STATE OF MAINE I~::. CC! \.l (~.: ,\.. !..., ~.: .", SUPERIOR COURT KC ~~;{~UC C:, l~ ,-: L' CRIMINAL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CR-08-211 zrOq FET Il /s. !lo: 2R ," , \ 14 .L)r', i', \ i'
STATE OF MAINE ', ...... ~ ..... J -, ,'-'. '....) I ".I,-}.) 1< I ..)
v. ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS GREGORY KIMBALL,
Defendant
Before the court is defendant's motion to suppress statements on the grounds
that such statements were involuntarily.
Upon complaint that unlawful sexual conduct had taken place between the
defendant and two stepdaughters, the Maine State Police conducted an investigation.
As part of that investigation, the defendant was offered an opportunity to be the subject
of a polygraph examination. The examination, as well as the conduct of the
interrogation before and after the examination, were recorded, which recording this
court has viewed. All evidence submitted assures the court that the defendant
undertook the polygraph examination voluntarily and with full understanding of its
implications.
The first attempt at a polygraph examination was undertaken on December 17,
2007, but the examiner declined to proceed with the examination because of the
emotional state of the defendant. However, a signed Miranda warning and polygraph
waiver was executed on that date, which document is in evidence. 2
On December 27, 2007, the defendant again appeared for a polygraph
examination and again signed the Miranda statement as well as the polygraph waiver.
There is no evidence that the defendant was in a high emotional state at the time of the
execution of the waiver nor that he was unable to read or understand its terms. The
signed document appears as a State's exhibit. In addition, the defendant signed a
document indicating that the examination was concluded at 2:48 p.m. and confirmed
that no promises or threats were made either in connection with the examination or the
signing of the consent.
The court examined the content of three DVD videos, the recordings of the
proceeding. The videos are very lengthy but also contain periods in which the
defendant was not present, having taken breaks, and no evidence was submitted
suggesting that promises, threats or involuntary statements were made to any of the
investigating officers during the break periods. Throughout the early stages of the
interrogation, it appeared clear that the defendant understood his rights and that he
could terminate the examination at any time and leave the premises. It was clear that
he was not subject to arrest and, therefore, the court finds no evidence that the
interrogation was custodial nor any suggestion by the defendant that it was the case.
The defendant freely discussed relationships with the alleged victims and the very
unhappy relationship with his wife. It was clear that whatever circumstances caused
the defendant to be investigated, the defendant believes it is an effort on the part of his
former wife to exact some form of retribution for one reason or another. The polygraph
examiner discussed the use of the polygraph, its functioning, and he related the precise 3
questions that were to be asked during the examination. Before the examination, the
examiner clearly gave the defendant the impression that it would be very difficult to
fool the machine. It did not appear that the examiner asserted the polygraph machine
to be perfect nor was there any discussion with respect to its admissibility but that the
results would guide the interrogator in the investigation.
After the examination, it does not appear that the examiner accused the
defendant of failing to tell the truth but he certainly hinted to the defendant that there
was more to discuss. The court does not find evidence in the record as to what the
results of the polygraph examination were. At any rate, it appears clear that the nature
of the interrogation became more focused after the completion of the polygraph
examination.
As the officer focused in on the relationship between the defendant, his wife and
the stepchildren, it became clear by the response of the defendant that something had
happened which he was not happy about and which was completely contrary to his
personal standards of behavior. As a result, the defendant made succeeding
inculpatory statement suggesting that at the behest of his depraved spouse, some
conduct had taken place resulting in a confession by the defendant which he reduced to
writing. His written statement concluded that he had done something wrong and he
was ready to accept the consequences even though he asserted he was pressured into II
them." The investigator then asked the defendant to put in his statement in his words
what it is he did that was wrong, more specifically. At that point, the defendant added 4
to his writing that, "The evil bitch that I am married 2 ... " made him engage in the
unlawful conduct with the children.
The polygraph examiner then explained to the defendant that he would like him
to confirm his statement by answering the questions of another detective. The second
detective then entered the room and the confession was made. This is the only time that
the defendant was in the examination room with any other person except the polygraph
examiner. While the defendant was clearly emotionally upset at the time the final
confession was made, it appears to this observer that the cause of his emotional state
was the conduct under the investigation and of which the defendant was really upset as
a matter of personal principle. During the discussion, the defendant offered details to
the examiners which are not contained in his written statement.
The court finds no evidence of improper inducement by promises of leniency
regarding either the charge or the sentence. State 7). Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598 (Me. 1977).
A confession is admissible in evidence only if voluntary, and the State bears the
burden of establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to find a
statement voluntary, it must first be established that it was as a result of defendant's
exercise of his own free will and rational intellect. The court must consider the totality
of the circumstances in determining whether a confession is voluntary. State II. Sawyer,
2001 ME 88,772 A.2d 1173 at 1175.
In applying a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine voluntariness,
the court must consider both external and internal factors, such as: the details of the
interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the 5
interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers
involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or
inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant's age, physical and mental
health, emotional stability, and conduct. 772 A.2d at 1176.
The interrogation took place in the polygraph examination room of the Maine
State Police over a period of five or six hours, including break time. The circumstances
were clearly not custodial. The defendant was in the room alone with a single
polygraph examination/interrogator, was free to leave, at times did leave to take a
break, and was told that he was not going to be arrested.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
STATE OF MAINE I~::. CC! \.l (~.: ,\.. !..., ~.: .", SUPERIOR COURT KC ~~;{~UC C:, l~ ,-: L' CRIMINAL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CR-08-211 zrOq FET Il /s. !lo: 2R ," , \ 14 .L)r', i', \ i'
STATE OF MAINE ', ...... ~ ..... J -, ,'-'. '....) I ".I,-}.) 1< I ..)
v. ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS GREGORY KIMBALL,
Defendant
Before the court is defendant's motion to suppress statements on the grounds
that such statements were involuntarily.
Upon complaint that unlawful sexual conduct had taken place between the
defendant and two stepdaughters, the Maine State Police conducted an investigation.
As part of that investigation, the defendant was offered an opportunity to be the subject
of a polygraph examination. The examination, as well as the conduct of the
interrogation before and after the examination, were recorded, which recording this
court has viewed. All evidence submitted assures the court that the defendant
undertook the polygraph examination voluntarily and with full understanding of its
implications.
The first attempt at a polygraph examination was undertaken on December 17,
2007, but the examiner declined to proceed with the examination because of the
emotional state of the defendant. However, a signed Miranda warning and polygraph
waiver was executed on that date, which document is in evidence. 2
On December 27, 2007, the defendant again appeared for a polygraph
examination and again signed the Miranda statement as well as the polygraph waiver.
There is no evidence that the defendant was in a high emotional state at the time of the
execution of the waiver nor that he was unable to read or understand its terms. The
signed document appears as a State's exhibit. In addition, the defendant signed a
document indicating that the examination was concluded at 2:48 p.m. and confirmed
that no promises or threats were made either in connection with the examination or the
signing of the consent.
The court examined the content of three DVD videos, the recordings of the
proceeding. The videos are very lengthy but also contain periods in which the
defendant was not present, having taken breaks, and no evidence was submitted
suggesting that promises, threats or involuntary statements were made to any of the
investigating officers during the break periods. Throughout the early stages of the
interrogation, it appeared clear that the defendant understood his rights and that he
could terminate the examination at any time and leave the premises. It was clear that
he was not subject to arrest and, therefore, the court finds no evidence that the
interrogation was custodial nor any suggestion by the defendant that it was the case.
