State of Minnesota v. Joseph Robert Clay

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: a250549
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0549

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Robert Clay, Appellant.

Filed March 23, 2026 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Larson, Judge

Redwood County District Court File No. 64-CR-23-357

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shannon M. Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Smith & Johnson, Attorneys at Law, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Schmidt,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

In this direct appeal, appellant Joseph Robert Clay challenges the constitutional

validity of his guilty plea. Because we conclude Clay entered a voluntary and accurate guilty plea, we affirm the validity of his guilty plea. In the alternative, Clay argues that we

must reverse and remand for correction of his warrant of commitment. Because we agree

that the warrant of commitment incorrectly includes a conviction for unlawful possession

of ammunition, we reverse and remand for the district court to correct the warrant of

commitment.

FACTS

In May 2023, a police officer observed Clay driving over the speed limit. The

officer activated his emergency lights and stopped Clay’s vehicle near the end of a

residential driveway. Clay then exited his vehicle, fleeing down the nearby driveway and

behind a garage. The officer called for Clay to stop running, but Clay entered the house.

Two witnesses then exited the house and told the officer that Clay was inside. The officer

located Clay inside the house and escorted him out. The officer then searched behind the

garage and located a pistol with nine rounds of ammunition in its magazine. The officer

placed Clay under arrest.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Clay with one count of possession of a

firearm by an ineligible person under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022) (firearm

charge); one count of possession of ammunition by an ineligible person under Minn. Stat.

§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (ammunition charge); and one count of fleeing on foot under Minn.

Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2022) (fleeing charge). 1 At his first appearance, the district court

set an unconditional bail amount at $60,000 and a conditional bail amount at $40,000. The

1 The parties agree that Clay was ineligible to possess a firearm or ammunition at the time of the offense.

2 district court informed Clay that if he elected to post the conditional bail, he would need to

remain law-abiding, among other conditions. About one week later, Clay posted a

conditional bail bond for $40,000 and was released from custody.

On the morning the case was set for a jury trial, the parties reached a plea agreement.

As part of the plea agreement, Clay agreed to plead guilty to all counts, and the state

“agree[d] to allow [Clay] to remain out of custody until sentencing.” The plea did not

include an agreement on the length of Clay’s sentence. On the record, Clay confirmed that

he had an opportunity to speak with his attorney regarding the plea petition and waived his

right to a jury trial.

Clay then pleaded guilty on all counts. Using leading questions, the district court

elicited a factual basis for each charge. The district court then accepted his plea. Following

the state’s recommendation, the district court allowed Clay to remain out of custody until

sentencing under the terms of his conditional release.

After his guilty plea but prior to sentencing, Clay was arrested on new charges.

Based on these new charges, the state filed a conditional-release-violation notice alleging

that Clay had violated his conditional release when he failed to remain law-abiding. 2 The

district court addressed the state’s conditional-release-violation notice during Clay’s first

hearing on the new charges. At this hearing, the state acknowledged that pursuant to the

plea agreement, the state had agreed to recommend that Clay remain out of custody until

2 The offense date for one of the new charges was October 9, 2024, before Clay pleaded guilty. But the other two new charges had a December 10, 2024 offense date, which was after Clay pleaded guilty.

3 sentencing on the charges subject to this appeal. But, based on the new charges, the state

requested that the district court hold Clay in custody. The district court deferred setting

bail on the new charges until after the sentencing hearing for the charges subject to this

appeal. The district court then revoked Clay’s conditional release and ordered that he be

held without bail pending the sentencing hearing.

Prior to sentencing, Clay moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing withdrawal

would be “fair and just” because the “allure of remaining out of custody . . . clouded his

understanding” such that he did not comprehend the ramifications of pleading guilty. See

Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. The state argued that the district court released Clay

based upon specified conditions—which he violated—and therefore he was not entitled to

withdraw his guilty plea. The district court, agreeing with the state’s argument, denied

Clay’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

At sentencing, Clay stated again that he had “a lot” on his mind when he pleaded

guilty and asserted that he was “innocent.” The district court reminded Clay that he entered

a guilty plea at the prior hearing. The district court then sentenced Clay to a 60-month

prison term for the firearm charge and a 90-day prison term for the fleeing charge, to be

served concurrently. 3 The warrant of commitment reflects that Clay was convicted of all

three charges.

Clay appeals.

3 At the sentencing hearing, the district court did not indicate if it entered a conviction for the ammunition charge but expressly declined to impose a sentence for the ammunition charge.

4 DECISION

Clay raises two arguments in this direct appeal. First, he challenges his guilty plea

arguing it was constitutionally involuntary and inaccurate. Second, and in the alternative,

Clay argues that we must reverse and remand because his warrant of commitment

erroneously includes a conviction for the ammunition charge. We address each argument

in turn.

I.

Clay challenges the constitutional validity of his guilty plea. “An appellant may

challenge a guilty plea’s validity in the first instance on direct appeal.” State v. Lawrence,

982 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. App. 2022). 4 “We review whether a defendant entered a

valid guilty plea de novo.” Id. “If a defendant entered an invalid guilty plea, we reverse

and remand for the district court to allow a defendant to withdraw their guilty plea.” Id.

“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and

intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citing North Carolina v.

Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)); see also State v. Lyle, 409 N.W.2d 549, 552-53 (Minn.

App. 1987) (applying the constitutional standard to a plea petition). Here, Clay argues his

guilty plea was involuntary and inaccurate. We consider both arguments below.

4 The parties argue over the applicability of the manifest-injustice standard under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. The state argues that Clay’s challenge under this standard is forfeited on appeal. But Clay may challenge, and we may review, the constitutional validity of a guilty plea on direct appeal. See Lawrence, 982 N.W.2d at 775.

5 A. Voluntariness

Clay argues he entered an involuntary plea. Voluntariness refers to “what the parties

reasonably understood” the terms of the plea agreement to be and whether the defendant

pleaded guilty due to “improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.

“Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all relevant circumstances.” Id.

Clay first asserts that his plea was involuntary because the state breached the plea

agreement when it filed the conditional-release-violation notice and requested that he be

held in custody pending sentencing. “A guilty plea is involuntary when it rests in any

significant degree on an unfulfilled . . . promise.” Uselman v. State, 831 N.W.2d 690, 693

(Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). To determine whether the state breached a plea

agreement, we look at the parties’ reasonable understanding of the terms of the agreement.

See State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Minn. 2003). “On demonstration that a plea

agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea.” State v. Brown,

606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).

Here, the state “agree[d] to allow [Clay] to remain out of custody until sentencing.”

Clay then pleaded guilty, and upon accepting his plea, the district court, following the

state’s request, allowed Clay to remain out of custody and reminded him that he was still

required to comply with the conditions of his release, which included the condition to

remain law-abiding.

Based upon the record, we conclude that the state did not breach the plea agreement.

Instead, the record shows that the state fulfilled its promise when it recommended to the

district court that Clay remain out of custody following his guilty plea. Further, the state

6 did not breach the plea agreement when it filed the conditional-release-violation notice

because the record demonstrates that Clay understood he needed to comply with the

conditions of his release to remain out of custody pending sentencing, notwithstanding the

plea agreement.

Relatedly, Clay argues that his plea was involuntary because the district court

impermissibly participated in the plea negotiation when it imposed conditions on his

release. A district court “must not participate in plea negotiations.” Minn. R. Crim.

P. 15.04, subd. 3(1); see also Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 564-65 (Minn. 2018)

(stating that a district court judge “should not participate” in the plea negotiations). When

a judge becomes involved in the plea-bargaining process, there is an inherent risk that the

defendant will feel pressured to plead guilty, potentially leading to an involuntary plea.

See Wheeler, 909 N.W.2d at 567-68. Thus, the district court can approve or reject a plea

but cannot effectively become a party to negotiations. Id. at 564-65. The district court

may, however, inquire about the status of negotiations, share general sentencing practices,

and provide “nonbinding plea and sentencing information at the joint request of the parties”

without becoming improperly entangled in the plea-bargaining process. Id. at 565.

We are not persuaded that the district court impermissibly participated in plea

negotiations when it released Clay prior to sentencing subject to conditions. Here, Clay

pleaded guilty, and the district court accepted his plea at the plea hearing. As such, the

district court had the authority to impose conditions of continued release, wholly apart from

any plea agreement Clay had with the state. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.01 (allowing the

court, after conviction but before sentencing, to “continue or alter the terms of release”);

7 State v. Bigelow, No. A20-0600, 2021 WL 561536, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Feb. 16, 2021),

rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 2021). 5 Indeed, the district court could have denied the state’s

request and taken Clay into custody until the sentencing hearing. See Bigelow, 2021 WL

561536, at *3. Instead, the district court imposed reasonable conditions on Clay’s release

to ensure public safety.

For these reasons, we conclude Clay entered a voluntary guilty plea.

B. Accuracy

Clay argues that he entered an inaccurate plea. “The accuracy requirement protects

a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which [the

defendant] could be convicted if [the defendant] insisted on [the] right to trial.” Raleigh,

778 N.W.2d at 94. For a guilty plea to be accurate, it must be supported by a proper factual

basis, with “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct

falls within the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson,

664 N.W.2d 346, 349-50 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). The adequacy of the factual

basis is usually established by the defendant explaining the circumstances surrounding the

crime. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994).

Clay first argues that his plea was inaccurate because his admissions were obtained

using leading questions. The supreme court has generally “cautioned against the use of

exclusively leading questions to establish a proper factual basis for a guilty plea.” Lussier

v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012); see also State v. Jones, 7 N.W.3d 391, 396

5 This case is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential cases for persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

8 (Minn. 2024). Although the use of leading questions is generally disfavored, “it does not

by itself invalidate a guilty plea.” Barnslater v. State, 805 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. App.

2011); see also Jones, 7 N.W.3d at 396 (noting that the supreme court has “never held”

that responding to “leading questions on its own invalidates a guilty plea”). As such, the

district court’s use of leading questions does not invalidate Clay’s guilty plea. And upon

review of the record, we conclude that Clay’s guilty plea is supported by a sufficient factual

basis and none of his statements at the plea hearing negated an essential element of the

offenses.

Clay argues second that his guilty plea was inaccurate because he asserted his

innocence at the sentencing hearing. Generally, a plea is inadequate if the defendant

“makes statements that negate an essential element of the charged crime,” unless the

statement is subsequently withdrawn or rehabilitated. Jones, 7 N.W.3d at 396 (quotation

omitted). However, unlike in Jones, Clay did not negate an element of the offense during

his plea colloquy—instead, he asserted his innocence at his sentencing hearing when he

was not under oath. It is well established that we review the sufficiency of the factual basis

for a plea from the record made at the time the defendant entered—and the district court

accepted—the guilty plea. 6 See, e.g., State v. Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn. App.

6 To the extent Clay contends his statements of innocence were made before the district court accepted his guilty pleas, we disagree with this characterization of the record. Clay made no statements regarding his innocence at the plea hearing. And the district court accepted Clay’s guilty plea at the plea hearing and reiterated on subsequent occasions— prior to his claims of innocence at sentencing—that his plea had been entered.

9 1987). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Clay’s statements at the sentencing hearing

render his guilty plea inaccurate.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Clay entered a constitutionally valid guilty

plea.

II.

In the alternative, Clay argues we must reverse and remand for correction of his

warrant of commitment. Minnesota law generally prohibits multiple convictions and

sentences if the defendant’s criminal conduct is part of the same criminal act. See Minn.

Stat. §§ 609.035, subd. 1, .04 (2022). Clay and the state agree that the warrant of

commitment erroneously reflects that the district court entered convictions for both the

firearm charge and the ammunition charge. We also agree.

A defendant charged with both unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful

possession of ammunition as a result of possessing a single loaded firearm may be

convicted and sentenced for only one of those counts—not both. See State v. Nowels, 941

N.W.2d 430, 443 (Minn. App. 2020) (“[T]the possession of a single firearm loaded with

ammunition constituted one course of unlawful conduct and is not subject to multiple

convictions and sentences.”), rev. denied (Minn. June 16, 2020). Accordingly, we reverse

and remand for the district court to vacate Clay’s conviction for the ammunition charge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.