This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0472
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Tuquan Lee Smith, Appellant.
Filed February 8, 2016 Affirmed Peterson, Judge
Mower County District Court File No. 50-CR-13-2543
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Jeremy Clinefelter, Assistant County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Worke,
Judge. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from a conviction of first-degree aggravated robbery, appellant argues
that his Alford plea was invalid because the factual basis for the plea was insufficient to
establish that he believed that he would be convicted by a jury. We affirm.
FACTS
Three men robbed the Freeborn Coop gas station in Lyle. Police began surveillance
in the area and saw a Chevrolet Impala with a driver and passengers who fit the description
of the robbers. When police stopped the car, appellant Tuquan Lee Smith was driving, and
Vonzell Whitehead, Elgin Green, and Keion Clay were passengers. Police searched the
car and discovered clothing used in the robbery, cash, and checks made out to the gas
station. The police also recovered clothing along the road that matched witness
descriptions of the robbers.
On a surveillance video, police were able to identify Whitehead and Green as active
participants in the robbery. A third man appeared in the video, but his face was covered.
That man was wearing light or gray shoes; Smith was wearing gray shoes when he was
arrested. A witness reported seeing a Chevrolet Impala parked near the gas station with
four men in it. This car moved to various locations in the parking lot before the robbery.
All four men were charged with first-degree aggravated robbery, and they all denied
involvement. The district court ordered that all four trials be joined. Clay, Green, and
Whitehead pleaded guilty, and, during their plea hearings, all three men implicated Smith
2 in the robbery. Smith observed at least two of the pleas. On the scheduled date of his trial,
Smith entered an Alford1 plea to the charge of first-degree aggravated robbery.
During the plea colloquy, Smith admitted that (1) he reviewed the police reports and
knew that his co-defendants had pleaded guilty; (2) he was aware that there was a handgun
and a long gun in the car; (3) he was driving the car and made a statement to the others
about how many customers were still in the gas station; (4) he heard Whitehead say “go
get ‘em” indicating that all the customers had left the gas station; (5) Whitehead would
testify that he gave Smith some money and the gun used by Green during the robbery, and
Smith wiped the gun clean and put it between the seats of the car; (6) both Green and Clay
testified in their plea proceedings that Smith was a party to the robbery and discussed it
with them; (7) he was “not truthful” when he told police that he had not stopped after
leaving Iowa and entering Minnesota, and he did not know that anything was going on or
that there was evidence of a robbery in the car; (8) police found a gun, cash, and checks
from the gas station in the car and clothing along the road; (9) he took evasive action by
taking back roads in an attempt to avoid detection; and (10) “in reviewing all of the
evidence that would be tendered against [him], it is clear . . . that a reasonable group of
1 The United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who maintains that he is innocent may nevertheless plead guilty to a charge in order to take advantage of a plea agreement by acknowledging that the evidence is strong enough to enable a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970). Here, the state agreed not to seek an aggravated sentence based on the factor that three or more people acted together to commit the crime. Minnesota adopted the reasoning of Alford in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761-62 (Minn. 1977).
3 jurors, based upon this evidence, could certainly conclude that [he] aided and abetted the
actions in this robbery.”
The district court found that Smith made his plea intelligently and voluntarily and
that there was a factual basis for the plea. The district court imposed the presumptive 78-
month sentence, based on Smith’s criminal-history score of three. Smith now seeks to
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice because his plea was not accurate.
DECISION
A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that we review de novo.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted). Smith challenges
only the accuracy of his plea, which protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more
serious charge than he could be convicted of at trial. Id.
A plea is accurate if it is supported by sufficient facts on the record to demonstrate
that the defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he is pleading guilty. Lussier
v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588-89 (Minn. 2012). This is particularly important in the case
of an Alford plea. See State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007) (stating that
“defendant’s acknowledgment that the State’s evidence is sufficient to convict is critical to
the court’s ability to serve the protective purpose of the accuracy requirement”). Because
a defendant entering an Alford plea is maintaining his innocence, his admission to the facts
alleged in the complaint is insufficient, standing alone, to provide a basis for the plea. State
4 v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29,
2015). In addition to the factual admissions, a defendant must acknowledge that the
“evidence the State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict.” Id. (quotation omitted).
And the district court must “independently conclude that there is a strong probability that
the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id.
(quotation omitted). In Theis, the supreme court concluded that there must be a “strong
factual basis” before an Alford plea is valid. 742 N.W.2d at 649.
Smith was charged with aggravated robbery, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245,
subd. 1 (2012) (committing a robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon). Smith
signed a plea petition acknowledging that he had been advised of his rights and had
sufficient time to talk to his attorney.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0472
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Tuquan Lee Smith, Appellant.
Filed February 8, 2016 Affirmed Peterson, Judge
Mower County District Court File No. 50-CR-13-2543
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Jeremy Clinefelter, Assistant County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Worke,
Judge. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from a conviction of first-degree aggravated robbery, appellant argues
that his Alford plea was invalid because the factual basis for the plea was insufficient to
establish that he believed that he would be convicted by a jury. We affirm.
FACTS
Three men robbed the Freeborn Coop gas station in Lyle. Police began surveillance
in the area and saw a Chevrolet Impala with a driver and passengers who fit the description
of the robbers. When police stopped the car, appellant Tuquan Lee Smith was driving, and
Vonzell Whitehead, Elgin Green, and Keion Clay were passengers. Police searched the
car and discovered clothing used in the robbery, cash, and checks made out to the gas
station. The police also recovered clothing along the road that matched witness
descriptions of the robbers.
On a surveillance video, police were able to identify Whitehead and Green as active
participants in the robbery. A third man appeared in the video, but his face was covered.
That man was wearing light or gray shoes; Smith was wearing gray shoes when he was
arrested. A witness reported seeing a Chevrolet Impala parked near the gas station with
four men in it. This car moved to various locations in the parking lot before the robbery.
All four men were charged with first-degree aggravated robbery, and they all denied
involvement. The district court ordered that all four trials be joined. Clay, Green, and
Whitehead pleaded guilty, and, during their plea hearings, all three men implicated Smith
2 in the robbery. Smith observed at least two of the pleas. On the scheduled date of his trial,
Smith entered an Alford1 plea to the charge of first-degree aggravated robbery.
During the plea colloquy, Smith admitted that (1) he reviewed the police reports and
knew that his co-defendants had pleaded guilty; (2) he was aware that there was a handgun
and a long gun in the car; (3) he was driving the car and made a statement to the others
about how many customers were still in the gas station; (4) he heard Whitehead say “go
get ‘em” indicating that all the customers had left the gas station; (5) Whitehead would
testify that he gave Smith some money and the gun used by Green during the robbery, and
Smith wiped the gun clean and put it between the seats of the car; (6) both Green and Clay
testified in their plea proceedings that Smith was a party to the robbery and discussed it
with them; (7) he was “not truthful” when he told police that he had not stopped after
leaving Iowa and entering Minnesota, and he did not know that anything was going on or
that there was evidence of a robbery in the car; (8) police found a gun, cash, and checks
from the gas station in the car and clothing along the road; (9) he took evasive action by
taking back roads in an attempt to avoid detection; and (10) “in reviewing all of the
evidence that would be tendered against [him], it is clear . . . that a reasonable group of
1 The United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who maintains that he is innocent may nevertheless plead guilty to a charge in order to take advantage of a plea agreement by acknowledging that the evidence is strong enough to enable a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970). Here, the state agreed not to seek an aggravated sentence based on the factor that three or more people acted together to commit the crime. Minnesota adopted the reasoning of Alford in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761-62 (Minn. 1977).
3 jurors, based upon this evidence, could certainly conclude that [he] aided and abetted the
actions in this robbery.”
The district court found that Smith made his plea intelligently and voluntarily and
that there was a factual basis for the plea. The district court imposed the presumptive 78-
month sentence, based on Smith’s criminal-history score of three. Smith now seeks to
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice because his plea was not accurate.
DECISION
A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that we review de novo.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted). Smith challenges
only the accuracy of his plea, which protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more
serious charge than he could be convicted of at trial. Id.
A plea is accurate if it is supported by sufficient facts on the record to demonstrate
that the defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he is pleading guilty. Lussier
v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588-89 (Minn. 2012). This is particularly important in the case
of an Alford plea. See State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007) (stating that
“defendant’s acknowledgment that the State’s evidence is sufficient to convict is critical to
the court’s ability to serve the protective purpose of the accuracy requirement”). Because
a defendant entering an Alford plea is maintaining his innocence, his admission to the facts
alleged in the complaint is insufficient, standing alone, to provide a basis for the plea. State
4 v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29,
2015). In addition to the factual admissions, a defendant must acknowledge that the
“evidence the State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict.” Id. (quotation omitted).
And the district court must “independently conclude that there is a strong probability that
the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id.
(quotation omitted). In Theis, the supreme court concluded that there must be a “strong
factual basis” before an Alford plea is valid. 742 N.W.2d at 649.