The defendant freely discussed relationships with the alleged victims and the very
unhappy relationship with his wife. It was clear that whatever circumstances caused
the defendant to be investigated, the defendant believes it is an effort on the part of his
former wife to exact some form of retribution for one reason or another. The polygraph
examiner discussed the use of the polygraph, its functioning, and he related the precise 3
questions that were to be asked during the examination. Before the examination, the
examiner clearly gave the defendant the impression that it would be very difficult to
fool the machine. It did not appear that the examiner asserted the polygraph machine
to be perfect nor was there any discussion with respect to its admissibility but that the
results would guide the interrogator in the investigation.
After the examination, it does not appear that the examiner accused the
defendant of failing to tell the truth but he certainly hinted to the defendant that there
was more to discuss. The court does not find evidence in the record as to what the
results of the polygraph examination were. At any rate, it appears clear that the nature
of the interrogation became more focused after the completion of the polygraph
examination.
As the officer focused in on the relationship between the defendant, his wife and
the stepchildren, it became clear by the response of the defendant that something had
happened which he was not happy about and which was completely contrary to his
personal standards of behavior. As a result, the defendant made succeeding
inculpatory statement suggesting that at the behest of his depraved spouse, some
conduct had taken place resulting in a confession by the defendant which he reduced to
writing. His written statement concluded that he had done something wrong and he
was ready to accept the consequences even though he asserted he was pressured into II
them." The investigator then asked the defendant to put in his statement in his words
what it is he did that was wrong, more specifically. At that point, the defendant added 4
to his writing that, "The evil bitch that I am married 2 ... " made him engage in the
unlawful conduct with the children.
The polygraph examiner then explained to the defendant that he would like him
to confirm his statement by answering the questions of another detective. The second
detective then entered the room and the confession was made. This is the only time that
the defendant was in the examination room with any other person except the polygraph
examiner. While the defendant was clearly emotionally upset at the time the final
confession was made, it appears to this observer that the cause of his emotional state
was the conduct under the investigation and of which the defendant was really upset as
a matter of personal principle. During the discussion, the defendant offered details to
the examiners which are not contained in his written statement.
The court finds no evidence of improper inducement by promises of leniency
regarding either the charge or the sentence. State 7). Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598 (Me. 1977).
A confession is admissible in evidence only if voluntary, and the State bears the
burden of establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to find a
statement voluntary, it must first be established that it was as a result of defendant's
exercise of his own free will and rational intellect. The court must consider the totality
of the circumstances in determining whether a confession is voluntary. State II. Sawyer,
2001 ME 88,772 A.2d 1173 at 1175.
In applying a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine voluntariness,
the court must consider both external and internal factors, such as: the details of the
interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the 5
interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers
involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or
inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant's age, physical and mental
health, emotional stability, and conduct. 772 A.2d at 1176.
The interrogation took place in the polygraph examination room of the Maine
State Police over a period of five or six hours, including break time. The circumstances
were clearly not custodial. The defendant was in the room alone with a single
polygraph examination/interrogator, was free to leave, at times did leave to take a
break, and was told that he was not going to be arrested. The details of the polygraph
examination were explained to him and he expressed and executed a document
displaying his willingness to undertake the examination. There was a summary
explanation of the evidence available in the case and a discussion of the defendant's
relationship with his wife. The Miranda warning was given, explained to the defendant
who executed a document, in evidence, confirming the same. During the process, the
defendant was with a single investigating officer. A second officer did not participate
in the process until the defendant had already made the inculpatory statements and
was there to confirm the confession.
The examiner was extremely persistent and more so after the conduct of the
examination. It was clear he was wearing down the defendant once it appeared that the
defendant acknowledged something that he was not happy about. In spite of the
persistence, at no time did the defendant express an intention of refusing to answer any
further questions. The defendant was a 42 year-old man who appeared to be in good 6
physical and mental health but clearly emotionally upset during the final stages of the
interrogation. In spite of that emotional state, he appears to have made no attempt to
leave or to terminate the discussion. It is difficult to determine how much of
defendant's emotional state is related to the conduct of which he admitted and his
strong abhorrence of his wife's conduct.
The fundamental issue, then, is whether a defendant under threat of having
untruthful answers to questions exposed by an imperfect scientific device, can amount
to police trickery. In accordance with a compilation of cases found at 89 A.L.R.3d 230
on the subject in question, it appears that the representation to a defendant that a
polygraph examination will expose any untruthful statements with some degree of
accuracy, does not, standing alone amount to such police misconduct as to make a
confession inadmissible. This is true when a defendant was told that the polygraph had
a likelihood of producing a false confession. Canada v. State, (1975) 56 Ala. App. 722, 325
So.2d 513. It was admissible when the defendant was told that the test indicated the
defendant was not telling the truth once it is determined that the lie detector test was
taken willingly. People v. Barreto, (1967) 256 Cal. App. 2d 392, 64 Cal. Rptr. 211. The
confession was admissible when the defendant was told that he had been found by the
polygraph to be deceptive despite the fact polygraphs are not completely reliable. State
v. Clifton, (1975) 271 Or. 177,531 P.2d 256. In Commonwealth v. Hipple, (1939),333 Pa. 33,
3 A.2d 353, a confession was held admissible where the court found that a statement
made by a police officer to the defendant that he could not lie to the machine amounted
in substance to no more than admonition to tell the truth which was proper. Informing 7
the defendant of the results of a polygraph examination does not constitute misconduct
or overreaching sufficient to raise an issue of an involuntary confession. In U.S.c.A.
Const. Amend. V U.S. v. Beckwith, 22 P.5upp.2d 1270 (D. Utah 1998), confession
admissible after defendant was informed that his answers on a polygraph examination
were deceptive. Roberts v. State, 102 S.W.3d 482 (Ark. 2003). Examiner's statement that
he thought she wasn't being completely truthful was not fundamentally unfair even
though the test results had been inconclusive. The subsequent confession was
voluntary. People v. Sohn, (1989 2d Dept) 248 App. Div. 2d 553,539 N.Y.5.2d 29.
Por purposes of comparison, the court then looks at the cases in which a
confession was held not admissible. In each case, there were other factors in addition to
the polygraph examination which caused the court to grant motions to suppress. When
s 15 year-old boy completed a series of nine polygraph examinations over a 6-hour
period, the confession was held inadmissible. United States ex reI. Monks v. Warden, New
Jersey State Prison (1972 D.C.N.].) 339 P.5upp. 30. It was ruled inadmissible as a result of
a IS-hour polygraph examination where the defendant was given neither food nor rest
nor allowed to leave the room. Bruner v. People, (1945) 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111. In
People v. Sammons (1959) 17 Ill.2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322, the confession was held
inadmissible because of promises of leniency. In People v. Leonard, (1977), 59 App.
Div.2d 1,397 N.Y.5.2d 386, the confession was inadmissible because of the defendant's
impaired physical and mental condition at the time of the polygraph examination. As
was the result of an upset emotional state, improper conduct of the police and the
polygraph operator, and an involuntary waiver of Miranda rights in People v. Zimmer B
(1972), 68 Misc.2d 1067, 329 N.Y.S.2d 17. Such is also the case where a 20 year-old
mentally retarded defendant, Henry v. Dees, (1981 CAS, La.) 658 F.2d 406, a confession
obtained by sleep deprivation, coercion and lies, including misrepresentations as to the
results of polygraph, State v. Sawyer, 561 So.2d 278, and the defendant being told the
polygraph is foolproof, State v. Davis, (1986), Minn. App. 381 N.W.2d 86.
The court is satisfied that the statement made by the defendant, in evidence, was
freely and voluntarily made, not obtained by direct or implied promises, threats or a
coercive totality of the circumstances.
The entry will be:
The defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED.
It , 2009 ~ Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT vs KENNEBEC, ss. GREGORY KIMBALL Docket No AUGSC-CR-2008-00211 43 UNITY RD BENTON ME 04901 DOCKET RECORD
DOB: 11/07/1965 Attorney: JAMES BILLINGS State's Attorney: EVERT FOWLE LIPMAN & KATZ & MCKEE, PA 227 WATER STREET PO BOX 1051 AUGUSTA ME 04332-1051 APPOINTED OS/28/2008
Filing Document: INDICTMENT Major Case Type: FELONY (CLASS A,B,C) Filing Date: 03/20/2008
Charge(s)
1 GROSS SEXUAL ASSAULT 07/01/2003 WATERVILLE Seq 637 17-A 253 (1) (B) Class A
2 UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT 07/01/2003 WATERVILLE Seq 8400 17 - A 255 - A ( 1) (E) Class C
3 GROSS SEXUAL ASSAULT 07/01/2003 WATERVILLE Seq 637 17-A 253 (1) (B) Class A
Docket Events:
03/20/2008 FILING DOCUMENT - INDICTMENT FILED ON 03/20/2008
TRANSFER - BAIL AND PLEADING GRANTED ON 03/20/2008
TRANSFER - BAIL AND PLEADING REQUESTED ON 03/20/2008
03/20/2008 Charge (s) : 1,2,3 WARRANT - ON COMP/INDICTMENT ORDERED ON 03/20/2008
03/20/2008 BAIL BOND - $20,000.00 CASH BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 03/20/2008
03/20/2008 BAIL BOND - $50,000.00 SURETY BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 03/20/2008
03/20/2008 Charge (s) : 1,2,3 WARRANT - ON COMP/INDICTMENT ISSUED ON 03/20/2008
CERTIFIED COPY TO WARRANT REPOSITORY 04/04/2008 Charge (s): 1,2,3 WARRANT - ON COMP/INDICTMENT EXECUTED ON 04/02/2008
04/07/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULED FOR 04/04/2008 @ 1:00 Page 1 of 5 Printed on: 02/18/2009 GREGORY KIMBALL AUGSC-CR-2008-00211 DOCKET RECORD
04/07/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT HELD ON 04/04/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE READING WAIVED. DEFENDANT INFORMED OF CHARGES. COPY OF INDICTMENT/INFORMATION GIVEN TO DEFENDANT. 21 DAYS TO FILE MOTIONS 04/07/2008 Chargers): 1,2,3 PLEA - NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/04/2008
04/07/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL SCHEDULED FOR 05/07/2008 ~ 10:45
04/07/2008 BAIL BOND - $20,000.00 CASH BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 04/04/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE OR SURETY $40,000 04/07/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/04/2008
04/07/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 WARRANT - ON COMP/INDICTMENT RETURNED ON 04/07/2008
04/07/2008 BAIL BOND - $40,000.00 SURETY BAIL BOND FILED ON 04/07/2008
Bail Amt: $40,000 Surety Type: REAL ESTATE Surety Value: $0 County: KENNEBEC County Book 10: 9690 Book Page: 233 Date Bailed: 04/07/2008 Prvdr Name: TIMOTHY BICKFORD Lien Issued: 04/07/2008 Rtrn Name: TIMOTHY BICKFORD Lien Discharged: 04/09/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL GRANTED ON 04/08/2008 JOSEPH M JABAR , JUSTICE COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 04/09/2008 Party(s): GREGORY KIMBALL ATTORNEY - APPOINTED ORDERED ON 04/08/2008
Attorney: MEGAN HANLEY 04/25/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 04/25/2008
04/28/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 04/28/2008 JOHN NIVISON, JUSTICE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE DEADLINE TO SUBMIT MOTIONS IS EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS, OR UNTIL MAY 9, 2008. COpy TO PARTY OF RECORDS. 05/01/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 05/01/2008
05/06/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 05/01/2008
05/06/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL GRANTED ON 05/05/2008 JOSEPH M JABAR , JUSTICE COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL REVISED TO PARTIALLY INDIGENT 05/06/2008 Party(s): GREGORY KIMBALL ATTORNEY - PARTIALLY INDIGENT ORDERED ON 05/05/2008
Page 2 of 5 Printed on: 02/18/2009 GREGORY KIMBALL AUGSC-CR-2008-00211 DOCKET RECORD Attorney: MEGAN HANLEY 05/07/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 05/07/2008 NANCY MILLS, JUSTICE Defendant Present in Court
COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 05/07/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL HELD ON 05/07/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE Reporter: JANETTE COOK Defendant Present in Court 05/07/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 05/07/2008
05/07/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME GRANTED ON 05/07/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 05/07/2008 Charge(s!: 1,2,3 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL SCHEDULED FOR 06/02/2008 @ 10:45
OS/22/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON OS/21/2008
OS/22/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CNSL FILED BY COUNSEL ON OS/22/2008
OS/22/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED BY DEFENDANT ON OS/21/2008
OS/28/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CNSL GRANTED ON OS/28/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL ALL DEADLINES ARE EXTENDED UNTIL 20 DAYS FROM THE DATE THAT NEW COUNSEL IS APPOINTED. OS/28/2008 Party(s): GREGORY KIMBALL ATTORNEY - WITHDRAWN ORDERED ON OS/28/2008
Attorney: MEGAN HANLEY OS/28/2008 Party(s): GREGORY KIMBALL ATTORNEY - APPOINTED ORDERED ON OS/28/2008
Attorney: JAMES BILLINGS 05/30/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON OS/22/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 05/30/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME DENIED ON OS/22/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 05/30/2008 Charge(s): 1,2,3 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL CONTINUED ON OS/22/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE 06/19/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/18/2008
06/19/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 08/14/2008 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 06/23/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/23/2008
Page 3 of 5 Printed on: 02/18/2009 GREGORY KIMBALL AUGSC-CR-2008-00211 DOCKET RECORD 06/23/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR FUNDS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/23/2008
EX-PARTE 06/25/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR FUNDS GRANTED ON 06/24/2008 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE COPY TO DEFENDANT ON 6/25/08 TOTAL OF $1,000.00. 06/26/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO AMEND BAIL SCHEDULED FOR 07/08/2008 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/01/2008 AUDIT - AUDIT REPORT CHART_OF_ACCOUNT EDI ON 08/01/2008 @ 10:41
RV APPR ABRV:GF; OLD OVERRIDE CODE:NONE; NEW OVERRIDE CODE:NONE; OLD AMT OVERRIDE:O; NEW AMT OVERRIDE: 0; USER ID:PMOORE 08/05/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY STATE ON 08/05/2008
08/06/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 08/06/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/06/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 08/06/2008
08/06/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 08/26/2008 @ 1:00
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/22/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 08/22/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE 09/16/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 11/14/2008 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 10/20/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ON 10/20/2008
11/10/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR FUNDS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 11/10/2008
11/13/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR FUNDS GRANTED ON 11/12/2008 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 11/18/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 11/14/2008 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE Reporter: JANETTE COOK Defendant Present in Court 11/18/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 11/14/2008
02/18/2009 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED ON 02/11/2009 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 02/18/2009 ORDER - COURT ORDER FILED ON 02/17/2009 DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 02/18/2009 Charge(s): 1,2,3 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL SCHEDULED FOR 04/07/2009 @ 8:30
Receipts Page 4 of 5 Printed on: 02/18/2009 GREGORY KIMBALL AUGSC-CR-2008-00211 DOCKET RECORD
Attorney Payment $50.00 CA paid. OS/28/2008 Attorney Payment $100.00 CK paid. 08/01/2008
A TRUE COpy ATTEST: Clerk
Page 5 of 5 Printed on: 02/18/200