STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0834
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Renee Zhoushkogeshig Gale, Appellant.
Filed May 11, 2026 Affirmed Bond, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-24-7854
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kristyn Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Caleb A. Johnson, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, R. David Hahn, Special Assistant Public Defenders, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
SYLLABUS
When determining whether the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement
justifies a seizure under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, a police
officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant. OPINION
BOND, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence
obtained after police, in responding to a 911 call that appellant was sleeping or unconscious
in a car lawfully parked on a street, seized appellant by blocking in her car and placing tire
deflation sticks under its wheels. Appellant argues that the seizure was not supported by
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and that it was not justified under the
emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement because the officer did not
subjectively intend to render aid. Appellant acknowledges that an officer’s subjective
intent is irrelevant for purposes of applying the emergency-aid exception under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, but she contends that article I, section 10 of
the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection against unreasonable seizures in
this context. Lastly, appellant argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to expand
the seizure into a driving while impaired (DWI) investigation by asking appellant to submit
to field sobriety tests.
We conclude that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify the seizure at its inception. But we also conclude that the emergency-aid
exception to the warrant requirement justified the seizure under the Minnesota Constitution
because the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an
emergency requiring immediate law-enforcement assistance. In so doing, we decline
appellant’s invitation to interpret the Minnesota Constitution as providing broader
protection than the federal constitution by requiring consideration of the officer’s
2 subjective intent. We further conclude that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity to justify expanding the scope of the seizure into a DWI investigation.
We therefore affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 5:15 p.m. on December 30, 2023, a Minneapolis police officer
(the officer) responded to a 911 call reporting that a motorist “was slumped for
approximately an hour . . . [with] their head . . . leaned back” in a parked car on Hennepin
Avenue in Minneapolis. 1 A slumped motorist generally describes a person behind the
wheel of a motor vehicle who is either asleep or under the influence of an intoxicant. As
the officer later testified, because a slumped motorist can “wake up and become startled,
stomp on the gas, and then take off . . . , resulting in wrecks, accidents, [or] people getting
run over,” the officer planned to box in the car and use tire-deflation devices to prevent the
motorist from driving away.
When the officer arrived at the scene, it was dark and cold outside. The officer
observed a car in a legal parking spot on the side of the street with its engine running. The
motorist, later identified as appellant Renee Zhoushkogeshig Gale, “appeared to be
slumped behind the wheel,” with her head leaned back. 2 After additional officers arrived,
1 These facts derive from the evidence received at the contested omnibus hearing and the district court’s subsequent findings of fact. 2 On the way to the scene, the officer learned that the car’s registered owner had been arrested on a previous occasion. At some point after arriving, though, the officer realized the motorist was Gale, not the registered owner with the arrest record.
3 police boxed in Gale’s car by parking squad cars close to the front and rear bumpers and
placing tire deflation devices under the car’s front wheels.
After waiting a few minutes for traffic to clear, officers positioned themselves on
either side of the car while the officer repeatedly banged on the driver’s side window and
said, “Police, put it in park.” Gale woke up as the officer was banging on the window,
raised her head, and said, “What?” The officer again identified himself as a police officer
and told Gale to put the car in park. The officer also attempted to open the car door but it
was locked. Gale mouthed, “It is in park,” and pointed to the gear shift. The officer
responded, “Yep. Open the door.” Gale rolled down her window and said “What?” and
the office once again told her to open her door. Gale complied, and the officer directed
Gale to step out of the car. Gale spent a few moments removing various items from her
lap and taking off her seat belt and then she exited the car, explaining that she had fallen
asleep waiting for a friend who never showed up.
The officer continued to talk to Gale “to evaluate whether she was under the
influence of some type of medication, [or] whether she had some type of medical issue.”
