This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0767
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
James Michael Peterson, Appellant.
Filed May 13, 2024 Affirmed Bratvold, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DU-CR-19-3571
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge. *
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In a direct appeal, appellant challenges his conviction for aiding and abetting
second-degree murder. Witnesses reported hearing a gunshot, which was recorded at
1:47 a.m. Shortly after, law enforcement found the victim sitting inside his pickup truck
with a gunshot wound; he later died. No witness testified to seeing the murder or to seeing
appellant at the scene. The murder weapon was not recovered. But detailed testimony
described appellant with a gun driving toward the victim to confront him. Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to sustain his conviction. Because
the record evidence is consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of guilt, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 27, 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant James
Michael Peterson with aiding and abetting second-degree murder under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018). Most of the events included in the state’s case against Peterson
took place in Duluth and involved four people: T.N., the murder victim; T.N.’s friend, J.S.,
with whom he decided to buy drugs; C.B., the drug dealer; and Peterson, C.B.’s friend.
Before considering the evidence offered against Peterson, some background is
helpful. The following diagram provides an approximate layout of the relevant area and is
based on the record.
2 One of the key locations in the state’s case is C.B.’s house, which is located on 62nd
Avenue south of Bristol Street near to where 62nd Avenue begins to curve east. Law
enforcement found T.N. with a gunshot wound, sitting inside his pickup parked on 62nd
Avenue just north of Bristol Street.
3 Four surveillance cameras provided time-stamped recordings of some events, and
the recordings were admitted at trial. 1 The first camera was installed on a house located on
Green Street and surveilled the intersection with 62nd Avenue (Green Street camera). The
second camera surveilled Interstate 35’s Cody Street exit (Cody exit camera). The third
camera surveilled the parking lot of a convenience store in Proctor (convenience-store
camera). And the fourth camera was installed on a house on 61st Avenue (61st Avenue
camera). Relevant to the issues in this appeal, the fourth camera recorded the sound of a
gunshot at 1:47 a.m.
Before the Shooting
On September 21, 2019, J.S. and her “good friend” T.N. were hanging out in and
around Duluth. They decided to buy drugs and drove T.N.’s Chevrolet pickup truck to
C.B.’s home on 62nd Avenue. J.S. had known C.B. “[a] few months,” but T.N. did not
know C.B. The Green Street camera showed T.N.’s pickup driving south on 62nd Avenue
toward C.B.’s house at 12:46 a.m.
T.N. parked “a couple blocks away” from C.B.’s house and told J.S. he would wait
in the pickup. J.S. “walked up alone and met up with” C.B. Then, J.S. got in C.B.’s silver
Hyundai Elantra—a “little car” with “[l]oud exhaust.” The Green Street camera showed
1 The transcript shows that the jury viewed the recordings, which were embedded in a PowerPoint. The PowerPoint is in the record on appeal, but the record does not include the recordings. The PowerPoint shows the recordings as still photos with a time stamp. The time stamps include the hour, minute, and second (e.g., 12:10:45); for readability, we round times to the nearest minute.
4 C.B.’s car driving west on Green Street. 2 J.S. and C.B. drove a few blocks to a dirt road
and parked for about 15 or 20 minutes to complete the drug sale and use methamphetamine.
While C.B. and J.S. were parked, T.N., who was on foot, “came running out of
nowhere” and tried to “pull [C.B.] out of the vehicle.” T.N. said something like, “Give me
all your sh-t.” C.B. “got out of the car and punched” T.N., and “then [T.N.] ran back off.”
T.N. “didn’t actually get anything from” C.B. during this encounter. C.B. asked J.S. if she
knew who attacked him, and J.S. said, “[Y]es, that’s my ride.” C.B. “kind of chuckled” and
said, “[W]e’ll take care of it.”
At 1:26 a.m., J.S. texted T.N., “Your f--king stupid as f--k. Why would you do that?”
At 1:27 a.m., she texted him again, “Thanks a lot. You made me look like a f--king joke.”
At 1:28 a.m., the Green Street camera showed T.N.’s pickup traveling north on 62nd
Avenue toward Green Street—driving away from C.B.’s house.
C.B. and J.S. drove back to C.B.’s house. C.B. “went inside his house, and he came
back out with the shotgun,” and “Peterson was following behind him.” C.B. “got back into
the driver’s seat” of the silver sedan, and Peterson “got in the seat behind [J.S.]” They
asked J.S. to call T.N.
A call log from T.N.’s phone showed that J.S. called T.N. twice at 1:31 a.m. Over
J.S.’s speakerphone, T.N. “proceeded to apologize repeatedly” to C.B. and said that “he
2 At trial, an investigator testified that the car that appeared on the surveillance-camera recordings had characteristics “consistent with the overall key characteristics of [C.B.’s] vehicle.” The license-plate number was not visible in the recordings. The investigator testified that C.B.’s sedan and the sedan in the recordings were both silver, had rust near the driver’s side rear wheel well, had rectangular sidelights, had taillights angled diagonally toward the trunk, were marked by a stripe along each side, and had no hubcaps on any tire.
5 had no idea that it was” C.B. and J.S. when he ran up. C.B. was “too calm” and asked T.N.
to “meet up and talk.” T.N. agreed to meet and stated that J.S. knew where he was parked.
At 1:35 a.m., the Green Street camera showed T.N.’s pickup traveling south on 62nd
Avenue towards Bristol Street and in the direction of C.B.’s house.
C.B. “started to drive” and “handed the gun” to Peterson. C.B. told J.S. he “didn’t
want [her] to be there for it.” J.S. wanted to be dropped off at a convenience store in Proctor
because she “was going to Cloquet for the night, and that’s where [she] was getting picked
up from.”
On the drive to the convenience store, C.B. or Peterson said he “wondered if [J.S.]
had [T.N.’s] parents’ number because somebody would need to know where the body was.”
Then C.B. and Peterson “both kind of chuckled.” The Green Street camera showed C.B.’s
car driving west on Green Street toward Interstate 35 (I-35) at 1:37 a.m. About one and a
half minutes later, the Cody exit camera showed C.B.’s car entering the interstate from
Cody Street.
The convenience-store camera showed C.B.’s car entering the parking lot at
1:40 a.m. C.B. parked in an area that was not well lit, telling J.S. that he “thought that there
wouldn’t be as [many] cameras, or that they wouldn’t be seen as well.” J.S exited the car,
and C.B. and Peterson “drove off.” The convenience-store camera showed C.B.’s car
leaving at 1:41 a.m.
J.S. then immediately spoke with T.N. on the phone. The call log from T.N.’s phone
showed that T.N. called J.S. twice at 1:41 a.m. J.S. “begged [T.N.] to leave where he was
6 parked” and told him that she “didn’t think it was going to turn out good.” At the end of
the call at 1:43 a.m., T.N. told J.S. that he saw “headlights and he assumed it was them.”
The Cody exit camera showed C.B.’s car exiting I-35 onto Cody Street at 1:43 a.m.
About one and a half minutes later, the Green Street camera showed two occupants in
C.B.’s car turning from Green Street onto 62nd Avenue, at first swerving into the oncoming
lane, then correcting and driving south toward where T.N. was parked on 62nd Avenue just
north of Bristol Street.
The Shooting
The 61st Avenue camera recorded the sound of a gunshot at 1:47 a.m. Five
neighbors on 62nd Avenue and Bristol Street testified about what happened before and
after the gunshot. Four of the neighbors testified to hearing voices yelling and arguing
followed by a gunshot; two neighbors testified to hearing a five-minute argument. Two of
the neighbors testified to hearing a car with “a worn-out muffler” and “loud exhaust”
“speed away” after the gunshot; two other neighbors testified to seeing a large SUV speed
south on 62nd Avenue after the gunshot. One neighbor was not asked about whether they
heard or saw a vehicle driving away.
Duluth law enforcement responded to the report of a shooting, arrived at the scene
at 1:51 a.m., and found T.N. “sitting in the front driver’s seat” of his pickup with “his hand
on his abdomen . . . gasping for air.” T.N. was taken to the hospital and died of a gunshot
wound.
7 The Trial
Three investigators testified at trial. The first investigator testified that the front
passenger window of T.N.’s pickup was “broken out.” The first investigator recovered
fingerprints from the passenger-side door of the pickup. Forensic analysis showed that the
fingerprints did not match Peterson, and one fingerprint matched T.N.’s friend, who told
investigators that he had been in T.N.’s pickup “about four days prior” to the shooting but
was in jail at the time of the shooting. Investigators later learned that T.N.’s friend was not
in jail when T.N. was shot.
Along with many facts summarized above, J.S. testified that, around 4:30 a.m. on
September 22, she received a social-media message from Peterson “stating that he needed
[her] to call him.” J.S. testified that she called Peterson and that “he was frantic, and he
stated that he didn’t mean for it to escalate the way it did and that [T.N.] just kept lunging
at him, and he pulled the trigger but [T.N.] had a pulse when he walked away.” J.S. testified
that Peterson “said he needed to leave town, and then he hung up.”
The state offered evidence that on September 24, law enforcement executed a search
warrant at C.B.’s home on 62nd Avenue. Inside a bedroom in C.B.’s house, officers found
a wallet with Peterson’s identification. Inside C.B.’s garage, officers found a gun case
designed to accommodate a long gun. The case contained one “unfired” cartridge. DNA
analysis of the gun case matched C.B.’s DNA.
Law enforcement did not recover a fired bullet casing during their “initial article
search” of T.N.’s pickup and the surrounding area on September 22. On September 26, law
enforcement “found a fired casing in the leaves” on 62nd Avenue just north of Bristol
8 Street. The casing was “approximately 40 feet” from where law enforcement found T.N.’s
pickup on September 22.
The first investigator testified that the “unfired round from the gun case in [C.B.’s]
garage” was “very similar” to the fired casing found on 62nd Avenue. Both were stamped
with the text “7.62 by 39,” which the first investigator believed to be “the length and
diameter of the casing,” and contained the same “unknown symbol or marking.” The
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension could not determine whether the unfired
cartridge and the fired casing “had ever been cycled through the same weapon.” Law
enforcement did not find the murder weapon, nor did they find a long gun in C.B.’s house
or garage.
A second investigator interviewed Peterson on September 24 at police headquarters.
Peterson stated that, after they left J.S. at the convenience store, C.B. dropped Peterson off
at C.B.’s house on 62nd Avenue before driving towards T.N.’s pickup with a “very large
rifle.” A recording of the interview was received into evidence.
Peterson did not testify at trial or call any witnesses. The jury found Peterson guilty
of aiding and abetting second-degree murder. The district court sentenced Peterson to 346
months in prison.
Peterson appeals.
DECISION
Peterson argues that the record evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction on
appeal. Due process requires that the state prove every element necessary to convict the
9 defendant of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Burg, 648 N.W.2d 673,
677-78 (Minn. 2002).
The jury found Peterson guilty of aiding and abetting second-degree murder, which
requires proof that he aided and abetted the death of another that was caused with intent
but without premeditation. See Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (providing that
“[w]hoever . . . causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that
person or another, but without premeditation,” is guilty of second-degree murder). “To
impose liability under the aiding and abetting statute, the state must show some knowing
role in the commission of the crime by a defendant who takes no steps to thwart its
completion.” State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted); see
also Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2018) (“A person is criminally liable for a crime
committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires
with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.”).
A. The circumstantial-evidence standard of review applies.
Before evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the record
evidence was direct or circumstantial because the nature of the evidence affects our
standard of review. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39-40 (Minn. 2016) (deciding
whether to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence using the circumstantial-evidence
standard or the traditional standard based on direct evidence). Direct evidence is “based on
10 personal knowledge or observation and . . . if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). 3
Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which the jury “can infer whether the facts
in dispute existed or did not exist” and therefore “always requires an inferential step to
prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). If
circumstantial evidence is used to prove the elements of the crime challenged on appeal,
appellate courts apply a two-step analysis, which we describe below. State v. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013).
Peterson argues that this court should apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of
review because the evidence presented at trial was “almost entirely” circumstantial, and if
any of the material elements of the crime “are based on circumstantial evidence, that is the
standard of review.” The state argues that this court should affirm Peterson’s conviction
based on the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, or alternatively, Peterson’s
conviction “should be affirmed based on direct evidence alone.” The state contends that
the direct evidence includes J.S.’s testimony of the events just before the shooting and
Peterson’s confession to shooting T.N.
We are not persuaded by the state’s argument that we may apply the direct-evidence
standard of review, for two reasons. First, the evidence provided in J.S.’s testimony is not
3 If direct evidence is sufficient to prove the elements of the crime challenged on appeal, then appellate courts apply the traditional standard of review. Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 39-40 (“Under the traditional standard, we limit our review to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted)).
11 direct evidence of all necessary elements of the crime because it requires an inferential step
to conclude that Peterson aided and abetted second-degree murder. See Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 599. Second, even if we assume that Peterson’s confession to J.S. is direct
evidence of all necessary elements of the crime, corroborating evidence is required to
sustain his conviction on appeal. Minn. Stat. § 634.03 (2022) (“A confession of the
defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that the offense
charged has been committed . . . .”); State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d 803, 814 (Minn. 2021).
Neither J.S. nor any other witness saw who shot T.N. “When the direct evidence of guilt
on a particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict,” appellate courts apply
the circumstantial-evidence standard of review. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643
(Minn. 2017). Accordingly, we apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review
because, if we set aside the confession, there is only circumstantial evidence to prove some
elements of the crime of conviction.
The circumstantial-evidence standard of review has two steps, which we address in
turn.
B. The circumstances proved include J.S.’s testimony.
In the first step, an appellate court must “identify the circumstances proved.”
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. In doing so, appellate courts “defer to the jury’s acceptance
of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted
with the circumstances proved by the State.” Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). Appellate
courts also “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State
v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). “Stated differently, in determining the
12 circumstances proved, [appellate courts] consider only those circumstances that are
consistent with the verdict . . . because the jury is in the best position to evaluate the
credibility of the evidence even in cases based on circumstantial evidence.” Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599 (citation omitted).
The parties disagree about which facts are the circumstances proved. We note that
“where circumstances are uncontroverted, come from a state witness, and are not
necessarily contradictory to the verdict, they constitute circumstances proved.” State v.
German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 473 (Minn. App. 2019). In other words, we consider the state’s
evidence that does not contradict the verdict to be the circumstances proved. While
appellant’s brief to this court points out several inconsistencies in J.S.’s testimony, her
testimony is consistent with the jury’s verdict and is therefore included in the circumstances
proved.
The state proved these circumstances at Peterson’s trial: J.S. and T.N drove to C.B.’s
house to buy drugs at 12:46 a.m. T.N. parked “a couple blocks away” from C.B.’s house
and waited in his pickup while J.S. met with C.B. Then J.S. and C.B. got into C.B.’s silver
Hyundai Elantra, a “little car” with “[l]oud exhaust,” and drove a few blocks away to make
a drug transaction and use methamphetamine. After about 15 minutes, T.N., who was on
foot, approached C.B.’s car, assaulted C.B., and attempted to rob him. T.N. pulled C.B. out
of the car and said something like, “Give me all your sh-t.” In response, C.B. punched T.N.,
and T.N. left. C.B. asked who attacked him, and J.S. told C.B. that it was her “ride.” C.B.
“kind of chuckled” and said, “[W]e’ll take care of it.”
13 C.B. and J.S. drove back to C.B.’s house, where C.B. retrieved a gun. Peterson
joined them in C.B.’s car. C.B. and Peterson asked J.S. to call T.N. During this call, T.N.
repeatedly apologized for attacking C.B.; in response, C.B. was “too calm” and asked T.N.
to “meet up and talk.” T.N. agreed to meet and said that J.S. knew where he was parked.
C.B. handed the gun to Peterson, who was in the back seat. C.B. drove J.S. to a
convenience store, explaining that he “didn’t want [her] to be there for it.” During the drive,
C.B. or Peterson asked J.S. if she had T.N.’s parents’ number “because somebody would
need to know where the body was.” After this remark, both C.B. and Peterson laughed. At
1:40 a.m., C.B. dropped J.S. off in an area that was not well lit but close to the convenience
store because “they thought there wouldn’t be as [many] cameras, or that they wouldn’t be
seen as well dropping [J.S.] off there.”
After she exited C.B.’s car and the car drove away, J.S. spoke with T.N. by phone
and “begged him to leave where he was parked” because she “didn’t think it was going to
turn out good.” At 1:45 a.m., C.B.’s car turned onto 62nd Avenue from Green Street,
“swerved in the oncoming traffic lane . . . and then corrected itself and continued south on
62nd Avenue” toward where T.N.’s pickup was parked. Before 1:47 a.m., witnesses heard
voices yelling and arguing near 62nd Avenue and Bristol Street. At 1:47 a.m., there was a
gunshot. Immediately after the gunshot, a vehicle with “loud exhaust” or a “worn-out
muffler” left the scene. A large SUV also sped south on 62nd Avenue.
At 1:51 a.m., law enforcement found an injured T.N. in the driver’s seat of his
pickup, gasping for air. T.N. later died at the hospital of a gunshot wound. A few hours
after T.N. was shot, Peterson contacted J.S. via a social-media account. Peterson told J.S.
14 when she called that he “pulled the trigger” after T.N. lunged at him. Peterson also said
that T.N. had a pulse when he left the scene.
No gun was recovered. Subsequent law-enforcement investigation found a fired
casing near where T.N.’s pickup was parked, which was “very similar” to an unfired
cartridge in a gun case in C.B.’s garage. DNA on the gun case matched C.B.’s DNA.
Forensics also identified fingerprints found on the passenger-side door of T.N.’s pickup;
the fingerprints matched T.N.’s friend, who told law enforcement that he was in T.N.’s
pickup four days before the September 22 incident. T.N.’s friend also told law enforcement
he was in jail on September 22, but law enforcement later discovered that T.N.’s friend
was not in jail at that time.
C. The circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.
In the second step, appellate courts must “determine whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “review the
circumstantial evidence not as isolated facts, but as a whole,” and “examine independently
the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.”
Id. (quotation omitted). If an alternative hypothesis is “untied to the evidence before the
jury,” that hypothesis is “wholly speculative” and does not warrant reversal. German,
929 N.W.2d at 475. “[I]nconsistencies in the state’s case or possibilities of innocence” do
not require reversal so long as the evidence as a whole “makes such theories seem
unreasonable.” Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858.
15 Peterson argues that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with his guilt.
Peterson argues that the “State’s case was riddled with reasonable doubt” because J.S. was
“demonstrably incredible” and several witnesses heard voices yelling and arguing before
C.B.’s car could have arrived at the scene. The state argues that the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and that Peterson’s theory of innocence relies on facts that are not
part of the circumstances proved.
We reject Peterson’s argument for two reasons. First, an appellate court does not
assess J.S.’s credibility when determining the circumstances proved. Witness credibility is
for the jury to determine because “[j]uries are generally in the best position to weigh the
credibility of the evidence and thus determine which witnesses to believe and how much
weight to give their testimony.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329, 332-33 (Minn.
2010) (concluding circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of
first-degree murder); see also State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Minn. 2010) (deferring
to the jury’s credibility determinations in identifying the circumstances proved). Based on
the jury’s verdict, the jury found that J.S. was credible. 4
4 Peterson’s brief to this court argues that J.S.’s “version of events [was] riddled with falsehoods and inconsistencies.” For example, Peterson points out that J.S. “told [C.B.] where [T.N.] was parked, even though she was ‘nervous’ and worried about a confrontation”; J.S. testified that she called T.N. after being dropped off at the convenience store, but T.N.’s call log showed he called J.S.; J.S. described C.B. as both “calm” and “really angry”; and J.S. testified that Peterson called her to “1) confess; 2) beg [for] her forgiveness; and 3) ask for a pile of money to skip town” despite barely knowing her. We note that all the “inconsistencies” Peterson claims are in the record and were presented to the jury, which assessed J.S.’s credibility and the accuracy of her testimony. We will not second-guess the jury’s credibility finding.
16 Second, Peterson misapplies the standard of review. Peterson contends that the
state’s evidence about yelling and arguing before the gunshot shows that T.N. was “already
arguing with the people who shot him” before Peterson and C.B. could have arrived at the
scene. Peterson argues that two neighbors testified to hearing a five-minute argument
before the gunshot while the Green Street camera showed Peterson and C.B. driving
towards T.N.’s pickup about two and a half minutes before the gunshot.
But Peterson’s timeline is inconsistent with the guilty verdict. The jury found that
Peterson assisted in murdering T.N. based on evidence that, (a) at 1:45 a.m., C.B.’s car—
with two occupants—was driving towards where T.N.’s pickup was parked and, (b) at
1:47 a.m., T.N. was fatally shot. Thus, the jury apparently rejected the two neighbors’
testimony about a five-minute argument or found that the argument did not involve C.B.
or Peterson. Accordingly, the “five-minute argument” is not included in the circumstances
proved. See Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. We conclude that the circumstances proved, as
detailed above, are consistent with guilt.
D. The circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
Peterson argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with two reasonable
alternative hypotheses, which we consider in turn. First, Peterson contends that the
circumstances proved are consistent with proving that T.N.’s friend, or an unknown person,
shot T.N. and drove away in an SUV (SUV hypothesis). This hypothesis is based on the
testimony of two neighbors who saw an SUV or other large vehicle speeding away after
the gunshot. Peterson also relies on the fingerprints found on T.N.’s pickup, which matched
17 T.N.’s friend, and evidence that T.N.’s friend lied to law enforcement about being in jail
on the night of the murder.
The state argues that no vehicle larger than a sedan was at the scene at the time of
the gunshot because the “evidence most favorable to guilt shows that [C.B.]’s car was the
only car in the area.” The state contends that Peterson’s SUV hypothesis should be
dismissed as inconsistent with the guilty verdict. We disagree with the state’s analysis.
Evidence of an SUV driving away from the scene after the gunshot is not inconsistent with
Peterson’s guilt. Simply put, both C.B.’s sedan and an SUV may have driven away from
the scene after the shooting.
Keeping in mind that both C.B.’s sedan and the SUV may have been at the scene at
the time of the shooting, we consider Peterson’s SUV hypothesis—that T.N.’s killer was
someone in an SUV. We reject the SUV hypothesis, however, because it does not account
for or conflicts with, for example, the following circumstances proved. C.B.’s sedan was
driving toward T.N.’s pickup two minutes before the shooting. T.N. assaulted and
attempted to steal drugs from C.B., who fought back and then pursued T.N. after he ran
away. C.B. retrieved a gun and got Peterson; C.B. and Peterson talked to T.N., secured
T.N.’s promise to meet up, dropped J.S. off so she would not see what happened, and after
laughing about T.N.’s parents finding his body, drove back toward where they planned to
meet up with T.N.
Peterson’s SUV hypothesis also involves speculation. No evidence establishes any
connection between T.N. and the SUV or between T.N.’s friend and the SUV. In fact, other
than two neighbors seeing an SUV drive away after the gunshot, no evidence establishes
18 any connection between the SUV and T.N.’s murder—for example, who was in the SUV,
whether the SUV’s occupant(s) interacted—much less yelled or argued—with T.N., or
whether the SUV’s occupant(s) had a gun. 5
Peterson tries to bolster the SUV hypothesis by arguing that the Green Street camera
showed C.B.’s sedan turning onto 62nd Avenue and “veer[ing] around something in the
road.” Peterson posits that C.B. could have been veering around T.N. and the SUV
occupant(s) yelling and arguing. Peterson relies on the third investigator’s testimony
describing the path of C.B.’s sedan as seen in the Green Street camera’s recording. But the
third investigator’s testimony about the recording does not provide any evidence that T.N.
was outside his pickup—or that any people were on 62nd Avenue at the time C.B.’s sedan
veered. Thus, Peterson’s SUV hypothesis rests on speculation.
Unlike Peterson’s SUV hypothesis, the circumstances proved create a complete
chain of events leading to Peterson’s guilt of aiding and abetting T.N.’s murder. Along
with evidence about T.N.’s assault and attempted robbery of C.B, C.B. told J.S. that “we’ll
take care of” T.N., C.B. picked up Peterson and a gun from his home; Peterson held the
gun in C.B.’s car; Peterson and C.B. laughed about T.N.’s parents needing to know where
to find T.N.’s body; they dropped off J.S. at a convenience store, telling her she should not
5 Peterson also argues that T.N.’s statement to J.S. at the end of their call tends to prove that the SUV was driving toward T.N. well before C.B.’s sedan neared the same location. J.S. testified that, while she was at the convenience store and talking to T.N. by phone, he told her that he saw “headlights and he assumed it was them.” Peterson points out that this evidence is consistent with an SUV arriving before C.B.’s sedan because the call ended at 1:43 a.m. and C.B.’s car “didn’t arrive for nearly another 1-2 minutes.” But as noted above, both an SUV and C.B.’s sedan could have been in the area at the time T.N. was shot.
19 be “there” for what would happen next; C.B.’s sedan with two occupants arrived on 62nd
Avenue about two minutes before neighbors heard a gunshot and a vehicle with loud
exhaust driving away. Shortly after the gunshot, law enforcement found T.N. shot in his
pickup. A few hours after the shooting, Peterson called J.S. and said that he shot T.N. Near
the shooting scene, law enforcement recovered a fired casing that was “very similar” to an
unspent cartridge in a gun case in C.B.’s garage; the gun case had C.B.’s DNA on it. The
state’s evidence, as a whole, “form[s] a complete chain that . . . leads so directly to the guilt
of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other
than guilt.” Stein, 776 N.W.2d at 714 (quotation omitted). Thus, Peterson’s SUV
hypothesis is unreasonable.
Peterson’s second alternative hypothesis is that C.B. dropped Peterson off at C.B.’s
house before C.B. shot T.N. (drop-off hypothesis). This hypothesis is based on Peterson’s
statement to law enforcement that, after driving away from the convenience store, he and
C.B. exited from I-35 at Cody Street and drove south on 63rd Avenue, east on Bristol
Street, then south on 62nd Avenue to C.B.’s house. Peterson stated that, when they returned
to C.B.’s house, he exited the car and someone came “out of the garage area with a very
large rifle” and gave the gun to C.B. Peterson stated that C.B. then “took off at a high rate
of speed . . . towards Bristol Street.”
The state responds that Peterson could not have been dropped off at C.B.’s house
before the shooting based on the time, location, and direction of C.B.’s car on the
surveillance-camera recordings. We agree with the state that Peterson’s drop-off
hypothesis conflicts with the Cody exit camera showing C.B.’s car exiting I-35 at Cody
20 Street at 1:43 a.m. and, about one and a half minutes later, turning from Green Street onto
62nd Avenue heading south towards T.N.’s pickup.
The state offered evidence at trial that when law enforcement drove the route that
Peterson described in his statement, “it took about three minutes and 10 seconds” to drive
from the I-35 Cody Street exit, past C.B.’s house, and to the corner of Green Street and
62nd Avenue. Accordingly, Peterson’s drop-off hypothesis is not reasonable. If C.B. had
dropped off Peterson at C.B.’s house before the shooting, then C.B.’s car would have been
recorded heading towards T.N.’s pickup at around 1:47 a.m. rather than at 1:45 a.m.
Peterson cites three circumstantial-evidence cases to support his argument for
reversal based on either of his alternative hypotheses: Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465
(Minn. 2004); State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1994); and State v. Berndt,
392 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). Because it helps our legal analysis, we consider this
caselaw.
First, in Bernhardt, Bernhardt was convicted of aiding and abetting a second-degree
murder by ordering others to kill the victim from jail. 684 N.W.2d at 467. Bernhardt and
Caldwell were arrested at the victim’s home and jailed. Id. at 468-69. Days later, others—
known associates of Bernhardt and Caldwell—beat and murdered the victim to punish the
victim for “snitch[ing]” on Bernhardt and Caldwell. Id. at 469-70. On appeal, Bernhardt
argued two alternative hypotheses: first, that Caldwell, not Bernhardt, ordered the murder
or, second, that the killers acted on their own in murdering the victim without any
instruction from Bernhardt. Id. at 478-79.
21 The supreme court reversed Bernhardt’s conviction after concluding that the “facts
in the record” were “consistent” with both alternative hypotheses. Id. at 479. The supreme
court pointed to the “volume of damning evidence against Caldwell,” including “Caldwell
openly talk[ing] about the possibility of murdering” the victim if the victim “was the
‘snitch’ because [Caldwell] had murdered at least one ‘snitch’ in the past.” Id. at 478. The
supreme court also determined that the victim’s murder “could have constituted the
escalating actions of irrational individuals that became an out-of-control melee” based on
heavy methamphetamine use around the time of the murder and the belief that the victim
was a snitch. Id. 478-79.
Second, in Jones, the jury found Jones guilty of aiding and abetting the second- and
third-degree assault of a coworker. 516 N.W.2d at 546-47. The day before the assault,
Jones’s coworker grabbed Jones by his shirt and threatened to punch him, resulting in Jones
wetting his pants. Id. at 547. The next day, Jones told his brother what happened, and the
brother tracked down the coworker and shot him with Jones’s gun. Id. Jones was not
present during the shooting. Id. On appeal, the supreme court identified an alternative
hypothesis inconsistent with Jones’s guilt: that Jones’s brother decided to attack the
coworker of his own volition and without any instruction from Jones. Id. at 549 & n.5. The
court reversed Jones’s conviction after determining that “[o]ther rational conclusions” were
“consistent with the evidence presented.” Id. The court pointed to evidence that Jones’s
brother had previously used, and had access to, Jones’s gun. Id.
Third, in Berndt, Berndt was convicted of the first-degree murders of his wife and
children. 392 N.W.2d at 876. The state proved that, after a night out with friends, Berndt
22 and his wife returned home to their children and fell asleep. Id. at 877. Berndt testified that
he awoke to smoke and flames and ran outside before the entire house burst into flames.
Id. He was the only one to survive the fire; his wife and three children died. Id.
The supreme court reversed Berndt’s conviction, stating that Berndt’s physical
presence at the house when the fire started was the only evidence “consistent with the
state’s hypothesis of [Berndt’s] guilt.” Id. at 880. The supreme court noted that Berndt had
“spent [the] evening drinking and smoking marijuana.” Id. at 879. The supreme court
determined that it was “not rational” to infer that an intoxicated Berndt “could slosh 5
gallons of gasoline around the townhouse”—as the state alleged—“without almost
inevitably spilling some of the gas on himself or his clothing,” yet “no witness . . . detected
a gasoline odor about his person or clothing.” Id. at 880. The supreme court concluded that
“substantially all of the circumstances are consistent with a rational hypothesis other than
guilt”: that the fire was an accidentally ignited “flashback fire.” 6 Id. at 880.
These three cases support our conclusion that Peterson’s alternative hypotheses are
not reasonable. 7 In all three supreme court cases, the alternative hypotheses formed a
complete chain of events supported by the evidence. Peterson’s two alternative hypotheses
6 A flashback fire is “created when a fresh supply of oxygen, such as a door opening, reignites a smoldering fire or a build-up of gases, and the resulting fire flashes back across a room.” Id. at 878 n.4. 7 Peterson also cites El-Shabazz v. State, 754 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2008), arguing that J.S.’s “testimony is significantly undermined by the witnesses present at the scene, just as the witness in El-Shabazz was.” El-Shabazz, however, is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case. 754 N.W.2d at 372. And as noted above, we must assume the jury found J.S. credible, and we defer to the jury’s credibility determinations.
23 rely on evidence that is inconsistent with the circumstances proved—such as the time,
locations, and direction C.B.’s car traveled toward T.N.’s parked pickup or the five-minute
argument. Or Peterson’s alternative hypotheses are unsupported by the evidence as a
whole—for example, C.B.’s plan for him and Peterson to “meet up” with T.N. and “take
care” of him after T.N.’s attempted robbery and assault, C.B. enlisting Peterson and
obtaining a gun, C.B. dropping off J.S. so she would not see what happened, C.B. or
Peterson joking about notifying T.N.’s parents about his body, and C.B.’s sedan with two
occupants driving toward T.N.’s pickup just before T.N. was fatally shot. Accordingly,
Peterson’s alternative hypotheses are unreasonable.
In sum, the circumstances proved form a complete chain establishing Peterson’s
guilt and are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, we
conclude that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain Peterson’s conviction.
Affirmed.