Smith was charged with aggravated robbery, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245,
subd. 1 (2012) (committing a robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon). Smith
signed a plea petition acknowledging that he had been advised of his rights and had
sufficient time to talk to his attorney. He also acknowledged that he “had an opportunity
to review all of the police reports and the statements and sit in on some of the pleas that
were given by other individuals that were present or involved in this incident.” As a factual
basis for the charge, Smith agreed that he (1) knew that the other men were armed and that
they were going to enter the gas station in order to rob it; (2) received money and a handgun
from Green after the robbery, wiped the handgun clean, and put it between the seats;
(3) understood that the other defendants implicated him in the robbery; (4) lied to the police
and acknowledged that they found the gun and proceeds of the robbery in the car he was
driving; and (5) took “evasive actions” in driving by leaving the main road and taking back
roads in order to avoid police. Smith acknowledged that “in reviewing all of the evidence
that would be tendered against [him], it is clear . . . that a reasonable group of jurors, based
upon this evidence, could certainly conclude” that he aided and abetted the armed robbery.
5 The prosecutor explained the range of sentences that Smith would be subject to based on
his criminal-history score, the possibility that he could receive an aggravated sentence
because more than three people were involved in the crime, and that he would not be
subject to an aggravated sentence if he pleaded guilty. This provides a strong factual basis
for the guilty plea. And Smith agreed that a jury “could certainly conclude” that he was
guilty.
After Smith was questioned, the district court stated, “Mr. Smith, I will accept your
plea of guilty and find that there is a factual basis for it. I also find that you have made a
voluntary and intelligent waiver of your right to trial.” In addition, the court stated: “For
purposes of the Alford Plea, also, I . . . will find that based on . . . your answers to those
questions, that there would be a probability of your conviction; and in that regard, your
plea here today was made voluntarily and intelligently and rationally.”
Smith argues that the district court’s statements were inadequate because the court
did not find that there was a “strong probability” that he “would” be convicted. But the
district court’s obligation is to “ensure that an adequate factual basis has been established
in the record.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). There is no requirement
that the district court use certain words to discharge this obligation.
Citing Theis, Smith argues that his acknowledgement that he “could” be found
guilty is nothing more than Theis’s acknowledgement that there was a “risk” that he would
be found guilty, which the supreme court held was insufficient for an Alford plea. 742
N.W.2d at 649-50. But in Theis, no one inquired into the factual basis for the plea. Id. at
645. Theis reviewed the plea petition, stated that he understood his rights and the charges
6 against him, and agreed that he had non-consensual sexual contact with his stepdaughter,
but no factual details were placed on the record. Id. The supreme court concluded that
when a defendant enters an Alford plea, there must be “a strong factual basis” that is “based
on evidence discussed with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing.” Id. at 649.
Unlike Theis, the record here includes a specific strong factual basis for Smith’s plea and
Smith agreed that he also had reviewed the police reports and knew that the co-defendant’s
testimony would implicate him.
In Theis, the supreme court also cautioned that “the court must be able to determine
that the defendant, despite maintaining his innocence, agrees that evidence the State is
likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict.” Id. To achieve this, the defendant should
“specifically acknowledge on the record at the plea hearing that the evidence the State
would likely offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard,
to find the defendant guilty of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” Id. Smith agreed
that it was “clear” that a “reasonable group of jurors, based on this evidence, could certainly
conclude” he was guilty. In contrast, Theis agreed that there was a “risk” that he would be
found guilty. Id. at 650. Finally, in Theis, the district court stated that “it was satisfied
with the basis for the plea and would accept it” without commenting on the factual basis
for the plea. Id. at 645 (quotations omitted). Here, the district court found that there was
a sufficient factual basis for the Alford plea, that Smith had entered the plea voluntarily and
intelligently, and that “there would be a probability of your conviction.”
7 This court stated in Johnson that “[t]here is no suggestion in the caselaw that a
district court, as a routine matter when accepting a Norgaard2 plea, must make an express
finding that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the
charge to which he pleaded guilty.” 867 N.W.2d at 216 (quotation omitted). This court
continued, “[W]e decline to impose a requirement that, in every Norgaard guilty plea, the
district court must make an express finding on the record that there is a strong probability
that the defendant would be found guilty of the crime to which he is pleading guilty.” Id.
at 217. Thus, when the record clearly demonstrates that the accuracy requirement is
satisfied, there are no prescribed words that must be said before an Alford plea is valid.
Smith agreed to a specific factual basis and admitted that, based on the evidence, a jury
could “certainly conclude” that he was guilty of aggravated robbery. The record
demonstrates that Smith was not pleading guilty to a more serious charge than he could
have been convicted of at trial. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. And the district court
expressly stated that it had considered the factual basis provided at the plea and that it was
sufficient to establish a probability of conviction.
Affirmed.
2 “The means of ensuring the factual basis of an Alford/Goulette plea are essentially the same as the means of ensuring the factual basis of a Norgaard plea.” Johnson, 867 N.W.2d at 215. A Norgaard plea is made when a defendant claims a loss of memory through amnesia or intoxication. Id.