defense that she was a liar because she previously recanted her allegations of abuse and
that she had an alleged motive to fabricate allegations against Watson. Williams, 548
S.W.3d at 290 (“[T]he defense’s attack upon the credibility of the state’s witnesses,
including [the] [v]ictim, enhanced the probative value of [Defendant’s] prior crime
evidence.”); Brown, 596 S.W.3d at 209 (“The probative value of propensity evidence is
enhanced where the only eyewitness to the sexual abuse is the victim, and the defense
attacks the victim’s credibility.”).
And where, as here, there were no eyewitnesses to the abuse, and no medical or
scientific evidence, such as a SCAN test, to corroborate Victim’s account, the
prosecution’s need “weighs heavily in the [trial court’s] decision for the probative side.”
State v. Davison, 636 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (emphasis added); see also
Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 289 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence in part because there were no eyewitness accounts and “[n]o other
scientific, forensic, medical, or psychological witness was available”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The culmination of these factors under the unique circumstances of this case lead
us to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
propensity evidence had probative value.
C. Prejudice
Turning to the question of prejudice:
Several factors may bear on a [trial] court’s analysis of the prejudicial effect of propensity evidence: whether the jury could infer the defendant was punished for his past criminal acts, how the State goes about
17 proving the prior act at trial, whether the charged crime is overshadowed by evidence of the prior act, and the manner in which the State uses the prior act at trial.
Shepard, 662 S.W.3d at 770-71 (citing Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290-91).
While we agree with Watson that special attention must be accorded to the
admissibility of evidence of prior uncharged crimes, Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290 (“If the
jury is allowed to infer (or, worse, speculate) the defendant escaped punishment in the
past, it may be inclined to convict merely to punish the defendant for past criminal acts. .
.”), it is equally clear that Article I, section 18(c), contemplates situations in which prior
uncharged criminal acts may be admissible where relevant and the resulting prejudice is
limited. See Brown, 596 S.W.3d at 208 (“Article I, section 18(c) . . . clearly allows for
the admission of evidence of uncharged prior criminal acts.”); Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 821
(“The plain language indicates the circuit court retains substantial discretion in admitting
or excluding this evidence even if there is a danger of some prejudice.”). We agree with
the trial court that the prejudice was limited in this case and it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to admit the challenged testimony.
Throughout its presentation of evidence, the State always commented that Watson
was not on trial for past uncharged crimes and instead was on trial for what he did to
Victim.
Similarly, the trial court explicitly instructed the jury in Instruction No. 5 that
“[Watson] is on trial only for the offenses charged” and that the jury “may not find
[Watson] guilty only because [it] believe[s] he may have been involved in or committed
other offenses or bad acts in the past[.]” (emphasis added). “Even though there might
18 have been a risk the jury may ‘have been inclined to convict’ [Watson] for his past
uncharged criminal acts rather than for the crimes charged, . . . these risks are low given
it would have contradicted the trial court’s instructions, which we presume the jury
correctly followed.” State v. Robertson, 674 S.W.3d 153, 167 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023); see
also Shepard, 662 S.W.3d at 771 (“Even if the jury was concerned about this, the risk
that it was inclined to convict [the defendant] for past conduct rather than for the crime
charged—disobeying the court's explicit instruction to the contrary—is low.”). Under
Missouri law, “[a] jury is presumed to follow the circuit court’s instructions.” State v.
Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2022).
Regarding other circumstances surrounding the propensity evidence in this case,
we acknowledge the propensity evidence was introduced through live testimony, which
can result in greater prejudice to a defendant than a stipulation for a prior conviction.
Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290. But “[l]ive testimony regarding prior bad acts is not per se
unfairly prejudicial[.]” Shepard, 662 S.W.3d at 771 (citing Brown, 596 S.W.3d at 210).
It is only when it is “graphic . . . , overly detailed, and not dispassionate” that the danger
of unfair prejudice is increased. Brown, 596 S.W.3d at 210.
Nothing in the record before us suggests the propensity witnesses engaged in
“theatrical drama or exaggerated sobbing” that could tilt the balance towards unfair
prejudice. State v. Banks, 582 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). Rather, the
record indicates that V.W., T.W., and Ta.W., who were all adults at the time of their
testimony, offered dispassionate, brief accounts of their sexual abuse by Watson with no
testimony concerning their feelings on the matter. See Coyle, 671 S.W.3d at 723 (finding
19 no abuse of discretion where the propensity witness’s testimony was “limited to reporting
[the defendant’s conduct] . . . with virtually no discussion of [her] feelings”). Defense
counsel even remarked in his closing that Ta.W. didn’t display any “pain” during her
testimony and testified “like she’s reporting the weather.”4
Moreover, Victim’s evidence of the charged offenses was not eclipsed by the
propensity testimony—which concerned “less heinous crime[s].” Williams, 548 S.W.3d
at 290. Victim described a forcible rape where she was held down by Watson while he
vaginally and anally penetrated her, while the propensity witnesses described incidents of
clothed “humping” and anal penetration attempts. Therefore, the testimony of the
propensity witnesses is not so jarring that we can conclude Watson was unduly
prejudiced by its admission.
Finally, our review of the record shows the State properly employed the
propensity evidence to corroborate Victim’s account of the rape; to rebut attacks on her
credibility based on her initial lack of reporting and her siblings’ testimony that they did
not hear Victim scream; and to demonstrate Watson’s propensity to commit the charged
offenses due to the similarities between Victim’s testimony and the uncharged crimes.
Because the State’s use of the propensity evidence was limited to its proper purpose, the
danger of unfair prejudice was lowered. See Shepard, 662 S.W.3d at 772; Coyle, 671
S.W.3d at 724; Robertson, 674 S.W.3d at 169.
4 Compare these facts with Brown, where we held the danger of unfair prejudice was increased where a propensity witness testified about how her sexual assault by the defendant caused her to drop out of school and feel angry and depressed many years removed from the incident. 596 S.W.3d at 210.
20 Watson argues we must nonetheless reverse because there is no indication the trial
court considered any of “the relevant factors” herein discussed or “engaged in the
balancing required by Article I, Section 18(c).” Watson essentially takes the position
that the trial court should have made a pretrial balancing-analysis ruling on the admission
of the propensity evidence after his written objection was filed. But a trial court “is not
required to make an express finding of legal relevance before admitting evidence under
article I, section 18(c), provided the record reflects a sound basis for the balancing the
amendment requires.” Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 286.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Watson’s motion in limine during which it
was apprised of the content of the propensity witness testimony and the parties’
arguments for and against its admission. The trial court then properly articulated the
Article 1, section 18(c) standard for admission—that propensity evidence is allowed
where its probative value outweighs the prejudicial danger to the defendant—and let
Watson know that he should be ready to “counter that evidence or at least plan on having
some of that heard.” Watson raised his arguments again via written objection, and the
trial court acknowledged that filing before overruling the objection at trial. The record
reflects a sound basis for the balancing process section 18(c) requires, and accordingly,
we find no abuse of discretion.
Watson’s points on appeal are denied.
21 Conclusion
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
___________________________________ Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge
Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge, concur.