This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0235
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Robert Jon Hill, Appellant.
Filed February 9, 2026 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Harris, Judge
Scott County District Court File No. 70-CR-23-8852
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan Ottaviani, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Florey, Judge. ∗
∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment following a jury trial, appellant challenges his
convictions of domestic assault, arguing that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions of domestic assault-fear and domestic assault-harm, (2) the district court
abused its discretion by issuing a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) during his
sentencing hearing and by naming R.H. as a protected victim, and (3) the district court
violated appellant’s substantive and procedural due-process rights by not holding a separate
DANCO hearing, and prohibiting all contact between Hill and his minor daughter.
Applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support Hill’s conviction of domestic assault-fear. However, the district court
violated Hill’s procedural due-process rights by issuing a DANCO naming R.H. as a
protected person. The district court also erred by entering convictions for two offenses
arising from a single criminal act, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.04,
subdivision 1 (2022). Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Robert Jon Hill with one count of
domestic assault-fear and one count of domestic assault-harm under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.2242, subdivisions 1(1) and 1(2) (2022) 1. The charges arose from a July 2023
1 The state also charged Hill with threats of violence under Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2022). He was later found not guilty of that charge.
2 incident in which Hill physically assaulted L.L. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The
following facts summarize the trial evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
June 2023 Domestic Assault
In June 2023, an argument between Hill and L.L., who were in a relationship, arose
after Hill discovered that L.L. had eaten a donut that Hill wanted for himself. L.L. was in
their bedroom watching television when Hill confronted L.L. Unbeknownst to Hill, L.L.
began recording the argument. Hill began yelling at her and threw his cellphone at her leg.
L.L. then moved to the living room where their minor daughter, R.H. was present. 2 Hill
began hitting L.L.’s dogs and chased the dogs with a broomstick. When L.L. told him to
stop, Hill replied, “You’re done. Do you understand me? You better fear me.” (Emphasis
added.) Hill then said, “I’m threatening you. I ain’t threatening you, I’m promising you
. . . . I’ll go after your farm. I’ll go after you. I’ll go after every f-cking thing you got. Try
me. It ain’t a f-cking threat. I’ll bury your ass.” Hill then approached L.L. where she sat
on the couch beside R.H., leaned over L.L., and spat in her face.
During the argument, Hill threatened to destroy an heirloom doll that L.L. received
from her father. Hill opened the cabinet where the doll was located, and L.L. tried to stop
him. Hill then hit her in the face, saying, “Don’t you grab me by my f-cking hair, don’t
you grab me by my f-cking hair and think you’re not going to get f-cking touched back.”
2 The couple’s 17-year-old son, J.H. was also in the house during the argument. J.H. could hear yelling and loud noises from his room in the basement but could not hear the specific words being said. J.H. observed the bruises on L.L. after she had been hit by Hill.
3 When the altercation ended, Hill directed his attention to R.H., who was present during the
altercation, and said to her:
Please take your drink and go on and go to bed. Mom and I are done. I’m not going to talk to her. She’s not going to talk to me. But I want you to go in your room because this is volatile, and this is something that you shouldn’t be a part of. All that said, I’m going in there to go to bed, and your mom can sit out here and cry and wallow in her own shit. Because she’s a f-cking fat pig, she doesn’t give a f-ck about nobody.
Hill then leaned close to L.L. and whispered, “F-ck off and kill yourself. I pray that you
die.”
Hill’s Arrest
That evening, L.L. sent the audio recording of the altercation to a family member,
who turned the recording in to the police. Five days later, police officers began monitoring
Hill’s residence. The officers observed Hill and L.L. leave their home and enter Hill’s car.
As Hill began to drive away, the officers conducted a routine traffic stop of Hill’s car for
an inoperable passenger-side brake light and missing rear license plate. Officers arrested
Hill after discovering his driver’s license was canceled as inimical to public safety. During
the traffic stop, L.L. was visibly frightened and refused to speak with the officers.
Eventually, L.L. exited the vehicle and officers observed a bruise over her left eye and
bruising on her legs. The officers asked L.L. how she got the bruises, and L.L. told the
officers that Hill had hit her. The officers then cited Hill for driving with a canceled
driver’s license and, later, formally charged him for domestic assault-fear and domestic
assault-harm.
