State of Maryland v. USDA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: September 8, 2025
• Docket: 25-1338
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 1 of 41

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1248

STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF MINNESOTA; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; STATE OF HAWAII; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF WISCONSIN,

Plaintiffs – Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; BROOKE ROLLINS, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; HOWARD LUTNICK, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Commerce; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; PETER HEGSETH, In his Official Capacity as Secretary of Defense; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; LINDA MCMAHON, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Education; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Energy; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT; SCOTT TURNER, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; DOUGLAS BURGUM, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Interior; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; LORI CHAVEZ- DEREMER, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Labor; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; SEAN P. DUFFY, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Transportation; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; SCOTT BESSENT, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 2 of 41

DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Veterans Affairs; CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU; RUSSELL VOUGHT, in his Official Capacity as Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; LEE ZELDIN, in his Official Capacity as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION; TRAVIS HILL, in his Official Capacity as Acting Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; MICHAEL J. RIGAS, in his Official Capacity as Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration; NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION; OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; SCOTT KUPOR, in his Official Capacity as Director of the Office of Personnel Management; SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; KELLY LOEFLER, in her Official Capacity as Administrator of the Small Business Administration; UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; MARCO RUBIO, in his Official Capacity as Acting Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and Archivist for the National Archives and Records Administration,

Defendants – Appellants.

------------------------------

THE OVERSIGHT PROJECT; DAN HUFF,

Amici Supporting Appellant.

DONALD B. AYER; BARBARA COMSTOCK; JOHN FARMER, JR.; PETER D. KEISLER; PHILIP ALLEN LACOVARA; J. MICHAEL LUTTIG; JOHN MCKAY; TREVOR POTTER; ALAN CHARLES RAUL; PAUL SAMUEL ROSENZWEIG; CLAUDINE SCHNEIDER; ROBERT SHANKS; WILLIAM WELD; CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN,

Amici Supporting Appellee.

No. 25-1338

STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF MINNESOTA; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; STATE OF HAWAII; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF

2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 3 of 41

MICHIGAN; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF WISCONSIN,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; BROOKE ROLLINS, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; HOWARD LUTNICK, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Commerce; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; PETE HEGSETH, In his Official Capacity as Secretary of Defense; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; LINDA MCMAHON, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Education; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; CHRISTOPHER A. WRIGHT, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Energy; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT; SCOTT TURNER, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; DOUGLAS BURGUM, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Interior; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; LORI CHAVEZ- DEREMER, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of Labor; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; SEAN P. DUFFY, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Transportation; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; SCOTT BESSENT, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of Veterans Affairs; CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU; RUSSELL VOUGHT, in his Official Capacity as Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; LEE M. ZELDIN, in his Official Capacity as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION; TRAVIS HILL, in his Official Capacity as Acting Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; MICHAEL J. RIGAS, in his Official Capacity as Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration; NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION; OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; SCOTT KUPOR, in his Official Capacity as Director of the Office of Personnel Management; SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; KELLY LOEFLER, in her Official Capacity as Administrator

3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 4 of 41

of the Small Business Administration; UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; MARCO RUBIO, in his Official Capacity as Acting Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and Archivist for the National Archives and Records Administration,

THE OVERSIGHT PROJECT; DANIEL HUFF,

DONALD B. AYER; BARBARA COMSTOCK; JOHN FARMER, JR.; PETER D. KEISLER; PHILIP ALLEN LACOVARA; J. MICHAEL LUTTIG; JOHN MCKAY; TREVOR POTTER; ALAN CHARLES RAUL; PAUL SAMUEL ROSENZWEIG; CLAUDINE SCHNEIDER; ROBERT SHANKS; WILLIAM WELD; CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN,

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, Senior District Judge. (1:25−cv−00748−JKB)

Argued: May 6, 2025 Decided: September 8, 2025

Before WILKINSON, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated with directions to dismiss by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Rushing joined. Judge Benjamin wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Sarah Elizabeth Welch, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Caroline S. Van Zile, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Yaakov Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Mark R. Freeman, Courtney L. Dixon, Steven A. Myers, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Kelly O. Hayes, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF

4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 5 of 41

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellants. Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Anne Deng, Assistant Attorney General, Tessa Gellerson, Assistant Attorney General, Chris Edward Mendez, Assistant Attorney General, Mark A. Rucci, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C.; Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, Julia Doyle, Solicitor General, Joshua M. Segal, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Adam Kirschner, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Drezner, Assistant Attorney General, Virginia A. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MINNESOTA, St. Paul, Minnesota; Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General, Hayleigh S. Crawford, Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona; Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Satoshi Yanai, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Miranda Mason, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Demian Camacho, Deputy Attorney General, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, San Diego, California; Phil Weiser, Attorney General, David Moskowitz, Deputy Solicitor General OFFICE OF THE COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Denver, Colorado; William Tong, Attorney General, Michael Skold, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT, Hartford, Connecticut; Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Ian R. Liston, Director of Impact Litigation, Vanessa L. Kassab, Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware; Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General, Kaliko‘onālani D. Fernandes, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HAWAII, Honolulu, Hawaii; Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, Sarah A. Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL, Chicago, Illinois; Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, Katherine Dirks, Chief State Trial Counsel, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, Boston, Massachusetts; Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Bryan Davis, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Debbie Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Labor Division, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, Detroit, Michigan; Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Heidi Parry Stern, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Las Vegas, Nevada; Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, Nathaniel Levy, Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Trenton, New Jersey; Raúl Torrez, Attorney General, Anjana Samant, Deputy Counsel for Impact Litigation, NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Letitia James, Attorney General, Mark S. Grube, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, New York, New York; Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Stacy M. Chaffin, Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OREGON, Salem, Oregon; Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General, Sarah W. Rice, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISLAND, Providence, Rhode Island; Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, Jonathan T. Rose, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 6 of 41

OF VERMONT, Montpelier, Vermont; Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General, Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Attorney General, WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Madison, Wisconsin, for Appellees. Samuel Everett Dewey, CHAMBERS OF SAMUEL EVERETT DEWEY, LLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Amici The Oversight Project and Dan Huff. Kristy Parker, Ori Lev, Washington, D.C., Conor Gaffney, New Orleans, Louisiana, Julia L. Torti, PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT, New York, New York, for Amici Former Government Officials.

6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 7 of 41

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Shortly after the 2025 Presidential Inauguration, the federal government began to

lay off thousands of probationary employees across multiple federal agencies. Many people

regard these sudden terminations as a harsh and dislocating action that works significant

hardship on many civil servants—individuals who committed their considerable energy

and talents to serving the nation. Others regard these terminations as part of a long-overdue

effort to downsize the federal government and trim unnecessary expenses. Complaints

about the bloat of the federal bureaucracy and concerns about preserving the public fisc

have long been facets of our political discourse.

