State of Maine v. Nicholas P. Lovejoy

2024 ME 42

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: May 23, 2024
• Docket: Ken-23-43
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2024 ME 42 Docket: Ken-23-43 Argued: December 6, 2023 Decided: May 23, 2024

Panel: HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ, and HUMPHREY, A.R.J. 1

STATE OF MAINE

v.

NICHOLAS P. LOVEJOY

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Nicholas P. Lovejoy appeals from a judgment of conviction of

intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2024), entered in the

trial court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J.) on Lovejoy’s conditional guilty plea. He

argues that the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence that

was obtained from an allegedly unlawful traffic stop and a subsequent search

of his home without a warrant and without any applicable exception to the

warrant requirement. Further, Lovejoy contends that the court abused its

discretion in considering his mental state and post-crime conduct in step two

1 Although Justice Jabar participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified. Although not available at oral argument, Active Retired Justice Humphrey participated in the development of this opinion. See M.R. App. P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified Justice may participate in a decision even though not present at oral argument.”). 2

of its sentencing analysis. We conclude that the court properly denied Lovejoy’s

motion to suppress because the traffic stop was supported by reasonable,

articulable suspicion and because the warrantless search of his home was,

considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable response to what

law enforcement knew, and had an objectively reasonable basis to believe at

the time, to be an exigent circumstance. We also conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in sentencing Lovejoy. We therefore affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] We view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s

order on the motion to suppress.” State v. Akers, 2021 ME 43, ¶ 2, 259 A.3d 127.

The following facts are supported by competent record evidence. See id.

[¶3] Lovejoy and the victim were long-term romantic partners and the

parents of twin children. Lovejoy, the victim, and the children, who were eight

years old at the time of the events in this case, lived together in an apartment

in Waterville. On October 22, 2019, at around 6:45 p.m., a friend of the victim

contacted the Waterville Police Department because she was concerned for the

victim’s well-being. The friend told the police that she had not heard from the

victim all day, which was unusual, and that there was a history of domestic

violence between Lovejoy and the victim. Officers were dispatched for a 3

welfare check and arrived at the family’s home at 7:13 p.m. The dispatcher

advised the officers that Lovejoy had a history of possessing firearms.

[¶4] The officers did not observe anyone at the home and were unable to

contact Lovejoy, the victim, or the victim’s friend, so they returned to the

station. At around 8:00 p.m., two other friends of the victim went to the

Waterville Police Department and expressed concern for the victim’s safety. At

10:30 p.m., Officer Codey Fabian and Sergeant Jason Longley returned to the

home and observed lights on inside the residence and the victim’s car parked

in the driveway.

[¶5] The officers knocked on the door. Lovejoy opened the door, and the

officers stated their concern for the victim’s safety. Lovejoy responded that the

victim had left around 7:30 that morning to bring the children to the school bus

stop, after which she came back to the residence, left to get coffee at the store,

and after returning home with the coffee, then left the residence on foot at

9:00 a.m. Lovejoy stated that he did not know where she had gone and that she

had not returned. The officers asked if they could enter the home, but Lovejoy

declined because the children were asleep inside. The officers and Lovejoy

talked for about forty-five minutes. At the end of the conversation, Lovejoy

asked the officers whether he could leave the children asleep in the home while 4

he went to look for the victim. The officers told him that the children were not

old enough to be left alone in the home.

[¶6] After talking with Lovejoy, Sergeant Longley instructed Officer

Fabian to remain and surveil Lovejoy’s home. Officer Fabian parked his police

cruiser on the street around the corner from the home at a location where he

could see the side of the home and the victim’s car parked in the driveway.

Using a pair of binoculars, Officer Fabian watched Lovejoy through a window

as he appeared to mop the floor of the kitchen. At 11:37 p.m., Officer Fabian

observed Lovejoy exit the home and walk his dog around the property for

twelve minutes.

[¶7] At 12:30 a.m., Officer Fabian observed Lovejoy exit the home and

get into the victim’s car, pulling it out onto the street where the officer was

parked. At 12:31 a.m., after noting that one of the two rear license plate lights

was out on the victim’s car, Officer Fabian stopped Lovejoy about ten to twenty

yards from the home.

