State of Louisiana Versus Megan Linley Lassus

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: December 18, 2024
• Docket: 24-KA-115
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KA-115

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEGAN LINLEY LASSUS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 23-3624, DIVISION "E" HONORABLE FRANK A. BRINDISI, JUDGE PRESIDING

December 18, 2024

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Stephen J. Windhorst, John J. Molaison, Jr., and Timothy S. Marcel

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED JJM SJW TSM COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. Thomas J. Butler Darren A. Allemand

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, MEGAN LINLEY LASSUS Holli A. Herrle-Castillo MOLAISON, J.

The defendant, Megan Lassus, appeals her conviction for unauthorized entry

of an inhabited dwelling and sentencing as a second-felony offender. We affirm

the convictions and sentence for the following reasons, and grant the defense

counsel’s motion to withdraw.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged the defendant with unauthorized entry of an inhabited

dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.3. She pled not guilty. On December 19,

2023, a six-person jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant pled

guilty to the multiple offender bill of information, alleging her to be a second-

felony offender. On January 8, 2024, the trial court sentenced the defendant to

imprisonment at hard labor for three years on the underlying offense. The trial

court then vacated the original sentence and resentenced the defendant as a second-

felony offender to imprisonment at hard labor for three years. The trial court

granted the defendant’s motion for appeal on February 9, 2024.

FACTS

On July 24, 2023, Deputy Peyton Wilkie of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s

Office (JPSO) responded to a call placed by Andrew Bultman, who reported that

when he arrived home, he saw an unknown female, later identified as the

defendant, inside his residence. Deputy Wilkie and Sergeant Aaron Verrette

entered the residence. When Deputy Wilkie opened the closet door in the

bedroom, he saw the defendant. The defendant exited the closet as ordered, and

Sergeant Verrette handcuffed her.

The State introduced the incident video from Deputy Wilkie’s body camera

into evidence and played it for the jury. In that video, the defendant said she

entered the residence after breaking the window. The defendant’s purse, personal

24-KA-115 1 items, and shoes were near the bed in the victim’s bedroom. The defendant asked

for help and indicated she was running from someone who was trying to kill her.

The defendant was rambling and sweating profusely. Deputy Wilkie did not see

anyone walking around the apartment complex when he approached the victim

outside the apartment or returned to his vehicle. The defendant, who had no

visible injuries, was arrested.

Mr. Bultman testified that he returned home on July 24, 2023, to find his

front door unlocked. He was certain he had locked his door when he left at

approximately 11:30 p.m. He opened the door and saw “a homeless or random

person” in his kitchen in the dark. Mr. Bultman recalled that the defendant said,

“Help me.” He did not recognize the woman and did not permit anyone to be in

his apartment that night. Mr. Bultman slammed the door, backed away, and called

the police. He stood on the sidewalk, waited for the police, and saw no one else in

the area. The police arrived and walked into his residence, after which he heard

screaming. The two police officers and “a homeless lady,” identified as the

defendant, exited the apartment. Mr. Bultman testified that his closet was

“trashed” but that the defendant did not take anything or try to attack him. There

was no damage to his apartment.

ANDERS BRIEF

Under the procedure adopted by this Court in State v. Bradford, 95-929, (La.

App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108, 1110-11,1 appointed appellate counsel has

filed a brief asserting that she has thoroughly reviewed the trial court record and

cannot find any non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Accordingly, according to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and

1 In Bradford, supra, this Court adopted the procedures outlined in State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), which the Louisiana Supreme Court sanctioned in State v. Mouton, 95-981 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177 (per curiam).

24-KA-115 2 State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241 (per curiam), appointed

counsel requests permission to withdraw as counsel of record.

In Anders, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated that the appointed

appellate counsel may request permission to withdraw if she finds her case wholly

frivolous after a conscientious examination.2 The request must accompany “‘a

brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal’” to

provide the reviewing court “with a basis for determining whether appointed

counsel have fully performed their duty to support their clients’ appeals to the best

of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court “in making the critical

determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that counsel should be

permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486

U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988) (quotation omitted).

In Jyles, 96-2669, 704 So.2d at 241, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that

an Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pretrial motion or

objection made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or

objections lack merit. The Supreme Court explained that an Anders brief must

demonstrate by complete discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast

an advocate’s eye over the trial record and considered whether any ruling made by

the trial court, subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant,

adverse impact on shaping the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.”

Id.

When reviewing for compliance with Anders, an appellate court must

independently review the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly

frivolous. Bradford, 95-929, 676 So.2d at 1110. If, after an independent review,

the reviewing Court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may

2 The United States Supreme Court reiterated Anders in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).

24-KA-115 3 grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant’s conviction and

sentence. However, suppose the Court finds any legal point arguable on the

merits. In that case, it may either deny the motion and order the court-appointed

attorney to file a brief arguing the legal point(s) identified by the Court, or grant

the motion and appoint a substitute appellate counsel. Id.

ANALYSIS

The defendant’s appellate counsel asserts that after a detailed review of the

record, she could find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Counsel provides

that the bill charging the defendant with unauthorized use of an inhabited dwelling

plainly and concisely stated the essential facts constituting the charged offense and

sufficiently identified the defendant and the crime charged. She also provides that

the defendant, represented by counsel, appeared at each stage of the proceedings

against her. Therefore, there are no appealable issues surrounding her presence or

the fact of her representation. Counsel asserts that the defense filed omnibus

motions, which the Court did not take up, and that the defendant did not object to

the trial court’s failure to hear or rule on the motions. As such, she acknowledges

that the defendant waived these motions.

Additionally, the counsel states that law enforcement did not seize evidence

from the defendant, which would be subject to a motion to suppress evidence.

Likewise, counsel points out that identification was not an issue because law

enforcement did not conduct an identification procedure since the defendant’s

arrest occurred while committing the offense. The incident was recorded on

Deputy Wilkie’s body camera. Counsel also avers the defendant made

spontaneous statements, and police advised her of her rights. Therefore, she

contends there is no issue regarding the motion to suppress the statements.

Additionally, counsel indicates that the evidence was sufficient to support the

24-KA-115 4 conviction, pointing out that the body-camera footage depicts the defendant inside

the victim’s apartment and admitting that she entered through the window.

Further, the defendant’s appellate counsel asserts that the jury was

comprised correctly of six jurors under La. C.Cr.P. art. 7823, and that the verdict

was unanimous. Counsel concludes there is no issue regarding the number of

jurors on the jury panel. Counsel acknowledges that there are no viable issues

related to jury selection since the defense did not exhaust all of its peremptory

challenges, and the defendant did not lodge any objections during the voir dire

process. With no objections lodged during opening statements, the testimony of

either witness, or the closing arguments, counsel asserts that no issues were

preserved for review.

The defendant’s appellate counsel points out that although the defendant’s

behavior during the offense was erratic, the defense did not raise sanity as an issue.

She also points out that while there was testimony that the defendant may have

been on narcotics at the time of the incident, defense counsel could not raise

voluntary intoxication as a defense because the unauthorized entry of an inhabited

dwelling is a general intent offense.4 Counsel asserts that there were no

deficiencies in the multiple bill, and the trial court advised the defendant of her

multiple bill rights before her stipulation to the multiple bill.

According to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2), Appellate counsel avers that the

trial court imposed the agreed-upon three-year enhanced sentence, pointing out that

a defendant cannot appeal a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea

3 La. C.Cr.P. art. 782 provides in pertinent part, “A case in which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of six jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.” Here, La. R.S. 14:62.3 reflects that punishment may be confinement at hard labor. The jury was properly composed of six jurors and reached a unanimous verdict in this case. 4 Unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling requires general intent. State v. Riviere, 08-105 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/27/08), 986 So.2d 768, 770, writ denied, 08-1383 (La. 2/13/09), 999 So.2d 1146. Voluntary intoxication can only be considered as a defense in cases where specific intent is a necessary element of the crime, and the defendant claims his intoxication precluded the capacity to form that intent. State v. Clarke, 21-1460 (La. 6/29/22), 345 So.3d 1015, 1018. Thus, voluntary intoxication could not have been used as a defense in this case.

24-KA-115 5 agreement. Counsel further avers that the sentence falls within the sentencing

parameters of the statute, and therefore, there are no viable sentencing issues to

raise.

The State agrees with appellate counsel that no non-frivolous issues exist for

appeal. After a jury trial, a jury convicted the defendant when sufficient evidence

was presented to sustain her conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, infra. The State

points out that the defendant was caught in the act of violating La. R.S. 14:62.3.

With respect to the habitual offender proceedings, the State provides that the trial

court conducted a colloquy with the defendant and explained to her the rights she

was waiving by stipulating to the multiple offender bill of information. The State

also provides that the defendant executed a written waiver of rights form relative to

the multiple offender bill. The trial court explained the maximum sentence to the

defendant and the sentence to be imposed according to the multiple bill plea. The

written waiver of rights form reflects the maximum and actual sentences.

The State points out that the trial court failed to impose the enhanced

sentence without probation or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S.

15:529.1(G). Nevertheless, the State submits that this error is insignificant since

the defendant did not receive probation or a suspended sentence. Further,

according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the State asserts that neither the transcript nor

the habitual offender waiver of rights form indicates that the Court advised the

defendant of the time periods to appeal or seek post-conviction relief. The State

argues that neither issue warrants vacating the defendant’s conviction or sentence

and requests that this Court affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

Appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record,

which states that she has prepared an Anders brief and has notified the defendant of

her right to file a pro se brief in this appeal. Additionally, this Court sent the

defendant a letter by certified mail informing her of the Anders brief filing and

24-KA-115 6 that she had until May 5, 2024, to file a pro se supplemental brief. The defendant

has not filed a supplemental brief.

Our independent review of the record supports the appellate counsel’s

assertion that there are no non-frivolous issues for review on appeal.

The bill of information correctly charged the defendant and plainly and

concisely stated the essential facts constituting the charged offense. The bill

sufficiently identified the defendant and the crime charged. See generally La.

C.Cr.P. arts. 464-466. The minute entries show that the defendant and her counsel

appeared at all crucial stages of the proceedings against her, including her

arraignment, trial, multiple bill proceedings, and sentencing. Thus, the defendant’s

presence does not present any issues that would support an appeal.

The record contains omnibus pretrial motions filed by the defense, including

a motion to suppress the statements, a motion to suppress the evidence, a motion to

suppress the identification, and a motion for preliminary examination. The court

did not hear these pretrial motions, and defense counsel did not object to the trial

court’s failure to hear or rule on these motions. If a defendant does not object to

the trial court’s failure to rule on a motion before trial, the motions are waived.

State v. Wise, 05-221 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/6/05), 916 So.2d 290, 293. Hence, the

defendant waived these pretrial motions.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must

determine that the evidence, whether direct, circumstantial, or a mixture of both,

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a

rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond

a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979).

In this case, the jury convicted the defendant of unauthorized entry of an

inhabited dwelling. La. R.S. 14:62.3(A) defines the unauthorized entry of an

24-KA-115 7 inhabited dwelling as “the intentional entry by a person without authorization into

any inhabited dwelling or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or

in part as a home or place of abode by a person.” An unauthorized entry is an

entry without consent, express or implied. State v. Rivet, 01-353 (La. App. 5 Cir.

9/25/01), 798 So.2d 219, 224. In the case of a private residence, a person must

have the consent of the occupant or an occupant’s agent to constitute a defense to

unauthorized entry. This consent must be given by a person with authority or

capacity to consent. State v. Kirsch, 04-214 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/04), 880 So.2d

890, 894.

At trial, the victim testified that when he arrived home, the screen had been

removed from the window to the left of his front door. When he opened his front

door, he saw an unknown female inside his residence, later identified as the

defendant. The victim slammed the door and called 9-1-1. He pointed out that he

did not give the defendant permission to be in his apartment that night and had

locked the door before leaving. Deputy Wilkie testified that he and Sergeant

Verrette entered the apartment and found the defendant hiding in a bedroom closet.

In the incident recording captured on Deputy Wilkie’s body camera, the defendant

admitted entering the residence through the window.

A rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence was sufficient

under the Jackson standard to support the defendant’s conviction. Thus, our record

review indicates no non-frivolous issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.

Concerning the multiple offender proceedings, the record shows that the trial

judge advised the defendant of her rights. The waiver of rights form and the

transcript indicate that the defendant was advised of her right to a hearing, at which

the State would have to prove her multiple offender status, and of her right to

remain silent throughout the hearing. The defendant was advised of the potential

sentencing range as a second-felony offender and the actual sentence she would

24-KA-115 8 receive. The defendant indicated that she had not been forced or coerced into

stipulating to the multiple offender bill of information, that she understood her

rights and the legal consequences of pleading guilty to the multiple offender bill of

information, and that she wished to “plead guilty.” The trial judge, after that,

accepted the defendant’s stipulation to the multiple offender bill as knowingly,

intelligently, freely, and voluntarily made. An unconditional plea, willingly and

knowingly made, waives any and all non-jurisdictional defects and bars a

defendant from later asserting on appeal that the State failed to produce sufficient

proof at the multiple offender hearing. See State v. Thomas, 20-97 (La. App. 5 Cir.

11/4/20), 306 So.3d 568, 574.

As the defendant’s appellate counsel pointed out, the defendant’s three-year

enhanced sentence was not constitutionally excessive and does not present an issue

for appeal.

The defendant’s enhanced sentence was imposed per a plea agreement. La.

C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking review of a sentence

imposed in conformity with a plea agreement that was set forth in the record at the

time of the plea. State v. Washington, 05-211 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/6/05), 916 So.2d

1171, 1173. Likewise, this Court has consistently recognized that La. C.Cr.P. art.

881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking a review of an enhanced sentence

to which the defendant agreed. State v. Williams, 12-299 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/11/12), 106 So.3d 1068, 1075, writ denied, 13-109 (La. 6/21/13), 118 So.3d

406. Accordingly, the defendant could not have challenged her enhanced sentence

on appeal because the enhanced sentence was imposed following the plea

agreement set forth in the record at the time of the plea.

Because the appellate counsel’s brief adequately demonstrates by complete

discussion and analysis that she has reviewed the trial court proceedings and

cannot identify any basis for a non-frivolous appeal, and an independent review of

24-KA-115 9 the record supports the counsel’s assertion, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to

withdraw as attorney of record.

ERROR PATENT DISCUSSION

We reviewed the record for patent errors following La. C.Cr.P. art. 920;

State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175

(La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The transcript shows that the defendant was not advised of the provisions of

La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; however, the minute entry reflects she was advised of these

provisions. When there is a discrepancy between the transcript and the minute

entry, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). If a

trial court fails to advise or provides an incomplete advisal, according to La.

C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the appellate Court may correct this error by informing the

defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for post-conviction relief through

its opinion. State v. Becnel, 18-549 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 1017,

1022. Accordingly, we advise the defendant that no application for post-

conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be

considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and

sentence has become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence for the preceding

reasons and grant the appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw.

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED

24-KA-115 10 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIRST DEPUTY CLERK SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY DECEMBER 18, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KA-115 E-NOTIFIED 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HONORABLE FRANK A. BRINDISI (DISTRICT JUDGE) DARREN A. ALLEMAND (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) HOLLI A. HERRLE-CASTILLO (APPELLANT)

MAILED HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR. (APPELLEE) DISTRICT ATTORNEY TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 200 DERBIGNY STREET GRETNA, LA 70053