This clash of views must ultimately be resolved by the voters. For our part, we deal

with a narrow constitutional question: whether a group of states has Article III standing to

challenge the composition of the federal workforce. Standing doctrine requires us to ensure

that the proper party is seeking the proper relief. Here that is not the case. Although it was

the employees who suffered the brunt of the harm, they are nowhere to be found in this

case. We conclude that the plaintiff States lacked standing here and return this case to the

district court with directions to dismiss it.

I.

A.

The federal government can hire employees subject to a one- or two-year

probationary period depending on the nature of the particular job. These probationary

employees are not at-will employees, but their employment is far from guaranteed. A

federal agency may terminate probationary employees (1) for conditions arising prior to

7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 8 of 41

their appointment; (2) for cause; or (3) as part of a reduction in force (“RIF”). See 5 C.F.R.

§§ 315.803(a), 315.805; 5 U.S.C. § 3502. For-cause termination requires an individualized

determination that the employee’s “work performance or conduct during [the probationary]

period fails to demonstrate his fitness or his qualifications for continued employment” after

being given a fair shake in the role. 5 C.F.R. § 315.804(a); see McGuffin v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., 942 F.3d 1099, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Younies v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 662 F.3d

1215, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

RIFs—administrative procedures to effectuate departmental reorganizations and/or

respond to the lack of available work—likewise provide certain procedural guardrails for

terminated federal employees. These requirements are numerous, spanning an entire Part

of the Code of Federal Regulations. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 351.201–351.902. Therefore, properly

preparing for and implementing a RIF can often take well over a year. See J.A. 235.

Out of all the RIF requirements, only one—a notice provision—has state

governments specifically in mind; the rest serve to vindicate the interests of the federal

employees alone. The notice provision mandates that the federal government provide both

released employees and state governments of the impacted jurisdictions 60 days’ notice

before termination. 5 U.S.C. § 3502(d). In emergency situations, the President may shorten

this notice period to no less than 30 days “if necessary because of circumstances not

reasonably foreseeable.” Id. § 3502(e)(1). The notice serves in part to help states “carry out

rapid response activities [required] under section 134(a)(2)(A) of the Workforce

Investment Act of 1998.” Id. § 3502(d)(3)(A)(i). These rapid response activities are meant

to “assist dislocated workers” in “obtaining reemployment as soon as possible” through,

8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 9 of 41

for example, “the provision of information on and access to available employment and

training activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 3102(51). Congress set forth the information that the notice

must contain to help states prepare for and conduct these activities: (1) the number of

terminated employees in specific geographic areas, (2) when the terminations will occur,

and (3) “any other matter” that would aid in facilitating the states’ rapid response activities.

5 U.S.C. § 3502(d)(3)(B).

Federal employees may contest the validity of their terminations under the Civil

Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) in an administrative tribunal known as the Merit Systems

Protection Board (“MSPB”). Probationary employees may only challenge terminations for

“improper procedure” or discrimination based on “partisan political reasons or marital

status.” 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. They may appeal an adverse decision of the MSPB to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which generally has exclusive

jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

B.

It is no secret that the current Administration aims to reduce the workforce of many

federal agencies. This mission began in earnest on day one, when the Office of Personnel

Management (“OPM”) distributed a guidance memorandum directing executive agencies

to “identify all employees on probationary periods” and “promptly determine whether

those employees should be retained.” J.A. 45. On February 11, 2025, the President issued

an Executive Order aiming to “eliminat[e] waste, bloat, and insularity” in the Executive

Branch and ordering agency heads to investigate ways of reducing the federal workforce,

including through RIFs. J.A. 482. On February 13, news media reported that OPM had

9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 10 of 41

directed multiple federal agencies to begin terminating the majority of the federal

government’s probationary employees en masse. J.A. 47. The next day, OPM followed up

over email with the human resources officials of each federal agency, asking them to

“separate probationary employees that you have not identified as mission-critical no later

than end of the day Monday, 2/27” in accordance with “the President’s directive to

dramatically reduce the size of the federal workforce.” J.A. 609–10.

Shortly thereafter, on February 26, OPM and the Office of Management and Budget

(“OMB”) issued another guidance memorandum in compliance with the February 11

Executive Order. RUSSELL T. VOUGHT & CHARLES EZELL, GUIDANCE ON AGENCY RIF

AND REORGANIZATION PLANS (Feb. 26, 2025). This document provided that “[a]gencies

should [] seek to consolidate areas of the agency organization chart that are duplicative;

consolidate management layers where unnecessary layers exist; [and] seek reductions in

components and positions that are non-critical.” Id. at 2. OPM and OMB instructed

agencies to continue “evaluat[ing] probationary employees” for the purposes of removal

and created a plan for future “large-scale reductions in force.” Id. at 3.

By February 13, 2025, various federal agencies had begun terminating large swaths

of probationary employees. For example, the USDA terminated approximately 3,400

employees in the Forest Service, the Treasury Department terminated approximately 6,000

employees, the VA terminated approximately 2,400 employees, and HHS terminated

approximately 1,300 employees. By early March, the federal government had terminated

at least 24,000 probationary employees. See J.A. 45–51.

10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 11 of 41

The government did not provide 60- or 30-days’ advance notice of the terminations.

The plaintiff States in this case allege that in the weeks after the terminations began,

affected jurisdictions began experiencing sharp increases in unemployment claims as

compared to the same period last year—including a 330% increase in Maryland and a

149% increase in California. J.A. 485. Plaintiffs further allege that they had to expend

substantial resources in response to the sudden and unnoticed terminations in order to

initiate the rapid response activities required under the Workforce Investment Act. For

instance, some created new websites and phone lines specifically intended to assist these

probationary employees. Finally, the States allege a diversion of significant financial and

personnel resources from other government programs to their rapid response programs.

See, e.g., J.A. 82–85, 104, 117–18, 125–26, 142–43.

C.

On March 6, 2025, 19 states and the District of Columbia (the “States”) sued 21

federal agencies in the United States District Court for Maryland, alleging that the

terminations of probationary employees were unlawful.1 Plaintiffs argued that the mass

terminations were unlawful because (1) the terminations were not a result of individualized,

for-cause determinations, (2) they therefore constituted a RIF, and (3) the federal

government did not comply with the statutory RIF requirements, which included giving

the States 60 days’ notice. J.A. 51–54, 71.

