State of Louisiana Versus Keith Brumfield

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 18, 2024
• Docket: 24-K-532
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-K-532

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

KEITH BRUMFIELD COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

November 18, 2024

Linda Wiseman First Deputy Clerk

IN RE KEITH BRUMFIELD

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR., DIVISION "L", NUMBER 23-5410

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Scott U. Schlegel, and Timothy S. Marcel

WRIT DENIED

Defendant, Keith Brumfield, seeks review of the trial court’s September 19,

2024 ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant contends that an

officer improperly conducted a warrantless stop of his vehicle based on an

anonymous complaint. The complaint was from an unidentified female indicating

that she was uncomfortable because a person in a white Mitsubishi sedan yelled at

her from the car to ask for her phone number. Defendant contends that asking for a

phone number is not criminal activity, and as a result the officer did not have

probable cause to conduct the investigatory stop. The State contends in response

that the harassing conduct complaint provided the officer with reasonable

suspicion of a potential disturbing the peace violation to warrant the investigatory

stop. For reasons discussed more fully below, we deny defendant’s writ

application.

24-K-532 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Deputy Andrew Scott with the

Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office testified that he received a call to respond to a

complaint of harassment at 4321 Hessmer Street in Metairie. He explained that an

anonymous female complained that an individual in a white Mitsubishi sedan

harassed her on the street. On cross-examination, Deputy Scott further explained

that the anonymous woman indicated that she felt uncomfortable because the

person in the vehicle yelled at her from the window to ask for her phone number.

Deputy Scott agreed that when he located the vehicle, he did not observe any

traffic violations or illegal activity prior to conducting the investigatory stop of the

vehicle. Deputy Scott testified that after the vehicle stopped, the driver opened the

driver’s side door. As the deputy approached the vehicle, he detected the odor of

marijuana. He also saw a small bag of marijuana in plain view in the bottom

compartment of the driver’s side door. After conducting a search of the vehicle,

the officer located a handgun under the driver’s seat, additional marijuana in the

back of the car, and a blister pack of tapentadol in the center console.

Following the deputy’s testimony, defense counsel asked the trial court to

suppress the evidence because Terry v. Ohio1 requires reasonable suspicion of a

crime being committed (or about to be committed) in order to conduct an

investigatory stop. Defense counsel argued that an anonymous call from a female

stating that she was uncomfortable because someone asked for her phone number

is not a crime. She further argued that the officer admitted that he stopped the

vehicle without observing any traffic violations or criminal activity. After the

conclusion of oral argument, the trial court denied the motion to suppress finding

that when the officer got the call about the suspicious person, he believed a crime

had been committed.

1 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2 In its opposition to the writ application, the State agrees that a man asking a

woman for her phone number is not in and of itself illegal. However, the State

contends that the complaint of harassing behavior was sufficient to satisfy the low

threshold of reasonable suspicion that defendant may have committed a violation

of La. R.S. 14:103(A)(2), disturbing the peace.2 The State further recognizes that

anonymous complaints are generally looked at with skepticism, but argues that this

situation is distinguishable because the anonymous complaint comes from the

person who was the subject of the alleged harassing conduct.

The trial court is vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to

suppress. State v. McCarthy, 21-153 (La. 4/20/21), 313 So.3d 1234, 1236. The

trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly

erroneous standard. Id.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and

Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable

searches and seizures. State v. Roche, 05-237 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/25/06), 928 So.2d

761, 765, writ denied, 06-1566 (La. 1/8/07), 948 So.2d 120. Warrantless searches

and seizures are unreasonable per se unless justified by one of the specific

exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. In a hearing on a motion to suppress

evidence seized without a warrant, the State bears the burden of proving that an

exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Lane, 09-179 (La. App. 5

Cir. 9/29/09), 24 So.3d 920, 923, writ denied, 09-2360 (La. 5/21/10), 36 So.3d 226

(citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D)).

2 La. R.S. 14:103(A)(2) provides:

A. Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in such manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public: . . . (2) Addressing any offensive, derisive, or annoying words to any other person who is lawfully in any street, or other public place; or call him by any offensive or derisive name, or make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with the intent to deride, offend, or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business, occupation, or duty. 3 In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States Supreme Court recognized the

investigatory stop as an exception to the warrant requirement. State in Interest of

T.L., 17-579 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/21/18), 240 So.3d 310, 323. In Louisiana, a law

enforcement officer may stop and question a person in a public place whom he

reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a criminal

offense. Id.; La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A). Reasonable suspicion to stop is something

less than the probable cause required for an arrest, and the reviewing court must

look to the facts of each case to determine whether a detaining officer had

knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to justify an infringement of the

suspect’s rights. State v. Bell, 14-1046 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/15/15), 169 So.3d 417,

422. The determination of reasonable grounds for an investigatory stop does not

rest on the officer’s subjective beliefs or attitudes, but is dependent on an objective

evaluation of all the circumstances known to the officer at the time of his

challenged action. Lane, 24 So.3d at 924. In determining whether the officer

acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his

inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to the specific reasonable

inferences that he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. State

v. Interest of T.L., 240 So.3d at 323.

An anonymous tip may provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory

stop if it accurately predicts future conduct in sufficient detail to support a

reasonable belief that the informant had reliable information regarding the

suspect’s illegal activity. State v. Smith, 00-1838 (La. 5/25/01), 785 So.2d 815,

816, citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301

(1990). Predictive ability is not always necessary; a non-predictive anonymous tip,

coupled with police corroboration or independent police observation of unusual

suspicious activity, can provide the police with the requisite reasonable suspicion

to detain a suspect. State v. Triche, 03-149 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/03), 848 So.2d

4 80, 85, writ denied, 03-1979 (La. 1/16/04), 864 So.2d 625. “[I]f a tip has a

relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish

the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more

reliable.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416. Whether an

anonymous tip establishes reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop is

considered under the totality of the circumstances. State in Interest of T.L., 240

So.3d at 324. The sufficiency of an anonymous tip under Terry is determined by

the reliability of its assertion of illegality and not just its tendency to identify a

determinate person. Id.

In Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1692, 188 L.Ed.2d

680 (2014), the United States Supreme Court ruled that an anonymous tip provided

officers with reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. Officers received

information from an anonymous 911 caller that she had been run off the road by a

truck. The caller provided identifying information about the truck, and after

conducting an investigatory stop, officers detected the smell of marijuana. A

search of the truck bed revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The trial court denied the

defendant’s motion to suppress, and the appellate court affirmed

On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether officers lacked reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop based solely on information

supplied by the caller. Id. at 1688-89. In upholding the trial court’s ruling, the

Court reasoned that the anonymous call was sufficiently reliable because the caller

identified the truck and claimed eyewitness knowledge of an offense. Id. at 1689.

The Court also found that the proximity in time between the call and when officers

located the truck “negate[d] the likelihood of deliberate or conscious

misrepresentation” and supported the reliability of the information because it

suggested that the incident was reported soon after it occurred. Id. Although the

Court found the Navarette case to be a close call, it concluded that the tip created

5 reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime, rather than an isolated episode of past

recklessness, and that the relevant circumstances, taken together, justified the

officer’s reliance on the reported information. Id. at 1690-92.

After considering the totality of the circumstances presented at the hearing

on the motion to suppress in the instant matter, we find no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Just as in Navarette, supra, the

anonymous caller provided identifying information of the vehicle, as well as an

eyewitness account of harassing conduct that she claimed made her feel

uncomfortable. Shortly after receiving the complaint, the officer located a vehicle

fitting the description provided by the caller. In addition, the report of a complaint

of harassing conduct that made the female feel uncomfortable, together with

rational inferences drawn therefrom, support a reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity, i.e., disturbing the peace. See Bell, 169 So.3d at 422-23 (finding that

officer’s stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment; officer’s knowledge that

defendant caused a disturbance at a restaurant and refused to leave the premises for

a period of time supported reasonable suspicion that violations of criminal trespass

and disturbing the peace may have occurred).3 If the defendant had simply

requested the female’s phone number, it is unlikely that she would have made the

complaint.

Accordingly, this writ application is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 18th day of November, 2024.

SUS SMC TSM

3 The Bell court further recognized that whether the officer “had these particular statutes, or any others, in mind when he stopped the defendant is of no moment. The fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Id. at 423. In addition, public safety requires some flexibility for officers to investigate and prevent crime. State v. Cyprian, 21-287 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 271, 282. 6 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIRST DEPUTY CLERK SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS DAY 11/18/2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-K-532 E-NOTIFIED 24th Judicial District Court (Clerk) Honorable Donald A. Rowan, Jr. (DISTRICT JUDGE) Mark D. Plaisance (Relator) Thomas J. Butler (Respondent) Darren A. Allemand (Respondent)

MAILED Remy V. Starns (Relator) Mariah Jackson (Relator) Marcus J. Plaisance (Relator) Attorney at Law Attorney at Law Attorney at Law 301 Main Street 848 Second Street Post Office Box 1123 Suite 700 3rd Floor Prairieville, LA 70769 Baton Rouge, LA 70825 Gretna, LA 70053

Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. (Respondent) District Attorney Twenty-Fourth Judicial District 200 Derbigny Street Gretna, LA 70053