STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-1436
Court of Appeals McKeig, J. Took no part, Hennesy, Gaïtas, JJ. State of Minnesota,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: August 28, 2024 Office of Appellate Courts Jeron Garding,
Respondent.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Buffalo, Minnesota, for appellant.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Ted Sampsell-Jones, Special Assistant Public Defender, Tacota M. Lemuel, Certified Student Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent. ________________________
SYLLABUS
An officer may perform a drug-dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior when he has
reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity due to reasonable
inferences that the vehicle’s passenger has recently used drugs, a plastic shopping bag in
the backseat may contain drugs, and the driver’s flight from the scene was causally related
to drugs in the vehicle.
Reversed.
1 OPINION
MCKEIG, Justice.
This case requires us to determine whether law enforcement had reasonable,
articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to conduct a drug-dog sniff of the
exterior of a motor vehicle. Respondent Jeron Garding was arrested after a drug-dog sniff
of his parked car led to the discovery of approximately 410 grams of methamphetamine.
Garding moved to suppress the drugs found in the car, arguing that law enforcement lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to support the drug-dog
sniff of the car’s exterior. After a contested omnibus hearing at which the State offered
testimony from the state trooper who conducted the drug-dog sniff, the district court denied
Garding’s motion. Garding was convicted of first-degree possession of narcotics after a
stipulated facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, preserving review of the
pretrial ruling on his suppression motion. Garding then appealed the denial of his pretrial
motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the state trooper did not
have reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to conduct a drug-
dog sniff of the car’s exterior. Because we find that, under the totality of the circumstances,
the officer possessed sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal
activity, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
On August 10, 2021, Jeron Garding was arrested on first-degree narcotics charges,
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subds. 1(4), 2(a)(1) (2022), for approximately 410 grams of
methamphetamine found in his car after officers conducted a drug-dog sniff. He filed a
2 motion to suppress the drugs found in the car, arguing, among other things, that the officers
did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the drug-dog sniff of the exterior
of his car. The district court held a contested omnibus hearing on Garding’s motion to
suppress. State Trooper Jacob Bredsten testified at the hearing, and the parties stipulated
to four exhibits: dashcam video from the officer’s squad car, two screenshots from that
footage, and a photograph taken during the search of the car. 1
According to Trooper Bredsten’s testimony, in August 2021, the Minnesota State
Patrol undertook an organized police operation in rural Wright County to target drug,
weapon, and sex trafficking into northern Minnesota. At the time, traffickers were known
to be using a route that passed through a sparsely populated area near Hasty along
Interstate 94. On the evening of Garding’s arrest, Trooper Bredsten was assigned to work
a nighttime detail as part of this operation. Trooper Bredsten is a certified drug recognition
expert, and he was accompanied that evening by his trained drug-detection dog, as well as
a social welfare advocate who specialized in assisting victims of sex trafficking.
Around 8:30 p.m., Trooper Bredsten pulled into a truck stop near Hasty that was
just off—but not directly visible from—the interstate. The truck stop included a gas station
and a restaurant, which were all part of the same building. From his experience, Trooper
Bredsten knew that a truck stop in this area and at this time of night presented a heightened
1 We do not consider three additional photographs or three narrative police reports that are part of the complete record but were not part of the pretrial record at the time of the contested omnibus hearing.
3 risk of trafficking activity. He also knew that police had initiated a chase commencing at
this same truck stop the prior evening.
As Trooper Bredsten arrived at the truck stop, a parked sedan attracted his attention.
The vehicle was conspicuous to Trooper Bredsten because it was the only occupied vehicle
that was parked away from the gas pumps. Trooper Bredsten saw a male in the driver’s
seat—later identified as Garding—and a female in the front passenger seat. He ran the
car’s license plate number and learned that it was registered to an owner who lived in
Fergus Falls, which is nearly 130 miles away from Hasty. He also learned that the
registered owner of the car was significantly older than either of the car’s occupants
appeared to be. This discrepancy caught his attention because that year he had observed a
trend in his traffic stops involving criminal activity in which drivers were using vehicles
registered to owners who were not present.
After Trooper Bredsten ran the car’s license plate number, he drove away and
parked his squad car in a location where he could continue to monitor the car. As soon as
Trooper Bredsten drove away, Garding and the passenger got out of the car, and the
passenger went into the gas station while Garding spent a considerable length of time
apparently cleaning trash from the car’s interior. He appeared to collect items from
difficult-to-reach areas and place them in a plastic bag. Trooper Bredsten testified that, in
his experience, these difficult-to-reach areas are ones in which contraband can be hidden,
but he did not observe Garding extracting any such contraband from the car. He also
testified that, in his experience, it is not uncommon behavior for criminals to engage in
4 extensive cleaning of their vehicle when they are aware of an officer’s presence, in an
attempt to delay their departure until after an officer leaves the scene.
At this point, Trooper Bredsten repositioned his squad car so that it was closer to
Garding’s car, but he did not activate his emergency lights or block the car from moving
in any way. He then approached Garding on foot and asked him if everything was okay.
Garding closed the car’s driver-side door, walked to the back of the car, and placed the bag
of trash inside the trunk. Garding then closed the trunk and responded to Trooper Bredsten
that everything was fine before walking away into the gas station.
By that time, the passenger had returned to the car, and Trooper Bredsten turned to
speak with her through the partially open driver-side window. During the conversation,
the passenger—in response to Trooper Bredsten’s questions—stated that she did not have
identification, that Garding was her boyfriend, that they had travelled from the Twin Cities,
and that she had outstanding warrants. Although the passenger was initially hesitant to
reveal Garding’s name to Trooper Bredsten, she eventually did so.
While speaking with the passenger, Trooper Bredsten also noticed that she had
several physical signs of “prolonged drug use,” including recently scabbed pick marks
around her mouth, bruising on her legs and arms consistent with intravenous drug use, and
decaying teeth. When Trooper Bredsten initially asked the passenger about the pick marks
on her face, she told him that they were a result of poison ivy exposure. After Trooper
Bredsten told her that he did not believe they were consistent with poison ivy based on his
familiarity with such rashes as a hunter and a former military service member, the
passenger told him that they were a result of a childhood habit of scratching and picking at
5 her skin. Trooper Bredsten then asked the passenger when she last used meth or heroin, to
which she initially responded that she did not use drugs but then stated that she had last
used drugs about 6 years ago.
During this discussion, Trooper Bredsten was standing and looking down into the
car, and he had a view of both the front and rear seat areas. For a portion of the interaction,
Trooper Bredsten was also illuminating the car’s interior with his flashlight. He noticed
several things inside the car that seemed unusual based on his experience as a drug
recognition expert, including a white plastic shopping bag on the rear seat that had been
tied up and rolled over. He testified that the plastic bag caught his eye because it “looked
like there were numerous rocks on the inside.” In Trooper Bredsten’s experience,
“when you see meth, when it’s in a large amount, it breaks up like rocks and it’ll look like
rocks from the outside within the bag.” Nonetheless, Trooper Bredsten testified on cross-
examination that he was uncertain about the contents of the plastic bag before the search.
At one point while Trooper Bredsten was speaking with the passenger, he noticed
that Garding was watching the encounter through the window of the truck stop restaurant
before turning around and walking toward the far side of the gas station. When Trooper
Bredsten later went inside the gas station to find Garding, the employees reported that
Garding had watched Trooper Bredsten speak with the passenger from the store window,
then left the gas station and walked toward the woods. Trooper Bredsten testified that
the direction Garding had taken was significant because “there’s no highway or really any
houses or anything beyond [the wood line], so now it looked like he was trying to hide from
the situation and run from the vehicle.”
6 Based on all his observations, Trooper Bredsten decided to have his drug dog
conduct a sniff around the car’s exterior. The dog repeatedly alerted to the possible presence
of controlled substances. Trooper Bredsten then deployed the dog to sniff the car’s
interior, during which the dog again alerted. Finally, Trooper Bredsten searched the car
by hand and found approximately 410 grams of methamphetamine in the rocky-looking
bag on the rear seat. Garding was then located and arrested.
Following the contested omnibus hearing, the parties submitted briefing on
Garding’s suppression motion in which Garding contended that, among other things, the
drug-dog sniff of the car’s exterior was conducted without reasonable, articulable
suspicion. The district court denied Garding’s motion to suppress. It concluded that
Trooper Bredsten had reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to proceed with the drug-
dog sniff of the car’s exterior, explaining:
Cumulatively, Defendant’s behaviors had been very suspicious. Defendant initially backed away from Trooper Bredsten, and then turned and walked into the gas station. Trooper Bredsten later noticed that Defendant was watching him interact with the female passenger from the inside of the store. Defendant later left the store and traveled to the woodline. There was nothing of interest in or beyond the woodline. Trooper Bredsten additionally observed signs of drug use based on his interactions with the female passenger. Her dental hygiene, pick marks, and bruises were consonant with drug use based on Trooper Bredsten’s training in controlled substances enforcement. After being confronted by him about drug use, her attempts to explain these indicators changed from a bout of poison ivy to a preexisting medical condition. She later admitted to prior drug use, although she denied any recent drug use. Finally, Trooper Bredsten saw a white plastic bag that appeared “rocky” based on the bag’s contents pressing against the walls of the taut, thin plastic bag. This bag was sitting in a hat on the rear bench seat in plain view from the exterior. Based on all of this, Trooper Bredsten had a
7 reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug activity sufficient to justify the exterior dog sniff. 2
After the district court denied Garding’s motion to suppress, he agreed to proceed
with a court trial on stipulated facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, preserving
review of the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. The district court found
Garding guilty of first-degree possession of narcotics, and Garding appealed the district
court’s ruling on his suppression motion.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that “Trooper Bredsten lacked the
required reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to justify the
drug-dog sniff of the exterior of the vehicle because the record lacks an objective basis
from which an officer could reasonably infer that drugs may be present in the place he
sought to search.” State v. Garding, No. A22-1436, 2023 WL 5696235, at *10 (Minn.
App. Sept. 5, 2023). In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals evaluated each
individual circumstance that the State asserted created reasonable suspicion in isolation
and found each one independently weak. The court then summarily stated that these
circumstances were also insufficient in the aggregate to supply Trooper Bredsten with
reasonable articulable suspicion of present, drug-related criminal activity. We granted
review.
2 The district court found Trooper Bredsten’s testimony at the contested omnibus hearing credible and also addressed Garding’s attacks on the officer’s credibility based on two supposed variances between his testimony and the dashcam footage. The district court concluded that one alleged discrepancy was based on Garding’s inaccurate representation of Trooper Bredsten’s testimony, and the other involved dashcam footage that neither conclusively supported nor adversely weighed against the officer’s testimony.
8 ANALYSIS
The use of a trained narcotics-detection dog to sniff the exterior of a motor vehicle
is not a “search” requiring probable cause under either the Fourth Amendment or the
Minnesota Constitution. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2002). Instead,
before conducting such a drug-dog sniff, a police officer must have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. 3 Id. at 137.
“Reasonable suspicion must be ‘based on specific, articulable facts’ that allow the
officer to ‘be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that [they] had a particularized and
objective basis’ ” for suspecting criminal activity. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842–
43 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995)). “The
reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn.
2016) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is enough that a law
enforcement officer can articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.” State v. Lugo, 887
N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016). A trained officer may draw “inferences and deductions
that might well elude an untrained person.” U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see
also Morse, 878 N.W.2d at 502 (same).
3 The State concedes that it is required to show reasonable suspicion. Given the State’s concession, we have no occasion to address the antecedent question of whether reasonable suspicion is required for the drug-dog sniff of a vehicle where the vehicle was not stopped by officers, and where the driver was not seized, not present for the drug-dog sniff, and not the owner of the vehicle. Accordingly, we assume but do not decide that reasonable suspicion is required under these circumstances.
9 Reasonable suspicion is analyzed from the point of view of an objective police
officer and in light of the totality of the circumstances. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 486–87.
Where appropriate, the totality of the circumstances may be analyzed by looking first to
each identified fact supporting reasonable suspicion independently and then considering
whether those facts, even if independently weak, are sufficient in the aggregate. See State
v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 490–91 (Minn. 2005).
Whether an officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a drug-dog sniff
presents a “mixed question of fact and constitutional law.” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487.
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial ruling on a suppression motion, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and the district court’s legal determination
that an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
The State argues that the court of appeals “did not conduct the collective, totality-
of-the-circumstances assessment of the facts that is the hallmark of a proper reasonable-
suspicion inquiry.” The State claims that three “critical facts,” when viewed together,
support reasonable suspicion: 1) the passenger’s physical appearance indicative of
potential recent drug use; 2) the shopping bag in the car’s back seat that looked to contain
rock-like items; and 3) Garding’s decision to flee into the woods behind the truck stop.
The State’s first highlighted fact relates to Trooper Bredsten’s testimony about the
passenger’s appearance when he approached the car and spoke with her through the car’s
partially open window. Specifically, Trooper Bredsten testified that “[t]here did appear to
be marks around . . . her mouth and on her arms, they were kind of singular” and “[l]ooked
10 like they were relatively recent, scabbed, like pick marks.” Relying on his training and
experience as a drug recognition expert, Trooper Bredsten testified that the presence of
pick marks “gathered around the mouth” was consistent with drug use. In addition to the
pick marks on the passenger’s mouth and arms, Trooper Bredsten testified that he also saw
pick marks on her legs. He also testified that she had bruising on her arms and legs that
may have been consistent with “prolonged” intravenous drug use. He further noted that
the passenger had “poor dental hygiene” and exhibited stained or decaying teeth. Lastly,
Trooper Bredsten testified that, based on his training and experience, stained or decaying
teeth and pick marks in the form of small round scabs are “signs of prolonged drug use”
specific to methamphetamine.
The court of appeals acknowledged Trooper Bredsten’s testimony that the
passenger’s “appearance was consistent with signs of ‘prolonged drug use’ and that the
marks on her face looked like they were ‘relatively recent’ but ‘scabbed’ ” before deciding
that these facts were “not consistent with the degree of observations of recent drug use that
[the court of appeals has] typically found to be sufficient to support a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.” Garding, 2023 WL 5696235, at *7
(comparing Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137, and Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 490–91 with State
v. Cox, 807 N.W.2d 447, 449, 452 (Minn. App. 2011), and State v. Folkert, No. A12-0854,
2013 WL 499764, at *1, *5 (Minn. App. Feb. 11, 2013)). The court of appeals concluded
that recent drug use could not be reasonably inferred from the passenger’s appearance,
essentially requiring a showing of current impairment for an officer to infer recent drug
use. See Garding, 2023 WL 5696235, at *7–8.
11 But our court has never held that evidence of current impairment is necessary to
infer that a person has recently used drugs. Under the totality of the circumstances, officers
may reasonably infer a person’s recent substance use even if they do not appear to be
currently impaired. See State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 757–58 (Minn. 2021). Trooper
Bredsten testified that the scabs on the passenger’s pick marks were “relatively recent” and
that she showed signs of “prolonged drug use,” and under these circumstances, an officer
could reasonably infer that the passenger had recently used drugs.
The parties disagree about the appropriate weight to be given to signs of the
passenger’s apparent past drug use within the totality of the circumstances analysis. 4
Garding argues that the court of appeals did not err in assigning minimal weight to this fact
because the connection between the passenger’s appearance and current drug possession
relies on a series of questionable assumptions. 5 However, the State contends that the court
of appeals failed to appreciate how evidence of apparent past drug use lent particularized ,
corroborative weight to its second highlighted fact: Trooper Bredsten’s suspicion that the
plastic shopping bag contained drugs.
4 We agree with both parties that we have never announced a per se rule that prevents an officer from relying on observed signs of potential past drug use to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.
5 One such assumption animates Garding’s theory of the case as a whole. Namely, he suggests that the passenger’s physical signs of potential past drug addiction—decaying teeth and pick marks—were just as consistent with poverty and an attendant lack of access to dental and dermatological care as they were with past drug use. This assertion may well be true, but that does not diminish the reasonableness of the alternative inference, based on the officer’s training and experience, that these physical manifestations derived from past drug use. This inference is particularly reasonable here, as the passenger had already told Trooper Bredsten that she was a previous user of methamphetamine and heroin.
12 Whether current possession of drugs can reasonably be inferred from a person’s
apparent recent drug use is a separate question that cannot be answered by looking to
evidence of the passenger’s appearance alone. Were the passenger’s appearance the only
sign of drug use observed by Trooper Bredsten at the time, an inference of drug possession
would likely be unreasonable. See People v. Lampitok, 798 N.E.2d 91, 107 (Ill. 2003)
(officers lacked reasonable suspicion of a defendant’s drug possession based on one
officer’s “subjective perception” that her cohabitant was a drug user); State v. Miller, 508
P.3d 542, 547 (Or. Ct. App. 2022) (en banc) (“[E]vidence that a defendant is a drug user
or has recently used illegal drugs does not say much at all about whether a defendant
currently possesses illegal drugs.”). However, depending on the totality of the
circumstances, other facts may make the inference of current possession a reasonable one.
See United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d 997, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (reasonable suspicion
justified a drug-dog sniff of a car during a traffic stop because the officer smelled a
marijuana odor, recalled smelling marijuana during a previous stop of the driver, and knew
his detective bureau had evidence of the driver’s drug use); United States v. Rosian, 822 F.
App’x 964, 967 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (reasonable suspicion justified extension of
a traffic stop because of the defendant driver and passenger’s brief stop at a suspected drug
house, the passenger’s appearance consistent with drug use, and the passenger’s admission
to previous drug abuse).
Here, other facts tend to make Trooper Bredsten’s inference of current possession
of drugs in the car more reasonable. Trooper Bredsten’s observation of signs of the
passenger’s past methamphetamine use had a marked impact on the reasonableness of
13 inferences an officer could draw about the contents of the opaque bag that contained
“rock”-shaped items. The passenger’s apparent past methamphetamine use could
reasonably augment an officer’s suspicion that the “rocky” contents of an opaque bag were
methamphetamine because the officer had knowledge and experience that a larger quantity
of the drug “breaks up like rocks.” Simply put, neither the “rocky” contents of the plastic
bag nor the passenger’s apparent recent drug use were enough on their own for an officer
to reasonably suspect that there were drugs in the car, but considered together, these two
observations tend to make that inference a more reasonable one.
Moreover, the passenger’s appearance and the rocky bag were not the only pieces
of information relied upon by Trooper Bredsten. The State contends that the court of
appeals improperly dismissed evidence of Garding’s flight to the woods—the third key fact
highlighted by the State—and we agree. The court of appeals observed that Garding’s
behavior was “undoubtedly suspicious” but that the behavior provided no reasonable basis
to infer that the car was involved in drug-related criminal activity. Garding, 2023 WL
5696235, at *7.
In general, we have expressed reluctance to rely on evasive or nervous behavior as
evidence to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See Burbach,
706 N.W.2d at 490 (agreeing with a district court’s conclusion that a driver’s “significantly
more than normal nervousness during a traffic stop” was “reasonable in the context of
intense police questioning”); Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137 (concluding that under
circumstances where a driver was “evasive, nervous and had glossy eyes,” “acting
suspiciously [was] not an articulable basis to suspect criminal activity” that would justify
14 the drug-dog sniff of a car). However, “[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the
consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly
suggestive of such.” Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Where appropriate,
evidence of flight may therefore be considered within the totality of the circumstances
supporting an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.
See Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487.
Still, if the only fact known to the officer was Garding’s flight to the woods, then it
would be difficult for the officer to assert anything more than a suspicion of general
criminality, which would not be sufficient to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion for
a drug-dog sniff. But that fact did not stand in isolation. Garding only fled after watching
Trooper Bredsten speak with the passenger and view items visible inside the car, which
tends to support the inference that Garding’s flight was causally related to some concern
about the contents of the car or what the passenger may have told Trooper Bredsten.
Further, Trooper Bredsten knew that there was nothing of interest accessible to a pedestrian
behind the truck stop, which reinforces the reasonable inference that Garding was
motivated by an attempt to withdraw from any possible interaction with law enforcement
and avoid detection. Knowing these facts—and considering them alongside signs of the
passenger’s recent drug use and the plastic bag in the back seat that had an appearance
consistent with large amounts of methamphetamine—gave Trooper Bredsten reasonable,
articulable suspicion to permit a drug-dog sniff of the exterior of the car.
The information considered by the district court at the contested omnibus hearing
included: 1) the passenger’s signs of apparent recent drug use; 2) the plastic shopping bag
15 appearing to contain “rock-like” items and Trooper Bredsten’s knowledge and experience
that methamphetamine often has a similarly “rocky” shape; and 3) Garding’s flight to the
woods after viewing Trooper Bredsten’s encounter with the passenger. Any of these facts,
viewed independently, may be insufficient to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion for
a drug-dog sniff. But viewed in aggregate, see Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 490, these facts
furnished a sufficient basis for Trooper Bredsten to reasonably suspect that the car
contained evidence of drug-related criminal activity.
Under the totality of the circumstances, including all the facts known to Trooper
Bredsten at the time the drug-dog sniff was initiated, and the reasonable inferences drawn
from and between those facts, Trooper Bredsten had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
permitting him to conduct a drug-dog sniff of the car’s exterior. The district court therefore
did not err in denying Garding’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
ensuing search. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
HENNESY and GAÏTAS, JJ., not having been members of this court at the time of
submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.