The officer did not smell any intoxicating substances on Gale, did not think her speech was
slurred, and did not observe that her eyes were watery, bloodshot, or glassy. The officer
asked Gale if she had “had anything to drink,” and she said no. The officer then asked
Gale whether she would be willing to undergo field sobriety testing, and Gale agreed,
requesting that the officer “give [her] a second” because she had “just woke[n] up.” Based
on the field sobriety test results, the officer sought and obtained a warrant for a blood or
4 urine sample. Gale provided a urine sample, and the toxicology report showed the presence
of amphetamine, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl in Gale’s system.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Gale with one count of fourth-degree
operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (2022), and one count of fourth-degree operation of a
motor vehicle under the influence of a Schedule I or II controlled substance other than
marijuana in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2022). Gale moved to suppress
the evidence, arguing that (1) the officer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify the seizure, (2) the emergency-aid exception did not justify the
seizure because the officer was not subjectively motivated to render aid, and (3) the officer
expanded the scope of the seizure without reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity by asking Gale to submit to field sobriety tests.
The district court held a contested omnibus hearing during which the officer testified
consistent with the facts presented above, and footage from the officer’s body-worn camera
was received as an exhibit. The officer described his training and experience with drug
investigations and explained that common physical indicia of being under the influence of
a narcotic analgesic such as fentanyl can include drowsiness, sluggishness, grayish skin, a
raspy voice, and being slow to respond. The officer also testified that, based on his training
and experience, there are “bounce back” effects that may occur after the high of ingesting
a stimulant has worn off, which can cause a person to experience low motor function and
exhaustion. As to the initial seizure, the officer testified that his response would have been
the same regardless of the motorist’s identity because of his generalized concern that a
5 slumped motorist could wake up and drive away in a manner that might endanger
pedestrians or other cars. Finally, the officer identified multiple reasons why he expanded
the scope of the seizure by asking Gale to undergo field sobriety testing, including that
Gale had been asleep in her car for more than an hour and the officer observed indicia of
impairment once Gale was awake, such as that she was slow to respond and he had to “tell
her things multiple times.”
The district court denied Gale’s motion to suppress, determining that the initial
seizure of Gale’s car was lawful for two alternative reasons. First, the district court
determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Gale was under the influence of
an impairing substance while in physical control of a motor vehicle. Second, the district
court reasoned that, even if the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the
seizure was justified at its inception under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant
requirement. Applying the legal framework argued by the parties, which was based on this
court’s decision in State v. Lopez, the district court found the emergency-aid exception was
satisfied because the officer was subjectively motivated by concern for Gale’s well-being
and because a reasonable person would believe that an emergency existed. 698 N.W.2d
18, 23 (Minn. App. 2005). The district court further determined there was reasonable,
articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the seizure into a DWI investigation.
Gale waived her jury-trial rights and stipulated to the prosecution’s case to preserve
her right to appeal the district court’s pretrial suppression ruling under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Gale guilty of both counts. The court
adjudicated Gale guilty of count two, operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a
6 Schedule I or II drug other than marijuana in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7),
and sentenced her to 62 days in jail with credit for time served.
Gale appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the police have reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize Gale?
II. Was the seizure justified by the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution?
III. Did the police have reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the seizure to investigate whether Gale was driving while impaired?
ANALYSIS
Gale challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence.
Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Lugo,
887 N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn. 2016). We review the district court’s findings of fact for
clear error. Id. But we review whether the district court’s findings establish reasonable
suspicion de novo. Id. “The interpretation and application of the Minnesota Constitution
is a legal question” that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Castillo-Alvarez, 836
N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2013).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
“[A] warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions applies.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798
(Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted). The state bears the burden to establish that an exception
to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003).
7 Evidence obtained in violation of the federal or state constitution must be suppressed. State
v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, “a person has been seized if in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the
encounter.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). The parties agree that
Gale was seized when police boxed in her car with their squad cars and placed tire deflation
devices under her car’s front wheels. See Klotz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 437 N.W.2d
663, 665 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. May 24, 1989) (holding that a seizure
occurred when police partially blocked in defendant’s car with squad car and instructed
defendant to stop and identify himself). We agree as well.
Gale challenges the lawfulness of the seizure on three grounds. First, Gale argues
that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that Gale was engaged in criminal
activity to justify the seizure at its inception. Second, Gale argues that the seizure was not
justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement because the state
failed to establish that the officer was subjectively motivated to render aid, which Gale
contends is required under the Minnesota Constitution. And third, Gale argues that the
officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the initial stop into
a DWI investigation by asking her to undergo field sobriety tests. We address each
argument in turn.
8 I. Police did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure at its inception.
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to
conduct a brief, investigative seizure if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 21-22 (1968); Diede, 795 N.W.2d at
842. “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the
officer to be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Diede, 795
N.W.2d at 842-43 (quotation omitted). In determining whether an officer had reasonable
suspicion, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d
747, 752 (Minn. 2021), and recognize that a police officer may “draw inferences and
deductions that might well elude an untrained person,” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487 (quotation
omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high” but it requires police “to
articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal
activity.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted);
see also Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (“A hunch, without additional objectively articulable
facts, cannot provide the basis for an investigatory stop.” (quotation omitted)).
Here, the officer testified that he seized Gale’s car because it was a slumped-
motorist call. Specifically, a 911 caller reported that a motorist “was slumped for
approximately an hour” on a Minneapolis street with their head “leaned back.” Upon
arriving at the scene, the officer saw Gale “slumped behind the wheel, in the driver’s seat”
with her head back. In the officer’s experience, “slumped motorists” may be asleep or
9 intoxicated and may wake up and drive away at a high speed, potentially harming people
or property. 3 The officer observed additional facts when he arrived at the scene—including
that the car’s engine was running, the car was parked in a legal parking spot, and Gale was
wearing her seatbelt—but the officer testified that he “put the sticks on the tire believing
that it was a slumped motorist” and that his response to a slumped-motorist call would have
been the same regardless of the motorist’s identity.
Neither party cites any Minnesota case in which the seizure of a slumped motorist
was upheld under the reasonable-suspicion standard, and we have found no such
precedential authority. Instead, the parties primarily rely on Lopez. In Lopez, an employee
called the police after several customers reported seeing an unconscious person in a car in
a store’s parking lot. 698 N.W.2d at 20. A police officer responded at 8:11 p.m. and
observed the defendant’s legally parked car in the parking lot, in addition to several dozen
other cars. Id. at 20-21. After partially blocking the car, the officer observed the defendant
3 The officer’s body-worn camera shows that, on the way to the scene, the officer learned that the car had “ignition interlock with whiskey plates on it.” On appeal, the state raises this “additional information in the record” pursuant to State v. Grunig, which provides that a respondent may “raise alternative arguments on appeal in defense of the underlying decision when there are sufficient facts in the record for the appellate court to consider the alternative theories, there is legal support for the arguments, and the alternative grounds would not expand the relief previously granted.” 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003). At the contested omnibus hearing, the officer did not identify the car’s ignition lock or whiskey plates as contributing to any suspicion of criminal activity. See Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at 391-92 (stating that a police officer “must be able to point to objective facts” establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Neither party argued these facts before the district court, nor did the district court reference these facts in its order denying Gale’s motion to suppress. Because the officer did not rely on the car’s alleged ignition lock or whiskey plates, and the district court made no findings related to these facts, we do not consider them.
10 sitting in the driver’s seat, seemingly unconscious, with her head against the window and
her hands in her lap. Id. at 21. The officer woke the defendant by banging on the driver’s
side window and eventually opening the driver’s side door, at which point the officer
detected multiple indicia of intoxication. Id. We concluded that there were no facts
indicating that, at the time the officer seized the defendant by partially blocking and
approaching the car, “the officer had any articulable basis for suspecting that [the
defendant] had engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 23. Instead, we affirmed the district
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis of the emergency-aid
exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 24.
The facts of this case are very similar to those of Lopez. Like the police officer in
Lopez, the officer here responded to a call about a sleeping or unconscious motorist. Like
the defendant in Lopez, Gale had been slumped in a legally parked car for roughly an hour.
And, as was the case in Lopez, the officer did not articulate other facts, specific to Gale,
contributing to the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the
time of the seizure. The state contends that Lopez is distinguishable because Gale was
parked on a city street in the late afternoon, whereas Lopez was parked in a parking lot
during the evening hours. But for purposes of the reasonable-suspicion analysis, we see
no legal significance to those factual differences. Thus, as in Lopez, the facts existing at
the time of the seizure did not support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Gale was
engaged in criminal activity. 4
4 The parties also cite State v. Deml, a nonprecedential case, as persuasive authority for their respective positions. No. A06-859, 2007 WL 1674060, at *1 (Minn. App. June 12,
11 The state maintains that reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure exists based on
the officer’s testimony that slumped motorists may endanger people or property if they
become startled upon waking and quickly drive away. We acknowledge this public-safety
concern, but we conclude that this generalized statement based on the officer’s past
experience does not amount to a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting Gale
of being involved in criminal activity at the time she was seized. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d
at 842-43 (explaining that reasonable suspicion must be “based on specific, articulable
facts” that allow the officer “to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity”);
see also Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (stating that, under the reasonable-suspicion
standard, the officer must articulate a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity”).
While the reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, “[p]olice must be able to
articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal
2007). In Deml, a police officer saw a pickup truck parked with its engine running in an otherwise empty gas station parking lot around 4:30 a.m. Id. at *1. The police officer learned that the truck belonged to a customer who had bought food from the gas station 45 minutes earlier. Id. After blocking the truck with his squad car, the officer approached and saw the defendant “slumped over in the driver’s seat, with his fingers inside a jar of cheese dip.” Id. The officer knocked on the window and, after the defendant rolled down the window, observed multiple indicia of intoxication. Id. We concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of illegal activity at the time of the seizure but upheld the seizure based on the emergency-aid exception. Id. at *3. Because it is a nonprecedential opinion, we do not rely on Deml. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). But we observe that Deml tends to support Gale’s argument that no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed at the time of the seizure.
12 activity.” Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (quotations omitted). On this record, we
conclude that the officer’s identified reasons for seizing Gale fail to prove a particularized
and reasonable suspicion that Gale was engaged in criminal activity at the time she was
seized. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844 (concluding that officer’s articulated reasons for
seizing the defendant failed to prove an objective basis for suspecting that the defendant
was engaged in drug-related criminal activity at the time she was seized). Therefore, the
district court erred when it determined that the initial seizure was justified by reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
II. The emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the seizure under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
Having determined that the officer’s seizure of Gale was not justified by reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, we must next consider whether the seizure was
valid under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement.
A. The emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement.
The emergency-aid exception “is a subset of the exigent-circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement” that applies “in circumstances when police are objectively
motivated by the need to render aid or prevent injury.” Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 631
(Minn. 2018). Thus, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search or
seizure may be valid under the emergency-aid exception when (1) police “have reasonable
grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their
assistance for the protection of life or property” and (2) there is “some reasonable basis,
13 approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be
searched.” Id. at 632 (quoting State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Minn. 2007)). 5
Of particular relevance here, the subjective motivation of the officer is irrelevant to
the application of the emergency-aid exception under the Fourth Amendment. See
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (holding that, under the emergency-aid
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, “[t]he officer’s subjective
motivation is irrelevant”); Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 632 n.6 (acknowledging Lemieux’s
reference to “the prior application of an additional prong” requiring that the officer “must
not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest and seize evidence,” but recognizing that
Brigham City rejected that prong for Fourth Amendment purposes); Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d
at 788 (stating that, under Brigham City, an officer’s subjective intent is not relevant to the
emergency-aid exception under the Fourth Amendment).
In the district court, both parties addressed the applicability of the emergency-aid
exception under the two-prong test this court articulated in Lopez. That test considered
whether “the officer [was] motivated by the need to render aid or assistance” and whether,
5 It makes no doctrinal difference that this case involves a seizure rather than a search. See Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 632 (“Under the emergency-aid exception, officers may help an injured person or act to protect life or property if” they have “reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992) (stating that, “[t]o determine whether the officer’s actions meet an objective standard of reasonableness [for purposes of the emergency-aid exception] the court should ask whether with the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search, would a person of reasonable caution believe that the action taken was appropriate” (emphasis added)).
14 “under the circumstances, . . . a reasonable person [would] believe that an emergency
existed.” Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23 (citing State v. Auman, 386 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Minn.
App. 1986) (stating that the emergency-aid exception applies only where the officer is
subjectively and “actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance”
(quotation omitted))). The parties agreed Lopez’s second prong was satisfied because a
reasonable person would believe that an emergency existed, but they disputed whether,
under the first pong, the officer was subjectively motivated by the need to render aid.
Applying the Lopez framework, the district court found the emergency-aid exception
justified the warrantless seizure because the officer was at least partly subjectively
motivated to render aid to Gale.
On appeal, the state contends that the parties and the district court erred in applying
Lopez because subsequent caselaw—namely, Brigham City, Ries, and Lemeiux—
eliminated the officer’s subjective intent as a consideration for purposes of the emergency-
aid exception under the Fourth Amendment. Gale acknowledges this caselaw. And she
agrees that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the officer’s subjective motivation is
irrelevant and that the emergency-aid exception is satisfied in this case. Instead, Gale
argues that we should interpret article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to provide
broader protections than the Fourth Amendment by requiring that an officer possess a
subjective intent to render aid for the emergency-aid exception to apply.
Before proceeding with our analysis, we address two preliminary matters. First, we
reject the state’s argument that Gale forfeited her state constitution claim by not raising
this argument to the district court. Gale identified the Minnesota Constitution in her motion
15 to suppress. In her supporting memorandum, she argued that the state had the burden to
prove the officer’s subjective intent to render aid for the emergency-aid exception to
apply—the same argument she raises on appeal. The state similarly framed the emergency-
aid exception as requiring proof of the officer’s subjective motivation, and the district court
made factual findings on the officer’s intent. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
Gale preserved for appeal the state constitutional law issue of whether the emergency-aid
exception requires proof of the officer’s subjective intent and, if so, whether the exception
justified the warrantless seizure in this case.
Second, we agree with Gale that Minnesota’s appellate courts have not squarely
decided whether an officer’s subjective intent is a relevant consideration when determining
the applicability of the emergency-aid exception under the Minnesota Constitution. In
Lemieux, after recognizing that Brigham City rejected consideration of subjective
motivation as part of the emergency-aid exception under the federal constitution, the
supreme court went on to state that, “assuming that the officers’ subjective motivations are
a relevant state-law consideration, a warrantless search conducted during a criminal
investigation does not necessarily preclude application of the emergency-aid exception so
long as one of the motives for the warrantless search corresponds to an objectively
reasonable emergency.” 726 N.W.2d at 790. Lemieux ultimately held that the warrantless
entry into the home in that case was justified under the emergency-aid exception in part
because “the entry was motivated primarily to look for possible victims.” Id. Thus,
Lemieux did not settle the question of whether the Minnesota Constitution provided broader
protection by considering an officer’s subjective intent under the emergency-aid exception.
16 See City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152, 157 (Minn. 2017) (rejecting the
district court’s conclusion that the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously determined a
state constitutional law question related to individualized suspicion for administrative
warrants because the prior decision had “only assumed arguendo that individualized
suspicion was required for an administrative search warrant under Article I, Section 10”).
Further, Ries does not dispose of Gale’s state constitutional argument because the supreme
court’s application of the emergency-aid exception in Ries was solely based on the Fourth
Amendment. 920 N.W.2d at 622. And in Lopez, we cited both federal and state decisions
but did not expressly base our emergency-aid analysis on either the Fourth Amendment or
the Minnesota Constitution. 698 N.W.2d at 21, 23-24.
Because neither the Minnesota Supreme Court nor this court has decided this issue
and its resolution is necessary to Gale’s appeal, we now turn to Gale’s argument that article
I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution should be interpreted to require consideration
of the officer’s subjective intent when analyzing the emergency-aid exception to the
warrant requirement.
B. Under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement.
Minnesota courts have a responsibility to “safeguard for the people of Minnesota
the protections embodied in our constitution.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 362
(Minn. 2004). As such, “[i]t is axiomatic that [courts] are free to interpret the Minnesota
Constitution as affording greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
than the United States Constitution.” Id. at 361; see also State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d
17 149, 156 (Minn. 2020) (recognizing “without a doubt that Article I, Section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection against suspicionless law enforcement
conduct than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution”). But in
“independently safeguard[ing] for the people of Minnesota the protections embodied in our
constitution,” courts “will not cavalierly construe our constitution more expansively than
the United States Supreme Court has construed the federal constitution.” Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d at 362 (quotation omitted). Instead, there must be “a principled basis” to interpret
article I, section 10 as providing greater protections than the federal constitution. State v.
McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “A decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the federal constitution that is textually
identical to a provision of the Minnesota Constitution is of inherently persuasive, although
not necessarily compelling, force.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002).
Citing Askerooth, Gale argues there is a principled basis to interpret article I,
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to require consideration of an officer’s subjective
intent because Brigham City marked a sharp departure from “Minnesota’s tradition of
considering an officer’s subjective motivation” in the context of warrantless searches and
seizures. 6 In Askerooth, the supreme court held that, under the Minnesota Constitution, a
warrantless arrest for a traffic violation must be reasonable and supported by individualized
suspicion of criminal activity. 681 N.W.2d at 365. The supreme court declined to follow
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that
6 Gale does not argue that Brigham City marked a sharp departure from United States Supreme Court precedent.
18 “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,
arrest the offender.” Id. at 360-61 (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
354 (2001)). In light of the longstanding interpretation of article I, section 10 relating to
traffic stops, the supreme court concluded that Atwater was a “sharp departure” from
Minnesota’s search and seizure jurisprudence. Id. at 362.
As support for her proposition that Brigham City was a sharp departure from
Minnesota’s tradition of considering an officer’s subjective intent in the context of the
emergency-aid exception, Gale relies on the supreme court’s decision in State v. Terrell.
283 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 1979). In Terrell, the supreme court affirmed the district court’s
determination that a warrantless entry of a cabin in which a killing had just occurred was
justified under the emergency-aid exception. Id. at 532. As part of its recitation of the
facts adduced at the omnibus hearing, the supreme court stated, “the chief deputy felt that
it was possible that the victim, if there was a victim, might still be alive.” Id.
Viewed in context, we understand Terrell’s statement about the chief deputy’s
beliefs to be a reference to the objective component of the emergency-aid exception, which
the supreme court explained authorizes a police officer to make “warrantless entries and
searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.”
Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Gale’s contention that this
sentence from Terrell amounts to an adoption of a subjective standard for purposes of the
emergency-aid exception under the Minnesota Constitution.
19 Gale also relies on a handful of nonprecedential opinions from our court, in which
Gale contends we have “applied the Lopez framework and considered the officers’
subjective intent.” Nonprecedential opinions of this court are, of course, not binding. See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Furthermore, of the five nonprecedential
opinions Gale cites, only one—State v. Radermacher, No. A18-0590, 2018 WL 6441636,
(Minn. App. Dec. 10, 2018)—post-dates Ries, in which the supreme court clarified, albeit
for Fourth Amendment purposes, that an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant. Ries, 920
N.W.2d at 632 n.6. While we recited the subjective-intent prong in Radermacher, we
ultimately rejected application of the emergency-aid exception because, given the
circumstances present in the case, “a reasonable person would not have believed that an
emergency existed or that [the defendant] was in need of immediate assistance.” 2018 WL
6441636, at *4. Thus, Radermacher is not persuasive, and we do not consider it to be a
sufficiently principled basis on which to interpret article I, section 10 more broadly than
the Fourth Amendment. 7
More generally, Gale appears to argue that Brigham City departed from Minnesota’s
traditional understanding that consideration of an officer’s subjective motivation protects
7 We note that, in multiple nonprecedential decisions after Radermacher, we have addressed the emergency-aid exception under the objective standard set out in Ries, without considering the officer’s subjective intent. See, e.g., State v. Olson, No. A23-1129, 2024 WL 3025069, at *3 (Minn. App. June 17, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2024); Cadwell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A19-1797, 2020 WL 5107304, at *2 (Minn. App. Aug. 31, 2020); State v. Peterson, No. A18-1969, 2019 WL 4409712, at *1 (Minn. App. Sept. 16, 2019); State v. Gunther, No. A18-1696, 2019 WL 3000730, at *2 (Minn. App. July 8, 2019); State v. Shaw, No. A18-0937, 2019 WL 1591796, at *6 (Minn. App. Apr. 15, 2019).
20 Minnesotans from unreasonable searches and seizures. We do not see such a traditional
understanding in Minnesota’s search and seizure jurisprudence. See McMurray, 860
N.W.2d at 692-93 (declining to interpret the Minnesota Constitution to require greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of a warrantless search of garbage in
part because “Minnesota does not have a long tradition of protecting garbage set out for
collection from a warrantless search”). In fact, caselaw suggests the opposite. See, e.g.,
State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Minn. 2011) (stating that the reasonableness of an
officer’s actions in a probable-cause analysis is “an objective inquiry” and the “actual,
subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness” (quotation
omitted)); State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004) (stating that, when
determining the validity of a traffic stop, decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court “and
the United States Supreme Court focus not on the subjective belief of the officer, but rather
on the objective basis for the belief that the defendant was engaged in illegal activity”).
A recent decision from the Minnesota Supreme Court, Lorsung v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, provides additional guidance. 30 N.W.3d 777 (Minn. 2026). In Lorsung, a
license-revocation decision released after the parties filed their briefs in this case, the
supreme court held that the totality of the circumstances provided the officer with an
objective basis for suspecting that the defendant had driven while impaired. Id. at 785.
Noting that “it is an open question whether this court must disregard an officer’s subjective
belief that no crime has occurred,” the supreme court discussed the general rationale for
rejecting consideration of an officer’s subjective beliefs:
21 The rationale for excluding evidence of subjective beliefs from the reasonable-suspicion analysis is not because they are irrelevant, but because “[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The objective standard therefore serves as a safeguard by requiring an evidentiary floor, preventing officers from justifying intrusions based on their subjective beliefs or hunches.
Id. at 787 n.12. 8 Consistent with this rationale, we conclude that Brigham City was not a
“sharp departure” from Minnesota precedent and “our traditional understanding of the
protections from unreasonable seizure” in the context of the emergency-aid exception.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 362. Because there is no principled basis to interpret article I,
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to afford greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment in this area, we hold that an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant for
purposes of the emergency-aid exception under the Minnesota Constitution.
C. Gale’s seizure was lawful under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
Having concluded that the Minnesota Constitution does not require proof of the
officer’s subjective intent for application of the emergency-aid exception to the warrant
requirement, we now consider the constitutionality of Gale’s seizure. The emergency-aid
exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota
8 We emphasize that the supreme court’s discussion on this point involved whether a court should “disregard an officer’s statement disclaiming suspicion,” which the supreme court observed “remains an open question.” Lorsung, 30 N.W.2d at 787 n.12. Gale’s case does not involve an officer’s statement disclaiming suspicion.
22 Constitution allows a police officer to “act to protect life or property” if they have
“reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need
for their assistance for the protection of life or property.” Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 632
(quotation omitted). In the district court, Gale acknowledged that, given the circumstances,
a reasonable person would have believed that an emergency existed. And, on appeal, there
is no dispute that the officer had a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with Gale,
the subject of the warrantless seizure. See id. During oral argument, Gale’s counsel
conceded that, if the officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant, the emergency-aid
exception was otherwise established. Therefore, we conclude that the emergency-aid
exception justified the officer’s initial seizure of Gale.
III. The police had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of Gale’s seizure into a DWI investigation.
Lastly, Gale argues that the officer impermissibly expanded the scope of the seizure
to investigate whether she was driving while impaired by asking her to undergo field
sobriety testing without reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 9 The parties
agree, as do we, that the officer expanded the scope of the stop when he asked Gale to
undergo field sobriety tests. See State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Minn. App. 2012)
(concluding that an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a driver was impaired justified
expanding the scope of a traffic stop by asking a driver to undergo field sobriety tests).
9 Gale also argues that the officer expanded the scope of the stop by asking her to step out of the car. As Gale’s counsel conceded at oral argument, Gale did not challenge this aspect of the police interaction in the district court. We therefore do not consider it. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (stating that appellate courts “generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court”).
23 “An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes ‘intolerable’ in its
‘intensity or scope.’” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18).
Accordingly, under the Minnesota Constitution, each incremental intrusion must “be tied
to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop,
(2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” Id. at 365; see
also State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012) (stating that an expansion of the
scope of a stop “not strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the stop
permissible must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal
activity”).
The district court determined there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand
the scope of the seizure into a DWI investigation based on the circumstances of the
slumped-motorist call, the officer’s training and experience on “bounce back” effects of
drug use, and Gale’s slow physical and verbal responses. We agree.
In his testimony, the officer explained the factors that caused him to expand the
seizure into a drug investigation by asking Gale to undergo field sobriety testing. Gale had
been slumped, with her head leaning back, for more than an hour in a running car parked
on a busy Minneapolis street. In the officer’s experience, a slumped motorist is either
asleep or impaired. Once Gale was awake, the officer observed indicia of impairment,
including that she was slow to respond, and he had to “tell her things multiple times.” The
officer, who had training and experience with drug and narcotics investigations, testified
that a person under the influence of a narcotic analgesic such as fentanyl may exhibit
drowsiness, sluggishness, grayish skin, a raspy voice, and be slow to respond. A “bounce
24 back” effect may occur after the high of ingesting a stimulant has worn off, which causes
a person to experience low motor function and exhaustion. We conclude that, under the
totality of the circumstances, these facts amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion
permitting the officer to expand the seizure to investigate whether Gale was driving while
impaired.
Gale asserts that the officer’s body-worn camera footage shows she was not moving
slowly and did not exhibit other indicia of impairment. But the district court found the
officer’s testimony that Gale was slow to respond and required repeated instructions
credible, and that the testimony was corroborated by the body-worn camera footage. We
defer to the district court’s credibility determination and its characterization of the body-
worn camera footage. Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn.
App. 2013). Further, we have reviewed the body-worn camera evidence and we are not
convinced that the district court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous. See State v. Rhoads,
813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012) (stating that a factual finding “is clearly erroneous
when there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate court is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred”).
Establishing reasonable suspicion is a “low hurdle.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 757.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officer identified
“sufficient articulable facts, and inferences that could be drawn from those facts, to
establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion” that Gale was operating a vehicle while
impaired. See id. at 758. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that the
25 officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to expand the scope of the stop into
a DWI investigation by asking Gale to undergo field sobriety tests.
DECISION
The officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
the seizure at its inception. When determining the applicability of the emergency-aid
exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution,
an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant. Because the circumstances of the slumped-
motorist call provided the officer with an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there
was an emergency requiring immediate law-enforcement assistance, the emergency-aid
exception to the warrant requirement justified the seizure under the Minnesota
Constitution. And because the state established that the officer had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Gale was operating a vehicle while impaired, the officer’s
expansion of the scope of the stop into a DWI investigation was lawful. Therefore, the
district court did not err in denying Gale’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Affirmed.