MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 8 Docket: And-24-541 Argued: September 10, 2025 Decided: February 5, 2026
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
AARON ALDRICH
LIPEZ, J.
[¶1] Aaron Aldrich appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts
of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2025), and
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (Class C), 15 M.R.S.
§ 393(1)(A-1)(1) (2022),1 entered by the trial court (Androscoggin County,
Archer, J.) after a jury trial. Aldrich challenges the court’s denial of his motion
to suppress his post-arrest statements. He also asserts that a multitude of
erroneous evidentiary rulings infected his trial from start to finish and that
these errors, even if not individually sufficient to require reversal, cumulatively
deprived him of a fair trial. Lastly, he contends that the court improperly
1 As a result of recent amendments to 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1), the version of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person charged in this case is now a Class B crime. See P.L. 2023, ch. 491, § 1 (effective Aug. 9, 2024) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1) (2025)). 2
instructed the jury. Upon review of each of Aldrich’s claims, we conclude that
they either lack merit or, in instances where we do find error, that the errors—
even when viewed together—do not warrant reversal. Aldrich also appeals
from the court’s imposition of concurrent life sentences for the murder
convictions. See State v. Aldrich, No. SRP-24-540 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel
Feb. 20, 2025). We conclude that the court did not misapply legal principles or
otherwise err in imposing the sentences. We therefore affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
[¶2] We begin with an overview of the pertinent facts, reserving further
detail for our discussion of each of Aldrich’s arguments. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, the jury rationally could have found the
following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Lester, 2025 ME 21, ¶ 2,
331 A.3d 426.
[¶3] On the evening of February 20, 2023, Aldrich, who had plans to “do
a job,” obtained a ride from a friend to a trailer in Poland. Aldrich knew the
residents of the trailer—one adult and one teenager—because he had been
there two days prior to sell a generator to the adult. The adult resident was
known to keep illegal drugs and large amounts of cash on hand. 3
[¶4] Aldrich was carrying a tool bag with a nine-millimeter rifle inside
when he arrived at the trailer around 10 p.m. on February 20. While Aldrich’s
friend waited outside, Aldrich entered the trailer, where he encountered the
teenager sitting in a chair in the living room. Aldrich shot the teenager multiple
times. He then proceeded down a hallway to the bedroom, where he found the
adult resident. Aldrich struck the adult in the face with the rifle and then shot
him, too, multiple times. On his way out the door, Aldrich took a handgun and
cash from the trailer.
[¶5] As they drove away from the scene, Aldrich told his friend that he
had “flanked” or “flogged” them, which the friend understood to mean that
Aldrich had killed the people in the trailer. Aldrich met up with his girlfriend
shortly thereafter; he directed her to dispose of the tool bag and warned her
that if she did not comply, he would harm her daughter. Inside the tool bag,
which the girlfriend hid in a garage, were two pairs of the adult victim’s pants,
an empty nine-millimeter magazine, the nine-millimeter rifle, and Aldrich’s
jeans and sneakers. The rifle, jeans, and sneakers were splattered with the
adult victim’s blood.
[¶6] A friend of the adult victim reported the shooting to the police the
next morning. The officers who responded to the trailer confirmed that the two 4
victims were deceased. During a subsequent search of the trailer, Maine State
Police detectives found nine-millimeter bullet casings in the living room near
the teenage victim’s body and in the bedroom near the adult victim’s body.
Ballistics testing confirmed that the casings were fired from the nine-millimeter
rifle later recovered from the tool bag.
[¶7] On February 24, Maine State Police detectives, who had received
information that Aldrich was involved in the Poland deaths, tracked his cell
phone to a shopping mall in Salem, New Hampshire. The detectives sought
assistance from the New Hampshire State Police, informing them that in
addition to being a murder suspect, Aldrich had arrest warrants that subjected
him to extradition and had stolen a van from a parking lot in Brunswick on
February 22. When the New Hampshire officers found Aldrich and the stolen
van on the second floor of the mall’s parking garage, Aldrich fled on foot,
discarding along the way a large-capacity magazine and the handgun he had
stolen from the trailer. He was quickly caught and taken into custody.
[¶8] The stolen van was returned to Maine and searched pursuant to a
warrant. Inside, the Maine State Police discovered three additional
nine-millimeter magazines and a large quantity of nine-millimeter ammunition. 5
B. Procedure
[¶9] On February 27, 2023, the State charged Aldrich by complaint with
two counts of intentional or knowing murder. On April 4, a grand jury returned
an indictment charging him with two counts of murder and one count of
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.
[¶10] In May 2024, Aldrich filed a motion to suppress post-arrest
statements that he had made to law enforcement on the basis that he was
interrogated without being read his Miranda2 rights and after he had invoked
his right to counsel.3 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the
motion in a written order.
[¶11] In the run-up to trial, the court addressed several other pretrial
motions, the relevant details of which we discuss below. The trial, which lasted
seven days, required the court to resolve a panoply of evidentiary disputes. We
also defer recitation of the specific details of these disputes to our subsequent
legal analysis.
[¶12] Aldrich testified in his own defense, claiming that the teenage
victim threatened him in the days prior to the shootings, that he returned on
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 In July 2024, Aldrich filed a supplement to the initial motion to suppress. 6
the night in question (unarmed) to sell drugs to the adult victim, and that he
shot both victims in self-defense with his girlfriend’s rifle, which, for reasons
unknown to Aldrich, happened to be at the victims’ trailer.
[¶13] Following the close of the evidence, the court instructed the jury,
over Aldrich’s objection, that it could consider Aldrich’s flight after the
shootings as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The court also denied
Aldrich’s request for an instruction on the defense of “necessity,” but granted
his request for a self-defense instruction.
[¶14] The jury found Aldrich guilty of all charges. On
November 22, 2024, the court sentenced Aldrich to concurrent terms of life in
prison on each of the murder counts and a concurrent sentence of five years’
imprisonment on the firearm-possession count.4
[¶15] Aldrich filed a timely notice of appeal and an application to allow
an appeal of his sentence. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2115, 2151 (2025); M.R.
App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20. The Sentence Review Panel granted the application, and
the sentence appeal was automatically merged into the direct appeal, see M.R.
App. P. 20(g)-(h).
The court also ordered Aldrich to pay a fine and $6,795 in restitution to reimburse the Victims’ 4
Compensation Fund. 7
II. DISCUSSION
[¶16] On appeal, Aldrich argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying
his motion to suppress; (2) admitting a plethora of irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial evidence offered by the State while simultaneously excluding
admissible evidence offered by Aldrich; (3) instructing the jury; and
(4) conducting the sentencing analysis. We address each contention in turn.
A. Denial of Motion to Suppress
[¶17] Aldrich asserts that the court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress his post-arrest statements because the statements were elicited in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-70 (1966).5 He does not
dispute the suppression court’s factual findings, and we therefore review the
court’s denial of his motion to suppress de novo. See State v. Akers, 2021 ME
43, ¶ 23, 259 A.3d 127.
[¶18] The court found the following facts, “which are supported by
competent evidence from the suppression record.” State v.
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 2025 ME 9, ¶ 3, 331 A.3d 354. The New Hampshire
officers who arrested Aldrich brought him to a police barracks where two
Maine State Police detectives were waiting to speak with him. The detectives
Aldrich raises this claim pursuant to only the United States Constitution. 5 See State v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 2025 ME 9, n.5, 331 A.3d 354. 8
and Aldrich met in a small room for less than ten minutes. One of the detectives
told Aldrich that he was working on something in Maine and asked if Aldrich
was willing to discuss his whereabouts on a particular day and time. Aldrich
responded, “Half the time, I don’t know, like, dates and times,” and the detective
replied that they did not expect him to know “to a T” where he was but would
be looking for a “ballpark.”
[¶19] The detective informed Aldrich that he could decide whether he
wished to speak with the officers and that if he did, they would first read him
his rights. The detective also explained that if Aldrich agreed to an interview,
he could decide to answer only some questions and could end the conversation
at any time. Aldrich replied, “It depends on what it’s about because usually I
don’t even talk until I talk to my lawyer. I don’t even know what this is about.”
Aldrich continued, stating, “I got nothing to say until I find out what I’m being,
what this is about and until I talk to my lawyer.”
[¶20] After the detective responded that they were investigating a
homicide in Maine and were talking to a lot of people, Aldrich stated,
“Somebody said that to me recently and I’m like, are you f*****g serious? Like,
dude I’m a freaking thief, bro, I’m not . . . I’m an ice dealer, I’m not . . . .” The
detective reiterated that Aldrich needed to tell him what he wanted to do, and 9
Aldrich responded, “I’m good, like I’ll wait until I talk to a lawyer then . . . I
haven’t killed anybody, I know that.” The detective then explained that Aldrich
would be extradited to Maine and ended the interaction.
[¶21] Aldrich argues on appeal that evidence of his statement that he had
not killed anyone6 should have been suppressed because he made the
statement without having been advised of his Miranda rights. “A person who is
in custody and subject to interrogation must be advised of the rights referred
to in Miranda v. Arizona in order for statements made during the interrogation
to be admissible against [him] as part of the State’s direct case at trial.” State v.
Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 23, 829 A.2d 247. There is no dispute that Aldrich was
in custody when the detectives spoke with him; the only issue is whether the
police comments that preceded Aldrich’s statements constituted
“interrogation” under Miranda. We have explained that “[s]tatements are the
product of interrogation if the police engaged in express questioning or uttered
any word or actions that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect. The test is objective.”
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 2025 ME 9, ¶ 20, 331 A.3d 354 (alteration, citation, and
quotation marks omitted).
6The only statement introduced at trial was Aldrich’s assertion to the detective, “I haven’t killed anybody, I know that.” 10
[¶22] We conclude that the suppression court correctly determined that
the detective’s comments did not constitute interrogation. The detective’s
“announcement of an intent to question was not the functional equivalent of
interrogation.” State v. Rizzo, 1997 ME 215, ¶ 13, 704 A.2d 339 (affirming a
conclusion of no interrogation where an officer told the defendant “that he
would be asking him some questions, without initiating any further discussion
with” the defendant). Further, the reply to Aldrich that the detectives were
investigating a homicide was not interrogation because it was neither express
questioning nor reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
See Hernandez-Rodriguez, 2025 ME 9, ¶ 20, 331 A.3d 354; State v. Reese, 2010
ME 30, ¶¶ 5-6, 991 A.2d 806. Because the trial court did not err in determining
that Aldrich was not subject to custodial interrogation, we do not reach his
alternative argument that he was improperly questioned after he invoked his
right to an attorney. See State v. McNaughton, 2017 ME 173, ¶ 29, 168 A.3d 807;
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1984).
B. Evidentiary Rulings
[¶23] Aldrich’s primary argument on appeal is that the court made
several erroneous evidentiary rulings, the cumulative impact of which deprived
him of a fair trial. 11
[¶24] “[W]e have not explicitly adopted the federal cumulative error
analysis,” State v. Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 39, 82 A.3d 86 (Jabar, J., dissenting),
and “instead review allegations of multiple errors cumulatively and in context
to determine whether the defendant received an unfair trial that deprived him
or her of due process.” State v. Williams, 2024 ME 37, ¶ 45, 315 A.3d 714
(quotation marks omitted). Aldrich identifies a dozen alleged evidentiary
errors. We divide our analysis into three parts, first addressing those
evidentiary rulings in which we perceive no error, then explaining why in three
instances we conclude that the trial court did err, and finally, assessing the
impact of those errors on Aldrich’s right to a fair trial. See id. ¶ 46 (noting that
a cumulative-error argument “cannot succeed” absent an error).
1. No Error
a. Admission of Images of the Victims’ Bodies
[¶25] Aldrich contends that the court erroneously admitted unduly
prejudicial images of the victims’ bodies—in the form of police video footage
from the scene of the crime and photographs from the teenage victim’s
autopsy—in violation of M.R. Evid. 403, which provides that a “court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” We review a trial court’s determination 12
pursuant to Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion, Williams, 2024 ME 37, ¶ 28,
315 A.3d 714, and the court’s underlying factual findings for clear error, State
v. Gervais, 2025 ME 27, ¶ 16, 334 A.3d 645.
[¶26] “A gruesome photograph of a victim’s body may be admitted
provided that its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. The
critical factor in this balancing test is the significance of the photograph in
proving the State’s case.” State v. Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 46, 830 A.2d 433
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see M.R. Evid. 403. “To sustain a Rule
403 objection,” the evidence must have an “undue tendency to move the
tribunal to decide on an improper basis, commonly, though not always, an
emotional one.” State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶ 13, 892 A.2d 456 (quotation marks
omitted).
[¶27] Here, the court found that neither the video nor the photographs
were particularly prejudicial—a finding that was not clearly erroneous.
See id. ¶ 14. And importantly, the evidence was significant to the State’s case
because it helped to disprove Aldrich’s claim of self-defense. See State v.
Ouellette, 2012 ME 11, ¶ 17, 37 A.3d 921 (explaining that the State has the
burden to disprove a self-defense justification beyond a reasonable doubt). The
video footage showed that the position of the teenage victim’s body was not 13
consistent with Aldrich’s testimony: instead, the victim was found where
Aldrich claimed to be standing when he fired the gun. The autopsy
photographs, in turn, showed that Aldrich could not have been as close to the
teenage victim as he claimed. As the medical examiner testified, while using the
photographs for “illustrat[ive]” purposes, Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 46, 830
A.2d 433, the absence of soot or stippling on the body meant that the victim was
not shot at close range. We thus discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s
decision to admit the video and photographs. See id. ¶¶ 45-46 (finding no error
in the admission of gruesome autopsy photographs because they were “of
substantial probative value”).
b. Exclusion of Evidence of Aldrich’s Girlfriend’s Knowledge of Firearms
[¶28] Aldrich next contends that the court should have allowed him to
cross-examine his girlfriend about her “familiarity with and ownership of the
shooting weapon, along with other guns in general” because that evidence was
relevant to his claim of self-defense. We review a court’s determination of
relevance for clear error. State v. Healey, 2024 ME 4, ¶ 13, 307 A.3d 1082.
[¶29] Prior to the girlfriend’s direct testimony, Aldrich sought
permission to cross-examine her about her experience with firearms and in 14
particular about her connection to the gun used in another homicide.7 The
court limited Aldrich to queries about the witness’s connection to the rifle used
in the Poland shootings and to other weapons she had in her house at the time,
finding that her link to a firearm used in an unrelated homicide was not
relevant.
[¶30] The court’s analysis was not clearly erroneous. Although Aldrich
complains that the court prevented him from probing the girlfriend’s
ownership of the rifle that he used to shoot the victims, the court explicitly
permitted such testimony. Indeed, the girlfriend testified on both direct and
cross-examination that before the murders she stored the rifle in her bedroom.
This was consistent with Aldrich’s testimony about the provenance of the gun. 8
[¶31] As for Aldrich’s contention that he should have been allowed to ask
about the girlfriend’s knowledge of firearms generally, he argues only that such
7 Before trial, Aldrich twice sought to compel discovery of evidence from the other homicide case.
The court denied both motions without prejudice, finding that Aldrich had not demonstrated a connection between the two cases. Aldrich does not challenge the denial of his motions to compel or otherwise argue that the court’s rulings hampered his ability to present his defense.
8 Their testimony differed, however, in one important respect: The girlfriend testified that on the
night in question, Aldrich had been at her house before leaving to go to the trailer in Poland. She was not aware that Aldrich had taken the rifle until he returned later that evening and told her to get rid of the bag with the rifle and other items inside. Aldrich, by contrast, testified that he did not bring the gun to Poland and that it was already at the trailer when he arrived. 15
information was “highly relevant” to his case, without explaining how.9 We
conclude that the court did not err in determining that this evidence was not
probative of any fact of consequence in this case. See M.R. Evid. 401.
c. Admission of Evidence of Aldrich’s Theft of a Van
[¶32] Next, Aldrich argues that the court erred in admitting “extensive
evidence about [his] theft of a Ford Econoline van from Lowe’s two days after”
the murders because the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. He
posits that the “theft evidence ha[d] no relationship to the alleged murders.”
That contention, however, is simply not accurate under the circumstances
presented here.
[¶33] We have held repeatedly that “[e]vidence of events occurring after
an alleged criminal act is generally relevant if it tends to establish the
defendant’s state of mind. Specifically, evidence of a defendant’s effort to avoid
arrest can demonstrate a consciousness of guilt, which is relevant to a
fact-finder’s determination of guilt,” Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 21, 82 A.3d 86
(citations and quotation marks omitted). E.g., State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198,
201 (Me. 1995); State v. Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 21, 46 A.3d 1113; State v.
Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 27, 182 A.3d 145.
9 Aldrich does not renew on appeal the specific argument he made below—that he should have been allowed to ask about the girlfriend’s connection to the other homicide case. 16
[¶34] The critical question in this case was whether Aldrich intentionally
and knowingly killed the two victims or whether he shot them in self-defense.
A jury could reasonably infer that evidence of Aldrich’s extreme efforts to avoid
arrest—including the theft of a van to flee the state—demonstrated his
consciousness of guilt and was inconsistent with his assertion of self-defense.
See State v. Barnes, 2004 ME 38, ¶ 5, 845 A.2d 575; Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 22,
82 A.3d 86; M.R. Evid. 401. Further, although Aldrich argues that the evidence
should have been sanitized to make “no reference to additional criminal
conduct that was not directly related” to the murders, the court was not
required to do so when evidence of the additional criminal conduct was
admissible and not unduly prejudicial. See State v. Carlson, 304 A.2d 681, 683
(Me. 1973); Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶¶ 21, 26, 82 A.3d 86.
d. Exclusion of Evidence of Medical Examiner’s Disciplinary History
[¶35] We next review Aldrich’s assertion that the court erred when it
prohibited him from cross-examining the medical examiner about his record of
employee discipline and a consent agreement with the Board of Licensure in
Medicine.
[¶36] “We review the trial court’s ruling limiting the scope of
cross-examination for abuse of discretion, and will overturn such a ruling only 17
if it has clearly interfered with a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Butsitsi,
2013 ME 2, ¶ 13, 60 A.3d 1254 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶37] Aldrich sought permission to cross-examine the medical examiner
about (1) a 2020 disciplinary finding that he displayed disruptive and
inappropriate behavior and (2) a 2024 consent agreement addressing his 2023
arrest for operating under the influence at a time when he was on call for work,
more than six months after conducting the autopsies in this case.
[¶38] We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to
prohibit Aldrich from cross-examining the medical examiner about these
events. Although Aldrich urges that “[t]he information relates to [the medical
examiner’s] performance and . . . could have been used to question his work
product,” Aldrich failed to identify how the information would do so. When
pressed by the trial court, Aldrich acknowledged that he had no basis to believe
that the medical examiner’s performance of the autopsies in this case was
deficient in any way. As the trial court articulated in its ruling, use of the
proffered impeachment material to suggest otherwise would run afoul of the
prohibition on using information about other acts to suggest that a person acted
in conformity with those acts. See M.R. Evid. 404(b). 18
[¶39] In addition, the record supports the court’s finding that the medical
examiner’s indiscretions were not sufficiently probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness to be useful for cross-examination. See State v. Coleman, 2018
ME 41, ¶ 14, 181 A.3d 689 (stating that M.R. Evid. 608(b) “allows a court to
permit a witness’s credibility to be attacked through cross-examination on
specific instances of the witness’s prior conduct that are probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, to the extent that the information from the consent agreement and
record of employee discipline was relevant, the court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that “any minimal relevance [was] significantly
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues[,]
misleading the jury and wasting time,” Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 16, 182 A.3d
145.
e. Admission of Evidence that Aldrich Fired a Gun at His Former Girlfriend
[¶40] Aldrich next contends that the court should have excluded
testimony that he fired a gun at a former girlfriend because the evidence was
barred by M.R. Evid. 404(b), irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial. “We review a
trial court’s decision to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) for clear error
and its determination pursuant to Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.” 19
Williams, 2024 ME 37, ¶ 28, 315 A.3d 714 (alterations and quotation marks
[¶41] At trial, Aldrich’s former girlfriend10 testified that she
accompanied Aldrich as he fled to New Hampshire, that he was emotional
during the trip, and that he made admissions to her about his involvement in
the shootings. After Aldrich was arrested, the former girlfriend led the police
on a high-speed chase. Over Aldrich’s objection, the court allowed the State to
elicit her testimony that Aldrich fired a gun at her several weeks prior to their
ill-fated excursion to New Hampshire. The State offered the evidence to show
that fear of Aldrich partially motivated the former girlfriend’s behavior after
the shootings.
[¶42] The court did not clearly err in allowing the evidence for this
purpose because “Rule 404(b) does not render inadmissible evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts if the evidence is offered to demonstrate motive, intent,
identity, absence of mistake, or the relationship of the parties,” Barnes, 2004
ME 38, ¶ 5, 845 A.2d 575, as opposed to when the evidence is offered for an
improper purpose such as to show propensity to commit certain acts, M.R. Evid.
404(b). Here, the evidence was offered to demonstrate the nature of the
10 The former girlfriend is a different person from the girlfriend at the time of the murders, whose
testimony we described previously. 20
relationship between Aldrich and the former girlfriend, thereby explaining
what motivated her to aid Aldrich after the shootings and then flee from the
police. This context was useful and relevant information for the jury as it
considered her credibility about a critical issue: Aldrich’s state of mind in the
immediate aftermath of the shootings. See State v. Hildings, 611 A.2d 92, 93
(Me. 1992).
[¶43] Evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) is still “subject to
exclusion under M.R. Evid. 403 if its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant.” Id. Although the
disputed testimony was potentially prejudicial to Aldrich, the testimony was
brief and matter of fact, and the State did not bring it up again. We conclude
that the court struck the proper balance under Rule 403. See id. at 93-94; State
v. Shuman, 622 A.2d 716, 718 (Me. 1993).
f. Admission of Evidence of Aldrich’s Use of a Derogatory Term to Refer to the Victims
[¶44] Aldrich next challenges the court’s decision to admit evidence that
he used a racially derogatory term when referring to the victims. He argues
that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
[¶45] There was no abuse of discretion in the admission of this
testimony. See State v. Labbe, 2024 ME 15, ¶ 36, 314 A.3d 162. “When relevant 21
and probative of an individual’s actions, statements evidencing the speaker’s
racial animus are admissible.” State v. Eirby, 663 A.2d 36, 38 (Me. 1995); see
also Cruzado v. Alves, 89 F.4th 64, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2023). Here, evidence of
statements Aldrich made to his former girlfriend shortly after the shootings
was probative of his intent and state of mind and could therefore aid the fact
finder in determining whether his claim of self-defense was credible. See M.R.
Evid. 401; Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 21, 82 A.3d 86; Eirby, 663 A.2d at 38. Further,
the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the significant
probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to Aldrich. See Cruzado, 89 F.4th at 76; Hassan, 2013
ME 98, ¶ 26, 82 A.3d 86.
g. Unpreserved Evidentiary Claims
[¶46] Aldrich identifies three additional purported evidentiary errors.
Because Aldrich did not object to the admission of this evidence, our review is
for obvious error. See Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 18, 182 A.3d 145. “For us to
vacate a conviction based on the obvious error standard of review, there must
be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these
conditions are met, we will exercise our discretion to notice an unpreserved
error only if we also conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness 22
and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks
[¶47] We note at the outset that Aldrich’s arguments on appeal as to
these three additional errors are so underdeveloped that they are likely waived.
See Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290 (“We will apply the
‘settled appellate rule’ enunciated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals that
‘issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at
developed argumentation, are deemed waived.’” (quoting United States v.
Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)). Nonetheless, because we perceive no
error, much less obvious error, in the admission of the challenged evidence, we
briefly address Aldrich’s claims.
[¶48] Aldrich first contends that the court erroneously admitted
evidence that he obtained ammunition in the days following the murders.
Contrary to Aldrich’s argument, this evidence was probative of his
consciousness of guilt and was not unfairly prejudicial. See Hassan, 2013 ME
98, ¶¶ 21, 26, 82 A.3d 86.
[¶49] Aldrich next asserts that the court should not have allowed
testimony that he used his phone to search for “porn” and for information about
how to disable vehicular anti-theft systems. Aldrich’s argument rests on a 23
partial misapprehension of the record: although the trial transcript references
searches for “porn,” this appears to be a transcription error, because the
witness was in fact describing an exhibit showing that Aldrich used his phone
to search for pawn shops. And we see no obvious error in the admission of
evidence that Aldrich sought information about pawn shops shortly after he
stole a gun and money from the victims’ trailer, nor in the admission of evidence
that he researched vehicular anti-theft systems before he fled in a stolen van.
See id. ¶¶ 25-26.
[¶50] Aldrich also alleges that the court erred by waiting until just before
he testified to determine which of his prior criminal convictions the State could
use to impeach him.11 Before trial, Aldrich moved in limine to prevent the State
from impeaching him with any of his prior convictions. At a subsequent
hearing, however, Aldrich’s attorney suggested it would be best to defer a
ruling on the motion until Aldrich decided whether to testify. The court agreed
with this approach. “Having invited the result, [Aldrich] cannot now claim
error.” State v. Wilson, 456 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Me. 1983).
11 Aldrich does not contend that the court erred in its ultimate determination about which convictions the State could use. 24
2. Error
[¶51] We next address Aldrich’s challenges to three evidentiary rulings
that we conclude were erroneous. We review each ruling in turn before
addressing the cumulative impact of the errors.
a. Admission of Evidence of Arrest in New Hampshire & Arrest Warrants
[¶52] Aldrich argues that the court erred in admitting extensive evidence
about the circumstances surrounding his arrest in New Hampshire. He points
to the testimony of three New Hampshire police officers who arrested him, the
testimony of two Maine police officers who handled the evidence recovered
from New Hampshire, photographs of evidence and of the arrest site in New
Hampshire, and testimony of a Maine police officer that Aldrich had pending
arrest warrants.
[¶53] Aldrich objected at trial only to the testimony regarding arrest
warrants and to photographs of the arrest site and an extended magazine, but
not to any of the other photographs or accompanying testimony. Accordingly,
we review the court’s admission of the evidence to which Aldrich did not object
for obvious error.
[¶54] We conclude that the court properly admitted the photographs of
the arrest site and associated evidence. The evidence of Aldrich’s flight from 25
the police and disposal of the handgun and extended magazine was relevant to
Aldrich’s state of mind and was not “inherently inflammatory evidence that is
likely to arouse the passion of the fact-finder.” Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶¶ 21, 26,
82 A.3d 86; see also supra ¶ 48. Similarly, we perceive no error in the admission
of testimony from the Maine police officers who handled the evidence
recovered from New Hampshire.
[¶55] By contrast, we conclude that the court did err when it allowed
testimony that there were warrants pending for Aldrich’s arrest because the
testimony had minimal if any relevance and was unduly prejudicial. See M.R.
Evid. 401, 403. Although this objection was preserved, Aldrich does not argue
that the erroneous admission of this evidence alone is sufficient to warrant
reversal, so we reserve discussion of the impact of the evidence for our
cumulative-error analysis.
[¶56] Finally, we determine that the court erroneously admitted
excessive testimony about law enforcement’s preparations for Aldrich’s arrest.
For example, one officer testified that he understood that Aldrich “was armed
and dangerous and that it was going to be a . . . tactical takedown of him.” The
same officer provided detailed descriptions of the SWAT team planning for the
arrest, including anticipation of a possible “hostage . . . [or] active shooter 26
situation.” This evidence was not relevant to Aldrich’s charges or his state of
mind and unfairly painted him in a negative light. See Hassan, 2013 ME 98,
¶¶ 21, 26, 82 A.3d 86; M.R. Evid. 401, 403. We emphasize that it was
appropriate to admit evidence of Aldrich’s behavior, but the better course
would have been to sanitize the officers’ testimony regarding their planning.
Because Aldrich did not object to any of this testimony, however, we do not
even consider what impact the error may have had on his rights unless he first
shows that it was an error “so clear under existing law that the court and the
prosecutor were required to address the matter even in the absence of a timely
objection.” State v. Nobles, 2018 ME 26, ¶ 21, 179 A.3d 910 (quotation marks
omitted). Given the limited scope of the testimony, Aldrich cannot satisfy this
burden.
b. Admission of Evidence of Tip Received by Police
[¶57] Aldrich next contends that the court improperly admitted hearsay
evidence in the form of testimony that the police received a tip stating that
Aldrich’s girlfriend had pertinent information regarding the murders and that
Aldrich was “responsible for committing the homicides.”12 The State responds
12 To the extent that Aldrich argues that the admission of the evidence violated his rights pursuant
to the confrontation clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions, we consider the argument undeveloped and waived. See Mehlhorn, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290. 27
that evidence of the tip was “not offered for the truth but to explain” why
detectives went to the girlfriend’s house and ultimately to interview Aldrich in
New Hampshire.
[¶58] M.R. Evid. 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement that: (1) [t]he
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and
(2) [a] party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” We have found error when the court admitted an “out-of-court
statement for the purpose of explaining [a] trooper’s conduct” because the
statement constituted “inadmissible hearsay.” State v. White, 2002 ME 122,
¶¶ 14-16, 804 A.2d 1146; see also State v. Ali, 2025 ME 30, ¶¶ 9, 14, 334 A.3d
657 (holding that a court erred in allowing a detective to testify about what the
defendant’s family members told the police, despite the State’s argument “that
the testimony was not admitted for the truth but instead for its effect on the
listener to provide the jury with a complete picture of the police investigation”
(quotation marks omitted)).
[¶59] In this case, although the court accepted the State’s assertion at
trial that it was not offering the testimony about the content of the tip for its
truth, the court did not thereafter provide the jury with a limiting instruction
to that effect. “As a result, the jury was entitled to rely on the testimony to 28
conclude” that Aldrich’s girlfriend had information about the murders, and,
more problematically, that Aldrich was responsible for the murders. Ali, 2025
ME 30, ¶ 14, 334 A.3d 657. Accordingly, we agree with Aldrich that the court
erred in admitting the tip testimony without a proper limiting instruction.
See id.; M.R. Evid. 801(c). Here, too, Aldrich does not argue that this error alone
requires vacatur. We thus analyze the impact of the error only as part of the
cumulative-error discussion.
c. Exclusion of Evidence of Threat by Adult Victim to a Third Person
[¶60] Aldrich also argues that the court erred by excluding evidence that
he was aware of a threat made by the adult victim to “another known associate.”
“We review the trial court’s exclusion of evidence for clear error or abuse of
discretion.” State v. Laferriere, 2008 ME 67, ¶ 3, 945 A.2d 1235.
[¶61] Rule 404(b) does not prohibit all evidence of prior bad acts. M.R.
Evid. 404(b). Rather, “[a] defendant’s knowledge of prior acts of violence [by
the victim], whether witnessed by or recounted to the defendant, serves to
establish that the defendant’s mental judgments and physical responses during
the encounter were reasonable” and may therefore be admissible. State v.
Stanley, 2000 ME 22, ¶¶ 9-10, 745 A.2d 981; see also State v. Dutremble, 392
A.2d 42, 46 (Me. 1978). “When offered to demonstrate the reasonableness of a 29
defendant’s apprehension of danger, evidence of prior violent acts is essentially
proof of the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief with respect to the violent
character of the victim, and not evidence of the victim’s character.” Stanley,
2000 ME 22, ¶ 11, 745 A.2d 981.
[¶62] Here, the trial court excluded the evidence as inadmissible hearsay
because it concluded that Aldrich was offering his knowledge of the threat for
the truth of what was said. This was an error. Aldrich proffered that he was
aware of the threat and believed that it had been made. He was therefore
entitled to testify about his knowledge of the threat to support the
reasonableness of his belief that the victim posed a danger to him.13
See id. ¶¶ 10-11. We accordingly conclude that the court abused its discretion
in excluding this evidence.
[¶63] At oral argument, Aldrich asserted that this error alone requires
reversal of his conviction. We disagree. Although the court erred, we ultimately
conclude that the error was harmless, for several reasons. See State v. Quirion,
13 The court appears to have been concerned that the evidence consisted of two layers of potential
hearsay—the threat that the victim made to a third party and the third party’s report of that threat to Aldrich. See Ali, 2025 ME 30, ¶ 13, 334 A.3d 657 (“Statements containing multiple levels of hearsay are impermissible unless ‘each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule’ against hearsay.” (quoting M.R. Evid. 805)). But neither statement was offered for its truth. It did not matter whether the victim intended to harm anyone, nor did it matter whether the third party was telling the truth when he recounted the threat to Aldrich. The information was relevant and admissible so long as Aldrich reasonably believed that the threat had been made. 30
2025 ME 75, ¶ 20, 340 A.3d 662. First, Aldrich’s description of the alleged
threat was non-specific; he asserted only that he was “aware of a threat made
to another known associate that that known associate attributes to” the adult
victim. Such vague information would have done little to bolster Aldrich’s
claimed fear. Second, Aldrich was permitted to testify that the teenage victim
brandished a handgun in his presence two days prior to the murders. This
personal experience, proximate as it was to the shootings, was far more
relevant to the reasonableness of Aldrich’s fear. Third, several friends of the
victims testified that they had seen a firearm at the trailer, lending additional
support to Aldrich’s version of events. Fourth, as we explain more fully below,
the weight of the evidence against Aldrich was overwhelming. Thus, “it is
highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
3. Cumulative Impact of Errors
[¶64] Finally, we address Aldrich’s contention that the cumulative
impact of the trial court’s errors “permeated [his] trial from start to finish,
placing him in an extraordinarily unfair light in the eyes of the jury.” We review
the impact of the three errors we have identified—(1) the admission of
testimony that Aldrich had arrest warrants and was subject to a SWAT 31
takedown,14 (2) the admission of the confidential tip linking Aldrich to the
homicides, and (3) the exclusion of evidence that Aldrich knew that one of the
victims had threatened a third party—“cumulatively and in context to
determine whether the defendant received an unfair trial that deprived him . . .
of due process.”15 Williams, 2024 ME 37, ¶¶ 45-46, 315 A.3d 714 (quotation
[¶65] Aldrich has failed to demonstrate that these errors affected his
substantial rights. Aldrich’s rather incredible claim of self-defense could not
stand up to significant countervailing evidence, including but not limited to the
location of the teenage victim’s body, the nature of the injuries to the victims,
the origin of the murder weapon, and Aldrich’s conduct before and after the
murders. In the face of this overwhelming evidence, the few errors that we
have identified had minimal impact: the confidential tip illuminated only that
Aldrich was responsible for the shootings, a fact that was uncontested; evidence
that police responded aggressively to a murder suspect was unlikely to shock
14 Although we have concluded that the erroneous admission of the SWAT evidence did not on its
own constitute obvious error warranting reversal, see Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 18, 182 A.3d 145, we consider whether this testimony played a role in depriving Aldrich of a fair trial, Williams, 2024 ME 37, ¶¶ 45-46, 315 A.3d 714.
15 To the extent that Aldrich argues that we should consider the court’s denial of his motion to
suppress and its jury instruction rulings as part of the cumulative-error analysis, we decline to do so because in neither circumstance did the court err. See supra ¶ 22; infra ¶¶ 70, 73; Williams, 2024 ME 37, ¶ 46, 315 A.3d 714. 32
or inflame the passions of the jury; the reference to the arrest warrants was
made only in passing; and the vague nature of the purported threat made by
one of the victims would have done little to corroborate Aldrich’s claimed fear.
[¶66] “Our ultimate task in reviewing for both harmless error and
obvious error is to determine whether [Aldrich] received a fair trial.” State v.
Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 76, 58 A.3d 1032. Having reviewed all of Aldrich’s
evidentiary challenges, we are not persuaded that any errors, even when
considered cumulatively, affected the jury’s verdict. Put simply, Aldrich has not
demonstrated that he “received an unfair trial that deprived him . . . of due
process.” Williams, 2024 ME 37, ¶ 45, 315 A.3d 714 (quotation marks omitted).
C. Jury Instructions
[¶67] Aldrich next argues that the court erred by (1) instructing the jury
over his objection that it could infer consciousness of guilt from evidence that
he fled after the shootings and (2) denying his request for an instruction on the
justification of necessity.
1. Flight Instruction
[¶68] Aldrich contends that the court’s jury instruction regarding
evidence of his attempts to flee was prejudicial and “distracting from the issues
before the jury.” He also complains that by referencing the issue of flight at the 33
end of the jury instructions, the court unfairly “highlighted this one particular
aspect of the case.” We review preserved challenges to jury instructions for
prejudicial error, assessing the “jury instructions in their entirety to determine
whether they presented the relevant issues to the jury fairly, accurately, and
adequately, and we will vacate the court’s judgment only if the erroneous
instruction resulted in prejudice.” State v. Gaston, 2021 ME 25, ¶ 24, 250 A.3d
137 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶69] Regarding flight, the court instructed the jury as follows:
There’s one last issue that I wish to address before we turn to the attorney’s closing arguments, and that’s the issue of whether the defendant fled the scene to avoid arrest or prosecution. There was evidence presented by both sides on that issue, and it’s up to you to determine the facts.
If proven, flight to avoid prosecution may be evidence of consciousness of guilt. You are not required to draw such an inference, however. It is up to you, the jury, to decide what weight or effect, if any, should be given to any evidence concerning Mr. Aldrich’s departure from the scene.
The court delivered this instruction after it outlined the elements of the
offenses and before it explained to the jurors how to use the verdict form. The
attorneys’ closing arguments followed, and then the court provided final
instructions before directing the jury to deliberate. 34
[¶70] We conclude that the court’s instruction was accurate and
generated by the evidence and that it did not prejudice Aldrich’s rights.
See Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 27, 182 A.3d 145. Here, significant evidence—
that Aldrich stole a van, fled to New Hampshire, ran from police officers, and
attempted to discard a firearm in the process—generated a sufficient factual
predicate to support the instruction. See id. ¶ 27. Furthermore, the instruction
accurately informed the jury of the law and appropriately left it to the jurors to
determine what facts to find and whether to draw an inference of
consciousness of guilt. See id. ¶¶ 10, 28; Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction
Manual § 6-15A at 6-31 (2025 ed.). Finally, the court’s decision to give the
instruction after its recitation of the elements of the offense and before its
discussion of the verdict form did not unfairly highlight evidence of Aldrich’s
flight or otherwise cause prejudice. See State v. Rosario, 2022 ME 46, ¶ 29, 280
A.3d 199.
2. Necessity-Defense Instruction
[¶71] Aldrich also argues that the court erred when it denied his request
to instruct the jury that “necessity” is a defense to the charge of possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person. 35
[¶72] “We review for prejudicial error the trial court’s denial of a request
for jury instructions,” Gaston, 2021 ME 25, ¶ 24, 250 A.3d 137, but “[o]ur review
of the trial court’s interpretation of a justification defense is de novo,” State v.
Cardilli, 2021 ME 31, ¶ 15, 254 A.3d 415. “A party can demonstrate that the
court erred by failing to give a requested instruction only when the instruction
(1) states the law correctly; (2) is generated by the evidence in the case; (3) is
not misleading or confusing; and (4) is not otherwise sufficiently covered in the
court’s instructions.” Gaston, 2021 ME 25, ¶ 24, 250 A.3d 137 (quotation marks
[¶73] In this case, Aldrich’s requested instruction16 did not state the law
correctly because the common law defense of necessity is no longer available
in Maine. See State v. Demerchant, 2025 ME 49, ¶ 18, 339 A.3d 765; State v.
Poole, 568 A.2d 830, 832 (Me. 1990). Rather, the Legislature’s adoption of the
competing-harms justification, 17-A M.R.S. § 103 (2025), “was designed to
codify the principle inherent in the common law defense of necessity.”
16 Aldrich’s proposed jury instruction is not in the trial court’s file. Nonetheless, the trial transcript shows that Aldrich repeatedly asked for a “necessity” instruction and relied for support on United States v. Penn, 969 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2020), which sets forth “‘justification’ as a defense to a felon-in-possession charge,” id. at 455 (quoting United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1986)). 36
Demerchant, 2025 ME 49, ¶ 18, 339 A.3d 765 (quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the court did not err in declining to give the instruction.
[¶74] Even if we were to construe Aldrich’s request as one for a
competing-harms instruction, we would conclude that there was insufficient
evidence to generate that justification, which requires, inter alia, “evidence that
the defendant’s conduct was necessary because of a specific and imminent
threat of injury to the defendant or another leaving no reasonable alternative
other than violating the law.” Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted).
Aldrich wanted the court to instruct the jury that it could consider whether he
possessed a firearm due to a threat of imminent harm, but by his own
admission, he took a handgun from the trailer after shooting the victims and
maintained possession of the firearm until he was arrested in New Hampshire,
long past the time he could have faced any specific and imminent threat of
injury. Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Aldrich,
it was not “sufficient to make the existence of all facts constituting the
competing harms justification a reasonable hypothesis for the fact finder to
entertain.” Nobles, 2018 ME 26, ¶ 31, 179 A.3d 910 (quotation marks omitted). 37
D. Sentencing
[¶75] Finally, Aldrich argues that his sentence must be vacated because
the court found facts that lacked evidentiary support and failed to consider
mitigating factors in determining the final sentence. We reject each of these
contentions.
[¶76] A court imposing a sentence for murder must follow the two-step
process set forth in 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(A)-(B), (2) (2025).17 “First, the court
determines the basic term of imprisonment based on an objective
consideration of the particular nature and seriousness of the crime. Second, the
court determines the final period of incarceration based on the relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors.” State v. Sweeney, 2019 ME 164, ¶ 17, 221
A.3d 130 (citation and quotation marks omitted). To justify the imposition of a
life sentence, the sentencing court must find that “‘the murder is accompanied
by aggravating circumstances,’” including, as relevant here,
premeditation-in-fact and murder for pecuniary gain. State v. De St. Croix, 2020
ME 142, ¶ 6, 243 A.3d 880 (quoting State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 149
(Me. 1990)); see State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 44, 995 A.2d 243.
17 Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B) has been amended since the court imposed Aldrich’s sentence,
though not in any way that affects the present appeal. See P.L. 2025, ch. 402, § 1 (effective Sept. 24, 2025) (to be codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B) (2026)); P.L. 2025, ch. 420, § 1 (effective Sept. 24, 2025) (to be codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B) (2026)). 38
[¶77] We review the court’s determination of the basic sentence de novo
for misapplication of legal principles, Sweeney, 2019 ME 164, ¶ 17, 221 A.3d
130, the court’s factual findings for clear error, see State v. Goncalves, 2025 ME
70, ¶ 43, 340 A.3d 639, and the court’s determination of the final sentence for
abuse of discretion, Sweeney, 2019 ME 164, ¶ 17, 221 A.3d 130.
[¶78] The court held a sentencing hearing on November 22, 2024. After
considering the nature and seriousness of the offense and finding that
aggravating circumstances existed because the murders were premeditated,
were for gain, involved multiple deaths, and involved the use of a firearm by a
prohibited person, the court set a basic sentence of life. The court then
identified several aggravating factors, among them the impact of the crimes on
the victims’ families, Aldrich’s untruthful trial testimony,18 and Aldrich’s
lengthy criminal history. The court found that there were no mitigating factors
before ultimately imposing concurrent life sentences for the murder
convictions.
1. Basic Sentence
[¶79] Aldrich attacks the court’s factual findings on the basis that there
was no reliable evidence that these murders were premeditated or for gain. Yet
The court emphasized “the falsity with which [Aldrich] testified” and “his blatantly untruthful 18
claim of self-defense.” 39
the record, in the form of evidence that Aldrich told a friend he planned to “do
a job,” brought the murder weapon to the trailer, and left the scene with a
significant amount of cash, shows otherwise. We therefore discern no error in
the sentencing court’s fact finding and decision to set the basic sentence at life.
See De St. Croix, 2020 ME 142, ¶¶ 11-12, 243 A.3d 880.
2. Mitigating Factors
[¶80] We also conclude, contrary to Aldrich’s argument, that the court
did not “summarily dismiss[]” his presentation of mitigating factors or
otherwise abuse its discretion when it stated, “I don’t find there to be any real
mitigating factors, let alone factors that impacted my analysis to any substantial
degree.”
[¶81] “[T]he selection for appropriate emphasis among [the] disparate
purposes [of sentencing] rests in the discretion of the court,” State v. Hamel,
2013 ME 16, ¶ 8, 60 A.3d 783 (quotation marks omitted), and we accordingly
“afford the court significant leeway in what factors it may consider and the
weight any given factor is due when determining a sentence,” State v. Bentley,
2021 ME 39, ¶ 11, 254 A.3d 1171. “The court is not required to discuss every
argument or factor that the defendant raises, as long as it does not disregard 40
significant and relevant sentencing factors.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 34, 991 A.2d
806.
[¶82] Here, Aldrich cited as mitigating factors his history of drug use and
his attempts to support his family and start a business. The court stated that it
reviewed Aldrich’s sentencing memo and had considered his arguments. It
acknowledged that Aldrich had close family connections but concluded that he
rarely had been gainfully employed and had made no real effort to address his
substance use. No more was required. See id. The court’s ultimate decision not
to accept Aldrich’s mitigation arguments does not require vacatur of the
sentence. See id.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Jeremy Pratt, Esq. (orally), and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for appellant Aaron Aldrich
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Katie Sibley, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Androscoggin County Unified Criminal Docket docket No. CR-2023-420 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY