State of Maine v. McLean

Maine Superior

State of Maine v. McLean

DecidedMay 29, 2001

DocketKENcr-00-20

StatusUnpublished

This text of State of Maine v. McLean (State of Maine v. McLean) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State of Maine v. McLean, (Me. Super. Ct. 2001).

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Opinion

REGEWED AND FILED

KENNEBEC SUPERIOR COURT STATE OF MAINE 96 2061 SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss MAY 29 CRIMINAL ACTION GY DESJARDIN DOCKET NO. CR-00-20 Meee OF COURTS MAE RL, . of » STATE OF MAINE Vv. ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS DAVID McLEAN,

Defendant

The defendant seeks to suppress statements made by him at the accident scene and at the hospital. The defendant alleges that the statements were in violation of his Miranda rights and that the statements were not voluntary. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

On 4/19/99, at 1:30 a.m., Officer Jonathan Mazero from the Hallowell Police Department proceeded to an accident scene on Route 201, One person was lying in the northbound lane, unconscious and seriously bleeding. The defendant was conscious and was lying approximately 15 feet from a motorcycle on its side. The officer asked about the defendant's injuries. The defendant had minor cuts on his face and said his shoulder may have been dislocated and his ribs hurt.

The officer was able to detect the odor of alcohol as he spoke to the defendant. The defendant's eyes were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. The officer determined that the defendant was under the influence and wanted him to answer questions. It was not the officer's intent to charge the defendant; the officer was still investigating the accident.

The officer asked what caused the accident, if the defendant was driving, and

if he had been drinking. The defendant was coherent and able to converse with the officer. The defendant said he had consumed alcohol during different parts of that evening. He said he was driving because the passenger was too small to operate the motorcycle. The officer told the defendant to remain where he was and not to move until the ambulance arrived; the officer did not want the defendant to aggravate his injuries. The officer did not recall the defendant trying to get up.

The defendant was not told he was under arrest or that he was not free to leave. He was not in handcuffs. The ambulance arrived and the defendant was taken to the hospital. No law enforcement officer accompanied the defendant in the ambulance.

The officer arrived at the hospital at 4:00 a.m. A blood test was taken from the defendant at 5:40 a.m. The officer obtained permission of the medical authorities to speak to the defendant and spoke to the defendant at 6:00 a.m. on the same day. The defendant was in the emergency room and hooked up to a monitor. The officer did not know if the defendant was taking medicine and did not ask any medical personnel whether the defendant was affected by any medicine.

The officer had no discussion with the defendant before reading the Miranda warnings to the defendant. The officer did not tell the defendant that the officer suspected that the defendant had committed a crime. The Miranda warnings were not read verbatim. The officer believed that after each Miranda statement, he asked if the defendant understood. The officer testified that he would not have proceeded unless the defendant understood and that if he did not understand, the officer

would have explained. The officer told the defendant to respond verbally. Sometimes the defendant verbally responded “yes” and sometimes he responded “uh-huh.” The officer did not recall how the defendant answered each question. The officer did not recall the defendant's response to the fact that he had the right to have an attorney. The officer testified that it's a possibility that the defendant said no. The officer did not recall if the defendant said he wished to speak to an attorney; the officer did not recall exactly what the defendant said. No evidence was presented regarding whether the defendant was asked to and agreed to waive his rights and answer questions. It was clear from the officer's demeanor on the witness stand and from his admissions that he did not recall clearly his interaction with the defendant at the hospital.

After the warnings, the officer asked if the defendant was driving the motorcycle; the defendant said that he was. The officer asked if the defendant was drinking; the defendant said that he had been drinking. The defendant then said he wanted to speak to a lawyer. There was no further discussion after the defendant said he wanted to speak to a lawyer. The defendant was not in handcuffs and he was not told he was under arrest or that he was not free to go. According to the officer, during the conversation, the defendant was coherent and lucid. He appeared to understand the questions and responded appropriately.

This record does not reflect when the defendant was discharged from the hospital. The defendant was not arrested when he left the hospital. He turned

himself in to the police on 8/9/99. ACCIDENT SCENE

Voluntariness The defendant’s statements were voluntary. There is no evidence that his statements did not result from the free choice of a rational mind or that they were

the product of coercive police conduct. See State v. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, 7 9, 755

A.2d 1075, 1078.

Custody

No Miranda warnings were given to the defendant at the accident scene. A reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have believed he was in police custody and constrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. The

defendant was not in custody at the accident scene. See State v. Holloway, 2000 ME

172, J 18, 760 A.2d 223, 229; State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 9 4, 724 A.2d 1222, 1226.

See also Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910 F.2d 691, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1990), abrogation

recognized by United States v.. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (officer

arriving at automobile accident scene may ask questions in order to determine whether to issue a citation, to arrest, or to let the person involved leave); State v. Ferguson, 886 P.2d 1164, 1168-69 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (seriousness of potential traffic charge does not alter analysis under Terry regarding stop and inquiry). HOSPITAL

Voluntariness

The officer clearly had difficulty recalling important parts of the interview at

the hospital. That failure of recollection affects the assessment of all of his testimony regarding that interview. Further, although the defendant was in the emergency room after a serious car accident and hooked up to a monitor, no inquiry was made regarding the defendant’s status or treatment. The State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statements at the hospital were voluntary. See State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, J 10, 704 A.2d 387, 390.

The officer initiated contact at the hospital; this was the second interview of the defendant. At the time of the interrogation at the hospital, the defendant had already told the officer that he had been drinking during the day; a blood alcohol test had been administered. By his own statements at the scene that he had been driving at the time of the accident, the defendant made himself the focus of the investigation. The officer began this second interview by giving the Miranda warnings. The warnings were given improperly and were not waived.

On this record, the State has not proved that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have believed that he was in police custody. See

Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 7 4, 724 A.2d at 1226; see also United States v. Bautista, 145

F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir.

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