State of Maine v. Seamans

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: July 29, 2005
• Docket: PENcr-04-770
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, ss. CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CR-04-770 I - ! ' * * - .. . .. -. \

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RICHARD SEAMANS, JR., Defendant

Before the court is defendant's motion to suppress all the evidence obtained by

the State as a result of an interaction between Penobscot Deputy Jared Austin and

defendant on June 27,2004.

Defendant contends that Deputy Austin conducted an unlawful search of

Seamans's residence on that date and obtained statements from Seamans that were both

in violation of mranda and involuntary. He also contends that certain observations

that were made by Deputy Sean McCue of the contents of a w h t e van later on June 27,

2004 should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.

After a hearing held on January 6,2005, the court finds the following facts:

Initial Information

On Sunday, June 27, 2004 shortly after 7 am, Penobscot County Deputy Jared

Austin received a call from h s dispatcher stating that a citizen named Eugene Shorey

had reported (1)that he had observed a vehcle go off the road in Corinna, (2) that the

driver, rtchard Seamans, was intoxicated, and (3) that after the accident Shorey had

driven Seamans back to Seamans's residence. Austin was in the Bangor area and proceeded immediately to Corinna, where he met Shorey at the accident scene. Austin

spoke with Shorey by cell phone w h l e on h s way to Corinna and again at the accident

scene, and Shorey both times stated that h s vehcle had been following a w h t e van

with dealer plates, w h c h he said had come from a business called "Route 7 Auto."

Shorey had seen the van drifting all over the roadway and had then seen it leave the

roadway, become airborne, and come to rest in a field.

Shorey stated he had stopped and had observed Rchard Seamans, with whom

he was acquainted, walk toward h m from the direction of the van. Seamans was

visibly intoxicated and told Shorey he was "sht faced." Seamans then asked Shorey for

a ride home, telling Shorey h s would be Seamans's fourth OUI. Shorey then dropped

Seamans off at h s home.

-At the accident site D e p t y _A_~-~stin observed a level stretch of two-lane roadway

along Route 7 with dry pavement. In a field along side the road there was a w h t e van

and what Austin described as a debris field, mostly pieces of plastic that appeared to

have come from the underside of the van. Austin inspected the van and opened the

front door to make sure there was no one injured inside. When he did, he smelled the

odor of intoxicants and observed a bottle of an alcoholic beverage called "Aftershock"

on the floor on the driver's side.

Interaction at Defendant's Residence

Austin then asked Shorey to direct h m to the residence of Seamans. Austin

followed Shorey to the mobile home park where Seamans lived, and Shorey pointed out

the mobile home where Seamans resided. Shorey then departed because he was

concerned about being present for a confrontation with Seamans. Approximately 35

minutes had elapsed since Austin first received the call from h s dispatcher, and less

than an hour had elapsed since Shorey had observed the whte van leave the road. Austin walked up to the residence, and as he approached the door, noticed that a

male (later identified as Seamans) was observing h m through a window. Austin

banged on the door and yelled out for Seamans to come to the door. Seamans then

opened the door and Austin observed that he was visibly intoxicated, eyes red, speech

slurred, and swaying. At one point Seamans appeared to lose h s balance and grabbed

onto the doorframe. Deputy Austin was standing on the landing outside of the door

with one foot on the doorsill when he spoke to Seamans. Seamans was originally calm

but became belligerent when Austin explained why he was there, and Seamans then

told Austin he had been at h s residence all night.

Seamans then tried to slam the door on Austin but because Austin's foot was in

the door, the door did not close. Seamans walked back into the house and sat down on

the couch. Austin followed. At that point he believed he had probable rase to arrest

Seamans for OUI and wanted to administer an alcohol test to Seamans as soon as

possible. He believed it would take several hours to obtain a search warrant and he

was concerned that there would be a change in Seamans's blood alcohol content in the

interim. Austin testified that at that point Seamans was not free to go. He asked

Seamans several questions while Seamans was seated on the couch and Seamans

responded that he was not going to tell Austin anytlung.

Suddenly Seamans got up and bolted for the back of the mobile home. Austin

followed, concerned either that Seamans was going to flee or that he was going to grab

a weapon. Austin had observed a number of hunting weapons in the residence.

Seamans entered a bedroom at the back of the residence and unsuccessfully tried to

shut the bedroom door on the officer. Austin then entered the bedroom and found that

Seamans was calling 911. When the call was connected, Seamans handed the phone to

the officer, who explained the situation to the dispatcher and asked for backup. At h s point Austin began trying to de-escalate the situation to avoid any

confrontation with Seamans. He acknowledged that such de-escalation also is designed

to put suspects more at ease and more likely to answer questions. When Seamans said

he had to go to the bathroom, Austin, after checlung the bathroom for weapons,

allowed Seamans to use the bathroom with the door open.

Austin told Seamans he would be transported to the Penobscot County Jail, and

Seamans picked up a pair of shoes. He immediately put them down, stating that they

were wet, and put on another pair. Austin collected the wet pair of shoes for

comparison with footprints at the accident site.

Interactions in Transit and at the Penobscot Countv Tail

On the drive to the jail Seamans had calmed down. Austin and Seamans

engaged it-l snme r ~ n ~ ~ e r s a t i2hnl~t l ~ t - l hmting. Sez~..ns then x 2 d e 2 st2temer.t te tk.e

following effect, "You're the nicest cop I've met. N o h n g personal, but I need my

license for work." Although the State argues that tlus statement was volunteered, the

court finds that Seamans made the statement by way of explaining why he had

belligerently declined to answer Austin's questions in the residence. No Miranda

warnings had been g v e n at the residence, nor were such warnings given at any

subsequent time in the interaction between Austin and Seamans.

At the jail Austin asked Searnans if he would submit to a breath test, and the

latter replied, "I'm not going to take any of your tests." The officer went through the

implied consent form with Seamans and explained the consequences of refusal. Some

discussion ensued, and Seamans asked to telephone h s father - w h c h Austin allowed -

but after spealung with lus father, Searnans adhered to lus refusal to take the test.

Austin and Seamans had some further discussion on the subject on whether an

accident report was required under 29-A M.R.S.A. 52251. Told by Austin that accident reports were required for incidents involving property damage of $1,000 or more,

Seamans stated, "When I got out, I didn't see more than $500." Asked by Austin if he

had looked underneath the vehcle, he said that he had. In the booking room at some

point the officer also asked if Seamans needed mehcal attention. He said he had a sore

neck but it did not need treabnent.

Observations of Deputv McCue

In the meantime, Deputy Sean McCue had been dispatched to examine the van

but when he got to the accident scene, the van was gone. When he reported this by

phone to Austin and Austin asked Seamans where the van had gone, Seamans grinned

and said, "I don't know what you're tallung about." He later stated, however, that he

had called h s father and asked h m to pick up the van and take it back to Route 7 Auto

Sales - somethng th-at the police learned independently from Seamans's father when

the latter came to the jail to bail Seamans out.

Deputy McCue testified that he had been called out early on June 27, 2004, went

to the accident scene and saw signs of the accident but no van. At a subsequent time

that day, McCue was told to look for the van at Route 7 Auto, and he proceeded to that

location. Route 7 Auto consists of a parlung lot and a garage located in the area of the

lot away from the road. In the parlung lot, McCue found a w h t e van. There were three

rows of vehcles parked in the lot, and the whte van was parked in the h r d row at the

back of the lot. McCue walked onto the lot and inspected the van. There was some

grass hanging from a bumper and apparent damage to a parlung light, to the front

grille, to the muffler and to the left rear door. The van was locked but McCue looked

inside the driver's side and passenger's side windows and saw some muddy

handprints and a bottle of Aftershock liquor on the driver's side floor. Discussion

The court recognizes that h s case lies at the intersection of various lines of legal

precedent relating to warrantless arrests on a defendant's premises, warrantless arrests

of suspects on the thresholds of their residences, and exigent circumstances. See Welsh

v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); Pavton v.

New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); 3 LaFave, Search & Seizure §§ 6.l(a), 6.l(e),6.l(f) (2004).

In Welsh v. Wisconsin, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that where Wisconsin

treated a first offense OUI as purely a civil violation, the warrantless arrest of a

defendant in h s home in order to obtain a blood alcohol test violated the Fourth

Amendment. 466 U.S. at 754. In particular, the court stated, where exigent

circumstances were claimed, "an important factor to be considered in determining

whetk-er any exigency exists is the graviv of the l-lnderlying offense for which the arrest

is being made." Id. at 753. The decision left open the issue of whether exigent

circumstances would have been found if there had been probable cause to conclude that

the defendant had committed a criminal as opposed to a civil offense or whether

warrantless arrests in a defendant's residence would only be permitted if there were

both exigent circumstances and probable cause to believe the defendant had committed

a serious criminal offense such as a felony.

In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), although not presented with a

warrantless arrest,' the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the crucial distinction in

Welsh was between "non-jailable" and "jailable" offenses. 531 U.S. at 336. Given

1 McArthur involved whether law enforcement officers could prevent a suspect from reentering his own home for two hours while they obtained a search warrant. The officers had probable cause to believe that the suspect had hidden marijuana in his residence, and there was reason to believe he would destroy the evidence if allowed to reenter. The offenses in question were misdemeanors. McArthur, the court is of the view that the Maine Law Court, if presented with tkus

issue, would join those states w h c h have permitted warrantless arrests for jailable OUI

offenses inside a defendant's residence where the law enforcement officers had

probable cause to believe the defendant had operated under the influence and where

exigent circumstances also existed in that there was a need to promptly obtain evidence

of the defendant's blood alcohol content. See, e.G State v. Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557,565-

66 (Iowa 2004); State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 266-68 (Mum. 1996); City of Orem v.

Henrie, 868 P. 2d 1384, 1392 (Utah 1994).' T h s is particularly true because the Law

Court has emphasized the magnitude of the State's interest in addressing the problem

of intoxicated drivers. See State v. Chase, 2001 ME 168 ¶ I 2 785 A.2d 702, 706; State v.

Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1996).

Turning from the law to the f a c t of this casei the col-lrt c n n d d e s that at the t i m e

Deputy Austin went to the door of Seamans's residence, he had probable cause to arrest

Seamans for operating under the influence based on what had been reported to Austin

by Shorey. Moreover, because of the need to obtain contemporary evidence as to

Seamans's blood alcohol level before any alcohol in h s blood dissipated over time3,

exigent circumstances also existed at the time Austin ordered Seamans to open the

door. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). The combination of

probable cause and exigent circumstances permitted Austin to enter the residence in

order to arrest Searnans.

2 Professor LaFave appears to agree with this approach, although he notes that there are a number of jurisdictions that have reached a different result. 3 LaFave Search & Seizure tj 6.1(f) at 3 16 n. 2 11. At the time of the contrary decisions he cites, however, the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet decided Illinois v. McArthur. There was also the possibility that Searnans, if left at his residence, might ingest more alcohol, thus clouding the issue of his blood alcohol level at the time of operation. Indeed, at the time that Austin went to the door of Seamans's residence, he not

only had probable cause to believe that Seamans had committed a misdemeanor OUI

but also had probable cause to believe that Seamans had committed a felony OUI, based

on Seamans's statement to Shorey that this was h s fourth OUI.4

Whether Austin's command to Seamans to open the door is treated as a seizure,

see State v. Patterson, 2005 ME 26 qI.9 10-14, 868 A.2d 188, 191-192, or as a search, Austin

had both probable cause and exigent arcumstances. Austin's observations of Seamans

at the door are not subject to suppression. Moreover, whle Austin ordinarily would not

thereafter have been entitled to pursue Seamans into his residence in order to effect a

warrantless arrest, Austin's arrest of Seamans was valid in this case because the State

has met its burden of establishng the existence of both probable cause and exigent

circl~mstmces.See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 741 (cit;,=g P.vton 1.7. New Ynrk, 445 U.S. 573

(1980), for the proposition that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances,

warrantless arrests in the home are prohtbited by the Fourth Amendment). It follows

that Seamans's subsequent refusal of a breath test is also admissible.

Two other issues remain: the first is the status of statements made by Seamans

after the point when Austin pursued Seamans into his residence. The State has the

burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on Mzranda warning issues. The

court initially concludes that the State has proven that Seamans was not in custody

This is true even though Seamans was not ultimately charged with a Class C OUI in this case. In this connection, the court is aware that the District Attorney's office for Penobscot County has a practice of not listing prior OUI offenses in its misdemeanor complaints, although it does bring any prior OUI offenses to the attention of the judge at the time of any sentencing. The court is not aware what practice the District Attorney's office follows with respect to Class C OUI offenses. In any event, however, the dispositive issue is not what Seamans was eventually charged with but what Austin had probable cause to believe at the time. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. at 746 n.6. during the conversation that occurred at the door. Even if Seamans had been "seized"

at that time, by virtue of Austin's order that he should come to the door, see State v.

Patterson, 2005 ME 26 10-14, 868 A.2d at 191-92, a reasonable person in Seamans's

position would not have concluded he was in police custody and constrained "to a

degree associated with formal arrest." State v. Mchaud, 1998 ME 251 ¶ 4, 724 A.2d

1222,1226. Once Austin pursued Seamans into h s residence, however, Searnans was in

custody for purposes of Miranda and remained so thereafter.

Based on its earlier findings, the court concludes that the State has failed to meet

its burden of showing that Seamans's subsequent statement during the ride to jail

("nothing personal, but I need my license to work") was volunteered. That statement

appears at least as likely to have been a delayed explanation for Seamans's failure to

respond to Ai- sti in's ea~lierqi-~estionsin the residence: Similarly, Sea-m.ansls estimate

that there was only $500 in damage to the van was elicited by police questioning w h l e

he was in custody and no Miranda warning had been given.

At the same time, the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the

" n o h n g personal" statement and all of the other statements made by Seamans were

voluntary. The court concludes that all the statements made by Seamans resulted from

h s free choice, that they were the product of a rational mind, that they were not elicited

by coercive police conduct and that, under all the circumstances, the admission of the

statements at trial would be fundamentally fair. See State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1 q[ 10,

704 A.2d 387, 390-91, denied, 523 U.S. 1129 (1998).

The final issue involves Deputy McCue's observations of the van at Route 7 Auto

Sales. So long as Deputy McCue was in a place where he was lawfully entitled to be,

he was entitled to peer into the interior of the van. See State v. Hamman, 467 A.2d 745,

748 (Me. 1983), quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (plurality). The