[¶8] Other officers arrived, including Sergeant Longley. Officer Fabian

spoke to Lovejoy at the driver’s-side window. Sergeant Longley, who had

walked around to the opposite side of the car, observed a shotgun, with a loaded

magazine, sitting on the front passenger seat. Lovejoy admitted that the gun 5

was loaded and told the officers that he was on the way to the store and had the

gun for self-defense. Lovejoy was arrested for having a loaded firearm in a

motor vehicle (Class E), in violation of 12 M.R.S. § 11212-A(2) (2024), and for

endangering the welfare of a child (Class D), in violation of 17-A M.R.S.

§ 554(1)(C) (2024). During the arrest, officers told Lovejoy that they would be

entering his home to check on the safety of the children. The officers did not

ask for consent to search the home, and Lovejoy did not give consent for a

search.

[¶9] After taking nearly thirty minutes to organize and confer about what

to do next, officers, including Officer Fabian and Sergeant Longley, used a spare

key to open the front door of Lovejoy’s home.2 They entered the first floor of

the residence and observed, inter alia, a piece of cardboard on the porch with

stains that appeared to be blood, red or brown stains on the toe of a boot, red

or brown stains on a roll of duct tape, a bottle of ammonia in the bathroom, and

a mop in the kitchen sink. The officers also smelled an odor of cleaning solution

and the floors appeared to have been recently mopped. The officers were on

the first floor for about two minutes and did not locate the children.

2 Lovejoy told Officer Fabian and Sergeant Longley the location of a spare key to the home prior to the officers’ entry. 6

[¶10] The officers attempted to go up the stairs but encountered an

aggressive dog. A sergeant of the Maine State Police arrived and suggested that

the officers call out to the children; there was no response to those calls. The

dog was secured, and the officers located the children sleeping in their

second-floor bedroom. About thirty minutes elapsed between the officers’

entry into the home and their discovery of the children. During this period, the

officers notified the Department of Health and Human Services of the situation.

The Department later took responsibility for the children.

[¶11] Because Lovejoy’s motion to suppress did not contest the legality

of the officers’ actions in the home after their entry, the evidence presented at

the suppression hearing did not address the officers’ subsequent activity in the

home, including a further search that led to the discovery of the victim’s body.3

[¶12] On November 22, 2019, the State charged Lovejoy by indictment

with one count of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), in

connection with the death of the victim alleged to have occurred on

3 Though details of the circumstances of the murder were not admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing, the court noted at sentencing that Lovejoy learned that the victim was having an affair; that their relationship had since been abusive and involved constant threats of injury or death, including with guns; that Lovejoy had sexually abused the victim; that Lovejoy shot the victim four times and then cleaned up the scene; that Lovejoy staged fake text and Facebook messages pretending that the victim was still alive; and that Lovejoy had attempted to hide the victim’s body in the basement of the home. 7

October 22, 2019. On November 1, 2021, Lovejoy filed a motion to suppress

(1) all observations and evidence resulting from the October 23, 2019, motor

vehicle stop on the grounds that the stop was not supported by reasonable,

articulable suspicion; (2) all observations, evidence, and “fruit of the poisonous

tree” of the warrantless entry into and search of Lovejoy’s home on

October 23, 2019, on the grounds that the entry was unreasonable and not

justified by an exception to the warrant requirement; and (3) statements

Lovejoy made in custody at the Kennebec County Jail on the grounds that the

statements were made involuntarily or in violation of his Miranda rights.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966).

[¶13] The court held a hearing on the motion on January 21, 2022.

Officer Fabian, Sergeant Longley, and Maine State Police Detective Joshua

Birmingham testified. The court admitted in evidence video footage of the

night’s events from Lovejoy’s personal surveillance cameras, the Maine Motor

Vehicle Inspection Manual, and a diagram of Lovejoy’s home. After the hearing,

the parties submitted memoranda in support of their positions. On April 1,

2022, the court heard oral argument by the parties on the motion to suppress.

In an order entered on April 7, 2022, the court granted the motion in part, 8

suppressing Lovejoy’s statements but not suppressing any evidence gained as

a result of the motor vehicle stop and the warrantless entry.

[¶14] The court held a Rule 11 hearing on May 4, 2022, at which Lovejoy

entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of murder. See M.R.U.

Crim. P. 11. Following the hearing, the court sentenced Lovejoy to a term of

forty-two years of incarceration and ordered him to pay $4,500 as restitution

to the Victims’ Compensation Program. Lovejoy timely appealed from the

judgment of conviction. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2024); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).

Lovejoy also filed an application for leave to appeal the sentence, which the

Sentence Review Panel granted. See 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2024); M.R. App. P. 20;

State v. Lovejoy, No. SRP-23-44 (Me. Sen. Rev. Panel Apr. 19, 2023).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Traffic Stop

[¶15] Lovejoy argues that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion,

as required by the United States Constitution,4 to support the traffic stop

because (1) the vehicle had a functioning license plate light, which met the

statutory requirement that the license plate be illuminated and legible from

4Lovejoy does not cite a specific constitutional provision supporting his argument, stating only that the traffic stop did not pass “constitutional scrutiny.” 9

fifty feet away; and (2) Lovejoy was not endangering the welfare of his children

when he was stopped close to his home. The State responds that (1) the

inoperable plate light created reasonable, articulable suspicion that Lovejoy

was committing a civil traffic infraction; and (2) leaving the home in a vehicle

while his children were home sleeping, paired with the suspicious

circumstances of the victim’s disappearance, created reasonable, articulable

suspicion that Lovejoy was endangering the welfare of the children.

[¶16] “We review a suppression court’s findings of fact for clear error,

and its legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Drewry, 2008 ME 76, ¶ 19, 946 A.2d

981. Officers may conduct a traffic stop if they have reasonable, articulable

suspicion that an individual has committed or intends to commit a crime or

traffic violation. See State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 13, 759 A.2d 1085;

State v. Richford, 519 A.2d 193, 195 (Me. 1986). The standard of reasonable,

articulable suspicion is low; it is considerably less than a preponderance

standard and less than probable cause. See State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 10,

43 A.3d 961. At the time of a stop, an officer must be able to articulate specific

facts underlying his or her suspicion that a crime or traffic violation has

occurred, that suspicion must be objectively reasonable considering the totality

of the circumstances, and the officer must have “more than a bare speculation 10

or an unsubstantiated hunch.” Id. ¶ 13; State v. Bolduc, 1998 ME 255, ¶ 6, 722

A.2d 44; State v. Lear, 1998 ME 273, ¶ 5, 722 A.2d 1266; see also State v. Sasso,

2016 ME 95, ¶ 2 & n.1, 143 A.3d 124 (finding that the officer had reasonable,

articulable suspicion for a traffic stop because he observed that one of the

defendant’s brake lights appeared to be “stuck on”).

[¶17] In this case, prior to stopping Lovejoy while he drove the victim’s

car, Officer Fabian observed that one of the two lights intended to illuminate

the car’s rear license plate was out. The court did not err in finding that it was

objectively reasonable to believe that the inoperable light constituted a traffic

violation. See 29-A M.R.S. § 1909 (2018)5 (“A vehicle must have a white light

capable of illuminating the rear registration plate so that the characters on the

plate are visible for a distance of at least 50 feet.”); 29-A M.R.S. § 1768(5)(A)

(2018) (stating that operating a vehicle not in compliance with the rules of the

Chief of State Police outlined in the Maine Motor Vehicle Inspection Manual is a

traffic infraction); Maine Motor Vehicle Inspection Manual, 16-222 C.M.R. ch. 1,

§ 170(9)(D)(9) (effective Aug. 29, 2013) (“Reject vehicle if the tail and rear

plate lights do not operate properly in all switch positions.”). We need not go

Title 29-A M.R.S. § 1909 was recently amended, though the amendment is not relevant to this 5

appeal. See P.L. 2021, ch. 216, § 45 (effective Oct. 18, 2021). 11

further in our analysis because reasonable, articulable suspicion existed to

justify the stop when the officer observed Lovejoy’s inoperable license plate

light. State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984 (“In order to support a

brief investigatory stop of a motor vehicle . . . a police officer must have an

objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil

violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to

occur.” (footnote omitted)).

B. Warrantless Entry

[¶18] Lovejoy also argues that the warrantless entry and search of his

home violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

therefore all evidence resulting from the entry and search should be

suppressed.6 Lovejoy contends that there were no exigent circumstances,

including circumstances that would fall under the emergency aid exception to

the warrant requirement,7 that would support the warrantless entry into his

6Though Lovejoy briefly references the relevant provision of the Maine Constitution, Me. Const. art. I, § 5, his arguments rely entirely on federal precedent. Thus, we decline to analyze Lovejoy’s claims under the Maine Constitution and instead analyze them under the United States Constitution. See State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶¶ 19-20, 290 A.3d 533 (declining to analyze Maine Constitutional claim where defendant failed to adequately raise the issue in the trial court or on appeal).

Lovejoy asserts that the community caretaking exception, another widely recognized exigent 7

circumstance that justifies an exception to the warrant requirement, does not extend to a search of a home. See Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 197-99 (2021). The State agrees. 12

home. Lovejoy argues that because the officers took no steps to determine

whether the children were safe prior to entering Lovejoy’s home, and because

they had time to apply for and receive a warrant but did not do so, the

warrantless entry was unreasonable.8 The State responds that, although the

officers did not attempt alternative modes of checking on the children’s safety

or attempt to obtain a warrant,9 the entry was permissible pursuant to the

emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement and was reasonable

considering the totality of the circumstances.

[¶19] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects

“persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Searches and seizures inside a home without

a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 133

(1st Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). “But this presumption may be

overcome in some circumstances because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth

8 Lovejoy also argues that because the officers did not subjectively believe that the children were

in immediate danger, there was no exigency. This contention misstates the law. The emergency aid exception is analyzed from the perspective of an objective officer without considering the subjective intent of the officer at the time of the warrantless search or seizure. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47, 49 (2009). 9 The State concedes that “it is also questionable whether officers could have obtained a warrant.

Their search was not a search for evidence—it was a search for children.” 13

Amendment is reasonableness.” United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir.

2017) (alterations and quotation marks omitted).

[¶20] The primary exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches

of homes include exigent circumstances, such as when entry into the home is

necessary to administer emergency aid to an injured person or to prevent

imminent injury. See id. at 16-17; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978);

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). The recognized exceptions to

the warrant requirement for searches of homes are reflective of the Supreme

Court’s more general rule that “[w]hen a warrantless search or seizure is not

per se unreasonable, the court may balance the privacy-related and law

enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.”

Bain, 874 F.3d at 17 (quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the officers’

warrantless entry into Lovejoy’s home was justified by the unique exigent

circumstances presented at the time.

[¶21] To justify a warrantless entry into a home under the emergency

aid exception, there must be “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that

there was such a compelling necessity for immediate action that the delay of

obtaining a warrant could not be tolerated.” Merrill, 15 F.4th at 133 (quotation

marks and alteration omitted); c.f. Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 198-199 14

(holding that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement

does not extend to the home, though exigent circumstances may still justify a

warrantless search of the home). “The emergency aid exception does not

depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they

are investigating when the emergency arises. It requires only an objectively

reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of

immediate aid.” Akers, 2021 ME 43, ¶ 36, 259 A.3d 127 (alteration and

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, to determine whether officers had an

objectively reasonable basis for believing there was a need to enter a home

without a warrant, “we look to the facts known to the officers at the time they

made the decision to enter.” United States v. Maxwell, 89 F.4th 671, 676 (8th

Cir. 2023); see, e.g., United States v. Giambro, No. 2:22-cr-00044-GZS, 2023 WL

3123001 at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 27, 2023) (holding that warrantless entry of home

was justified by emergency aid exception because defendant had told his son

that defendant’s wife had died in their home while the son was away on

vacation but was evasive as to how; defendant would not tell the son where the

body was; defendant had been brought to hospital by the son because he was

confused; and officers, without getting a response, knocked on the door of the

home, walked around the home looking for tracks in the snow, attempted to 15

look in the windows of the house and the garage, loudly banged on the door,

yelled, “Sheriff’s office,” and instructed anyone inside to answer); State v. Pine,

219 N.E.3d 423, 434-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023) (holding that warrantless entry of

the area under a trailer home was justified by emergency aid exception where

officers responded to a call about domestic violence, the victim told a

responding officer that defendant grabbed a firearm and loaded it after

grabbing her by the throat, the defendant was seen crawling under the trailer

with a firearm, the defendant crawled out from under the trailer and was placed

under arrest but did not possess the firearm, more than ten adults and

one child were aware that defendant had brought a firearm under the trailer,

the trailer was close to the road and did not have a fence, and a neighbor

volunteered to go under the trailer and retrieve the firearm).

[¶22] Risk to an unattended young child is a factor that may be

considered when determining whether an exigency requiring emergency aid

exists. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 321 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2003);

State v. Peterson, 543 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Ga. 2001). An intensive, fact-based

analysis is necessary, with consideration of, inter alia, the child’s age, the

circumstances of the child’s caregivers, whether there are signs of distress from

the child, and whether law enforcement attempted to confirm the child’s safety 16

and were unable to do so prior to entering the home. See, e.g., United States. v.

Gillespie, 332 F.Supp.2d 923, 927-28 (W.D. Va. 2004); Bradley, 321 F.3d at

1214-15 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court of Nebraska determined that

officers were justified in entering a home without a warrant when they could

reasonably conclude that two four-year-old children and a two-week-old infant

were unaccounted for and had not had adult supervision for several hours, they

were unable to verify the safety of the children with three different family

members, the defendant had lied about the children’s location, and prior police

reports alleged that the children had suffered physical abuse by the defendant.

State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253 at 262-63 (Neb. 1990). Similarly, the Ninth

Circuit determined it was permissible for officers to enter a home without a

warrant to provide emergency aid where they had just arrested a child’s

mother on drug charges, the officers could not locate the child in either the

child’s home or a neighbor’s home, the child was nine years old and may have

been in the home alone, and the officers did not know if the home was safe. See

Bradley, 321 F.3d at 1214-15; see also Maxwell, 89 F.4th at 676-77 (holding that

warrantless entry was justified by need to provide emergency aid because

officers reasonably believed that an infant and a toddler either were alone in a

house with unaccounted-for, unsecured firearms that were evidence from an 17

armed robbery or were with a person who had recently threatened people with

a firearm during an armed robbery); Caniglia, 593 U.S. at 204-08

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting that cases involving unattended young

children inside a home may justify a constitutional warrantless entry under the

exigent circumstances doctrine); United States v. Sanders, 4 F.4th 672, 677-78

(8th Cir. 2021) (holding that warrantless entry was justified by need to provide

emergency aid because officers responded to a 9-1-1 call alleging a domestic

disturbance, witnessed a child motioning in an upstairs window, observed the

victim’s injuries when she came outside the home, and heard a child crying

inside the house); Giambro, 2023 WL 3123001, at *4; Pine, 219 N.E.3d at

436-37.

[¶23] The following facts support our conclusion that, at the time of the

entry into Lovejoy’s home, there was an objectively reasonable basis for

believing that the officers needed to provide emergency aid:

 Three friends of the victim had contacted the police to voice concern for her safety and wellbeing because they had not heard from her all day, which was unusual;

 At 10:30 p.m., Lovejoy had given police an implausible explanation of the children’s mother’s absence—that she had left on foot in the morning, more than twelve hours earlier, and that she had neither returned nor been in contact;

 There was a history of domestic violence between Lovejoy and the victim; 18

 Lovejoy had a history of possessing firearms;

 Lovejoy had left the home in the victim’s vehicle, late at night, while the children were sleeping, and told officers he was on the way to the store;

 At the time of the traffic stop, Lovejoy had a loaded shotgun in the vehicle, which he said he needed for self-defense;

 There were two eight-year-old children asleep inside the home;

 Lovejoy was under arrest and it was unclear whether and when he could meet bail conditions and be released; and

 With Lovejoy unavailable, there were no adults in the home.

After the officers entered Lovejoy’s home, they conducted a brief search of the

first floor of the home but were unable to locate the children. Once it was safe

for them to do so, the officers proceeded upstairs and confirmed the safety of

the children. We conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances,

the officers were justified in entering Lovejoy’s home without a warrant.

C. Sentencing

[¶24] Lastly, Lovejoy contends that the court erred in considering, in the

second step of the sentencing analysis, his mental state at the time of the offense

and his “post-murder conduct,” arguing that these factors are properly

considered only at the first step. Lovejoy argues that the court’s analysis was

prejudicial because consideration of these factors at step two reduced the 19

impact of mitigating factors also considered in step two. The State responds

that the sentencing court has broad discretion in its examination of sentencing

factors and that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing.

[¶25] In a sentencing for murder, a court must follow a two-step process

codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)-(2) (2024). The statute provides:

A. First, the court shall determine a basic term of imprisonment by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the individual.

B. Second, the court shall determine the maximum term of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to the case. Relevant sentencing factors include, but are not limited to, the character of the individual, the individual’s criminal history, the effect of the offense on the victim and the protection of the public interest.

The purpose of the first step of the analysis is to place the crime “at a point on

the continuum for the type of criminal conduct involved.” State v. Bentley, 2021

ME 39, ¶ 15, 254 A.3d 1171 (quotation marks omitted). The second step of the

analysis “encourage[s] individualization of each sentence based on

circumstances specific to the case and the defendant.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 16. We afford

the sentencing court “significant leeway in what factors it may consider and the

weight any given factor is due when determining a sentence.” Id. ¶ 11.

Sentencing courts may “refer to the same facts in the various steps of the 20

sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at

each step.” State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13, 893 A.2d 611 (emphasis added and

quotation marks omitted).

[¶26] Lovejoy does not challenge the basic sentence set by the court in

the first step of the analysis; he challenges the court’s analysis in the second

step supporting the maximum sentence of forty-two years. “We review the trial

court’s application of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the

maximum sentence for abuse of discretion.” State v. Gaston, 2021 ME 25, ¶ 36,

250 A.3d 137 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶27] Contrary to Lovejoy’s contention, the court did not “double-count”

the consideration of Lovejoy’s mental state at the time of the offense and his

post-murder conduct. In step one, the court discussed Lovejoy’s mental state

and post-murder conduct to determine whether the murder was premeditated.

See State v. De St. Croix, 2020 ME 142, ¶¶ 8-12, 243 A.3d 880. In step two, the

court considered Lovejoy’s traumatic brain injury in the context of his mental

state and post-murder conduct to determine the extent of the injury’s impact

on his cognitive abilities at time of the crime. The court stated:

But what it does suggest to me is his ability to realize what he had to do now was to conceal the crime by cleaning it up, by moving her body, by concocting a story about [how] she walked off, haven’t seen her since, let me go out and look for her, all that stuff is 21

complete hogwash, and he knew it. So as much as I think the [traumatic brain injury] . . . is a legitimate mitigating circumstance . . . it is really offset by his cognitive ability to take steps to conceal what he had done . . . .

The court, as our case law permits it to do, analyzed the same facts for different

purposes: in the first step to determine if there was premeditation and in the

second step to determine the extent to which Lovejoy’s traumatic brain injury

was a mitigating circumstance. See Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 16, 893 A.2d 611

(“The court responded to [the defendant’s] argument that his brain injury

should be considered as a mitigating factor by pointing to several of his

deliberate acts during the commission of the offenses. The recitation of the

facts of the offenses in more than one step of the sentencing analysis is not an

abuse of discretion when it is done for a different purpose.”). We discern no

abuse of discretion and thus affirm the sentence.

The entry is:

Judgment and sentence affirmed. 22

Scott F. Hess, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Scott F. Hess, LLC, Augusta, for appellant Nicholas P. Lovejoy

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Katie Sibley, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2019-2350 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY