STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CR-08-534 ( ,._ ~"" l./ :.. } (\/\, \) ,..... .,.".' ' w» i"
; • I - , • ~' r- I I ! · .• r••, ...... .._
STATE OF MAINE
v. DECISION
BRIAN ARBO,
Defendant
Before the court is the defendant's motion to suppress.
On July 14, 2008, the defendant accompanied an Oakland police officer to
Augusta for purposes of taking a polygraph examination. The Oakland police officer
had contacted the defendant regarding allegations made against him by the young
daughter of a former domestic partner. The police officer had indicated to the
defendant that the best way to clear his name was to take a polygraph examination.
Months later, the defendant agreed to the examination. The defendant traveled with
the police officer to Augusta to take the polygraph examination. During the ride, the
Oakland police officer indicated that he did not remember whether they discussed the
allegations. The defendant did not indicate whether or not they discussed the
allegations during the ride down to the examination.
The defendant and the police officer arrived for the polygraph examination at
approximately 9:30 a.m. The defendant indicated in his testimony that he had worked
all night and had not slept since 10:00 p.m. the prior evening. However, on the video he
indicated that he was tired but had taken naps the day before and had been in bed by
7:00 p.m. and then up at 1:30 a.m. to deliver papers. He also indicated that he had eaten
that morning. 2
The defendant stated that he was aware that he did not have to talk to the
polygraph operator. He also acknowledged that the operator told him that they would
discuss the results of the test following his completion of the examination. Prior to the
examination, the defendant signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. This
occurred at 10:30 a.m. (State's Ex. #2.) Following the completion of the polygraph
examination, including the polygraph examiner's follow-up questions, the defendant
signed a document indicating that he submitted freely to the examination, that he had a
right to leave at any time, and that no promises were made to him. (State's Ex. #3.)
The videotape demonstrates that the examination, the pre-examination
questions, and the post-examination questions were conducted entirely by the polygrah
examiner. The entire interview, both pre-test and post-test questions, was included on
the videotape. The Videotape (State's Ex. #1) also demonstrates that the defendant was
explained his Miranda rights and that he signed the document without any sort of
coercion or confrontation.
The defendant did not relate any statements regarding any coercion or
confrontation that did not appear on the videotape. The Videotape shows the entire
interaction between the operator and the defendant, including both his oral and written
statements. Further, the defendant's written confirmation that he took part in the
examination of his own free will was also on the videotape.
Discussion
The defendant argues that although the defendant may have waived his Miranda
rights to the polygraph examination, he did not waive his Miranda rights to the post
polygraph examination. The defendant also argues that the statements were not
voluntary. The State argues that the defendant was not in custody requiring Miranda 3
and secondly, that in the event that the court finds that he was in custody the defendant
did waive his Miranda rights, and finally that the statements given were voluntary.
Custody
After considering all of the factors in this case, the court finds and concludes that
the defendant was not in custody when he undertook the polygraph examination and
the follow-up questions. In order to find custody, the court must determine that there
was an actual formal arrest, restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated
with a formal arrest, or that a reasonable person in the circumstances of the defendant
would have believed he was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
State v. Higgins, 2002 ME 77,
may consider are set out in State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 724 A.2d 1222, and include,
but are not limited to the following:
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements; (2) the party who initiated the contact; (3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant); (4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant, to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it); (7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings; (8) the number of law enforcement officers present; (9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and (10) the duration and character of the interrogation.
Id.
After considering all these factors, the court finds that the defendant was not in
custody. The videotape shows that although the polygraph examiner was persistent, he
was not confrontational nor was he argumentative during the interview. Furthermore,
the examiner made it very clear prior to the examination and during the examination 4
that the defendant was free to leave and that he was not going to be arrested. On
several occasions, the defendant did leave the room for purposes of using the bathroom
and prior to leaving did telephone someone to indicate that he was returning to the
Oakland Police Department. The defendant was not arrested by the Oakland Police
Department at that time.
Waiver of Miranda
Notwithstanding the court's determination that the defendant was not in
custody, the court will address the defendant's contention that he did not waive his
Miranda rights to the post-polygraph examination. In determining whether or not there
was any waiver of Miranda, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the defendant did freely and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.
See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.s. 1039, 1046 (1983). Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.s. 42 (1982)
and other cases that follow Wyrick deal with the situation where the defendant is
subjected to custodial interrogation following a polygraph examination. The law quite
clearly indicates that the validity of any post-polygraph examination waiver depends
upon the totality of the circumstances under which the waiver occurs. See United States
v. Leon-Delfts, 203 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Gr. 2000). The rule set out in Wyrick is not a per se
rule but a determination by the court after considering all of the circumstances. Some of
the factors that the court may consider are as follows:
(1) whether the suspect consulted an attorney;
(2) whether the suspect requested the examination;
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CR-08-534 ( ,._ ~"" l./ :.. } (\/\, \) ,..... .,.".' ' w» i"
; • I - , • ~' r- I I ! · .• r••, ...... .._
STATE OF MAINE
v. DECISION
BRIAN ARBO,
Defendant
Before the court is the defendant's motion to suppress.
On July 14, 2008, the defendant accompanied an Oakland police officer to
Augusta for purposes of taking a polygraph examination. The Oakland police officer
had contacted the defendant regarding allegations made against him by the young
daughter of a former domestic partner. The police officer had indicated to the
defendant that the best way to clear his name was to take a polygraph examination.
Months later, the defendant agreed to the examination. The defendant traveled with
the police officer to Augusta to take the polygraph examination. During the ride, the
Oakland police officer indicated that he did not remember whether they discussed the
allegations. The defendant did not indicate whether or not they discussed the
allegations during the ride down to the examination.
The defendant and the police officer arrived for the polygraph examination at
approximately 9:30 a.m. The defendant indicated in his testimony that he had worked
all night and had not slept since 10:00 p.m. the prior evening. However, on the video he
indicated that he was tired but had taken naps the day before and had been in bed by
7:00 p.m. and then up at 1:30 a.m. to deliver papers. He also indicated that he had eaten
that morning. 2
The defendant stated that he was aware that he did not have to talk to the
polygraph operator. He also acknowledged that the operator told him that they would
discuss the results of the test following his completion of the examination. Prior to the
examination, the defendant signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. This
occurred at 10:30 a.m. (State's Ex. #2.) Following the completion of the polygraph
examination, including the polygraph examiner's follow-up questions, the defendant
signed a document indicating that he submitted freely to the examination, that he had a
right to leave at any time, and that no promises were made to him. (State's Ex. #3.)
The videotape demonstrates that the examination, the pre-examination
questions, and the post-examination questions were conducted entirely by the polygrah
examiner. The entire interview, both pre-test and post-test questions, was included on
the videotape. The Videotape (State's Ex. #1) also demonstrates that the defendant was
explained his Miranda rights and that he signed the document without any sort of
coercion or confrontation.
The defendant did not relate any statements regarding any coercion or
confrontation that did not appear on the videotape. The Videotape shows the entire
interaction between the operator and the defendant, including both his oral and written
statements. Further, the defendant's written confirmation that he took part in the
examination of his own free will was also on the videotape.
Discussion
The defendant argues that although the defendant may have waived his Miranda
rights to the polygraph examination, he did not waive his Miranda rights to the post
polygraph examination. The defendant also argues that the statements were not
voluntary. The State argues that the defendant was not in custody requiring Miranda 3
and secondly, that in the event that the court finds that he was in custody the defendant
did waive his Miranda rights, and finally that the statements given were voluntary.
Custody
After considering all of the factors in this case, the court finds and concludes that
the defendant was not in custody when he undertook the polygraph examination and
the follow-up questions. In order to find custody, the court must determine that there
was an actual formal arrest, restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated
with a formal arrest, or that a reasonable person in the circumstances of the defendant
would have believed he was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
State v. Higgins, 2002 ME 77,
may consider are set out in State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, 724 A.2d 1222, and include,
but are not limited to the following:
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements; (2) the party who initiated the contact; (3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant); (4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant, to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it); (7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings; (8) the number of law enforcement officers present; (9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and (10) the duration and character of the interrogation.
Id.
After considering all these factors, the court finds that the defendant was not in
custody. The videotape shows that although the polygraph examiner was persistent, he
was not confrontational nor was he argumentative during the interview. Furthermore,
the examiner made it very clear prior to the examination and during the examination 4
that the defendant was free to leave and that he was not going to be arrested. On
several occasions, the defendant did leave the room for purposes of using the bathroom
and prior to leaving did telephone someone to indicate that he was returning to the
Oakland Police Department. The defendant was not arrested by the Oakland Police
Department at that time.
Waiver of Miranda
Notwithstanding the court's determination that the defendant was not in
custody, the court will address the defendant's contention that he did not waive his
Miranda rights to the post-polygraph examination. In determining whether or not there
was any waiver of Miranda, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the defendant did freely and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.
See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.s. 1039, 1046 (1983). Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.s. 42 (1982)
and other cases that follow Wyrick deal with the situation where the defendant is
subjected to custodial interrogation following a polygraph examination. The law quite
clearly indicates that the validity of any post-polygraph examination waiver depends
upon the totality of the circumstances under which the waiver occurs. See United States
v. Leon-Delfts, 203 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Gr. 2000). The rule set out in Wyrick is not a per se
rule but a determination by the court after considering all of the circumstances. Some of
the factors that the court may consider are as follows:
(1) whether the suspect consulted an attorney;
(2) whether the suspect requested the examination;
(3) whether the waiver form initially presented clearly indicates that the post-
examination questioning is a possibility; and 5
(4) whether the post-examination was conducted by the polygraph operator
or by investigating officers. See id.; United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 921 nA (3d Cir.
1987); United States v. Gillyard, 726 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
After considering all of the circumstances, the court finds and concludes that the
defendant waived his Miranda rights regarding the entire process. The court finds
significant the fact that the operator of the polygraph was the same person who
conducted the followup examination. Furthermore, the defendant acknowledged that
he knew the polygraph examiner was going to ask him some questions following his
completion of the polygraph test.
Also significant is the defendant's waiver, signed prior to the examination and at
the completion of the examination wherein he "completely reaffirmed the above
agreement [waiver of Miranda]".
For the reasons stated above, the court finds and concludes that the defendant
knowingly and willfully waived his Miranda rights.
Voluntariness
The defendant also argues that the statements given by the defendant in this case
did not result from the exercise of his own free will and rational intellect, but resulted
from threats, promises or inducements made to him by law enforcement officers during
the interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88,
For many of the reasons stated above, the court finds and concludes that the
defendant voluntarily and freely gave the written statement to the police officers. The
oral admission made to the polygraph examiner and the follow-up written statement
were not the resul t of any coercion, promises or threats. For this reason, the court finds
and concludes that the statements given by the defendant were voluntarily and freely
given. 6
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the defendant's motion to suppress is hereby
DENIED.
Dated: AprilL 2009
Attorney for the State of Maine Paul Rucha, ADA 95 State Street Augusta, ME 04330
Attorney for defendant Jeffrey Towne 179 Main Street Suite #202 Waterville, ME 04901 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT vs KENNEBEC, ss. BRIAN KEITH ARBO Docket No AUGSC-CR-2008-00534 8 MONUMENT STREET #2 WINSLOW ME 04901 DOCKET RECORD
DOB: 12/09/1962 Attorney: JEFFREY TOWNE State's Attorney: EVERT FOWLE 179 MAIN STREET STE 202 WATERVILLE ME 04901 PARTIALLY INDIGENT 09/02/2008
Charge (s)
1 GROSS SEXUAL ASSAULT 07/25/2002 OAKLAND Seq 637 17-A 253 (1) (B) Class A
2 UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT 07/25/2002 OAKLAND Seq 4236 17-A 255(1) (C) Class C Charged with INDICTMENT on Supp1em
DOI~ket Events:
07/16/2008 FILING DOCUMENT - NON CASH BAIL BOND FILED ON 07/16/2008
07/16/2008 Charge(s); 1 HEARING - INITIAL APPEARANCE SCHEDULED FOR 09/23/2008 @ 8:00
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 07/16/2008 BAIL BOND - $1,500.00 UNSECURED BAIL BOND FILED ON 07/16/2008
Bail Amt: $1,500 Date Bailed: 07/14/2008 08/13/2008 Charge(s): 1 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 08/13/2008
SCREENER IS FINDING THE DEF. PARTIALLY INDIGENT. MOTION WILL NOT GO UP TO THE JUDGE UNTIL COMPLAINT IS FILED. 08/28/2008 Charge(s): 1,2 SUPPLEMENTAL FILING - INDICTMENT FILED ON 08/28/2008
08/28/2008 Charge(s): 1 HEARING - INITIAL APPEARANCE NOT HELD ON 08/28/2008
08/28/2008 Charge(s): 1,2 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULED FOR 09/23/2008 @ 8:00
09/02/2008 Charge (s): 1 MOTION - MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CNSL GRANTED ON 09/02/2008 JOHN NIVISON, JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 09/02/2008 Party(s): BRIAN KEITH ARBO ATTORNEY - PARTIALLY INDIGENT ORDERED ON 09/02/2008
Page 1 of 3 Printed on: 04/10/2009 BRIAN KEITH ARBO AUGSC-CR-2008-00534 DOCKET RECORD Attorney: JEFFREY TOWNE 09/:23/2008 Charge(s): 1,2 HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT HELD ON 09/23/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE READING WAIVED. DEFENDANT INFORMED OF CHARGES. COpy OF INDICTMENT/INFORMATION GIVEN TO DEFENDANT. 21 DAYS TO FILE MOTIONS 09/:23/2008 Charge (s): 1,2 PLEA - NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 09/23/2008
09/:23/2008 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL SCHEDULED FOR 11/10/2008 @ 2:45
10/16/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 10/14/2008
10/16/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 12/05/2008 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 10/16/2008 MOTION - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 10/14/2008
10/16/2008 HEARING - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER SCHEDULED FOR 12/05/2008 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 10/20/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 10/20/2008
10/24/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 10/20/2008 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 10/24/2008 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL CONTINUED ON 10/20/2008 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE 11/18/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 11/18/2008
12/04/2008 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 12/04/2008 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 12/04/2008 HEARING - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER CONTINUED ON 12/04/2008
12/04/2008 HEARING - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER SCHEDULED FOR 01/07/2009 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 12/04/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 12/04/2008
12/04/2008 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 01/07/2009 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 01/06/2009 Charge (8): 1,2 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 01/06/2009
01/06/2009 Charge(s): 1,2 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 01/06/2009 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE Reporter: TAMMY DROUIN COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 01/16/2009 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 01/07/2009
Page 2 of 3 Printed on: 04/10/2009 BRIAN KEITH ARBO AUGSC-CR-2008-00534 DOCKET RECORD 01/16/2009 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 01/06/2009
01/16/2009 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 01/06/2009 NANCY MILLS , JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 01/16/2009 HEARING - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER CONTINUED ON 01/07/2009
01/16/2009 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 03/05/2009 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 01/16/2009 HEARING - MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER SCHEDULED FOR 03/05/2009 @ 8:30
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 02/05/2009 AUDIT - AUDIT REPORT CHART_OF ACCOUNT EDI ON 02/05/2009 @ 9:01
RV APPR ABRV:GF; OLD OVERRIDE CODE:NONE; NEW OVERRIDE CODE:NONE; OLD AMT OVERRIDE: 0; NEW AMT OVERRIDE:O; USER ID:CWILLARD 03/13/2009 OTHER FILING - OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 03/12/2009
STATE'S MEMORANDUM ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS 03/13/2009 OTHER FILING - OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 03/13/2009
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 04/10/2009 ORDER - COURT ORDER FILED ON 04/10/2009 JOSEPH M JABAR , JUSTICE 04/10/2009 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 03/05/2009 JOSEPH M JABAR / JUSTICE Attorney: JEFFREY TOWNE DA: PAUL RUCHA Defendant Present in Court 04/10/2009 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED ON 04/10/2009 JOSEPH M JABAR / JUSTICE COpy TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 04/10/2009 Charge(s): 1,2 TRIAL - DOCKET CALL SCHEDULED FOR 06/02/2009
Receipts 09/22/2008 Attorney Payment $50.00 CK paid. 02/05/2009 Attorney Payment $150.00 CK paid.
A TRUE COPY ATTEST: Clerk
Page 3 of 3 Printed on: 04/10/2009