MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 70 Docket: Ken-24-329 Argued: April 9, 2025 Decided: August 7, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
IRINEU B. GONCALVES
HORTON, J.
[¶1] Irineu B. Goncalves appeals from a sentence imposed by the trial
court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) in a judgment of conviction entered after a
jury-waived trial. The court sentenced Goncalves to thirty years in prison for
attempted murder (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 152(1)(A) (2025); see 17-A M.R.S.
§ 201(1)(A) (2025), with all but eighteen years suspended and four years of
probation. In the first of his two arguments, Goncalves asserts that the trial
court violated his Eighth Amendment rights in arriving at this sentence by
failing to consider as a mitigating factor that Goncalves committed the offense
while in a “blind jealous rage.” We are not persuaded by this argument, but we
agree with Goncalves’s other argument—that his attempted-murder sentence 2
should be vacated because the court erred in finding as an aggravating factor
that he had assaulted a hotel clerk.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Goncalves’s appeal is from a judgment of conviction in which the
trial court sentenced him for five crimes:
attempted murder (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 152(1)(A); see id. § 201(1)(A);
domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(D) (2023);1 see 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(C) (2025);
domestic violence criminal threatening (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A) (2023);2 see 17-A M.R.S. § 209 (2025);
assault on an officer (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 752-A(1)(A), (3) (2025); and
violating a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2025).
The facts relevant to this appeal are drawn from the procedural record and
from the court’s written findings of fact after the bench trial and its oral findings
at sentencing, which are all supported by competent evidence in the record,
1 The relevant paragraph of this statute has been amended since the date of the charged crime to
include conduct against “a dating partner as defined in Title 19-A, section 4102, subsection 4” in the definition of the crime. See P.L. 2023, ch. 465, § 4 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(D) (2025)).
2 The relevant paragraph of this statute has been amended since the date of the charged crime to
include conduct against “a dating partner as defined in Title 19-A, section 4102, subsection 4” in the definition of the crime. See P.L. 2023, ch. 465, § 7 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A) (2025)). 3
except as we indicate. See State v. Wilson, 2015 ME 148, ¶ 13, 127 A.3d 1234;
State v. Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 15, 852 A.2d 70.
[¶3] As of June 14, 2023, Goncalves and the victim, the parents of two
young children, had been in an on-and-off relationship for approximately five
years. Goncalves lived in Massachusetts but worked as a truck driver and
arranged his routes so that he could stay in Waterville, where the victim
resided, to see her and the children. Despite a breakup in September 2022,
Goncalves and the victim continued to have contact, and Goncalves wanted to
continue his relationship with the victim.
[¶4] On June 14, 2023, Goncalves called the victim repeatedly on her cell
phone and contacted her through a communication software application. The
victim played in a pick-up soccer game that evening, and when she saw
Goncalves walking alongside the road during her drive home, she agreed to give
him a ride to the Waterville hotel where he was staying. She told him that she
had to be home by 8:30 p.m. He directed her to pull into the hotel’s back parking
lot, which she did.
[¶5] While they were still in the car, Goncalves begged the victim to go
inside with him and asked why they could not be together and if she was seeing
someone else. When she received a text message at 8:04 p.m. from a man with 4
whom she plays soccer, Goncalves became angry and did not believe her
assurances that the man was only a friend. Goncalves calmed down and asked
for a hug. The victim hugged him, and then Goncalves opened the passenger
side door to exit the car. Standing between the door and the body of the car, he
refused to close the door despite the victim’s insistence that she needed to get
home to the children. In an effort to edge away from him, the victim put her car
in reverse and removed her foot from the brake. As she then eased the car
forward so she could depart, Goncalves jumped back into the car, shut the door,
and stared at her. She happened to notice that the dashboard clock read
8:24 p.m.
[¶6] Goncalves said, “I am going to kill you this time, I am going to kill
you now.” He put his right hand on the victim’s throat, pushing her back into
the seat, and pressed on her trachea as if to crush it. She coughed up blood. He
continued to push her into the seat while bracing himself against her seat with
his left hand and the passenger seat with one knee, with one foot on the floor.
He pulled his hand back as if to rip her throat out, and the victim was unable to
breathe. She tried to press the gas pedal to accelerate the car and throw him
off balance, but she could not reach it. When she squeezed his testicles, he used
both hands to squeeze her neck. 5
[¶7] The victim opened the door and was able to breathe long enough to
scream for help. She got her left foot out the door and slipped out of the chest
strap of her seatbelt but was still held by the lap belt. A van pulled up, and she
twisted to get out of the lap belt. She landed on the ground near the car. She
screamed, “He is going to kill me!” The van driver yelled at Goncalves to stop
and called 9-1-1. Instead of stopping, Goncalves told the van driver that he had
a firearm in his backpack and would kill the driver and the victim.
[¶8] Outside the car, Goncalves punched the victim’s face, ear, and head.
He pinned her down, put his knees on her chest, and began to strangle her while
staring into her eyes. She lost sensation in her hands and feet. Her hearing
diminished. She felt cold.
[¶9] The hotel’s front desk clerk came outside while Goncalves was on
top of the victim. She yelled at Goncalves to stop and pulled on the backpack he
was wearing to get him off the victim. One of his hands was drawn away from
the victim, but due to exhaustion, the clerk had to let go. Goncalves continued
to choke the victim with two hands.
[¶10] A police officer arrived and attempted to restrain Goncalves.
Goncalves bit him and twisted his ear as if to pull it off. The officer yelled, “Let 6
go of my gun!” when Goncalves attempted to pull the officer’s firearm out of its
holster. With his face expressionless, Goncalves continued to fight.
[¶11] The hotel clerk hid behind a vehicle. Another officer arrived and
attempted to pepper spray Goncalves twice. The first officer also administered
his taser twice. It was not until a third officer arrived, however, that the police
were able to subdue and handcuff Goncalves.
[¶12] Eventually the victim started to feel her fingers and toes again and
saw paramedics at her side. She suffered injuries to her face, eyes, arms, back,
shoulders, and hands. Her nose was broken, and the whites of her eyes were
thoroughly bloodshot. She was taken to the hospital and treated for her
injuries. The hospital released her to recover at home, and five days later she
returned with head pain and dizziness. A doctor determined that she had likely
suffered a concussion.
[¶13] Goncalves, meanwhile, was taken into custody. Goncalves asked
one of the officers why the officer was looking so serious. After the officer said
that he always looked serious, Goncalves said that the officer should smile and
not take it personally.
[¶14] On August 24, 2023, the grand jury charged Goncalves by
indictment with seven crimes—the five listed above and two other charges: 7
domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(A), and
domestic violence terrorizing (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-B(1)(A) (2023).3
Those two other charges were later dismissed as part of an agreement by which
Goncalves pleaded guilty to domestic violence aggravated assault, 17-A M.R.S.
§ 208-D(1)(D), and violating a condition of release, 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A).
[¶15] On May 28 to 30, 2024, the court held a jury-waived trial on the
charges of attempted murder, domestic violence criminal threatening, and
assault on an officer. The State offered testimony from the victim, the hotel
clerk, the van driver who called 9-1-1, the first two officers to arrive at the
scene, an EMT who attended to the victim, the doctor who saw the victim when
she returned to the hospital for care, and the victim’s sister, who had helped
her during her recovery.
[¶16] Goncalves called one witness—a criminal psychologist who opined
that, although Goncalves did not have cognitive problems or ongoing mental
health issues, the reports about his blank expression and staring during the
assault and his own report that he did not recall the time between the victim
moving the car and him being restrained by police indicated that he was either
3 The relevant paragraph of this statute has been amended since the date of the charged crime to
include conduct against “a dating partner as defined in Title 19-A, section 4102, subsection 4” in the definition of the crime. See P.L. 2023, ch. 465, § 9 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 210-B(1)(A) (2025)). 8
in a blind rage or experienced a dissociative episode when he was strangling
the victim. The psychologist reasoned that Goncalves had felt threatened when
the car moved while he was next to it and had a traumatic response—going into
fight mode. He characterized the events as flowing from an unspecified
dissociative disorder and testified that Goncalves’s inability to be consciously
aware of what he was doing affected his ability to form intent.
[¶17] The court entered written findings on June 26, 2024, finding
Goncalves guilty of all three charges tried to the court. The court found that
although Goncalves suffered from an abnormal condition of mind when he
attacked the victim, there was no trauma event that explained the dissociative
features of his conduct. The court found that Goncalves reacted to the victim’s
need to leave to care for their children with extreme and relentless rage and
violence. The court found that he “knew who he was attacking when he began
choking and beating [the victim]. This was a very personal attack on someone
he knew well. And he signaled his intention to her in the moment before the
attacks began: ‘I am going to kill you this time, I am going to kill you now.’”
[¶18] With respect to the attempted murder charge, the court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Goncalves was aware of what he was doing and
had the conscious object and firm intent to kill the victim, as particularly 9
indicated by his stated intent just before attacking her. See 17-A M.R.S
§§ 152(1)(A), 201(1)(A); cf. 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2025) (“Evidence of an abnormal
condition of the mind may raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a
required culpable state of mind.”). It found that the State had also proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had taken a substantial step toward
murdering her. See 17-A M.R.S. § 152(1)(A).
[¶19] Similarly, with respect to the charge of domestic violence criminal
threatening, the court found that Goncalves had the specific intent to kill the
victim and intentionally or knowingly placed her in fear of imminent bodily
injury by telling her that he was going to kill her. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 209(1),
209-A(1)(A). It found that Goncalves’s abnormal condition of mind did not
negate his conscious intent to place the victim in fear of imminent bodily injury
and that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Goncalves and
the victim were family or household members. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 209(1),
209-A(1)(A); cf. 17-A M.R.S. § 38.
[¶20] With respect to the charge of assault on the officer who initially
attempted to restrain Goncalves, the court found that when Goncalves bit the
officer’s hand and tore at his ear, he intentionally caused bodily injury to the
officer while the officer was performing his official duties. See 17-A M.R.S. 10
§ 752-A(1)(A). It further found that any abnormal condition of mind
experienced by Goncalves did not negate his intent to cause bodily injury to the
officer. See 17-A M.R.S. § 752-A(1)(A); cf. 17-A M.R.S. § 38.
[¶21] After receiving sentencing memoranda from the State and
Goncalves, the court held a sentencing hearing on July 10, 2024.
[¶22] In formulating its sentence for the attempted murder, the court
first determined the basic sentence based on the nature and seriousness of the
criminal conduct itself. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(A) (2025). The court found
that Goncalves’s attack on the victim had been in close quarters and was brutal,
persistent, and unrelenting. The court considered the offense to be in the upper
tier of the continuum of seriousness and set the basic sentence at twenty-five
years. See id.; 17-A M.R.S. § 1604(1)(A) (2025) (establishing a maximum term
of imprisonment of thirty years for a Class A crime).
[¶23] At the second step of the sentencing process, the court determined
“the maximum term of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other
relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to the
case.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B). The court considered as mitigating factors
that Goncalves had no criminal record, accepted responsibility by pleading 11
guilty to several serious charges before trial, and had good relationships in his
family and a good work ethic.
[¶24] With respect to Goncalves’s asserted abnormal condition of mind,
the court found as follows:
In this case, the Court found based primarily on the State’s witnesses, that the defendant did experience an abnormal condition of mind, not based upon a biologically based mental illness because the defense agrees there is no mental health history here, but it was noteworthy to the professional witnesses as well as the lay witnesses, that it seemed that Mr. Goncalves was impervious to efforts made by a number of people to restrain him, to tase him, to subject him to extreme levels of electronic voltage and he didn’t make a sound when these vicious attacks were going on. So I don’t fault at all the defense for raising that issue and attempting to raise reasonable doubt, but as the parties know the Court concluded that this is one of those cases where actually the abnormal condition of mind, as [the expert] I think said pretty clearly, there were two basic theories; one, is that it was a dissociative state, and the other theory is that it was blind rage, blind jealous rage, and frankly, based upon the record and the history of the parties the Court believes that what was going on was blind rage.
And so the Court is not going to mitigate, or find as a mitigating factor the fact that there was an abnormal condition of mind. Had it been a biologically based mental illness, had it been a developmental disability over which he had some control, the Court might use that as a mitigating factor, but under the circumstances the Court declines to use the abnormal condition of mind as a mitigating factor.
[¶25] The court declined to use evidence of uncharged conduct by
Goncalves against the victim as an aggravating factor because it was not clear 12
why previous matters involving the two were dismissed. The court considered
Goncalves’s persistent communications to the victim and his conduct toward
the van driver and the hotel clerk as aggravating factors. The court referred to
“the assault that he made against” the hotel clerk and stated that Goncalves
responded to the intervention of others with “threats to kill [the van driver],
and assaultive conduct against [the hotel clerk].” The court also considered the
profound impact on the victim with respect to both physical and psychological
harm. Because of these aggravating factors, which the court determined
outweighed the mitigating factors, the court increased the sentence to thirty
years.
[¶26] In the third step of the sentencing analysis, the court determined
whether and for what duration to suspend any portion of the maximum term of
imprisonment. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(C). The court suspended all but
eighteen years of the maximum term that it had determined for attempted
murder and ordered four years of probation. The court then imposed a fully
suspended consecutive thirty-month sentence with two more years of
probation for assault on an officer, and additional sentences running
concurrently with the attempted murder sentence for the other crimes of which
Goncalves was convicted. 13
[¶27] Goncalves timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. See
15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2025); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1). He also applied for leave to
appeal from his sentence, see 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-2157 (2025); M.R. App. P. 20,
but the Sentence Review Panel denied that application. See State v. Goncalves,
No. SRP-24-331 (Oct. 28, 2024). Thus, his arguments on appeal—both of which
focus on his sentence and not any aspect of the trial or findings of guilt—
challenge only the legality of the sentence, not its propriety. See State v.
Hemminger, 2022 ME 32, ¶ 14, 276 A.3d 33.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶28] Goncalves argues that the court, in sentencing him for attempted
murder, (A) violated his Eighth Amendment rights in refusing to consider his
“blind jealous rage” as a mitigating factor4 and (B) erred in finding as an
aggravating factor that he assaulted the hotel clerk. We consider each
argument in turn.
A. The Eighth Amendment and “Blind Rage” as a Mitigating Factor
[¶29] For purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding, that
the blind rage that the court found to have driven Goncalves’s assaultive
4 Goncalves has not presented an argument under the Maine Constitution’s counterpart to the
Eighth Amendment. See Me. Const. art I, § 9 (“Sanguinary laws shall not be passed; all penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense; excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.”). 14
behavior can, as the court found in convicting Goncalves, constitute an
abnormal condition of mind. We acknowledge that rage can in some
circumstances mitigate the seriousness of criminal conduct. For instance, as set
forth in the manslaughter statute, “The fact that the person causes the death
while under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by
adequate provocation constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder
to manslaughter . . . .” 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(B) (2025). The manslaughter
statute plainly has no application here because Goncalves’s murderous conduct
was unprovoked, but the phrase “under the influence of extreme anger” is an
apt descriptor of “blind rage.” The question before us is whether the Eighth
Amendment compelled the court to consider Goncalves’s blind rage as a
mitigating factor in determining its sentence for attempted murder.
[¶30] Goncalves argues that the court erred in determining that because
the condition was not biologically based, his “blind rage” was categorically
excluded as a mitigating factor for sentencing. He argues that the court was
required to consider his blind rage as an abnormal condition of mind in
mitigation despite its ruling that his mental state did not negate—i.e., raise a
reasonable doubt as to—his criminal intent. He concludes that his sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which 15
requires that the punishment be appropriate in the circumstances of the
individual case.
[¶31] The State responds that Goncalves has misconstrued the court’s
sentencing analysis and argues that the court fully considered Goncalves’s
abnormal condition of mind but was not persuaded that it was mitigating.
1. Standard of Review
[¶32] When preserved, an argument under the Eighth Amendment
presents a legal issue that we review de novo. See City of Lewiston v. Verrinder,
2022 ME 29, ¶ 15, 275 A.3d 327. When a party fails to raise the issue to the trial
court, however, it is unpreserved and will be reviewed only for obvious error.
See State v. Watson, 2024 ME 24, ¶ 18, 319 A.3d 430; State v. J.R., 2018 ME 117,
¶ 20, 191 A.3d 1157.
[¶33] At sentencing, Goncalves did not mention the Eighth Amendment,
arguing only, “We respect the Court’s findings after trial. However, that doesn’t
mean the Court still cannot consider an expert’s opinion when determining
sentence, Your Honor.” He argued that the sentence should be lower because
he dissociated and acted in a way that was out of character for him. Because
Goncalves never argued or even mentioned the Eighth Amendment in the trial
court, we conclude that the basis for his argument was not preserved. We 16
therefore apply the obvious error standard of review. “Error is obvious when
there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If
these conditions are met, we must also conclude that (4) the error seriously
affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings
before we vacate a judgment on the basis of the error.” Watson, 2024 ME 24,
¶ 18, 319 A.3d 430 (quotation marks omitted).
2. Eighth Amendment Analysis
[¶34] “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “The
Eighth Amendment does not mention disproportionate punishments explicitly,
but rather incorporates the principle that a grossly disproportionate
punishment is cruel and unusual.” State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 16, 21 A.3d
1033 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (“For the most part . . .
punishments [are] challenged not as inherently barbaric but as
disproportionate to the crime. The concept of proportionality is central to the
Eighth Amendment.”)).
[¶35] In capital cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that a sentencing
court must consider any mitigating factor that might weigh against the
imposition of the death penalty. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 17
(1982); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[T]he Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind
of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”
(footnote omitted)).5 The Court has also interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s
proportionality principle to apply to life sentences without the opportunity for
parole. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 (providing that as to such sentences, “the
Court considers all of the circumstances of the case to determine whether the
sentence is unconstitutionally excessive”).
[¶36] The Court reviewed a death penalty sentence in which the
sentencing court found that the defendant had a difficult childhood and a
personality disorder but concluded—as did the intermediate appellate court—
that these were not properly considered as mitigating factors because they
would not excuse the defendant’s behavior. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 108-10. The
Supreme Court held, “Just as the State may not by statute preclude the
5 The Court further explained, “[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). 18
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer
refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. In this
instance, it was as if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the
mitigating evidence [the defendant] proffered on his behalf. The sentencer, and
the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given
relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding
such evidence from their consideration.” Id. at 113-15; see also Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (reaffirming that in a death penalty case,
“a State cannot preclude the sentencer from considering any relevant
mitigating evidence that the defendant proffers in support of a sentence less
than death” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶37] Applying this standard, the Court has held that evidence of
developmental and cognitive deficits must be considered as mitigating factors
in a death penalty case, whether or not such a characteristic of the offender
affected the commission of the crime, because impairments in intellectual
function are “inherently mitigating.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285-87
(2004). It has also held that, for juveniles, a mandatory sentence of life without
the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality
requirement, even for a homicide conviction, because the statutory mandate 19
precludes the sentencing court from considering mitigating factors such as
youth and any cognitive or developmental issues before imposing a sentence
that is, for a juvenile, similar in gravity to the death penalty. Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 469-80 (2012); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (reaching this
conclusion earlier as to a non-homicide juvenile case).
[¶38] Outside the realm of capital cases and life sentences without
parole, however, the Court has indicated that “legislatures remain free to decide
how much discretion in sentencing should be reposed in the judge or jury.”
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603 (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 604-05
(noting that for noncapital sentences, “the established practice of
individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but on public
policy enacted into statutes”).
[¶39] Goncalves contends that even in a noncapital case, a court must, to
comply with the Eighth Amendment, consider a defendant’s blind rage as an
abnormal condition of mind in mitigation, regardless of whether the condition
has an organic or biological basis or constitutes a developmental or cognitive
disability, and regardless of whether it negates an element of the crime for
which the defendant is being sentenced. However, we do not view the Eighth
Amendment to require the court to consider an adult defendant’s blind rage to 20
be a mitigating factor for purposes of sentencing in a noncapital case,
particularly when the blind rage is unprovoked, cf. 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(B).
See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603-605.6 As we held in State v. Dobbins, 2019 ME 116,
¶ 57, 215 A.3d 769, where an adult defendant argued that his youth had to be
considered as a mitigating factor, “The opinions in Graham and Miller are built
on two factors that are not present here: offenders who are younger than
eighteen at the time of the crime, and the imposition of a life sentence
(discretionary in Graham, mandatory in Miller) without any possibility of
parole.”7 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-60 (citing cases that demonstrate that “it
has been difficult for the challenger to establish a lack of proportionality” in
noncapital sentences).
[¶40] We need not decide whether the Eighth Amendment ever requires
the consideration of an abnormal condition of mind as a mitigating factor when
a court sentences an adult to a term of years. It is sufficient for us to conclude
that even if we were to apply the reasoning that the Supreme Court has applied
to death-penalty and juvenile life sentences, Goncalves would not prevail. At
6 Goncalves has raised no argument that the Maine Constitution or any Maine statute requires the
consideration of “blind rage” or “blind jealous rage” as a mitigating factor when a court sentences a defendant for a Class A crime.
7See also State v. J.R., 2018 ME 117, ¶ 21, 191 A.3d 1157 (“[C]ourts rarely find sentences disproportionate pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, except in cases involving the death penalty or juvenile defendants.” (quotation marks omitted)). 21
sentencing, the court made it clear that, as between a dissociative state and
“blind rage,” it was the latter that defined Goncalves’s mental state during his
criminal acts. Assuming that his blind rage constituted an abnormal condition
of mind, it was a transient phenomenon and not the kind of permanent
condition—such as cognitive, intellectual or developmental impairment or
disability—that the Supreme Court has held is inherently mitigating, at least in
capital cases. See Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287.
[¶41] Moreover, regardless of whether an incident of domestic violence
results in part or whole from the batterer’s blind rage, there is nothing in the
sentencing statutes that requires the court to consider blind rage in mitigation.
In fact, courts are required by statute to consider whether to order such
defendants to address their behavior through certified domestic violence
intervention programs. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1807(2)(D-1), (5) (2025). Because it
is primarily the sentencing statutes, rather than the Eighth Amendment, that
govern sentencing in Goncalves’s case, see Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603-05, we
discern no error, much less obvious error, in the court’s determination that
Goncalves’s blind jealous rage was not a mitigating factor for sentencing
purposes. 22
B. Finding of Assault of the Hotel Clerk as an Aggravating Factor
[¶42] The parties agree that the court inaccurately based its sentence for
attempted murder in part on “‘the assault [Goncalves] made against’” the hotel
clerk, when there was no evidence that he assaulted the clerk. They disagree
about whether a remand is necessary for the court to reconsider the sentence
without that aggravating factor.
[¶43] When preserved, we review a sentencing court’s factual findings
for clear error to determine whether competent evidence in the record
supports the finding. See State v. Prewara, 687 A.2d 951, 954-55 (Me. 1996);
see also State v. Rosario, 2022 ME 46, ¶¶ 39-40, 280 A.3d 199 (reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a sentencing fact when reviewing the
legality—not the propriety—of the sentence). Because Goncalves did not draw
the trial court’s attention to its erroneous finding that he assaulted the hotel
clerk, however, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 35(a) (authorizing a motion for correction of
a sentence), we review this issue for obvious error. See Watson, 2024 ME 24,
¶ 18, 319 A.3d 430. “Error is obvious when there is (1) an error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these conditions are met, we
must also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity 23
or public reputation of judicial proceedings before we vacate a judgment on the
basis of the error.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
2. Obvious Error Analysis
[¶44] The State concedes that there is an error that is plain on the record;
there is no evidence to support the court’s finding that Goncalves assaulted the
clerk. See 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2025).8 We must therefore consider
whether the error affects Goncalves’s substantial rights, namely his due process
right arising from his liberty interest in a sentence in which each aggravating
factor has a basis in fact and law. See Green v. State, 247 A.2d 117, 121
(Me. 1968) (“[A] sentence substantially predicated upon assumptions
concerning past criminal activity untrue in fact or upon misinformation as to
other material facts, either as a result of carelessness or design, would be in
violation of due process.”); Watson, 2024 ME 24, ¶ 34, 319 A.3d 430 (vacating
a sentence and remanding for resentencing due to obvious error given “the
importance of the liberty interest at stake . . . and the need to ensure that due
consideration is given to all relevant and proper sentencing factors—and no
improper factors—when determining a sentence”).
8 As the statute would apply in the circumstances here, where both Goncalves and the clerk are adults, an assault occurs when a “person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2025). 24
[¶45] When a defendant challenges the validity of information that a
court considers in its sentencing analysis, “[t]he reviewing court must examine
the record to see whether the sentencing judge gave specific consideration to
the questionable information.” United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863,
866 (7th Cir. 1984). Thus, a sentence will be vacated if the record shows that
the court’s reliance on consequential misinformation “is explicit and
incontrovertible.” Id.; State v. Alexander, 858 N.W.2d 662, 671-72 (Wis. 2015)
(analyzing whether the court, in its articulation of the basis for the sentence,
explicitly relied on an improper factor); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443, 447-49 (1972) (concluding, on habeas corpus review, that resentencing
was necessary because the sentencing court had explicitly relied on
unconstitutional prior convictions in sentencing the defendant); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (concluding, on habeas corpus review, that
a state supreme court erred in denying habeas relief to a defendant who was
sentenced based on inaccurate information at a time when he lacked
representation).
[¶46] To determine whether a sentencing error affects substantial rights,
we consider whether there is “a reasonable probability that, but for the error,
the [sentencing] court would have imposed a different, more favorable 25
sentence.” United States v. González-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶¶ 25-29, 28
A.3d 1147 (emphasizing, in following federal caselaw, that the principles that
underlie the federal plain-error rule also underlie Maine’s obvious-error rule).
A defendant’s rights are substantially affected when a sentencing court
assumes an unsupported fact of significance in the sentencing.
See González-Castillo, 562 F.3d at 83; see also State v. Moore, 2023 ME 18, ¶ 25,
290 A.3d 533 (citing Commonwealth v. Bethea, 379 A.2d 102, 106 (Pa. 1977)
(stating that “a sentence based in part on an impermissible consideration is not
made proper simply because the sentencing judge considers other permissible
factors as well”)); United States v. Avilés-Santiago, 558 F. App’x 7, 10 (1st Cir.
2014) (“[A] sentence based on an unsupported fact cannot stand.”). We have
made clear that the consideration of improper information at sentencing
undermines due process. See Green, 247 A.2d at 121.
[¶47] In several cases, federal courts have vacated sentences when there
was a reasonable probability that the court’s unsupported findings resulted in
a more severe sentence. See, e.g., González-Castillo, 562 F.3d at 83 (concluding
that an unsupported finding that the defendant was convicted of a similar crime
affected the defendant’s substantial rights when the finding motivated the court 26
to focus on deterrence); United States v. Wilson, 614 F.3d 219, 224-25 (6th Cir.
2010) (concluding that an unsupported finding that played an important role
in sentencing affected the defendant’s substantial rights); United States v.
Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 341-43 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding, based on a
review of the sentencing transcript, that there was a “substantial chance” that
the misapprehension of a fact resulted in a more severe sentence).
[¶48] In contrast, when courts have held that there was no reasonable
probability of a different sentence, they have done so because in the context of
the sentencing, the fact was not of consequence. See, e.g., Putt v. United States,
363 F.2d 369, 370 (5th Cir. 1966) (affirming a sentence when false information
in a report submitted to the court had no demonstrated effect on the sentence);
United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 38-40 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding
that a defendant who acquiesced in the characterization of his earlier
conviction as a drug trafficking offense failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability of a more lenient sentence when he did not demonstrate that his
criminal record, if produced, would “show that his prior offense was other than
a drug trafficking offense” and result in a lesser sentence); United States v.
Martin, 739 F. App’x 851, 853-54 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming a sentence upon
concluding that the court’s unsupported findings—including an inaccurate 27
finding that the defendant was convicted for criminal conduct when he had in
fact only admitted to the conduct—were inconsequential to the sentence);
Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding, on a habeas
appeal, that resentencing was not necessary when there was “no indication in
the record that the [sentencing] court founded its sentence at least in part on”
the unsupported facts).
[¶49] The materiality of the error to the court’s sentencing analysis is the
decisive consideration. Thus, if a court finds that an extended pattern of
uncharged conduct constitutes an aggravating factor, and a single instance
among many is unsubstantiated, the error may reasonably be deemed
inconsequential. Similarly, if a court finds a defendant’s substantial criminal
history to be an aggravating factor, a lack of support in the record for one minor
misdemeanor conviction among a multitude of convictions for more serious
crimes probably would not affect the sentence. This is not such a case. The
finding that Goncalves had assaulted the hotel clerk was one of just a few
aggravating factors identified in the court’s analysis, and the court presumably
would not have made an unqualified finding that it was an aggravating factor if
the court did not intend it to affect the sentence. We conclude that there is a 28
reasonable probability that the error affected the sentence and thus affected
Goncalves’s substantial rights.
[¶50] The question then becomes whether the error “seriously affects
the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Watson,
2024 ME 24, ¶ 18, 319 A.3d 430 (quotation marks omitted). Many errors in
judicial proceedings do not rise to the level of meeting that standard. However,
the same factors that lead us to conclude that the error in this case was material
and probably affected the sentence lead us to conclude that ignoring the error
could undermine public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
sentencing process. See Avilés-Santiago, 558 F. App’x at 10; cf. United States v.
Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84, 92 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[L]eaving intact a sentence
that exceeds a congressionally mandated limit may sully the public’s perception
of the fairness of the proceeding. That perception, in turn, may threaten respect
for the courts and may impair their reputation.”).
[¶51] In these circumstances, we vacate the court’s judgment sentencing
Goncalves on the attempted murder charge and remand for resentencing.
See Watson, 2024 ME 24, ¶¶ 18, 34, 319 A.3d 430. 29
The entry is:
Judgment vacated as to Count 1 (attempted murder). Remanded for resentencing.
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellant Irineu B. Goncalves
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Shannon Flaherty, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District IV, for appellee State of Maine
Kennebec County Uni ied Criminal Docket docket number CR-2023-1010 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY