State of Maine v. Seymore

Maine Superior

State of Maine v. Seymore

DecidedSeptember 1, 2009

DocketCUMcr-09-3427

StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. Seymore (State of Maine v. Seymore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State of Maine v. Seymore, (Me. Super. Ct. 2009).

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Opinion

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET CUMBERLAND, ss. CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CUMCD-09-3427 (-,

_)' STATE OF MAINE,

Plaintiff

v. ORDER & DECISION

CATRINA LYNN SEYMORE,

Defendant.

BACKGROUND

The defendant, Catrina Lynn Seymore (Seymore), is charged with one count ofEngaging

in Prostitution, a Class E crime. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 853-A. 1 A Class E crime is punishable by up

to a $1,000 fine and six months imprisonment, but section 853-A(l )(A) articulates that for a

first-time violation the "sentencing alternatives may include only the penalties provided in

section 1301." Section 1301 states that a person convicted of a crime "may be sentenced to pay

a fine," and provides guidelines amounts? Seymore alleges that, in accordance with 17-A

1 Section 853-A states: I. A person is guilty of engaging in prostitution if: A. The person engages in prostitution as defined in section 851. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, except that the sentencing alternative may include only the penalties provided in section 130 I; or B. The person violates paragraph A and, at the time of the offense, the person has one or more prior convictions under this section or for engaging in substantially similar conduct to that contained in this section in another jurisdiction. Section 9-A governs the use of prior convictions when determining a sentence, except that, for the purposes of this paragraph, the date of the prior conviction may not precede the commission of the offense by more than 2 years. Violation ofthis paragraph is a Class D crime. 2 The relevant portions of section 1301 are: "1-A. A natural person who has been convicted of a Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D or Class E crime may be sentenced to pay a fine, unless the law that the person is convicted of violating expressly provides that the fine and imprisonment penalties it authorizes may not be suspended, in which case the convicted

0 11 , , , I C, - I - 1'0. M.R.S.A § 4-B, since the section of the statute with which she is charged does not impose any

jail time, it is a civil violation, not a crime. 3 On this basis, Seymore has moved, pursuant to M.R.

Crim. P. 12(b)(2), to dismiss the complaint for failure to allege a criminal offense. For the

reasons discussed below, her motion is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The interpretation of statutes is a question of law. State v. Day, 2000 ME 192, ,-r5, 760

A.2d 1039, 1040. The court first looks to the plain meaning ofthe statute and "considers the

particular language in the context of the whole statutory scheme." !d. (internal citations

omitted). Although, criminal statutes must be strictly construed, "judicial interpretation must be

reasonable and sensible, with a view to effectuating the Legislature." State v. Millett, 392 A.2d

521, 525 (Me. 1978). If there are ambiguities after strictly construing a criminal statute, the

statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant, but statutory language should not be construed

so as to provide "absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results." State v. Day, 1999 ME 29, ,-r13, 724

A.2d 1245, 1247; see also State v. Wilder, 2000 ME 32, ,-r 30, 748 A.2d 444, 452. However the

court must not lose sight of the integral principle "that, where the language of a statute [is] plain

and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation. State

v. Millett, 392 A.2d at 525 (citing Chase v. Edgar, 259 A.2d 30, 32 (Me. 1969)).

person must be sentenced to the imprisonment and required to pay the fine authorized in that law. Subject to these sentences and to section 1302, the fine may not exceed: ... E. $1,000 for a Class E crime." Section 1302 provides the criteria for imposing fines, namely an offender's ability to pay the fine.

3 Section 4-B(3) states: "A law or ordinance which prohibits defined conduct, but does not provide an imprisonment penalty, is a civil violation, enforceable in accordance with subsection I. A law or ordinance which is stated to be a criminal violation or which otherwise uses language indicating that it is a crime, but does not provide an imprisonment penalty is a civil violation ... unless the law or ordinance is an exception to the operation of this subsection."

2 II. Section 853-A

The court concludes that violating section 853-A is a crime, not a civil violation, and

Defendant Seymore's argument fails because it ignores the plain language and the entire

statutory schema of section 853-A.

The plain language of section 853-A clearly indicates the criminal nature of the statute by

establishing that a first time violation of the statute is a Class E crime, and subsequent violations

are Class D crimes. 4 The court concludes that not only is the statute clear and unambiguous, but

also that to construe it any other way would cause absurd results because it would render the

statute essentially useless. If, as Seymore contends, first time violators could only be convicted

of a civil violation then section 853-A (1 )(B) would be of no use because no one would ever

have prior criminal convictions under the statute. Thus, the court disagrees with Seymore's

contention that the statute should be construed as a civil violation, both because it contravenes

the plain language of the statute, and because the interpretation would render absurd results. 5

Defendant Seymore further asserts that since the portion of section 853-A with which she

is charged does not provide for imprisonment this portion of the statute can only be a civil

violation. The court is not persuaded by this argument. "Statutes should be construed as a

whole." Walters v. Ives, 1988 Me. Super. LEXIS 137, 16 (June 6, 1988) (citing Inman v.

4 The defendant alleges that the Legislature intentionally made violation of section 853-A a civil violation because they could have amended the language of the statute when making the 2001 amendments to exclude the applicability of 4-B. The court disagrees. Although it is not necessary to discern the legislative intent behind the statute since its purpose is clear from the plain language, the court notes that one of the primary purposes for the 2001 amendments was to make the entire Chapter 17-A gender neutral. See L.D. 128, Summary, at lines 34-37 (120th Legis. 2001) (stating that the changes include "language to make the statutes gender neutral"); see also Kimball v. Land Use Regulation Commission, 2000 ME 20, ~ 19,745 A.2d 387,392 (stating that "only when the words are susceptible of multiple meanings, or render the enactment an absurdity or nullity, should the court explore the indicia of legislative intent"). 5 The court further notes that as the statute is not ambiguous, the "Rule of Lenity" is inapplicable.

3 Willinski, 144 Me. 116, 123, 65 A.2d 1, 5 ( 1916) ). The meaning of a statute "is to be sought by

an examination and consideration of all of its parts and not from any particular word or phrase

that may be contained in it. This is the guiding star in the construction of any statute. Such a

construction must prevail as it will form a consistent and harmonious whole." !d.

Lastly, a plain reading of section 853-A reveals two different penalties for violating the

statute, one that allows imprisonment and one that imposes a fine. "The fact that one sentence

does not refer to imprisonment as a sanction does not alter the criminal import of the provision."

See Walters, 1988 Me.

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