1 The 19 states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. J.A. 22–23.

11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 12 of 41

Plaintiffs requested both “immediate temporary relief” and “preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief.” J.A. 71–72. Specifically, the States requested “immediate

temporary relief restraining Defendants from terminating any probationary employees

without making specific, individualized determinations regarding the inadequacy of the

employee’s conduct or performance and reinstating probationary employees who were

terminated on or after January 20, 2025, as part of mass terminations that did not comply

with RIF procedures and were not based on individualized determinations of the

inadequacy of the employee’s conduct or performance.” J.A. 71. Next, plaintiffs sought

“preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining any further terminations that do not

follow the RIF requirements or requirements for separating probationary employees for

performance.” J.A. 72.

On March 13, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining

order (“TRO”). It ordered the government to “REINSTATE all Affected Probationary

Employees throughout the United States FORTHWITH, and in any event before March

17, 2025.” J.A 531. The district court further ordered that the defendants “SHALL NOT,

throughout the United States, conduct any future Reductions in Force (‘RIFs’)—whether

formally labeled as such or not—except in compliance with the notice requirements set

forth in 5 U.S.C. § 3502, relevant regulations set forth in Title 5, Chapter I of the Code of

Federal Regulations, and all other applicable law.” J.A. 531–32. In a footnote, the district

court added, “Nothing in this Order prohibits the Government from conducting lawful

terminations of probationary federal employees—whether pursuant to a proper RIF or else

for cause, on the basis of good-faith, individualized determinations, under the standards for

12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 13 of 41

making such determinations set forth in the foregoing Memorandum, and not as part of a

mass termination.” J.A. 532. The court stated that it planned to hold a preliminary

injunction hearing on March 26, 2025. Id.

The government appealed the TRO and requested an administrative stay or a stay

pending appeal. In the meantime, it began to reinstate the terminated probationary

employees in compliance with the district court’s order. See J.A. 537–607. On March 21,

this court denied the government’s motion, noting “the district court’s stated intention to

hold a hearing on March 26, 2025, and to promptly grant or deny preliminary injunctive

relief thereafter.” Order at 2, Maryland v. USDA, No. 25-1248 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025). In

a concurrence, Judge Rushing recognized “the growing concerns over district courts

issuing nationwide injunctions to order redress for those who have not sought it.” Id. at 4

(Rushing, J., concurring).

After extending the TRO and holding a hearing, the district court granted plaintiffs’

request for a preliminary injunction on April 1, 2025. J.A. 990–94. The preliminary

injunction was similar to the TRO, except that it was limited to reinstating and restraining

the government’s ability to terminate only those probationary employees “[w]hose duty

station (prior to any purported termination) and/or residence” was in one of the 20 plaintiff

jurisdictions. J.A. 993–94. The court ordered the government to “TAKE all steps necessary

to undo the purported terminations of such Affected Probationary Employees” to the extent

that was not completed pursuant to the TRO. J.A. 990. And it further ordered that the

government “SHALL NOT conduct any future Reductions in Force (‘RIFs’)—whether

formally labeled as such or not—with respect to Affected Probationary Employees, except

13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 14 of 41

in compliance with the notice requirements set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 3502, relevant

regulations set forth in Title 5, Chapter I of the Code of Federal Regulations, and all other

applicable law.” J.A. 990–91 (emphasis added). The court included the same footnote as

in the TRO, which indicated that the government was permitted to terminate federal

employees “(1) pursuant to a proper RIF conducted in compliance with all applicable laws,

or else (2) for cause, on the basis of good-faith, individualized determinations, under the

standards for making such determinations set forth in the TRO Memorandum.” J.A. 991.

The government promptly appealed the preliminary injunction and requested a stay

pending appeal. J.A. 995. On April 9, this court granted the government’s motion and

stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The panel majority concluded that the

government was “likely to succeed in showing the district court lacked jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ claims.” Order at 5, Maryland v. USDA, No. 25-1248 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025).

Judge Benjamin dissented on this point. Id. at 6. The States moved for an administrative

stay, which the panel majority denied. The panel then requested full briefing and held oral

argument.

II.

Article III requires that federal courts adjudicate only cases and controversies.

Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024). Justiciability turns on the threshold question

of standing: whether the party bringing suit is “a proper party to invoke judicial resolution

of the dispute.” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (quoting Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)). This is no “troublesome hurdle” to be cleared with

the most whimsical of attempts on the way to the merits. United States v. Texas, 599 U.S.

14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 15 of 41

670, 675 (2023) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of

Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 (1982)). Rather, Article III standing is an integral

component of our nation’s system of checks and balances and a key mechanism of judicial

restraint. Therefore, our exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate only when a plaintiff has

affirmatively established “(1) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete,

particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant, and

(3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the requested judicial relief.” Thole v. U.S.

Bank N.A., 590 U.S. 538, 540 (2020). To fail this three-part test is to put a period on the

case.

We hold that the States failed to allege a cognizable and redressable injury and look

no further into the merits of the preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs’ failure to receive notice sounds like a quintessential informational

injury—the federal government withheld information that the States had a statutory right

to receive. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998). But Congress

cannot create an injury-in-fact through legislative fiat alone. See TransUnion LLC v.

Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426 (2021). And the Supreme Court has specifically expressed

skepticism about informational injuries insofar as they do not result in “‘downstream

consequences’ from failing to receive the required information.” Id. at 442 (citation

omitted). Thus, to transform an informational injury-in-law into an injury-in-fact, plaintiffs

must allege “a ‘real’ harm with an adverse effect” resulting from the failure to receive the

15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 16 of 41

information. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016)).

The States advance two related theories of informational injury: first, that the injury

was the failure to obtain the specific information mandated by the notice requirement, and

second, that the injury was the preparatory time lost as a result of the failure to provide

notice. The alleged downstream harms caused by both alleged injuries converge into three

rough categories: (1) rapid-response-related expenses incurred prior to filing the present

lawsuit (e.g., the costs of creating the new websites and phone lines and any costs

associated with diverting resources to implementing the programs); (2) forward-looking

rapid-response-related expenses; and (3) various indirect impacts to state budgets (e.g., the

costs of processing heightened volumes of applications for state-subsidized health

insurance and the income tax losses for the period the probationary employees would have

worked had there been a 60-day notice period). See Response Br. at 14–15.

None of these categories provides a sufficient basis to find a cognizable injury-in-

fact. As an initial matter, the States cannot point to previously incurred expenses as a harm

for purposes of standing in a request for a preliminary injunction. “Past exposure to illegal

conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy” for purposes of equitable

relief. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974). Prospective relief must instead be

justified by prospective injury. See Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602

U.S. 367, 381 (2024) (requiring that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief show “sufficient

likelihood of future injury”); Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58. Even if directly attributable to the

16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 17 of 41

lack of notice, such expenses are in the past, so they can only support an action for damages,

not injunctive relief.

Thus, with regard to the rapid response programs, we focus only on the allegedly

ongoing and forward-looking expenses at the time the States filed their complaint. In doing

so, we look at whether these harms have a “close relationship to a harm traditionally

recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” TransUnion, 594 U.S.

at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341).

While monetary harms generally qualify as injuries-in-fact, we cannot view the

injuries of states at this high level of abstraction. We must instead consider the context in

which the alleged injuries arose. In United States v. Texas, no judicially cognizable injury

existed, despite the plaintiff states’ significant monetary harms, because the states were

contesting the “Executive Branch’s traditional discretion over whether to take enforcement

actions against violators of federal law.” Texas, 599 U.S. at 684. The Supreme Court further

noted that it was “mindful of bedrock Article III constraints in cases brought by States

against an executive agency or officer” in light of “our system of dual federal and state

sovereignty.” Id. at 680 n.3.

The federal government is required in all kinds of ways to respect the basic

sovereignty of the states. But the reverse is also true. It is hard to imagine a more

traditionally federal function than the management of the federal workforce. The federal

workforce performs federal functions. How it performs them is a matter of federal concern.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerated Congressional powers); art. II, § 3 (duty of the

Executive to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”). Indeed, the federal

17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 18 of 41

government “has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own

internal affairs’” including when it comes to the composition of its workforce. Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974) (internal citation omitted); see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416

U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he Government, as an employer,

must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal

affairs.”). Because the interest here is a traditionally federal one, the States have no

judicially cognizable injury under Texas.

A contrary result would upend our federalist system by ceding federal sovereignty

to the states. Innumerable federal actions impact state budgets and programs. Under

plaintiffs’ theory, every modification in federal funding levels would authorize states to

sue in federal court. This is all too open-ended. See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668,

672 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[T]he unavoidable economic repercussions of virtually all federal

policies, and the nature of the federal union as embodying a division of national and state

powers, suggest to us that impairment of state tax revenues should not, in general, be

recognized as sufficient injury in fact to support state standing.”). If we recognized a

cognizable injury here, there would be no end to the suits that states could bring to contest

any federal action.

Finally, the alleged declines in tax revenue and increased social services expenses

float ever further downstream. If states could claim these “peripheral costs” for purposes

of standing, there would effectively be no barrier to suit. Arizona v. Biden, 40 F.4th 375,

386 (6th Cir. 2022). Such a result would “would make a mockery . . . of the constitutional

requirement of case or controversy.” Id. (quoting Alexander Bickel, The Voting Rights

18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 19 of 41

Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89–90 (1966)). For example, any allegation of improper

termination by any federal employer could allow a state to swoop in and claim a tax loss

for standing purposes. The only limit would be states’ willingness to sue. The Court has

long been wary of taxpayer standing for similar reasons, see, e.g., United States v.

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974), and we see no reason to view tax-recipient standing

with any less skepticism. Such harms are often too generally applicable and too attenuated

from the legal violation to serve as cognizable injuries-in-fact. This is especially true given

the sweeping injunctive relief plaintiffs seek. See Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540,

2558 (2025) (“[T]he broader and deeper the remedy the plaintiff wants, the stronger the

plaintiff’s story needs to be.” (quoting Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Getting into

Equity, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1763, 1797 (2022))).

In holding that the States did not allege a cognizable injury, we recognize that they

are not the proper parties to bring this suit. The real and direct harms were suffered not by

the States, but by the terminated probationary employees, none of whom are even parties

to this suit. And while the States may have valid practical reasons to be concerned about

their citizens’ employment statuses, they may not masquerade their efforts to serve as

parens patriae. See Murthy, 603 U.S. at 76 (“States do not have ‘standing as parens patriae

to bring an action against the Federal Government.’” (quoting Haaland v. Brackeen, 599

U.S. 255, 295 (2023))). “An uninjured plaintiff” may not bypass the standing requirement

“to ensure a defendant’s ‘compliance with regulatory law.’” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 427

(quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 345 (Thomas, J., concurring)).

19 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 20 of 41

We now turn to redressability, the other component of Article III standing that

looms in the plaintiffs’ path. The government contends that there is a “mismatch between

the states’ informational injury theory” and the remedy of indefinite reinstatement of

probationary employees. Opening Br. at 27. It argues that any remedy here should have

been tailored to the States’ specific injury, namely an injunction that gave the States the

information they were missing due to lack of notice or at most a temporary reinstatement

of 60 days to provide the States with the time they allegedly lost. See id.; Oral Arg. at 12:00.

Instead the district court, for the duration of the case, prohibited the federal agencies from

terminating the probationary employees unless they did so in compliance with “all

applicable laws.” This required the government not only to provide notice to the plaintiffs

but also to comply with all the laws and regulations that protect the employees

themselves—who, again, are not parties to this case. As the government put it, “neither

federal personnel law nor the U.S. Constitution contemplates that the legality of any

employee’s termination—whether the terminations at issue here, or any future RIF that an

agency might execute—will be subject to the continuing jurisdiction of a federal district

court at the behest of state governments.” Reply Br. in Support of Mot. for a Stay Pending

Appeal at 9 n.1 (emphasis added).

The States counter that any mismatch between injury and remedy is not related to

standing but would instead be an error on the merits as to the “scope of relief” granted by

the district court. See Response Br. at 32; Oral Arg. at 18:50.

We think, however, that the broad remedy here presents a redressability problem—

not because that is what the district court ordered, but because that was the relief that

20 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 21 of 41

plaintiffs requested in their complaint. As we discuss below, the plaintiffs’ requested

equitable remedy primarily served to vindicate the interests and rights of the non-party

probationary employees. This creates a fatal disconnect between the plaintiffs’ alleged

injury and the sweeping relief they requested.

1.

Under black-letter standing doctrine, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that [its] injury

likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602

U.S. at 380. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “standing is not dispensed in gross”

and “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing . . . ‘for each form of relief’ that is sought.”

Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). And

even though the government does not contest causation, “[r]edressability can still pose an

independent bar” even where “the defendant has directly injured the plaintiff.” All. for

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381 n.1; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.

83, 106 n.7 (1998).

To assess redressability, we look to the relief that was requested by the plaintiff in

its complaint. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105–06; Murthy, 603 U.S. at 73. Our scrutiny of

the requested relief under Article III standing doctrine, especially where plaintiffs are

seeking an equitable remedy, ensures that the “proper parties” are seeking the “proper

relief” to redress their injuries. William Baude & Samuel L. Bray, Proper Parties, Proper

Relief, 137 HARV. L. REV. 153, 158–61 (2023) (collecting “cases about equitable remedies”

in which the Supreme Court “emphasizes the standing-remedy connection”). That is why

21 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 22 of 41

sometimes “standing and remedies intersect.” Texas, 599 U.S. at 690 (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring); see also O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499 (“[Article III standing] considerations

obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for

equitable relief.”).

This close evaluation of the requested relief in the standing analysis is important for

at least three reasons, all of which are relevant to this case. First, a plaintiff may not

normally seek relief in federal court to vindicate “the legal rights or interests of third

parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). In other words, “standing doctrine

strongly disfavors so-called ‘third party standing’” cases, where “even though the plaintiff

does have an injury in fact and it can be redressed by her suit, she is denied standing

nonetheless, because she is vindicating rights that more properly belong to somebody else.”

Baude & Bray, supra, at 157 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).

Second, and relatedly, we must closely examine the “connection between the

alleged injury and the judicial relief requested” to guard against cases “in which the relief

requested goes well beyond the violation of law alleged.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,

753 n.19 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). This approach serves “the general rule” that

“injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide

complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765

(1994) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)); see also CASA, 145 S.

Ct. at 2557. The “remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the

injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353 (quoting Lewis, 518

22 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 23 of 41

U.S. at 357) (noting that plaintiffs’ proposed theory of standing “would contravene this

principle”). “The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve the purpose . . . of

preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches [] if once a

plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration,

the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration.” Lewis, 518

U.S. at 357.

And third, probing the requested relief in the standing analysis helps us determine

whether a federal court is even capable of providing the remedy the plaintiff seeks. For

example, “the case may not be of the kind ‘traditionally redressable in federal court.’” All.

for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381 n.1 (quoting Texas, 599 U.S. at 676). Or the relief

requested by the plaintiff is simply “not available” because of a law passed by Congress,

such that the plaintiff “fail[s] to show that the District Court could order effective relief.”

Texas, 599 U.S. at 690 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 704 (Barrett, J., concurring). Or

perhaps the plaintiff’s requested relief would otherwise have the federal court act beyond

its proper role in a system of separated powers and dual sovereignty with the states. See,

e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 385 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Principles of federalism and

separation of powers impose stringent limitations on the equitable power of federal

courts.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061,

1110–11 (2015) (“In actions for equitable remedies . . . the concerns bearing on standing

merge along a spectrum with concerns about whether the relief sought would overreach the

bounds of judicial competence or enmesh the issuing court in functions more properly

reserved to democratically accountable institutions.”).

23 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 24 of 41

2.

As discussed, the States alleged an informational injury from the lack of advance

notice. They argued, and the district court agreed, that they were deprived of two discrete

things: (1) information and (2) 60 days of time to prepare in advance of the terminations.

Keeping these alleged injuries in mind, and assuming they are cognizable, we turn

to the relief requested in the plaintiffs’ complaint. In addition to requests for “immediate

temporary relief” to reinstate the terminated probationary employees, the plaintiffs

ultimately sued for “preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.” J.A. 71–72. The

plaintiffs sought a court order “enjoining any further terminations that do not follow the

RIF requirements or requirements for separating probationary employees for performance

and enjoining Defendants from separating any employees pursuant to a RIF prior to the

reinstatement of the probationary employees described above.” J.A. 72.

The word “notice” does not appear once in the prayer for relief. Nor does “60 days”

or any discrete time period. Instead, plaintiffs requested an order that would indefinitely

require the government to comply with “the RIF requirements” or the “requirements for

separating probationary employees for performance.” Because other parts of the complaint

listed the “RIF Requirements” separately from the “RIF Notice Requirements” to include

the myriad other steps the government must take before conducting a RIF pursuant to 5

U.S.C. § 3502, we can only conclude that the States’ use of the broader “RIF requirements”

in their prayer for relief was intentional. See J.A. 42–43. And when stating their claims, the

States likewise argued that the government violated the law by not “following the required

RIF procedures, see 5 U.S.C. § 3502; 5 C.F.R. Part 351, including providing 60 days’

24 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 25 of 41

notice to states.” J.A. 68 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs reiterate on appeal that the agencies

“fire[d] employees en masse based on shifting justifications and with no process, despite

clear statutory and regulatory commands to the contrary.” Response Br. at 49. According

to the plaintiffs themselves, the injunction they requested—because it requires the federal

government to follow “the proper RIF procedures”—would remedy the harms to “24,000

public servants” and vindicate their “interests.” Id.

Given all this, we are unable to construe the States’ requested relief and ultimate

goal in this case as anything other than an attempt to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction

to restrain the federal government from terminating its probationary employees unless it

fully complies with all applicable employment statutes and regulations.2 That is a far cry

from a narrow order that the agencies comply with the 60-day notice provision applicable

to the plaintiffs before us.

Plaintiffs’ requested relief was ultimately aimed at vindicating the rights of the non-

party employees. The 60-day notice requirement applicable to the States is just one

provision amid a sea of provisions in the RIF statute that otherwise seek to protect the

rights and interests of federal employees. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 3502; 5 C.F.R.

§§ 351.201–351.902. Just to prepare for a RIF, “an agency spends approximately 12 to 18

2 We note that the district court granted plaintiffs’ requested injunction accordingly. It restrained the government from conducting RIFs unless they were “proper” and “in compliance with all applicable laws.” J.A. 991. The court noted in its memorandum opinion that there “must” be “no more terminations until all legally mandated procedures, including [the notice period], have been satisfied.” J.A. 934 (emphasis added). And it stated that the injunction “will extend indefinitely until final judgment.” J.A. 974 (emphasis added).

25 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 26 of 41

months” to comply with all of these employee-centric provisions. J.A. 235. And the States’

alternative demand for individualized employee-by-employee determinations would

similarly vindicate employees’ rights. The proper parties to vindicate the rights of

employees under federal employment law are the employees themselves, not state

governments on their behalf.

For similar reasons, the sweeping relief requested by the States was overly broad

and disconnected from both their asserted injury and the relevant statutory violation, going

far beyond the “inadequacy that produced [plaintiffs’] injury in fact.” Cuno, 547 U.S. at

353. The indefinite reinstatement of federal employees is simply too much to request to

remedy a lack of notice.

These two related problems with the requested relief reflect the concerns that the

Supreme Court articulated in Warth v. Seldin, Allen v. Wright, and other decisions. The

strictures of Article III that constrain plaintiffs from seeking expansive relief on behalf of

third parties not before the court “tend[] to assure that the legal questions presented to the

court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete

factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454

U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see also TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423–24 (“Federal courts do not

possess a roving commission to publicly opine on every legal question. Federal courts do

not exercise general legal oversight of the Legislative and Executive Branches, or of private

entities.”). A challenge to the legality of the underlying federal employment actions here

belongs to the employees.

26 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 27 of 41

In sum, the States impermissibly sought to use the narrow violation of one provision

in this large statutory scheme to have a federal district court oversee the Executive’s

compliance with broader employment law. See Baude & Bray, supra, at 160 (“Equity had

to be conscious about whether the plaintiff’s grievance was commensurate with the remedy

sought, because otherwise a trifle of grievance could be the basis for a remedy that imposed

massive costs on the defendant.”). Federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain such

lopsided suits.

We need not decide what relief the plaintiffs here could have permissibly sought,

but the parties offer two ideas. The government acknowledges that an appropriate remedy

for plaintiffs’ informational injury would be an injunction requiring the government to

produce the required information. See Opening Br. at 25–26 (citing Pub. Citizen v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Akins, 524 U.S. at 21). And as for plaintiffs’

“temporal” injury, the government concedes and plaintiffs acknowledge that the States

could have requested a narrow injunction requiring the government to give notice of the

terminations and restraining the government from effectuating the terminations for the 60-

day notice period. See Oral Arg. at 12:00, 34:38. That relief would be tailored to the narrow

statutory violation at issue. It would not invoke, at the behest of state governments, the

jurisdiction of the federal courts to monitor and enforce the federal government’s

compliance with a plethora of legal provisions that are unrelated to the States and instead

protect individual employees.

3.

27 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 28 of 41

Quite simply, the federal court in this case lacked the affirmative power to manage

the federal government’s workforce at the behest of state governments. The Civil Service

Reform Act’s reticulated scheme further supports our conclusion on redressability. In the

CSRA, Congress “established a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action

taken against federal employees,” entitling employees to a hearing before the MSPB and

judicial review in the Federal Circuit. Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2012)

(quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 455 (1988)). The Supreme Court has

concluded that Congress intended this scheme to be “exclusive” and has twice rejected

employees’ attempts to litigate their claims in other forums. Id. at 5, 9–11, 23 (citing

Fausto, 484 U.S. at 452). Indeed, the CSRA scheme explains why not a single individual

employee is herself a plaintiff in this case. See J.A. 941. Given this comprehensive review

system, which excludes the federal district courts and where terminated employees are

directed to challenge their terminations and seek reinstatement, we are skeptical that the

broad relief that the States sought in this case is available to them in a federal district court.

See Texas, 599 U.S. at 690 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (observing “a lack of redressability”

where the requested “form of relief is not available”).

III.

We acknowledge that the abrupt and indiscriminate dismissal of the probationary

employees here exacted all-too-human costs upon those affected. But this real impact on

the employees, who are not parties here, cannot govern our review. Instead, we are required

to answer a narrower question concerning the plaintiffs in this case: whether a group of

states may invoke the jurisdiction of a federal district court to oversee the federal

28 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 29 of 41

government’s compliance with federal employment laws governing the termination of

federal employees. The relief requested here is wholly out of proportion to the injury

alleged. To hold that standing exists would upset, indeed revolutionize, the balance

inherent in dual sovereignty, one in which reciprocal respect must be accorded by one

sovereign to the paramount interests of another. We must hold, as the Supreme Court’s

decisions plainly dictate, that these plaintiffs lacked standing to seek the relief that they

did. We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to the district

court to dismiss the action.

VACATED WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS

29 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 30 of 41

DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority votes to dissolve the district court’s well-reasoned decision granting a

preliminary injunction. For the reasons below and those explained in thorough detail by

the district court, I would leave the preliminary injunction intact. Therefore, I respectfully

dissent.

Immediately upon assuming office, President Donald J. Trump appointed Charles

Ezell to serve as acting director of the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”). J.A.

45.1 The same day, Ezell distributed a memo to the directors and acting directors of

departments and agencies, directing the heads to “ ‘identify all employees on probationary

periods . . . and send a report to OPM listing all such employees’ no later than January 24,

2025” and to “promptly determine whether those employees should be retained by the

agency.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted in second quote). “Also on January 20,

2025, President Trump signed an executive order entitled ‘Hiring Freeze,’ ” instructing

“the Director of the Office of Management and Budget—in consultation with OPM and

the United States Department of Government Efficiency Service (‘DOGE’)—to ‘submit a

1 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize the “JA#” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.

30 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 31 of 41

plan to reduce the size of the Federal Government’s workforce through efficiency

improvements and attrition.’ ” Id. at 45–46.

“On February 11, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14210, entitled

‘Implementing the President’s “Department of Government Efficiency” Workforce

Optimization Initiative,’ ” which “directed agency heads to ‘promptly undertake

preparations to initiate large-scale reductions in force (RIFs), consistent with applicable

law, and to separate from Federal service temporary employees and reemployed annuitants

working in areas that will likely be subject to the RIFs.’ ” Id. at 46.

Shortly thereafter, various agencies began mass terminations, firing more than

twelve thousand employees within a month of the executive order: the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau terminated 143–173 employees; “the Department of Education

terminated 60 probationary employees”; “the General Services Administration notified

approximately 100 probationary employees that they would be terminated”; “the

Department of Energy terminated nearly 2,000 probationary employees” and “terminated

around 130 probationary employees in the Bonneville Power Administration” (380

reinstated later); the Department of Veterans Affairs terminated approximately 2,400

probationary employees; “OPM fired 250 probationary employees”; “the Small Business

Administration terminated around 720 probationary employees”; “the Department of

Agriculture terminated approximately 3,400 probationary employees”; “the Environmental

Protection Agency fired approximately 388 probationary employees”; “the Interior

Department fired approximately 2,400 probationary employees”; and “the Department of

Homeland Security terminated 605 probationary employees”; etc. Id. at 46–48.

31 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 32 of 41

On March 6, 2025, the States2 filed a complaint, arguing the Government’s mass

firings were in violation of law, arbitrary and capricious, and ultra vires. Id. at 68–70. The

States allege that the Government “ha[s] not abided by the statutory and regulatory

requirements for RIFs, including the requirement to provide 60 days’ notice to the Plaintiff

States.” Id. at 45. Specifically, the States allege that the Government failed to “designate

the ‘competitive areas’ in which employees would compete for retention,” “designate any

‘competitive levels’ of positions included in the RIFs,” “establish a retention register of

employees in each competitive level,” “rank employees for retention,” or “provide required

notices 60 days in advance of the effective date of termination to affected employees, their

collective bargaining representatives, or to Plaintiff States.” Id. at 51–52.

On March 7, 2025, the States filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO).

The district court granted the TRO, and this panel affirmed. Subsequently, the States

moved for a preliminary injunction, the district court granted the motion, and this panel

granted a stay of the preliminary injunction pending this appeal.

2 Plaintiff States are a consortium of nineteen states (Maryland, Minnesota, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia.

32 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 33 of 41

The majority finds that the States do not have standing. It ignored the real harms

asserted by the States, relies on a misreading of United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670

(2023), and adopts the Government’s willful ignorance of the States’ actual claims.

As the district court’s order ably set-out, the States clearly have standing to

challenge the process by which the Government has engaged in mass firings.3

To establish standing, “the plaintiff must have a ‘ “personal stake” ’ in the case.”

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.

811, 819 (1997)). To prove a personal stake, “plaintiffs must be able to sufficiently answer

the question: “ ‘What’s it to you?’ ” Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing

as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882

(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A satisfactory answer to this question requires

a plaintiff to show “(i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and

actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the

injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).

3 The majority and the Government repeatedly mischaracterize the basis of the States’ claims, asserting that the States are attempting to sue on behalf of their respective citizens for alleged unlawful firings. This mischaracterization not only misses the point but—more seriously—distracts from the States’ actual alleged harm. The States were entitled to proper notice, which the Government did not give. That is the basis for the instant suit.

33 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 34 of 41

For injury-in-fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain intangible injuries,

including an “informational injury,” can support standing. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n

v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,

449 (1989). “[A] statutory violation alone,” however, “does not create a concrete

informational injury sufficient to support standing.” Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.,

856 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341–42

(2016)). Instead, a “constitutionally cognizable informational injury requires that a person

lack access to information to which he is legally entitled and that the denial of that

information creates a ‘real’ harm with an adverse effect.” Id. (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at

339–40).

By this standard, the States’ informational injury cannot be a “dead end,” as the

Government claims. See Appellants’ Br. (ECF No. 58) at 8 (hereinafter “Opening Br.”).4

First, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3502(d), the Government was legally required to inform the

States at least 60 days before any RIF. See also 5 C.F.R. § 351.803(b). The Government

failed to do so, thereby depriving the States of information to which they were legally

entitled and satisfying the first requirement of a constitutionally cognizable informational

injury. See Dreher, 856 F.3d at 345.

4 Page numbers for citations to ECF documents utilize the page numbers in the red or blue headers on each document.

34 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 35 of 41

Next, as discussed in depth by the district court, the denial of this notice has, and

will continue to, cause real harm with significant adverse effects. See Maryland v. United

States Dep’t of Agric., 777 F. Supp. 3d 432, 449–53 (D. Md. 2025). Such adverse effects

include, but are not limited to, an increase in unemployment benefits applications, an

increase in the resources required to investigate this influx in unemployment benefits

applications, additional financial and labor costs associated with the sudden strain placed

on rapid response programs without advance notice, unanticipated loss of tax revenue, and

the loss of support from federal employees who were working with various state agencies.5

See id. These harms, among others, plainly satisfy the concreteness requirement and thus

provide the necessary grounds for Article III standing. See Dreher, 856 F.3d at 345.

The majority summarily dismisses the harms alleged by the States. I agree with the

majority that “the [probationary] employees . . . suffered the brunt of the harm” from the

RIFs, Maj. Op. at 7., but the States alleged the deprivation of statutory and regulatory

notice that the federal government owed them, resulting in harms foreseen by the statute.

5 The Government’s argument regarding the harms suffered by the States as a result of the lack of statutory notice is concerning. See Opening Br. at 28–29 (arguing that allowing standing “based on downstream harms to state budgets and operations from the termination of probationary employees. . . would permit states to access the federal courts to supervise nearly any federal government action, and it is irreconcilable with Supreme Court precedent”); see also Maj. Op. at 18 (“Innumerable federal actions impact state budgets and programs. Under [the States’] theory, every modification in federal funding levels would authorize states to sue in federal court. . . . If we recognized a cognizable injury here, there would be no end to the suits that states could bring to contest any federal action.”). All that is required is for the federal government to adhere to statutory notice requirements as set forth by federal law. The Government had the opportunity to conduct the RIF according to statutory procedure and chose not to do so.

35 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 36 of 41

See 5 U.S.C. § 3502(d)(3)(A)(i) (“Notice . . . shall be given to the State or entity designated

by the State to carry out rapid response activities.”); see also Maryland, 777 F. Supp. 3d.

at 454–55 (district court detailing “concrete” harms to the States). Far from “ceding federal

sovereignty to the states,” Maj. Op. at 18, the States ask only that the federal government

do what is required under law. The statute and regulations require the Government to give

60 days’ notice before a RIF. The Government refused, and it is their disregard for the law

that prompted this lawsuit.

Further, the district court correctly distinguished this case from Texas. Asking the

Government “to change its arrest or prosecution policies so that the Executive Branch

makes more arrests or initiates more prosecutions” is a far cry from requiring the

Government to adhere to a statutory notice requirement. See United States v. Texas, 599

U.S. 670, 677 (2023). The former “run[s] up against the Executive’s Article II authority

to enforce federal law” and seeks to mandate something of the Government that was not

already required. Id. at 678. The latter merely asks the Government to comply with

legally-mandated procedure.

Additionally, unlike in Texas, the Government inaction here was not discretionary.

In Texas, the states sought damages for the costs associated with incarceration and social

services based on the Government’s failure to exercise its discretion—i.e., its discretionary

inaction. Id. at 674, 684–85. Here, the alleged harms, namely, the unexpected increased

financial burden placed on rapid response programs, are a result of the Government’s

failure to adhere to statutory notice requirements—i.e., its actions contrary to law. One is

tangentially related to actions that the Government was not required to take, while the other

36 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 37 of 41

is directly related to an action the Government was required to and failed to take. For these

reasons, and those aptly explained by the district court, Texas is inapplicable here.

Moving to redressability, the majority’s understanding of that standing requirement

relies on a misread of the complaint, ignoring the interconnectedness of the RIF procedures

and blessing the Government’s attempt to read-in claims under the Civil Service Reform

Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–35.

It is important to understand the RIF notice procedures when reading the complaint.

5 U.S.C. § 3502(d)(1)(B) directs, as relevant here, “an employee may not be

released, due to a reduction in force, unless . . . the requirements of paragraph (3) are met

at least 60 days before an employee is so released. Id. Subsection (d)(3) states “[n]otice

under paragraph (1)(B) shall be given to the State or entity designated by the State to carry

out rapid response activities.” Id. § 3502(d)(3)(A)(i).

The regulations implementing the statutory RIF notice requirements are contained

in 5 C.F.R. § 351 Reduction in Force. Section 351 is an exhaustive and detailed framework

for RIFs, largely focused on proper identification of employees who may be subject to

RIFs. Subsection 803(b)(1) contains the notice due to states: “When 50 or more employees

in a competitive area receive separation notices . . . the agency must provide written

notification . . . to [t]he State or the entity designated by the State to carry out rapid

response activities.” 5 C.F.R. § 351.803(b)(1).

37 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 38 of 41

The additional detail in the regulation as compared to the statute is important. Not

only is notice required but § 351.803(b)(1) presumes that separated employees are “in a

competitive area.” Id. Subsection 402 requires competitive areas to be defined by each

agency. See id. § 351.402. Even a cursory search through the regulation indicates why

agencies must do so. A RIF cannot be effectuated—the employees subject to a RIF cannot

be identified—without knowing which competitive area an employee is in.

This includes the regulation’s notice provision. A state receives notice only if “50

or more employees in a competitive area” are subject to a RIF. Id. § 351.803(b)(1). And

a competitive area is only established when “employees compete for retention” during a

RIF process. Id. § 351.402(a). So, the notice provision is not unmoored from the larger

statutory and regulatory framework of RIFs but an essential part of the RIF requirements.

Throughout the complaint the States refer alternately to “RIF requirements” and

“RIF notice requirements.” Looking to the prayer for relief, the States request that the

Government be made to follow “RIF requirements.” J.A. 71–72. In noting the States use

of “RIF requirements” over “RIF notice requirements” in the prayer for relief, the majority

believes it has routed the States on redressability. If the States went through the trouble of

using two terms and then settling on one, then the use of only one of those terms operates

to the exclusion of the other. See Maj. Op. at 24 (“Because other parts of the complaint

listed the ‘RIF Requirements’ separately from the ‘RIF Notice Requirements’ to include

the myriad other steps the government must take before conducting a RIF pursuant to 5

U.S.C. § 3502, we can only conclude that the States’ use of the broader ‘RIF requirements’

38 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 39 of 41

in their prayer for relief was intentional.”) (citation omitted). So, by choosing “RIF

requirements” the States are asking for relief broad enough to encompass not just their lack

of notice but also the probationary employees’ claims.

While creative, this seemingly simple “close evaluation of the requested relief,”

Maj. Op. at 22, can only be achieved by ignoring context. As discussed above, the RIF

notice requirements contained in the statute and the regulations are not divorced from the

broader RIF requirements. It is impossible to determine if a state receives notice under

§ 351.803(b)(1) without dozens of other decisions being made by OPM and the individual

agencies. See Maryland, 777 F. Supp. 3d. at 446 (“[A]gencies must, among other

requirements: identify ‘competitive areas’ . . . [and] rank employees based on various

criteria.”).

Though the majority attempts to distinguish between “RIF requirements” and “RIF

notice requirements,” any reasonable read of the complaint must be in the context of the

RIF statutes and regulations. Far from “an attempt to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction

to restrain the federal government from terminating its probationary employees unless it

fully complies with all applicable employment statutes and regulations,” Maj. Op. at 25

(emphasis removed), the States can only receive relief for the harms inflicted on them with

“adequate notice followed by forbearance—no more terminations until all legally

mandated procedures, including passage of the requisite period of time, have been

satisfied.” Maryland, 777 F. Supp. 3d. at 460 . Nowhere do the States ask for more than

39 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 40 of 41

they need. Any suggestion “that the mere provision of notice would do the trick toggles

between naïve and disingenuous.” Id. (internal citation omitted).6

The majority further aligns with the Government by converting their arguments on

the CSRA into an additional redressability bar. See Maj. Op. at 27 (“The Civil Service

Reform Act’s reticulated scheme further supports our conclusion on redressability.”).

The CSRA “provides for the original and exclusive administrative review of certain

labor- and employment-related claims brought by federal employees and/or their unions.”

Maryland, 777 F. Supp. 3d. at 462. The Government argues the CSRA precludes the

States’ claims because “the exclusion of states from the CSRA’s review scheme reflects

Congress’s considered judgment limiting who may challenge a personnel decision and on

what grounds—rather than providing carte blanche for states to sue outside the CSRA’s

comprehensive scheme.” Opening Br. at 39.

The States do not dispute that they cannot receive relief under the CSRA—instead,

they have consistently argued that their harm arises from an independent “statutory right[]

to notice.” Appellees’ Br. (ECF No. 63) at 85; Mem. in support of motion for prelim. inj.

6 I note also that nowhere in its opinion does the majority address the Government’s case-long assertion that they “Did Not Conduct A Reduction In Force.” Opening Br. at 43. No matter the relief the Government argues would have been appropriate to ask for, see Maj. Op. at 19–20 (discussing Government’s redressability argument), it is reasonable to question whether the Government’s redressability argument was designed to avoid the RIF statute and regulations altogether.

40 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1338 Doc: 70 Filed: 09/08/2025 Pg: 41 of 41

(D. ECF No. 78-1) at 15. As discussed previously, § 351.803(b)(1) requires the States

receive notice—not employees. I, like the district court, am not prepared to accept “the

faulty premise that the States [are] simply trying to vindicate the interests of the terminated

workers (as opposed to their own and separate harms as ‘state qua states’).” Maryland,

777 F. Supp. 3d. at 463.

* * *

Accordingly, the States have successfully answered the question: “ ‘What’s it to

you?’” See TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 423 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Standing based on the alleged informational injury is thus appropriate here.

I adopt the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned analysis of both standing and

the merits of the preliminary injunction. Instead of focusing on the case and claims before

us, the majority impermissibly broadens the scope to “whether a group of states has Article

III standing to challenge the composition of the federal workforce.” Maj. Op. at 7. As

explained above and in great detail by the district court, nowhere have the States asked to

micromanage the Government. They ask merely for what they are due—notice under the

statutes and regulations.

Because I will not endorse the Government’s attempt to circumvent our Nation’s

laws, I respectfully dissent.