4 At Hill’s first appearance, the district court issued a pretrial domestic-abuse no-
contact order (DANCO) prohibiting Hill from contacting L.L. and their minor daughter,
R.H. The district court did not conduct a separate hearing specifically addressing the
DANCO, as required under Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(4)(c) (2024).
Although the DANCO that was issued prohibited Hill from having contact with R.H., the
transcript of the hearing reflects that the district court informed Hill that the DANCO
applied to L.L. only and that he was permitted to have contact with their minor daughter,
R.H. With respect to the DANCO, the following exchange occurred between Hill and the
district court at the first appearance:
THE COURT: [ . . . ] I’ll hear from the State, please, on conditions.
THE STATE: Your Honor, State is asking for . . . no contact with the victim or kids. I would ask the Court to sign a DANCO in this matter . . . . The victim’s initials are L.L.
THE COURT: Okay.
....
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Hill, did you hear the - sorry. Yeah. Do we have a DANCO for him? . . . All right. Mr. Hill, did you hear the terms, the bail conditions that the State has asked me to impose?
HILL: I heard that there was no contact with L.L., but I didn't hear, there was another part prior to that. If you could repeat that.
THE COURT: Yeah. So the State has asked that I set bail at $30,000 bond or $3,000 cash alternative, subject to the conditions that you have . . . no contact with the alleged victim, L.L. Do you know who that is?
5 HILL: I do. It’s a little difficult when we have kids together and I live with her.
THE COURT: Okay. I would sign a domestic abuse no contact order that would prevent you from having any contact with L.L. or from going to the residence there . . . . Anything that you’d like to say before I set the conditions?
HILL: Just, if you could explain the condition of how I get my vehicle, some clothes.
THE COURT: Yeah. The domestic abuse no contact order, I would check a box that would say that you can go back to the house once with a sheriff or police escort to get any personal belongings that you might need in the short term, okay.
HILL: Okay. Yes, Your Honor. I understand.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you’d like to tell me, sir?
HILL: Not at this time.
THE COURT: No? Okay. So I’m going to set bail as follows: I am going to set $30,000 bond or $3,000 cash, subject to the conditions that I mentioned . . . . no contact with the alleged victim, L.L. . . . . we’re going to give to the deputy through the slot a, the domestic abuse no contact order . . . . And, sir, just want to verify that you received a, the copy of the domestic abuse no contact order that prohibits you from having contact with L.L. or going back to that residence . . . . So, Mr. Hill, just want to verify that you were served with a copy of the domestic abuse no contact order, correct?
HILL: Yes . . . . I do have one question, Your Honor . . . . Before I’m excused . . . . And that is, I do have children in this case, and I’d like to be able to see my daughter, and so I’d like to know how that works.
6 THE COURT: Yeah. There’s no prohibition on you seeing the children in the domestic abuse no contact order, but you can’t go to the house.
HILL: I understand, Your Honor. Thank you.
The pretrial DANCO was to remain in effect until the disposition of the criminal
case or until further order or modification. At multiple subsequent hearings, Hill was
provided inconsistent and conflicting information concerning the scope of the pretrial
DANCO.
October 2024 Jury Trial
At trial, the state presented testimony from L.L., the couple’s son, J.H., and three
police officers who observed L.L. on the day of Hill’s arrest. The state also played the
audio recording to the jury. On direct examination, L.L. testified about the events that
occurred leading up to the assault. L.L. testified that Hill began yelling at her and that the
yelling lasted for roughly 20 minutes. L.L. testified that she became increasingly afraid
that Hill would hit her as the argument escalated. J.H. testified that after the assault, L.L.
came down the stairs and he observed that her left eye was swollen and puffy and noticed
the bruising on her leg. The police officers also testified that they observed the bruises on
L.L.’s left eye and legs following Hill’s arrest. The jury found Hill guilty of domestic
assault-fear of immediate bodily harm or death and domestic assault-harm but found him
not guilty of threats of violence.
January 2025 Sentencing Hearing
In January 2025 the parties appeared for a sentencing hearing. The district court
began the hearing by asking the parties if there were any additions or corrections to the
7 presentence investigation. The state requested a two-year probationary DANCO, noting in
part that, “Mr. Hill has some serious anger problems that I do believe require supervision,
and I want the DANCO to be in place as long as possible.” The district court then asked
the state if it had any communication or statement from the victim. The state responded
that it had communication with the victim and stated, “She still wants a DANCO, she
doesn’t want any communication with Hill.”
The district court then turned to Hill’s counsel for a response. He insisted on a one-
year probationary period, as recommended by the presentence investigation. He also
stated, “The other issue that we have is related to the issue of a probationary DANCO. Mr.
Hill would request that the Court issue a limited probationary DANCO allowing him
contact with the victim as to coordinating visits or communication with his child, and
allowing him contact with his child.” Hill’s counsel discussed the current custody case
pending in tribal court and Hill’s lack of contact with his daughter. He ultimately requested
that the district court issue a limited DANCO allowing contact with the victim as it related
to his daughter. When the district court elicited comments from Hill, he discussed missing
his daughter and his desire to see her.
The district court entered convictions on both counts but sentenced only on count 2,
domestic assault-fear. The warrant of commitment reflects that the district court entered
convictions on both count 2 domestic assault-fear and count 3 domestic assault-harm.
However, at the sentencing hearing, the district court stated, “In regard to count three, the
same course of conduct, essentially a lesser included, and so I am going to not sentence
you on that file.” On count two, the district court stayed imposition of the sentence
8 pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.135 (2022), placed Hill on two years of
supervised probation, ordered that he serve 36 days in the Scott County Jail, and that he
complete domestic-abuse treatment. As it related to the DANCO, the district court stated
that Hill must “have no contact with the victim L.J.L. and the minor child, R.M.H.” The
district court further stated that Hill must “comply with all the terms of any active DANCO,
Order for Protection, or Harassment Restraining Order.” The district court stated, “There
is an active DANCO, so I expect you fully to comply with the DANCO.” The district court
did not independently impose a probationary DANCO.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to support Hill’s domestic assault-fear conviction because the circumstances proved are not consistent with a reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. 3
Hill argues that his domestic assault-fear conviction is not supported by sufficient
evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 1(1). More specifically,
Hill argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with the reasonable inference that
Hill “only intended to make L.L. fear that he would take away her property.” We are not
persuaded.
3 Hill also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the guilty verdict on his domestic assault-harm conviction. We do not address this challenge because the district court should not have adjudicated this. As explained below, it was error to enter a conviction on that count. See State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979) (declining to address sufficiency of evidence for jury’s guilty verdict on offenses of which defendant was not formally adjudicated guilty and for which defendant was not sentenced).
9 A. Legal Standard
To prove that Hill committed domestic assault-fear, the state must prove, in relevant
part, that Hill committed “an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily
harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1). Assault-fear is a specific-intent crime,
as evidenced by the legislature’s use of the words “with intent to.” State v. Fleck, 810
N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012). “‘With intent to’ or ‘with intent that’ means that the actor
either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if
successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2022). Therefore, in
order to prove domestic assault-fear, the state needed to prove that Hill acted with the
purpose to cause L.L. to fear immediate bodily harm or death.
“[I]ntent is a state of mind that is usually proved with circumstantial evidence.”
State v. Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 217 (Minn. 2020); State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131,
136 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Intent is a state of mind that is generally proved by using
circumstantial evidence by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in
light of the totality of the circumstances.” (quotation omitted)); accord State v. Johnson,
616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000) (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially,
by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”). Here,
the state proved intent using circumstantial evidence. Because intent is a state of mind, it
is generally proved by considering a defendant’s actions “in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.” State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1996).
If circumstantial evidence is used to prove an element of the conviction challenged
on appeal, we apply “a heightened two-step standard” of review to the sufficiency of the
10 evidence. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017); see also State v. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we must “identify the circumstances proved,”
disregarding evidence inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601
(Minn. 2017). We “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). Second, we must
“determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation
omitted); see also State v. Collins, 580 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Minn. App. 1998) (“[F]or a
conviction requiring specific intent to stand, such intent must be the only reasonable
inference when the evidence as a whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the state.”).
“We give no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 601. We consider the circumstantial evidence “as a whole” when completing
this step of the analysis. Id.; see also State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 332 (Minn. 2010)
(“[W]e do not review each circumstance proved in isolation. Instead, we must consider
whether the circumstances presented are consistent with guilt and inconsistent, on the
whole, with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” (quotation omitted)).
B. Circumstances Proved
We begin by identifying the circumstances proved. When viewing all questions of
fact in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, we are left with the following subset
of facts as circumstances proved by the state: (1) Hill began yelling at L.L. after discovering
that she ate his donut; (2) Hill confronted L.L. in their bedroom; (3) Hill possessed a cell
phone when he confronted L.L. in their bedroom; (4) Hill threw the cell phone at L.L.’s
11 leg; (5) L.L. moved to the living room where R.H. was present; (6) Hill leaned over L.L.
and spat in her face; (7) Hill stated that he would make L.L.’s life “a living hell”; (8) Hill
told L.L. he would call the city and get rid of her dogs; (9) When the dogs started barking,
Hill stated, “Don’t shut [the dog] up and see what I do”; (10) Hill began to hit L.L.’s dogs
and chased them with a broomstick; (11) Hill told L.L., “You’re done. Do you understand
me? You better fear me”; (12) Hill told L.L., “I’m threatening you”; (13) Hill told L.L.
“I’m going to get rid of your house”; (14) Hill told L.L., “I’ll go after your farm”; (15) Hill
stated, “I’ll go after you”; (16) Hill stated “I’ll go after every f-cking thing you’ve got”;
(17) Hill stated, “It [isn’t] a f-cking threat, I’ll bury your -ss”; (18) Hill told L.L. that he
would destroy her heirloom doll, stating “I might crush that [doll] with a hammer . . . better
yet, I’ll do it right in front of you”; (19) Hill stated, “It’s time for me to f-ck with you”;
(20) Hill stated, “If you f-ck my sh-t over one more f-cking time, I’m going to break your
sh-t”; (21) Hill stated, “I’m going to bust that TV that’s right behind me”; (22) Hill stated,
“I’m going to break all your sh-t right in front of you”; (23) Hill hit L.L. in the face, stating,
“Don’t you grab me by my f-cking hair and think you’re not going to get f-cking touched
back. How do you like it?”; (24) Hill stated, “I’m going to go after everything of yours”;
(25) Hill leaned in and whispered to L.L., “F-ck off and kill yourself. I pray that you die.”
These circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable inference that Hill
acted with intent to cause L.L fear of immediate bodily harm or death. Hill made multiple
threats towards L.L., including, “You better fear me,” and “It’s time for me to f-ck with
you” and “It [isn’t] a f-cking threat, I’ll bury your -ss.” Hill’s words were also coupled
with actions of a physical assault. The natural and probable result of Hill’s actions in
12 throwing and hitting L.L with a cell phone and then hitting her in the eye caused L.L. to
fear immediate bodily harm and potentially further violence by showing he could take
physical action against her.
L.L.’s emotional reaction may also be used as evidence of intent. Smith, 825
N.W.2d at 136-37. The jury heard testimony that five days after the incident, when police
conducted a routine traffic stop on Hill’s vehicle, Hill prevented police from speaking
directly with L.L. Police testified that when they eventually spoke with L.L. about the
incident, L.L. was “very timid.” “She wouldn’t look at me. She would look at the ground
. . . It was almost like she was trembling. Very, very scared.” When police asked L.L.
about the bruises they observed on her body, police testified that, “[L.L.] was very reluctant
for a while . . . it took a while for her to start to talk to us.” See State v. Andrews, 388
N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 1986) (“Events both before and after,” as well as during the
offense, “are relevant to the totality of the circumstances” from which an inference of intent
may be drawn).
Now that we have identified the circumstances proved, we must examine “the
reasonabless of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.”
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599.
C. Reasonable Inferences Other Than Guilt
The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a reasonable alternative hypothesis of
innocence. Id. Hill argues that the evidence is insufficient because the circumstances
proved are consistent with a finding that Hill “only intended to make L.L. fear that he
13 would take away her property.” The state maintains that the entire interaction demonstrates
Hill’s intent to cause L.L. fear of immediate bodily harm. We agree with the state.
Hill’s principal evidence in support of his alternative hypothesis is his statement,
“I’ll bury your -ss,” which he contends referred only to his intent to take a farm L.L.
inherited. We are not persuaded. Hill’s argument isolates a single statement and fails to
account for the totality of the circumstances proved. The audio recording contains
approximately sixteen minutes of Hill yelling at L.L., repeatedly using derogatory language
and issuing numerous threats in various ways. During the recording, Hill stated that he
would make L.L.’s life “a living hell,” that she “better fear” him, that he was “threatening”
her, that it was “time for [him] to f-ck with” her, and that he prayed she would die. Viewed
collectively, these statements demonstrate an intent to cause L.L. fear of immediate bodily
harm or death. When the record is considered as a whole, the circumstances proved do not
support a rational hypothesis that Hill intended only to cause L.L. fear of losing her
property. See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332 (explaining that circumstantial evidence must
be viewed as a whole and not examined in isolation).
Thus, viewing the circumstances proved in the light most favorable to the verdict,
and applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to convict Hill of domestic assault-fear because the circumstances proved are
“consistent with [Hill’s] guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (citation omitted).
14 II. The district court erred by issuing a DANCO against Hill during his sentencing hearing and naming R.H. as a protected party because it violated Hill’s procedural due-process rights. 4
Hill also contends that his procedural due-process rights were violated because the
district court failed to hold a separate hearing before issuing the probationary DANCO
under Minnesota Statute section 629.75 (2024). 5 The United States and Minnesota
Constitutions guarantee the right to due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1;
Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7. “The Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Minnesota
Constitutions require that a party receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard
before being deprived of life, liberty, or property.” Christopher v. Windom Area Sch. Bd.,
781 N.W.2d 904, 911 (Minn. App. 2010). Whether procedural due-process rights have
been violated is a question of law that we review de novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes,
823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). In evaluating a procedural due-process claim, we first
4 Hill also argues that (1) the district court abused its discretion because it failed to issue the DANCO in a separate proceeding as required by Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(c), (2) the district court abused its discretion by naming R.H. as a protected victim under the DANCO because his relationship with R.H. was not reasonably related to the purpose of his sentence, and (3) naming R.H. as a protected victim under the DANCO violates his substantive due-process rights because it places an unreasonable restriction on his fundamental right as a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of R.H., and because the DANCO was not narrowly tailored to advance the government’s interest because it prohibited all contact with R.H. for two years and did not rule out less restrictive alternatives. Because we reverse the issuance of the DANCO on behalf of R.H. on procedural-due-process grounds, we need not address these arguments. 5 Section 629.75, subdivision 1(1), provides that “[a] domestic abuse no contact order is an order issued by a court against a defendant in a criminal proceeding . . . for domestic abuse as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2.” Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 2(a)(2) (2022) (the Domestic Abuse Act), defines domestic abuse as “the infliction of fear or imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.”
15 “identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty,
or property interest” and, if so, determine next whether the procedures used were
constitutionally adequate. Id. “The procedures afforded by the government must provide
an individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Hill relies on State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2013), to support his contention
that he was denied procedural due process because the district court did not issue the
DANCO in a separate proceeding. In Ness, the supreme court rejected the argument that
the DANCO statute is facially unconstitutional for failing to provide adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions. Id. at 182-83. The supreme court concluded that the statute is
not unconstitutional in all of its applications because it expressly requires that a DANCO
hearing be held “immediately following” a proceeding in which any pretrial release or
sentencing issues are decided.” Id. at 183. The court explained that this requirement
ensures that a defendant receives notice and an opportunity to be heard through the pretrial-
release hearing before the district court imposes a DANCO. Id. The supreme court further
acknowledged the possibility of an as-applied due-process challenge to the statute, stating
that “[t]he issue of whether a particular defendant received sufficient notice is more
appropriately resolved in an as-applied challenge in which we can assess the contours of
due process against a fully-developed record.” Id. at 183 n.4.
As an initial matter, the parties agree that by naming R.H. as a protected party in the
probationary DANCO, the order deprives Hill of the care, custody, and control over R.H.,
16 which is a liberty interest. See Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014)
(stating that generally, a parent has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his
or her children).
Here, Hill raises an as-applied challenge, arguing that the district court violated his
procedural due-process rights by failing to comply with the separate hearing requirement
set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(c). Specifically, Hill contends
that he was not provided constitutionally sufficient notice of the conditions imposed by the
DANCO because the district court did not conduct a DANCO hearing, did not announce
the terms of the order on the record, and did not explain the factual or legal basis for issuing
a probationary DANCO protecting R.H. We agree.
Hill was not afforded constitutionally sufficient notice or an opportunity to be heard
before the district court imposed a probationary DANCO on behalf of R.H. The state
argues that the notice requirement was satisfied because Hill requested a limited DANCO
allowing contact with his minor daughter, demonstrating that he “knew it was an issue to
be addressed.” This argument mischaracterizes the record.
Nothing in the sentencing record indicates that the state or the district court ever
suggested that R.H. could, should, or would be protected by a probationary DANCO. To
the contrary, the record reflects that all discussion concerning a DANCO related to L.L.,
the victim. During sentencing, the district court invited the state’s comments. The state
requested a two-year probationary DANCO, asking that it “be in place as long as possible,”
but did not specify whom the order was intended to protect. When the district court asked
whether the state had communicated with L.L., the state responded that “[s]he still wants a
17 DANCO, she doesn’t want any communication with Mr. Hill,” reinforcing that the
requested order concerned L.L., not R.H.
When defense counsel was given an opportunity to respond, counsel stated: “The
other issue that we have is related to the issue of a probationary DANCO. Mr. Hill would
request that the Court issue a limited probationary DANCO allowing him contact with the
victim as to coordinating visits or communication with his child and allowing him contact
with his child.” This statement reflects an understanding that the proposed DANCO
concerned the victim, L.L., and that any limitation would permit communication with her
solely for purposes related to R.H. Nothing in this exchange suggests that Hill was on
notice that the district court was considering imposing a separate DANCO protecting R.H.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that Hill was to
“have no contact with the victim L.J.L. and the minor child, R.M.H.” The court further
ordered Hill to “comply with all the terms of any active DANCO, Order for Protection, or
Harassment Restraining Order,” and added, “There is an active DANCO, so I expect you
fully to comply with the DANCO.” At that time, the only DANCO in effect was the pretrial
DANCO, which by its terms remained in effect until disposition of the criminal case or
further order of the court.
Critically, the district court never stated on the record that it was issuing a
probationary DANCO, never identified R.H. as a protected party under such an order, never
announced the specific terms of any probationary DANCO, and never explained the
reasons for imposing one. As a result, Hill had no meaningful notice that a probationary
18 DANCO protecting R.H. was under consideration and no opportunity to be heard on its
necessity or scope.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court violated Hill’s procedural due-
process rights as-applied by imposing a probationary DANCO for the protection of R.H.,
and remand to the district court to vacate the portion of the DANCO prohibiting Hill from
having contact with R.H.
III. The district court erred by entering convictions for two offenses that were committed during a single behavioral incident, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1.
Finally, we address sua sponte the lawfulness of the district court’s entry of two
convictions under section 609.04, subdivision 1. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11;
State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 161 (Minn. 2024) (considering an issue not raised on
appeal); State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 556 (Minn. 2023) (same); State v. Hannuksela,
452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (addressing an issue not briefed or raised at oral
argument, emphasizing “it is the responsibility of the appellate courts to decide cases in
accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel’s oversights,
lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities” (quotation
omitted)). Here, the warrant of commitment reflects that convictions were entered on
count 2, domestic assault-fear of immediate bodily harm, and count 3, domestic assault-
harm, infliction of bodily harm. Under Minnesota law, a defendant “may be convicted of
either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04,
subd. 1. The proper procedure for district courts “when the defendant is convicted on more
than one charge for the same act is for the [district] court to adjudicate formally and impose
19 sentence on one count only,” retaining the guilty verdicts on the remaining charges but not
formally adjudicating them. State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).
However, “[w]hen [the] official judgment order states that a party has been convicted of or
sentenced for more than one included offense,” we reverse and remand with instructions
to vacate the erroneous conviction. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999);
State v. Crockson, 854 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 16,
2014). Here, Hill should not be convicted of domestic assault-harm because it involves the
same criminal act as the domestic assault-fear count for which we have concluded the
evidence is sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court to vacate
Hill’s adjudication for count 3 domestic assault-harm but leave the jury’s finding of guilt
intact.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.