State of Maine v. Kyle M. Fitzgerald

2025 ME 65

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: Cum-24-381
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 65 Docket: Cum-24-381 Argued: May 7, 2025 Decided: July 24, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

KYLE M. FITZGERALD

MEAD, J.

[¶1] The State of Maine appeals from an order entered by the trial court

(Cumberland County, McKeon, J.) granting Kyle M. Fitzgerald’s motion to

suppress evidence obtained after the Maine State Police stopped her car on

Interstate 295, detained her and her passengers until a drug detection dog

could arrive to conduct a sniff, and then searched the car, seizing the drugs

discovered inside. 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1) (2025); M.R. App. P. 21.

[¶2] The court granted the motion after finding that officers lacked

probable cause to conduct the search. We do not reach that issue because we

conclude that, well before the dog arrived and the search was conducted, the

reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation justifying the initial stop had been

investigated, and no reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity justified 2

prolonging the detention of Fitzgerald and her passengers beyond that point.1

For that reason, we affirm the suppression order. See State v. Sweeney, 2019

ME 164, ¶ 13, 221 A.3d 130 (“[I]f a court’s ruling is proper, we may affirm it on

grounds other than those stated by the trial court.” (quotation marks omitted)).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶3] The relevant facts are drawn from three sources: the court’s initial

order granting Fitzgerald’s motion to suppress,2 the court’s oral findings at the

hearing on the State’s motion for further findings and for reconsideration, and

the court’s written order granting the State’s motion for further findings in part

and denying the motion to reconsider. Because the State moved for further

findings pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d), we will not assume that the trial

court found facts beyond those that it stated. See State v. Ouellette, 2024 ME 29,

¶ 11, 314 A.3d 253.

[¶4] On November 15, 2021, Fitzgerald was driving a car south on

Interstate 295 in Freeport. Maine State Trooper Nicholas Young stopped

1We also do not reach the State’s contention that even if the dog’s sniff of the car’s interior violated the Fourth Amendment, suppression of the evidence was not warranted.

The court denied the motion to suppress brought by a co-defendant, Dennis Jones. Jones is not 2

a party to this appeal. 3

Fitzgerald because she was not wearing a seat belt and was driving

substantially slower than the speed limit and staring straight ahead with her

arms locked in front of her, although she appeared to notice Young traveling in

the left lane. In the car with Fitzgerald were three passengers and two young

puppies.

[¶5] Following the stop, Fitzgerald gave confused answers about where

she was going and did not appear to know whether her destination was

New Hampshire or Massachusetts. Fitzgerald and her passengers also gave

contradictory answers regarding how long they had known each other, and

Fitzgerald did not know the full name of one of her passengers, although she

said they had been friends for ten years.

[¶6] The passenger in the right rear seat was “effusive and forthcoming”

but also “anxious,” holding up her identification in the back seat before Young

even reached the car, an action he thought “bizarre” and “suspicious.” The front

passenger was “standoffish.” The passenger in the left rear seat, who was not

wearing a seatbelt, pretended to be asleep during the first few minutes of the

stop. When Young attempted to confirm his identity, he spoke in a very low

voice. He was eventually identified as Ja’Wayne Early from Alabama, but

because Early left out the apostrophe when verbally giving Young his first 4

name, Young was unable to confirm Early’s identity until forty-four minutes

after the stop. Early had a $500 roll of currency in his pocket; he told Young

that he worked but would not say what kind of work he did.

[¶7] Young requested a canine unit twenty-four minutes after the stop;

a trooper arrived with his trained drug detection dog fifty-three minutes later,

about seventy-seven minutes after the stop and thirty-four minutes after Young

had confirmed Early’s identity. The trooper had his dog sniff the car and then

informed Young that there was probable cause to search it. A “substantial

quantity” of illegal drugs was found.

B. Procedure

[¶8] In September 2022, a grand jury indicted Fitzgerald on six counts:

three counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 1105-A(1)(C-1)(1) (2025); aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs

(Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(C-1)(4) (2025); unlawful possession of

scheduled drugs (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(C) (2025); and unlawful

possession of scheduled drugs (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(F) (2025). 5

The indictment also charged two counts of criminal forfeiture, 15 M.R.S. § 5826

(2021).3 Fitzgerald pleaded not guilty at her arraignment.

[¶9] Fitzgerald moved to suppress all evidence derived from the search

of her car, alleging that officers “prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable

articulable suspicion of criminal activity” before conducting their search

without probable cause. In July 2024, following a two-day evidentiary hearing,

the court entered a written order granting the motion, finding that although the

extended detention to wait for a drug detection dog to arrive was

constitutional, the search of Fitzgerald’s car was not.

[¶10] Pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d), the State moved for further

findings of fact and conclusions of law and for reconsideration of the

suppression order. The court held a hearing at which it granted the motion in

part and made further factual findings from the bench. The court denied the

motion to reconsider, continuing to find that the search of Fitzgerald’s car was

not supported by probable cause. A subsequent written order memorialized

the court’s findings.

3 The statute has since been amended, but not in a way that affects this appeal. See P.L. 2023, ch. 196, § 1 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 5826(6) (2025)). 6

[¶11] The State timely appealed. 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1), (4); M.R.

App. P. 2B(b)(1), 21(a), (e). The appeal was accompanied by the Attorney

General’s written approval. 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(5); M.R. App. P. 21(b).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶12] In its brief, the State challenges “only the trial court’s legal

conclusions and its ultimate decision, not its findings of fact.” Accordingly, our

review is de novo. See State v. Thomas, 2025 ME 34, ¶ 38, 334 A.3d 686; State

v. Lepenn, 2023 ME 22, ¶ 15, 295 A.3d 139 (“We review a motion court’s

application of the law to undisputed facts de novo.” (quotation marks

omitted)); State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, ¶ 19, 272 A.3d 286 (“When a court has

granted a motion to suppress based on findings of fact that are not disputed on

appeal, the ultimate question . . . is a legal issue that we review de novo.”).

[¶13] At the hearing on her motion to suppress, Fitzgerald conceded that

the initial stop for a seatbelt violation was lawful. The question we must resolve

is whether Fitzgerald’s continued detention until the drug detection dog

arrived was also lawful.4

4Fitzgerald relies only on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; she has not developed a specific argument that article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution requires suppression of the evidence. See State v. Ouellette, 2024 ME 29, ¶ 10 n.1, 314 A.3d 253. 7

[¶14] Rodriguez v. United States is directly on point. 575 U.S. 348, 350

(2015). When considering “whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog

sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop,” the United States Supreme

Court held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter

for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against

unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic

violation, therefore, becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time

reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the

violation.” Id. (alterations and quotation marks omitted); see State v. Abdullahi,

2023 ME 41, ¶ 15, 298 A.3d 815 (“[A] traffic stop . . . must not last longer than

reasonably necessary to investigate the suspected violation of law.”). Because

“[a] dog sniff . . . is a measure aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal

wrongdoing,” unlike “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop” such as

checking a driver’s license or determining whether there are outstanding

warrants, “a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic

mission.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355-56 (alterations and quotation marks

omitted). The Court identified the “critical question” as “whether conducting

the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.” Id. at 357 (quotation marks

omitted). 8

[¶15] Under the holding in Rodriguez, “where a seizure is justified only

by a police-observed traffic violation, officers may not prolong a stop to

investigate another crime absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily

demanded to justify detaining an individual.” United States v. Reyes, 24 F.4th 1,

17 (1st Cir. 2022) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). We conclude that

the duration of Fitzgerald’s detention reached its constitutional limit when

Early’s identity was confirmed, thirty-four minutes before the dog arrived. At

that point, “the officer’s traffic mission” was complete, in that Trooper Young

could have issued seatbelt violation citations to Fitzgerald and Early and ended

the encounter.5 Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356.

[¶16] As the State has acknowledged, extending the stop further

required “[a] reasonable suspicion of further criminal wrongdoing.” United

States v. Cruz-Rivera, 14 F.4th 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2021). The State was very clear

at oral argument in identifying the suspected criminal activity that it contends

justified Fitzgerald’s continued detention. When asked “Articulable suspicion

of what? . . . What is [the officer] suspecting? . . . It’s drugs, isn’t it?,” the Assistant

District Attorney answered, “Yes.” At the suppression hearing Trooper Young

agreed, answering “No” to the question “[H]aving confirmed [Early’s] identity,

5 Trooper Young elected not to issue citations for those violations. 9

was there any remaining reason to keep these people waiting for the K-9 to

arrive, other than your suspicion about some illegal drug activity?”

[¶17] As support for its position, the State points to what it views as

suspicious behavior exhibited by Fitzgerald and her passengers, as well as the

potentially illegal transportation of underage puppies. Although the

circumstances noted by the State—i.e., Fitzgerald’s driving slower than the

speed limit with her arms locked to the front; the car occupants’ confused and

contradictory answers concerning the car’s destination and how long the

occupants had known each other; and Trooper Young’s initial difficulty in

identifying Early and Early’s possession of a roll of cash—may have aroused

Trooper Young’s suspicion generally, we cannot agree that they amount to an

articulable and objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity. See

State v. Lear, 1998 ME 273, ¶ 5, 722 A.2d 1266 (“[A]n analysis of the propriety

of an investigatory detention short of formal arrest necessarily involves both a

subjective component (i.e., actual articulable suspicion) and an objective

component (i.e., reasonable suspicion).”). The trooper’s suspicion that

something untoward was going on was a hunch—perhaps not conjured out of

thin air, but a hunch nonetheless. A reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a

detention requires “less than probable cause [but] more than a naked hunch.” 10

Cruz-Rivera, 14 F.4th at 43 (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Lovejoy, 2024

ME 42, ¶ 16, 315 A.3d 744.

[¶18] Trooper Young was candid at the suppression hearing when he

was asked whether, at the point in the stop when he asked for backup, he had

“a specific thing that [he was] suspicious of,” answering, “It was a general

suspicion of criminal activity.” The subsequent delay in confirming Early’s

identity did not add much to Young’s suspicion, viewed objectively—although

Early did not include the apostrophe in his first name when spelling it verbally,

he otherwise spelled his name correctly, and included the apostrophe when

asked to write out his name for the trooper. Early also gave the trooper his

correct date of birth, social security number, and state of residence.6 None of

the car’s occupants had outstanding warrants, current bail conditions, active

probations, or criminal records for drug activity. The State agreed that there

was nothing in the record establishing that Fitzgerald was operating in a known

drug corridor.

[¶19] Viewing the “whole picture” presented by this record, Cruz-Rivera,

14 F.4th at 43 (quotation marks omitted), we conclude that after Early was

6 At the suppression hearing, Trooper Young agreed that, in the end, Early “wasn’t actually being

deceptive.” 11

positively identified, the initially justified investigatory stop “last[ed] longer

than reasonably necessary to investigate the suspected violation of law.”

Abdullahi, 2023 ME 41, ¶ 15, 298 A.3d 815. For that reason, the stop “violate[d]

the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at

350, and the trial court did not err in granting Fitzgerald’s motion to suppress.7

The entry is:

Order granting Fitzgerald’s motion to suppress affirmed.

Jacqueline Sartoris, Esq., District Attorney, and Carlos Diaz, Esq. (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office, Portland, for appellant State of Maine

Daniel A. Wentworth, Esq. (orally), Law Offices of Dylan Boyd, Portland, for appellee Kyle M. Fitzgerald

Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2022-3601 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

7 In reaching this conclusion, we do not fault Trooper Young, whom the trial court characterized as “professional and courteous” and found gave credible testimony.