State of Minnesota v. Paul James Steichen

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: A240097
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A24-0097

Court of Appeals Hennesy, J. Dissenting, McKeig, Moore, III, JJ.

State of Minnesota,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: June 17, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts Paul James Steichen,

Respondent.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarity, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota for appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. To satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid guilty plea, a Norgaard plea,

like an Alford plea, requires a strong factual basis sufficient to allow a district court to

independently conclude that there is a strong probability that a defendant is guilty of the

charge to which they are pleading guilty.

1 2. Because the State did not describe the evidence it would present at trial to

convict respondent of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, respondent’s Norgaard plea

was not supported by a strong factual basis from which a district court could

independently conclude that there was a strong probability that respondent was guilty of

fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Affirmed.

OPINION

HENNESY, Justice.

The State charged respondent Paul James Steichen with two counts of third-degree

criminal sexual conduct. After the district court accepted his Norgaard plea1 to fifth-

degree criminal sexual conduct, Steichen appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that

the plea was constitutionally invalid because it was not supported by a strong factual

basis. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for Steichen to withdraw the plea,

determining that the State had failed to provide an adequate factual basis from which the

district court could have concluded that there was a strong probability that Steichen

would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. The State

petitioned for further review, arguing that the court of appeals erred by requiring

1 A Norgaard plea is a type of guilty plea in which a defendant pleads guilty despite having no recollection of the incident that led to the criminal charges. See State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Minn. 1961). 2 Steichen’s Norgaard plea to meet the “strong factual basis” standard required for a valid

Alford plea2 and concluding that Steichen’s plea did not meet that standard.

We hold that, to be valid, a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, requires a strong

factual basis which, at minimum, must include a description of the State’s evidence that is

sufficient for a district court to find that there is a strong probability that a defendant is

guilty of the charge to which they are pleading guilty. Based on the record in this case, we

conclude that Steichen’s Norgaard plea was not supported by a strong factual basis

because the factual inquiry conducted at Steichen’s plea hearing did not include any

description of the evidence the State would have presented at trial to secure a conviction

of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.

FACTS

The State charged respondent Paul James Steichen with two counts of third-degree

criminal sexual conduct for forcing a vulnerable adult to engage in oral sex with him.

Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(a), (b). Two days before trial, Steichen filed notice of an

intoxication defense. On the day of trial, pursuant to plea negotiations, Steichen entered a

Norgaard guilty plea to an amended charge of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct in

exchange for the State dismissing the remaining third-degree criminal sexual conduct

count. At the plea hearing, Steichen’s attorney reviewed Steichen’s petition to enter a

guilty plea and a Norgaard plea addendum with him on the record. Steichen indicated

2 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty when that defendant is “unwilling or unable to admit” to participating in the acts constituting the crime. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 3 that he could not remember the events alleged because he was drunk on the day of the

offense. He acknowledged that he had reviewed the evidence that the State would offer

against him if he had a trial. Steichen agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that a

jury would find him “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” of the offense to which he was

pleading guilty and confirmed that he was making no claim that he was innocent of the

charge. The prosecutor asked the following questions to establish a factual basis for

Steichen’s plea:

PROSECUTOR: Sir, I understand you—you don’t recall the date in question, right?

STEICHEN: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And the evidence you talked about reviewing with your attorney would establish, though, that on June 5th of this year, you were in Richfield, Hennepin County, when you encountered a male with the initials of C.T., and at some point the two of you engaged in sexual penetration. Specifically, you put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual. You understand that that’s the evidence that the State would present in this case?

PROSECUTOR: All right. And that’s the evidence that you are, through your Norgaard waiver, are not contesting and accepting as sufficient for the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?

PROSECUTOR: Okay. I believe that’s sufficient, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I think it is too. And so we’ll receive, then, the Norgaard plea document. And at this time, Mr. Steichen, I am finding that you have made a knowing waiver of your trial rights, sir, in this matter, and you have been advised of those rights thoroughly by your lawyer…. In addition, I’m finding that—that there are sufficient facts that have been averred to support your Norgaard plea of guilty to the amended Count 1 of

4 criminal sexual conduct in the 5th degree occurring on or about June 5th of 2023.

I’m not going to accept that plea at this time. Instead, we’re going to schedule this matter for sentencing.

The district court subsequently accepted Steichen’s plea and sentenced him to 14 months

in prison but stayed the prison sentence conditioned upon his successful completion of

three years of probation.

Steichen appealed, arguing to the court of appeals that his Norgaard plea was not

valid because it was not supported by a strong factual basis. Relying on its decision in

Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12–13 (Minn. App. 2009), the court of appeals stated

that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea requires two components: “a strong

factual basis and the defendant’s acknowledgment that the evidence would be sufficient

for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Steichen,

No. A24-0097, 2024 WL 4927659, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 2, 2024) (quoting Williams,

760 N.W.2d at 12–13). These components, the court reasoned, “provide the court with a

basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would

be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id. (quoting Williams,

760 N.W.2d at 13). Here, the court of appeals determined that the record did not provide

a basis for it to “conclude that there [was] a strong probability that Steichen would be

found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.” Id. at *3. As a result, the court of

appeals concluded that Steichen’s Norgaard plea was invalid and reversed and remanded

to allow Steichen to withdraw his plea. Id. at *4. We granted the State’s petition for

review.

5 ANALYSIS

We first consider whether a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, must be supported

by a strong factual basis. We then consider whether Steichen’s plea meets the applicable

standard. A plea’s validity is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Schwartz,

957 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Minn. 2021).

I.

“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and

intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Here, Steichen challenges

only the accuracy of his plea. The purpose of the accuracy requirement “is to ensure that

the defendant is in fact substantively culpable for the crime of conviction.” State v.

Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 144, 151 (Minn. 2025). Accordingly, it is the plea’s accuracy that

prevents a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious charge than that of which the

defendant could be found guilty at trial. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn.

1994).

For a guilty plea to be accurate, the district court must ensure that a proper factual

basis supports the plea.3 State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007). “In a typical

plea, where the defendant admits his or her guilt, an adequate factual basis is usually

3 We have previously observed that the factual basis requirement also “provides a means by which the trial court can test whether the plea is being intelligently entered, since an Alford-type plea could hardly be accepted as an intelligent, rational plea if there were an insufficient factual basis offered to support it.” State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977). Here, however, the parties do not challenge the intelligence of Steichen’s plea or his acknowledgment that he believed the State had sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. 6 established by questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in his or her

own words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. The

district court must then determine whether the “defendant’s admissions of the relevant

facts and circumstances of his conduct establish that he committed the offense charged or

an offense at least as serious as the offense to which he is tendering his plea.” State v.

Hoaglund, 240 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1976). The district court may not accept a typical

guilty plea unless there are “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that

defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Kelsey v.

State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974).

There are, however, two types of pleas that allow a defendant to plead guilty

without admitting the facts or circumstances constituting a crime: Alford4 and Norgaard

pleas. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. In an Alford plea, a defendant may plead guilty

while maintaining innocence. See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn.

2015); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding that express

admission of guilt is not a constitutional requisite to a valid guilty plea and that an

individual “may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of

a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts

constituting the crime”). In a Norgaard plea, a defendant pleads guilty despite claiming

4 In Minnesota, Alford pleas are sometimes referred to as Goulette pleas, based on our holding in State v. Goulette that a district court “may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused protests that he is innocent.” 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977); see State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716 (stating that Alford pleas are sometimes referred to as Goulette pleas in Minnesota). We use the term “Alford pleas” in this opinion. 7 an inability to remember the circumstances of the offense due to intoxication, amnesia, or

other reason. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. In a typical guilty plea, a defendant’s admission

of the facts constituting the crime assures the plea’s accuracy. But because Alford and

Norgaard pleas do not require such an admission, a court must ensure the plea’s accuracy

by other means.

We have held that an Alford plea’s accuracy is assured where a “strong factual

basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his

conviction provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong

probability that the defendant would be found guilty” at trial. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649;

see Alford, 400 U.S. at 26–27 (allowing a guilty plea to stand despite defendant’s refusal

to admit committing the acts constituting the crime because the record “contain[ed]

strong evidence of actual guilt”). We have not, however, expressly decided whether a

Norgaard plea also requires a heightened factual basis to be constitutionally valid.

Steichen argues that it does. For the reasons that follow, we agree and explain what this

standard requires.

A.

We begin by surveying our prior decisions on Norgaard and Alford pleas. We first

recognized that a guilty plea could be valid despite a defendant’s inability to remember

the circumstances of the offense in State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872

(Minn. 1961). When taking Norgaard’s guilty plea to second-degree assault, the

prosecutor described “the events and circumstances which formed the basis of the

information pertaining to the alleged assault.” Id. at 868–69. But when the State asked

8 Norgaard whether the facts alleged in the information were true, he said he could not

remember but “had been told what happened by others.” Id. at 869. Nevertheless,

Norgaard persisted in his desire to plead guilty, and the district court ultimately accepted

his guilty plea to second-degree assault. Id. On appeal, we concluded the plea was valid,

observing the following:

[i]f we were to say under the record here that reversible error was committed, we would be ruling in effect that no matter how obvious the crime or how anxious the accused might be to plead guilty, if he said he did not recall what happened, the court should not under any conditions accept such a plea.

Id. at 872. Because Norgaard did not challenge the factual basis in his case, we did not

address what constitutes a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea when a defendant

cannot remember committing the offense.

Over 30 years later, in State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717, we observed that

although Alford and Norgaard pleas present “two unique situations in which a defendant

may plead guilty without unequivocally admitting his or her guilt,” a district court should

accept a Norgaard plea with the same caution as an Alford plea and “affirmatively ensure

an adequate factual basis.” Id. at 716–17. In Ecker, we considered whether there was a

sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea that was not clearly an Alford or a Norgaard plea.

Id. at 716. Ecker pleaded guilty to intentional felony murder, but during his plea colloquy

told the court that he could not remember “pulling the trigger, although he remembered

going into the gas station and robbing it.” Id. at 715. On appeal, Ecker argued that his

plea was inaccurate because he had not acknowledged he had an intent to kill. Id. at 716.

We did not determine whether the defendant’s plea was an Alford or a Norgaard plea

9 before assessing whether the factual basis was sufficient. Instead, we equated the two

types of pleas in observing that a district court must accept both “with caution” after

“affirmatively ensur[ing] an adequate factual basis has been established.” Id. at 716–17.

We held that Ecker’s plea met “the requirements established by” Alford and State v.

Goulette, as well as Norgaard, because the record showed Ecker’s plea was “based on his

probable guilt and the likelihood a jury would convict him[.]” Id. at 717. We did not,

however, directly address what constitutes a sufficient factual basis for an accurate plea

because we were focused on whether the record established that Ecker reasonably

believed the State had sufficient evidence to convict him.5 See id.

We clarified the accuracy requirement for an Alford plea in State v. Theis, holding

that an Alford plea must be supported by both a “strong factual basis and the defendant’s

agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction[.]” 742 N.W.2d at 649.

We observed that these dual requirements provide the district court “a basis to

independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be

found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of

innocence.” Id. But we did not expressly decide whether this heightened factual basis

standard should also apply to Norgaard pleas.

5 In Ecker, we observed that we “discourage the use of leading questions to establish a factual basis” because “the defendant should be encouraged to state in his or her own words why he or she is willing to plead guilty notwithstanding a claim of innocence or a claimed loss of memory.” 524 N.W.2d at 717. In addition, because it was unclear from the record whether the defendant’s plea was an Alford or Norgaard plea, we emphasized the importance of clearly indicating the type of plea a defendant is entering and confirming that the defendant understands the legal implications of such a plea. See id. 10 Against this backdrop, the State argues that a Norgaard plea does not require a

district court to ensure the strong factual basis required in an Alford plea, because the two

pleas differ in one significant respect: In an Alford plea, a defendant’s guilty plea “is

actually contradicted by his claim of innocence,” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649, while a

defendant entering a Norgaard plea makes no claim of innocence. According to the State,

because a defendant can enter a Norgaard plea without claiming innocence, it does not

implicate the internal contradiction inherent in an Alford plea.

For purposes of the accuracy requirement, however, this is a distinction without a

difference. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court observed that there was no

perceptible “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the

criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.

Because “an express admission of guilt” is “not a constitutional requisite to the

imposition of criminal penalty,” the Supreme Court concluded that “[a]n individual

accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the

imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his

participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. (emphasis added). While defendants

who enter Alford pleas may maintain their innocence because they are “unwilling” to

admit committing the crimes alleged, Alford recognized that some defendants may

choose to plead guilty because they are unable to admit the acts constituting a crime. Id.

Here, for example, Steichen professed he was unable—rather than unwilling—to

admit to specific facts that satisfied the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Steichen acknowledged that he was not making any claim that he was innocent, but

11 indicated he was unable to remember the circumstances leading up to the alleged offense

due to intoxication. Regardless of whether a defendant pleads guilty because they are

unwilling or unable to admit committing an offense, the requirement that a defendant

admit facts and circumstances of the offense protects against the risk that the defendant

will plead guilty to a crime more serious than that of which they could have been

convicted at trial. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. Because the risks are the same in both

Alford and Norgaard pleas, we do not see any reason this accuracy requirement should be

different for a Norgaard than for an Alford plea.6

6 The dissent asserts that the United States Supreme Court in Alford and this court in Theis “implied … that the factual basis for an Alford plea must be heightened above the ‘adequate factual basis’ required for other types of pleas because the defendant claims innocence.” Infra at D-4. We disagree. To the contrary, the Alford Court implied that the constitutional concerns are the same whether a defendant refuses to admit guilt or maintains innocence. 400 U.S. at 35. In Alford, considering for the first time whether it is constitutional for a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence, the Court looked to its reasoning in Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926), a case in which it had determined that the constitution allows a defendant to be sentenced to prison for “a plea of nolo contendere, a plea by which a defendant does not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 35. The Court observed that “[t]he fact that [Alford’s] plea was denominated a plea of guilty rather than a plea of nolo contendere is of no constitutional significance with respect to the issue now before [the Court], for the Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences, not the formal categorizations, of state law.” Id. at 37. The Court further stated that an express admission of guilt is “not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, too, we must consider whether the Constitution requires something different of a plea in which a defendant does not expressly admit his guilt from a plea in which a defendant maintains his innocence. Consistent with Alford, we conclude that constitutional accuracy requires the same of both—a strong factual basis to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a crime more serious than that of which they could have been convicted at trial. 12 We also reject the State’s argument that Ecker and Theis established two distinct

standards for the factual bases required for Alford and Norgaard pleas. According to the

State, Ecker requires only that the factual basis for a Norgaard plea be “adequate,”

524 N.W.2d at 717, as opposed to the “strong” factual basis Theis requires for an Alford

plea. 742 N.W.2d at 649. The State’s argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.

First, we did not characterize the plea in Ecker as a Norgaard plea. See Ecker,

524 N.W.2d at 717. Because Ecker claimed both lack of memory and lack of intent, we

relied on our cases on both Alford and Norgaard pleas. See id. at 716–17. We observed

that while a district court must accept a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, “with

caution[,] … Alford, Goulette and Norgaard, and the cases that have followed, allow

Ecker to plead guilty without expressing the requisite intent so long as he believed the

state’s evidence was sufficient to convict him.” Id. at 717. As such, our conclusion that

there was an adequate factual basis to support Ecker’s guilty plea did not address whether

the factual basis requirement for a valid Norgaard plea is different from the requirement

for a valid Alford plea.

Second, while the State is correct that in Ecker we said that “an adequate factual

basis” is necessary to ensure a plea’s accuracy, we did not define what constitutes “an

adequate factual basis.” Id. at 716. In fact, we did not explicitly state what constitutes an

adequate factual basis for either a Norgaard or an Alford plea until 13 years after Ecker,

in Theis, where we stated that an Alford plea must be supported by a “strong factual

basis.” 742 N.W.2d at 649. Thus, prior to today, we have not expressly determined the

standard for the factual basis required to ensure a Norgaard plea’s accuracy.

13 Because a defendant entering an Alford plea will not, and a defendant entering a

Norgaard plea cannot, attest to facts proving guilt, we hold that both pleas must be

supported by a strong factual basis in addition to a defendant’s agreement that the

evidence is sufficient to support conviction. These dual requirements allow a district

court to reach a conclusion—independent of the defendant’s own assessment of the

strength of the case against them—as to whether there is a strong probability the

defendant would be found guilty at trial of the offense to which they are pleading guilty.

See id.

B.

In addition, we hold that to establish a strong factual basis, the State must, at

minimum, describe the type of evidence it would present at trial. This is consistent with

our discussion in Theis about how the State should establish a strong factual basis.

742 N.W.2d at 649. There we observed that “the better practice” is to discuss the facts

with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing:

This discussion may occur through an interrogation of the defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would likely be presented at trial, the introduction at the plea hearing of witness statements or other documents, or the presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses likely to testify at trial, or a stipulation by both parties to a factual statement in one or more documents submitted to the court at the plea hearing.

Id. In determining whether there is a strong factual basis for an Alford or a Norgaard plea,

a district court is tasked with ensuring that a defendant who enters either plea is protected

from “pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to

insist on his right to trial.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

14 protection is fortified by requiring that the factual basis for either an Alford or a Norgaard

plea constitute more than a general affirmation that the alleged conduct meets the

elements of the crime—it requires a description of the evidence the State would present at

trial sufficient for the district court to independently conclude that there is a strong

probability that the defendant is guilty of the elements of the crime to which they are

pleading guilty.7

II.

Having concluded that both Alford and Norgaard pleas must be supported by a

strong factual basis, we now consider whether the factual basis for Steichen’s Norgaard

plea meets this requirement.

Steichen pleaded guilty to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, which requires

that (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration with the victim, and (2) the sexual

penetration occurred without the victim’s consent. Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1. The

State argues that even if we apply a heightened factual basis standard to Steichen’s case,

the prosecutor’s summary description of the incident during Steichen’s plea hearing

established a strong factual basis to support Steichen’s guilt. We disagree.

At his plea hearing, Steichen stated that he had been drunk on the day of the

offense and could not remember what happened. The entirety of the factual basis for the

plea derives from a single question the prosecutor asked Steichen:

And the evidence you talked about reviewing with your attorney would establish, though, that on June 5th of this year, you were in Richfield,

7 The dissent contends that we should clarify here that this rule does not apply retroactively. The question of retroactivity, however, is not before us. 15 Hennepin County, when you encountered a male with the initials of C.T., and at some point the two of you engaged in sexual penetration. Specifically, you put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual. You understand that that’s the evidence that the State would present in this case?

The State did not provide any description of the type of evidence it would offer to show

that Steichen engaged in nonconsensual sexual penetration with C.T. Nevertheless, the

State argues that this is a sufficient factual basis even under the strong-factual-basis

standard.

Neither the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alford nor ours in Goulette

supports the State’s assertion. The pleas in each of those cases were supported by stronger

factual bases than submitted here. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court held there

was a strong factual basis for a plea to second-degree murder after multiple witnesses,

including a police officer, testified during a “summary presentation” of the State’s case.

Alford, 400 U.S. at 28. Although no eyewitnesses testified, the testimony “indicated that

shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill

the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing.” Id.

The Court reasoned that when viewing Alford’s plea “in light of the evidence against

him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a

means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered,” its

validity could not be seriously questioned. Id. at 37–38.

In Goulette, we held that there was a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea

where defense counsel “recited in summary form some of the key evidence which the

prosecution would have offered … to prove first-degree murder if the case had gone to

16 trial.” 258 N.W.2d at 761. The summary in Goulette included not only reviewing ten

witnesses’ anticipated testimony, but also Goulette’s own affirmation of the statement he

made to police.8 See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. While we upheld the factual basis for

Goulette’s pleas, we also observed the following:

In future similar cases, especially those involving major felonies, a better practice would be the introduction, by the prosecutor, of statements of witnesses or other items from his file which would aid the court in its determination. In appropriate cases, the prosecutor might even consider calling some of the state’s witnesses for the purpose of giving a shortened version of what their testimony would be were the case to go to trial.

Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761.

Contrary to the records supporting the defendants’ valid pleas in Alford and

Goulette, the factual basis offered to support Steichen’s plea included no evidence beyond

Steichen’s affirmative answer “yes” to the State’s question: “[Y]ou put your penis in [the

victim’s] mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that

nonconsensual. You understand that that’s the evidence that the State would present in

this case?” While Steichen acknowledged that there was a substantial likelihood that a

jury would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of fifth-degree criminal sexual

conduct at trial based on his review of the State’s evidence with his attorney, the single

question the prosecutor posed was not strong evidence of Steichen’s actual guilt.

Steichen’s acknowledgment amounted to him simply agreeing that the State could

8 The court in Goulette did not describe the content of this evidence in analyzing whether the factual basis was sufficient; in Theis, however, we reviewed the appellate record in Goulette that supported the factual basis for Goulette’s pleas. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. This recitation comes from Theis’s review of Goulette’s appellate record. See id. 17 establish the elements of the offense charged. Although the prosecutor indicated he was

seeking to confirm Steichen’s understanding of “the evidence” the State would present at

trial, nowhere in questioning Steichen (or anywhere else in the record) did the State

submit, identify, or describe any evidence—testimony or exhibits—it possessed and

intended to introduce to prove Steichen’s conduct satisfied those elements. Steichen was

thus not presented with—and did not agree to—a factual basis that would have allowed

the district court to independently conclude that he was not pleading guilty to a crime

more serious than the facts would support or that he did not commit. At minimum, the

State needed to describe key evidence it would have presented at trial to secure a fifth-

degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. We therefore conclude that Steichen’s

Norgaard plea was invalid because it was not supported by a strong factual basis to allow

the district court to independently conclude that there was a strong probability that

Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

18 DISSENT

MCKEIG, Justice (dissenting).

For putting his penis in the mouth of a vulnerable adult, Paul James Steichen was

charged with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 609.344,

subd. 1(a)–(b). After consulting with his attorney, Steichen accepted a plea negotiation.

The State agreed with Steichen’s request to enter a Norgaard plea to a lesser charge of

fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1, in exchange for

dismissal of the second count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.1 And Steichen did

just that. At the plea hearing, Steichen agreed that the State would present evidence

showing that Steichen put his penis in the victim’s mouth and the victim either said no or

resisted. He agreed that the State would show that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual

penetration. Steichen thus agreed to facts establishing the elements of fifth-degree

criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1. He repeatedly and

expressly affirmed, both in writing and on the record, that he was not claiming to be

innocent of this crime. By taking advantage of this plea bargain, Steichen pleaded guilty

to a felony that carried only a presumptive probationary sentence, in contrast to the

1 A conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct carries a much harsher statutory maximum sentence and collateral consequences than fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct: the maximum statutory sentence for third-degree is 15 years and requires mandatory conditional release after prison, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.344, subd. 2(1), 609.3455, subd. 6; the maximum statutory sentence for fifth-degree is two years, Minn. Stat. § 609.351, subd. 3(a), with no mandatory conditional release. D-1 presumptive 53–74-month executed prison sentence he faced if convicted for third-degree

criminal sexual conduct.2

The court nonetheless determines that Steichen may withdraw his guilty plea

because he claims for the first time on appeal that his plea was inaccurate and therefore

invalid. To do so, the court today determines that a valid Norgaard plea requires a

heightened factual basis in line with an Alford plea and concludes Steichen’s plea was

invalid under this heightened standard. But neither our precedent nor the U.S. Supreme

Court’s requires the strong factual basis standard the court adopts today for Norgaard

pleas. And, given the well-reasoned basis for treating Norgaard pleas and Alford pleas

differently, I disagree with the court’s decision to adopt that heightened standard for

Norgaard pleas. I would thus hold that Steichen’s plea satisfies the adequate factual basis

standard required for Norgaard pleas. I would also hold that Steichen’s plea meets even

the heightened standard reserved for Alford pleas. And I would further clarify that the

court’s newly announced rule does not apply retroactively. Accordingly, I respectfully

dissent.

A constitutionally valid guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.

State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A plea that fails to meet any of these

requirements is invalid. Id. The accuracy requirement serves a protective purpose:

2 Given Steichen’s criminal history score and the severity of the third-degree criminal sexual conduct offense, Steichen’s presumptive sentence for the offense under the sentencing guidelines was anywhere from 53–74 months. D-2 ensuring a defendant does not plead guilty to a more serious charge than the defendant

could be convicted of at trial. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). To meet

the accuracy requirement, a proper factual basis must be established. Id. To determine

whether a plea is supported by “an adequate factual basis, we examine whether there are

sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within

the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d

149, 154 (Minn. 2014) (citation modified).

For nearly 50 years, Minnesota has recognized three types of guilty pleas: typical

pleas, Alford pleas, and Norgaard pleas. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. In a typical

case where a defendant admits guilt, “an adequate factual basis is usually established by

questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in [the defendant’s] own

words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Id. at 716. This approach, however,

does not work in “two unique situations in which a defendant may plead guilty without

unequivocally admitting [the defendant’s] guilt”: Alford pleas and Norgaard pleas. Id. at

716–17. In Alford pleas, first adopted by this court in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758

(Minn. 1977), the defendant “maintains [their] innocence” but “reasonably believes, and

the record establishes, the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Ecker,

524 N.W.2d at 716; see also Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. By contrast, in Norgaard pleas,

first authorized by this court in State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867 (Minn.

1961), the defendant “claims a loss of memory, through amnesia or intoxication,

regarding the circumstances of the offense,” and the record “establish[es] that the

evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the

D-3 defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime

charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. When accepting either an Alford or a Norgaard

plea, a district court must do so with caution and “affirmatively ensure an adequate

factual basis has been established in the record.” Id. at 717.

As the court notes, we determined in Theis that a district court must apply a

heightened factual basis standard to Alford pleas. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (citing North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970)). That is because “[a]n Alford plea is not

supported by the defendant’s admission of guilt, and is actually contradicted by his claim

of innocence; precedent therefore requires a strong factual basis for an Alford plea.” Id.

We noted that the U.S. Supreme Court held that a “strong factual basis for the plea” was

enough to “substantially negate[] [Alford’s] claim of innocence.” Id.; see Alford, 400 U.S.

at 37–38. Thus, we implied, if not held, that the factual basis for an Alford plea must be

heightened above the “adequate factual basis” required for other types of pleas because

the defendant claims innocence. We then continued that this “strong factual basis and the

defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support [the defendant’s]

conviction” together give the court “a basis to independently conclude that there is a

strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which [the

defendant] pleaded guilty, notwithstanding [the defendant’s] claims of innocence.” Theis,

742 N.W.2d at 649. This is the heightened factual basis standard.

The court asserts that the Supreme Court’s discussion of nolo contendere pleas in

Alford supported the strong factual basis standard for Alford pleas and now supports the

court’s new heightened factual basis standard for Norgaard pleas. Supra at 12 n.6

D-4 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 35–37). But the Supreme Court considered its holding that

nolo contendere pleas are constitutional to support its holding that Alford pleas are also

constitutional. Alford, 400 U.S. at 35–37. The Court’s statement that a defendant “may

voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison

sentence even if [the defendant] is unwilling or unable to admit [the defendant’s]

participation in the acts constituting the crime” goes to the general constitutionality and

validity of those pleas—not the factual bases they require. Id. at 37. Thus, the court’s

contention that the Supreme Court’s nolo contendere discussion supports a particular

factual basis for either Alford or Norgaard pleas is incorrect.

The court also incorrectly contends that in Ecker “we equated” Alford and

Norgaard pleas. Supra at 10 (quoting Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17). In Ecker, we

described both types of pleas as applying in “two unique situations”—unique not only

from a typical plea, but also from each other—and explained Alford and Norgaard pleas

in two separate paragraphs, including what the record must establish for each type of plea

to be accurate. 524 N.W.2d at 716–17 (emphasis added). While we noted that district

courts must exercise caution and ensure that adequate factual bases exist when accepting

either type of plea, we neither equated the pleas nor suggested that the factual basis

required for each plea was the same. That we discussed the plea standards together when

applying them in Ecker was not because the plea standards were the same; it was because

the issue presented in that case was whether a sufficient factual basis for the plea required

the defendant to have acknowledged that he intended to kill the victim as part of his

guilty plea. Id. at 717. The answer was the same regardless of the type of plea the

D-5 defendant submitted: the defendant could “plead guilty without expressing the requisite

intent so long as he believed the state’s evidence was sufficient to convict him.” Id. The

defendant’s belief that the state’s evidence is strong enough to result in a conviction is a

feature of both factual basis standards, but it is not the only requirement of either

standard. Id. at 716–17 (noting Alford pleas require both that the defendant believe and

that the record establish that “the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction,” and

Norgaard pleas require that “the record must establish that the evidence … is sufficient to

persuade the defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant” is either “guilty

or likely to be convicted” or both). To describe Ecker as equating Alford and Norgaard

pleas oversimplifies and stretches our analysis in that case past its breaking point.

The court states that we have not expressly decided the factual basis required to

ensure the accuracy of a Norgaard plea, where the defendant does not maintain their

innocence. But the answer is readily available in our case law. Under Ecker and Fisher,

the record in a Norgaard plea “must establish that the evidence against the defendant is

sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is

guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17;

State v. Fisher, 193 N.W.2d 819, 820 (Minn. 1972). And under Lussier and Kelsey, an

“adequate factual basis” for a guilty plea exists when there are “sufficient facts on the

record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which

[defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Lussier, 853 N.W.2d at 154 (citation modified);

Kelsey v. State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974). In Kelsey, we specifically noted that

this holding “is in no way inconsistent with our prior holdings in cases such as State v.

D-6 Fisher.” 214 N.W.2d at 237; see Fisher, 193 N.W.2d at 820 (upholding the district court’s

acceptance of the defendant’s Norgaard plea when the defendant “claimed not to recall

the events of the crime” but “did not dispute the evidence which implicated him”).

It is a short step, then, to hold that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea

is one that “establish[es] that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade

the defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be

convicted of the crime charged” and “support[s] a conclusion that defendant’s conduct

falls within the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Ecker,

524 N.W.2d at 716–17; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at 237. I would take this opportunity to so

hold.

This holding would also be consistent with the rationale behind different proper

factual basis standards for Norgaard pleas and Alford pleas. To submit a Norgaard plea,

the defendant claims to not recall the circumstances surrounding the offense but does not

maintain innocence; to submit an Alford plea, the defendant maintains their innocence.

See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. As we noted in Theis, a “strong factual basis” is

necessary for Alford pleas because of “the inherent conflict in pleading guilty while

maintaining innocence.” 742 N.W.2d at 649 (emphasis added). This “inherent conflict” is

not present for Norgaard pleas—the defendant does not maintain their innocence and

instead is convinced by the State’s evidence that “the defendant is guilty or likely to be

convicted of the crime charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716 (emphasis added); see also

Fisher, 193 N.W.2d at 820. Because a defendant submitting a Norgaard plea does not

D-7 maintain their innocence, a heightened standard is not necessary, and an “adequate factual

basis” is sufficient for Norgaard pleas. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717.

Despite this clear differentiation, the court characterizes the defendant’s claim of

innocence as “a distinction without a difference” between Norgaard and Alford pleas.

Supra at 11. To support this assertion, the court cites the Supreme Court’s observations in

Alford that there is no “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit

commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence.”

400 U.S. at 37. The Court also held that a defendant may plead guilty “even if [the

defendant] is unwilling or unable to admit [the defendant’s] participation in the acts

constituting the crime.” 400 U.S. at 37. But while we have incorporated similar language

in Theis regarding an Alford plea, we have never incorporated this language into our

Norgaard cases. Contrast Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647 (noting scenarios where “a defendant

could decide that a guilty plea is the best available course of action despite [the

defendant’s] inability to admit guilt or [the defendant’s] affirmative belief in [their]

innocence”), with Norgaard, 110 N.W.2d 867, and Fisher, 193 N.W.2d 819, and Ecker,

524 N.W.2d 712. Additionally, Alford involved a defendant who did not admit to conduct

constituting a crime because he maintained he did not commit the crime; the Court was

not required to determine whether the defendant could plead guilty despite failing to

recall whether he engaged in criminal conduct. 400 U.S. at 27. Thus, to the extent that my

colleagues rely on any of the Court’s statements as applying to a defendant who cannot

remember the offense, they are relying on unpersuasive dicta. See State v. Bonnell,

31 N.W.3d 527, 542 & n.15 (Minn. 2026) (noting that a statement in a different Supreme

D-8 Court opinion was “obiter dicta because it went beyond the facts before the Court and

was not necessary or essential to the Court’s analysis”).

Furthermore, we recognized Norgaard pleas in 1961, several years before the U.S.

Supreme Court recognized Alford pleas. When we later adopted Alford pleas in Goulette

in 1977, we expressly stated that it was the “first time” this court was confronted with the

issue of whether “a trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the

accused protests that he is innocent.” Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761. We did not cite

Norgaard in Goulette. This means that we did not consider lack-of-memory pleas and

claim-of-innocence pleas to be the same.

The court now decides that a Norgaard plea and an Alford plea are functionally the

same: they both must be supported by the same heightened factual basis. This decision

flies in the face of decades of precedent distinguishing Norgaard and Alford pleas based

on a well-reasoned rationale to treat them differently. I would hold, consistent with our

case law, that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea exists when the record

“establish[es] that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the

defendant and [the defendant’s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be

convicted of the crime charged,” and there are “sufficient facts on the record to support a

conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which [the defendant]

desires to plead guilty.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at 237. Thus, I

Also, I would not prescribe a specific procedure for the district court to obtain a

factual basis for a Norgaard plea, as the court does. We have long held that for all guilty

D-9 pleas—typical, Norgaard, and Alford—to be accurate, they must have a proper factual

basis—not a specific procedure. See Lussier, 853 N.W.2d at 154; Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at

716–17; Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761; Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. While we have

provided guidance, or “better practice[s],” for entering factual bases for Alford pleas, we

have never prescribed how the State must do this before today. See Goulette, 258 N.W.2d

at 761; Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. Because neither our case law nor the facts of this case

compel us to do so here, I also respectfully dissent from this part of the court’s opinion.

I would hold that Steichen’s Norgaard plea satisfied the adequate factual basis

standard that I articulated above. I would also hold that the plea satisfied even the strong

factual basis standard that the court now requires.

Steichen reviewed the State’s evidence with his counsel and, based upon that

evidence, believed there was a “substantial likelihood” that he would be found guilty and

convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. Accordingly, Steichen and his

defense counsel entered his Norgaard plea. The record reflects that the evidence against

Steichen persuaded him that he was either guilty or likely to be convicted. The State then

confirmed that Steichen agreed that the evidence would present the following facts at

trial, “sufficient to prove [the State’s] case beyond a reasonable doubt”: on June 5, 2023,

in Hennepin County, Steichen sexually penetrated C.T. by putting his penis in C.T.’s

mouth, and C.T. “either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual.”

These facts, stated on the record, fulfilled the elements necessary to find Steichen guilty

D-10 of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.3451, subd. 1, 609.341,

subd. 12(1).

The plea satisfied both pieces of the adequate factual basis standard. Steichen was

persuaded that the State’s evidence was likely to result in a guilty verdict for fifth-degree

criminal sexual assault, and the facts in the record supported a conclusion that Steichen’s

conduct fell within that charge. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at

237.

Likewise, Steichen’s plea also met the heightened factual basis standard. The facts

constituted a strong factual basis for fifth-degree criminal sexual assault, and Steichen

agreed to the evidence’s sufficiency such that the district court could independently

conclude that there was a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-

degree criminal sexual assault at trial. Steichen’s plea is unlike the defendant’s plea in

Theis, which we held did not establish a strong factual basis. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649–

50. In Theis, we held that the defendant’s Alford plea did not meet this standard because

the defendant failed to acknowledge that the evidence “would be sufficient for a jury to

find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 650 (noting that the

defendant acknowledged only a “mere ‘risk’ that [the defendant] would be found guilty”).

Here, Steichen agreed there was a “substantial likelihood” that he would be found guilty

of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. Additionally, the plea colloquy in Theis

did not contain any of the facts that the evidence would prove. Id. Here, Steichen agreed

that the State would present evidence that he encountered C.T. in Hennepin County, that

D-11 Steichen put his penis in C.T.’s mouth, and that this conduct was nonconsensual.3 Thus,

the district court properly accepted Steichen’s Norgaard plea under either the adequate

factual basis or heightened standard. Accordingly, I dissent.

C.

The court does not address whether the new rule that it articulates today applies

retroactively or prospectively. To avoid an improper application of the rule that would

lead to an onslaught of postconviction petitions asserting inaccurate Norgaard pleas, I

would specifically note that this holding does not apply retroactively. See State v.

Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn. 2002) (expressly applying the new rule of law to

that case and prospectively “[g]iven the purposes to be served, the extent of reliance by

the parties and courts on previous standards, and the effect of retroactivity on the

administration of justice,” despite the parties’ apparent lack of briefing or argument on

retroactive versus prospective application). Generally, a new rule of law applies to “cases

pending on direct appeal at the time of the new rule’s announcement” and “cases arising

3 The court asserts that by acknowledging that the State “would establish” these facts, Steichen was “simply agreeing that the State could establish the elements of the offense charged.” Supra at 17–18 (emphasis added). The court’s characterization is incorrect and misleading. Steichen agreed that the State “would”—not that the State “could”—establish facts necessary to fulfill the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual misconduct. “Would” is definitive—if the case went to trial, the State “would establish” facts that would fulfill the necessary elements and, in doing so, prove Steichen guilty of the charged offense. If Steichen only agreed that the State “could” establish those facts, that leaves open the possibility that the State also could not establish those facts. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 650 (holding that the defendant’s Alford plea did not meet the heightened standard because the defendant did not acknowledge that the evidence “would be sufficient for a jury to find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis added)). D-12 after the rule is announced.” State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 283 (Minn. 2014). A new

rule “do[es] not apply to defendants whose convictions were final at the time the new rule

was announced.” Id. There are only two exceptions to this general rule of applicability:

we apply a new rule retroactively if it (1) “places certain kinds of primary, private

individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe”;

or (2) “requires the observance of those procedures that are … implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty,” in other words, “watershed rules of criminal procedure.” Chambers v.

State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 323 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307,

311 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Neither of these exceptions applies

here—the new heightened standard for Norgaard pleas does not place primary or private

individual conduct beyond what “the criminal law-making authority [can] proscribe,”

and, while the heightened standard is a stark and unnecessary departure from our

adequate factual basis standard, it is hardly a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure.”

Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).

I would state explicitly that this general rule of applicability controls here, and that

the new heightened factual basis standard for Norgaard pleas applies only to this case,

cases pending on direct appeal, and future cases.

* * *

Steichen agreed, on the record, that the State would present evidence showing that

Steichen put his penis in C.T.’s mouth, and C.T. either said no or resisted. Steichen agreed

that the State would show that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual penetration, fulfilling

the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.3451,

D-13 subd. 1. Steichen pleaded guilty because the lesser charge, while still a felony, carried

only a presumptive probation sentence, in contrast to the likely 53–74-month sentence he

faced for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. This was a voluntary, accurate, and

intelligent guilty plea that satisfied the adequate factual basis standard: the evidence

against Steichen was sufficient to persuade him that he was guilty or likely to be

convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the record included sufficient facts

to support a conclusion that Steichen’s conduct constituted fifth-degree criminal sexual

conduct. Because I would hold that Norgaard pleas require an adequate factual basis and

that Steichen’s plea satisfied that standard, I would reverse the court of appeals. I would

also reverse because Steichen’s plea satisfied the heightened factual basis standard

previously reserved only for Alford pleas. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

MOORE, III, Justice (dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice McKeig.

D-14