STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 19-KA-377
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
DEWAYNE A. ALLEN COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 17-5152, DIVISION "B" HONORABLE CORNELIUS E. REGAN, JUDGE PRESIDING
April 30, 2020
HANS J. LILJEBERG JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Robert A. Chaisson, Hans J. Liljeberg, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES ON COUNTS 2-5 AFFIRMED; SENTENCE ON COUNT 1 AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF THE UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED HJL RAC JJM COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. Thomas J. Butler Zachary P. Popovich Meredith Hearn
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, DEWAYNE A. ALLEN Dewayne A. Allen Cynthia K. Meyer LILJEBERG, J.
Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for five felony offenses.
For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and his sentences on
counts two through five. We amend the sentence on count one and affirm as
amended. We also remand for correction of an error patent. Finally, we grant
appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 9, 2017, the District Attorney for Jefferson Parish filed a bill of
information charging defendant, Dewayne A. Allen, with possession with intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A) (count one); possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A) (count two);
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count
three); possession of an unidentifiable firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 40:1792
(count four); and possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of
domestic abuse battery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.10 (count five). Defendant
pleaded not guilty to the charged offenses.
On February 5, 2019, defendant withdrew his former pleas of not guilty, and
after being advised of his Boykin1 rights, pleaded guilty as charged.2 In accordance
with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced on count one to 18 years
imprisonment at hard labor, with the first ten years of the sentence to be served
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; on count two to 18
years imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years to be served without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; on count three to 18 years
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
1 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). 2 On the same date, defendant pleaded guilty under district court case number 18-1307 to possession with intent to distribute heroin and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant’s appeal of those convictions is currently pending before this Court under companion case number 19-KA-388. Defendant also pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor offenses under case number 18-1571, which are not before this Court on appeal.
19-KA-377 1 sentence; on count four to five years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; and on count five to five years
imprisonment at hard labor. The trial court ordered defendant’s sentences to run
concurrently with each other.
On the same date, the State filed a multiple offender bill of information on
count three—possession of a firearm by a convicted felon—alleging defendant to
be a second-felony offender. Defendant stipulated to the multiple bill after being
advised of his rights. The trial court then vacated defendant’s original sentence on
count three, and pursuant to the multiple offender stipulation, resentenced
defendant on count three as a second-felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1, to
18 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole or suspension of
sentence. The trial court ordered all of defendant’s sentences, including those
imposed in case numbers 18-1307 and 18-1571, to run concurrently and
recommended defendant for participation in any available self-help programs.
Defendant appeals.
FACTS
Because defendant’s convictions were the result of guilty pleas, the facts
underlying the crimes of conviction are not fully developed in the record. Thus,
the facts were gleaned from the bill of information which alleged that on July 12,
2017, defendant violated La. R.S. 40:966(A) in that he did knowingly or
intentionally possess with the intent to distribute heroin (count one), defendant
violated La. R.S. 40:967(A) in that he did knowingly or intentionally possess with
the intent to distribute cocaine (count two), defendant violated La. R.S. 14:95.1 in
that he did have in his possession a firearm, to wit: a Sig Saur 9 mm, serial number
52A062448, and Taurus .45 caliber pistol, having been previously convicted of the
crime of possession of cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C), under case
number 471-934 on January 9, 2009, in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court
19-KA-377 2 (count three), defendant violated La. R.S. 40:1792 in that he did knowingly and
intentionally possess, transfer, or transport a firearm, to wit: a Taurus .45 caliber
pistol, with the serial numbers or identifying marks obliterated, altered, removed,
or concealed (count four), and defendant violated La. R.S. 14:95.10 in that he did
have in his possession a firearm, to wit: a Sig Saur 9 mm, serial number
52A062448, having been previously convicted of the crime of domestic abuse
battery (2 counts) in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3, under case number 531-678 on
June 16, 2017, in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court (count five).
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Defendant’s appointed counsel has filed an appellate brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). She
has also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. Defendant has filed a pro
se brief raising three assignments of error, namely, that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress, ineffective assistance of counsel, and sentencing
errors.
Anders Brief
Under the procedure adopted by this Court in State v. Bradford (La. App. 5
Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108, 1110-11,3 appointed appellate counsel has filed a
brief asserting that she has thoroughly reviewed the trial court record and cannot
find any non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Anders,
supra, and State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241 (per curiam),
appointed counsel requests permission to withdraw as counsel of record.
In Anders, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated that appointed
appellate counsel may request permission to withdraw if she finds her case to be
3 In Bradford, supra, this Court adopted the procedures outlined in State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), which were sanctioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Mouton, 95- 0981 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177 (per curiam).
19-KA-377 3 wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of it.4 The request must be
accompanied by “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal” so as to provide the reviewing court “with a basis for
determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support
their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court
“in making the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that
counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440
(1988).
In Jyles, 704 So.2d at 241, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that an
Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pre-trial motion or
objection made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or
objections lack merit. The supreme court explained that an Anders brief must
demonstrate by full discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an
advocate’s eye over the trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the
trial court, subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant,
adverse impact on shaping the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.”
Id.
When conducting a review for compliance with Anders, an appellate court
must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal
is wholly frivolous. Bradford, 676 So.2d at 1110. If, after an independent review,
the reviewing court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant’s conviction and
sentence. However, if the court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it may
either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief arguing
4 The United States Supreme Court reiterated Anders in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).
19-KA-377 4 the legal point(s) identified by the court, or grant the motion and appoint substitute
appellate counsel. Id.
In the present case, defendant’s appellate counsel asserts that after a detailed
review of the record, she could find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal.
Appellate counsel submits that the only pre-trial ruling which could arguably
support an appeal is the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress; however, she
notes that defendant did not preserve his right to seek appellate review of the
denial of any motions. Appellate counsel further maintains defendant entered
unqualified guilty pleas, thereby waiving any non-jurisdictional defects. She
further asserts the trial court advised defendant of the rights necessary to ensure a
knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, as well as the sentencing ranges for the
offenses and the sentences that would be imposed. Appellate counsel concludes
that defendant was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement, precluding him from
challenging his sentences on appeal.
Appellate counsel has also filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record
which states she has made a conscientious and thorough review of the trial court
record and can find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal and no rulings of the
trial court which would arguably support the appeal.
The State agrees with appellate counsel that there are no non-frivolous issues
to be raised on appeal, and that appellate counsel’s request to withdraw should be
granted.
An independent review of the record supports appellate counsel’s assertion
that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal.
The bill of information properly charged defendant and plainly and
concisely stated the essential facts constituting the charged offenses. It also
sufficiently identified defendant and the crimes charged. See generally La. C.Cr.P.
arts. 464-466. The record also shows there are no appealable issues surrounding
19-KA-377 5 defendant’s presence. The minute entries show defendant appeared at each stage
of the proceedings against him, including his arraignment, his guilty plea
proceeding, his sentencing, and his multiple bill proceeding, including his
stipulation and his enhanced sentencing.
Further, defendant pleaded guilty as charged to the offenses contained in the
bill of information. If a defendant pleads guilty, he normally waives all non-
jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea and precludes
review of such defects either by appeal or post-conviction relief. State v. Turner,
09-1079 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10), 47 So.3d 455, 459. Because defendant entered
unqualified guilty pleas, any non-jurisdictional defects were waived.
The record also indicates that defendant filed several pre-trial motions,
including motions to suppress, which the trial court denied. However, defendant
did not preserve any pre-trial rulings for appeal under the holding in State v.
Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).5
Additionally, a review of the record reveals no irregularities in defendant’s
guilty pleas that would render them invalid. Once a defendant is sentenced, only
those guilty pleas that are constitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or
post-conviction relief. A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm if it is not entered
freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is
induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain or what he justifiably believes was a
plea bargain and that bargain is not kept. State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La. App. 5 Cir.
2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124.
The record shows defendant was aware he was pleading guilty to possession
with intent to distribute heroin, possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of an unidentifiable
5 Under Crosby, a defendant may reserve his right to appeal a prior adverse ruling of the trial court. State v. Richardson, 09-714 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/9/10), 33 So.3d 903, 906-07, writ denied, 10-526 (La. 10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1109.
19-KA-377 6 firearm, and possession of a firearm by a person having been previously convicted
of domestic abuse battery. Defendant was also properly advised of his Boykin
rights. On the waiver of rights form and during the colloquy with the trial judge,
defendant was advised of his right to a judge or jury trial, his right to confrontation,
and his privilege against self-incrimination, and he indicated he understood he was
waiving these rights.
Further, defendant was informed during the colloquy of the sentencing
ranges for the offenses as well as the actual penalties that would be imposed upon
acceptance of his guilty pleas. The trial court further informed defendant that his
guilty pleas could be used to enhance a penalty for any future conviction.
Defendant confirmed that he understood the possible legal consequences of
pleading guilty and that he had not been forced, coerced, or intimidated into
entering his guilty pleas. After his colloquy with defendant, the trial judge
accepted defendant’s guilty pleas as knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
made.
Next, a review of the multiple offender proceeding does not reveal any non-
frivolous issues for appeal. Defendant was advised of his multiple offender rights
and indicated that he understood he was waiving them by stipulating to the
allegations in the multiple offender bill. Defendant was also advised of the
potential sentencing range as a second-felony offender for the crime of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon (count three), as well as the actual sentence that
would be imposed. Defendant stipulated to being a second-felony offender as
alleged in the multiple bill, thereby waiving his right to a hearing and any possible
non-jurisdictional defects. By stipulating to the multiple bill, defendant is barred
from asserting on appeal that the State failed to produce sufficient proof at the
multiple bill hearing. See State v. Schaefer, 97-465 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/97), 704
So.2d 300, 304.
19-KA-377 7 Lastly, defendant’s original sentences and enhanced sentence are within the
sentencing ranges prescribed by the statutes. See La. R.S. 40:966(B)(4)(a); La.
R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b); La. R.S. 14:95.1(B); La. R.S. 40:1792; La. R.S. 14:95.10;
La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Further, defendant’s original and enhanced sentences
were imposed pursuant to, and in conformity with, the plea agreement. La. C.Cr.P.
art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking review of his sentence
imposed in conformity with a plea agreement, which was set forth in the record at
the time of the plea. State v. Moore, 06-875 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 958 So.2d
36, 46; State v. Washington, 05-211 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/6/05), 916 So.2d 1171,
1173.
Based on the foregoing, the proceedings surrounding defendant’s guilty
pleas and sentencing do not present any non-frivolous issues to be raised on
appeal. Appellate counsel’s brief adequately demonstrates by full discussion and
analysis that she has reviewed the trial court proceedings and cannot identify any
basis for a non-frivolous appeal, and an independent review of the record supports
counsel’s assertion.
Pro Se Brief
In his first pro se assignment of error, defendant argues the evidence against
him was illegally obtained, and thus, the trial court improperly denied his motion
to suppress. He maintains the officers that entered his residence possessed an
arrest warrant and not a search warrant, which he submits constituted an illegal
search of the evidence that was seized.
As previously noted in the Anders discussion, defendant entered unqualified
guilty pleas on all counts and thus waived all non-jurisdictional defects. Further,
while defendant had a hearing on his motion to suppress, he did not preserve the
denial of his motion to suppress for appeal under the holding in Crosby, supra,
when he pleaded guilty and, therefore, he has waived any challenge to his guilty
19-KA-377 8 pleas based upon the denial of this motion.6 Accordingly, because the ruling was
not preserved for appellate review, we will not review the merits of defendant’s
motion to suppress as requested in this assignment of error.
In his second pro se assignment of error, defendant argues that his counsel
was ineffective because he provided false information regarding the time he would
have to serve in prison. Thus, defendant contends his pleas were unknowingly and
involuntarily made. He further argues that he asked his attorney to have a
preliminary hearing, but he did not receive one.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13
of the Louisiana Constitution safeguard a defendant’s right to effective assistance
of trial counsel. According to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984), a defendant asserting an ineffective assistance claim must show: 1) that
defense counsel’s performance was deficient; and 2) that the deficiency prejudiced
the defendant. The defendant has the burden of showing that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the two-part analysis of
Strickland, supra, relative to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Crawford, 15-0784 (La. 10/2/15), 176 So.3d 394, cert denied, -- U.S. -- , 136 S.Ct.
1454, 194 L.Ed.2d 557 (2016); State v. Washington, 491 So.2d 1337, 1338 (La.
1986).
6 A defendant may be allowed appellate review if, at the time he enters a guilty plea, he expressly reserves his right to appeal a specific adverse ruling in the case. State v. Turner, 10-995 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/27/11), 75 So.3d 491, 492, writ denied, 11-2379 (La. 4/27/12), 86 So.3d 625.
19-KA-377 9 Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is most appropriately
addressed through an application for post-conviction relief filed in the district
court, where a full evidentiary hearing can be conducted, if necessary, rather than
by direct appeal. State v. Taylor, 04-346 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 887 So.2d
589, 595. When the record contains sufficient evidence to rule on the merits of the
claim and the issue is properly raised in an assignment of error on appeal, it may be
addressed in the interest of judicial economy. Id. Where the record does not
contain sufficient evidence to fully explore a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the claim should be relegated to post-conviction proceedings under La.
C.Cr.P. arts. 924-930.8. Id.
Here, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to rule on the merits of
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.7 Accordingly, because the
record is insufficient to fully explore defendant’s claims, they would be more
appropriately raised in an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court,
where a full evidentiary hearing can be conducted, if necessary, and defendant can
present evidence to support his allegations.8
In his final pro se assignment of error, defendant avers the trial court
violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution when he was
sentenced under the habitual offender statute. He further argues he was subjected
to double jeopardy by his sentencing under the habitual offender statute because he
is already having to pay an increased penalty based on his prior felon status and
thus, to enhance his sentence would be considered excessive. Finally, defendant
argues his enhanced sentence is illegal because “the habitual offender bill was
7 As an attachment to his pro se brief filed with this Court, defendant has provided alleged text message communications between his sister and his trial counsel. He contends that these messages establish that his counsel provided false information about the time he would have to serve in prison. However, this evidence is not in the record before us, and an appellate court is precluded from considering evidence which is not part of the record. State v. Pertuit, 95-935 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/96), 673 So.2d 1055, 1057. 8 The defendant would have to satisfy the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 924, et seq., in order to receive such a hearing.
19-KA-377 10 amended as to the time between [defendant]’s release from supervision to the date
of his new arrest, which resulted in an 18 year sentence as a habitual offender
under the old law.”
First, defendant claims that the ex post facto clause was violated when he
was sentenced under the habitual offender statute. However, defendant has not
briefed this issue. This conclusory statement, without more, is insufficient for this
Court to review on appeal. Any assignment of error that is not briefed is
considered abandoned on appeal.. See State v. Allen, 06-778 (La. App. 5 Cir.
4/24/07), 955 So.2d 742, 757-58, writ denied, 08-2432 (La. 1/30/09), 999 So.2d
754. Thus, because defendant has not briefed this assignment of error, we find that
it is abandoned.
With respect to defendant’s double jeopardy claim, the Habitual Offender
Law creates no independent offense but rather prescribes the conditions under
which there is an enhanced penalty for the current offense. State v. Boykin, 34,133
(La. App. 2 Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So.2d 1074, 1075. Considerations of double
jeopardy do not apply to multiple offender proceedings. See State v. Dorthey, 623
So.2d 1276, 1279 (La. 1993) (explaining that because the multiple offender
hearing is not a trial, legal principles such as double jeopardy do not apply).
Accordingly, defendant’s claim that he was subjected to double jeopardy by being
sentenced under the habitual offender statute is without merit.
Lastly, defendant argues that his enhanced sentence is illegal because “the
Habitual Offender Bill was amended as to the time between [his] release from
supervision to the date of new arrest, which resulted in an 18 year sentence as a
habitual offender under the old law.” However, this argument is unclear and
defendant provides no further argument in support of this claim. Without further
19-KA-377 11 argument, defendant has failed to brief this issue and we consider it abandoned.9
See Allen, supra.
ERRORS PATENT
The record was reviewed for errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P.
art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556
So.2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). Two errors requiring corrective action were
noted.
With regard to defendant’s conviction on count one—possession with intent
to distribute heroin—the trial court imposed an illegally harsh sentence. At the
time defendant committed the offense on July 12, 2017, the sentencing range was
not less than ten nor more than 50 years imprisonment with at least ten years to be
served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S.
40:966(B)(4)(a). The statute did not provide for the restriction of parole.
However, defendant was sentenced on count one to 18 years at hard labor without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for the first ten years.
Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 882, an appellate court can correct an illegal
sentence at any time. When a sentencing error involves the imposition of
restrictions beyond those authorized by the legislature, the Louisiana Supreme
Court instructs appellate courts to correct the error pursuant to their authority under
La. C.Cr.P. art. 882. State v. Sanders, 04-17 (La. 5/14/04), 876 So.2d 42.
Therefore, we amend defendant’s sentence to eliminate the parole restriction on
count one for the first ten years of defendant’s 18-year sentence. See State v.
9 To the extent defendant challenges his enhanced sentence based upon changes to the multiple offender law, we reiterate that defendant pleaded guilty as charged and was sentenced in accordance with the multiple offender plea agreement. La. C.Cr.P. art 881.2(A)(2) provides: “[t]he defendant cannot seek appeal or seek review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement which was set forth in the record at the time of the plea.” See Moore, supra; Washington, supra.
19-KA-377 12 Durall, 15-793 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/12/16), 192 So.3d 310. We also remand to the
trial court with instructions to amend the sentencing minute entry and the
Louisiana Uniform Commitment Order (UCO) to correctly reflect the sentence on
count one as amended.
Also, the sentencing minute entry and the UCO, as to count five—
possession of a firearm having been previously convicted of domestic abuse
battery—reflect that defendant’s five-year sentence is to be served without
benefits. However, the trial court did not restrict benefits on defendant’s count-
five sentence, and the statute does not provide for a restriction of benefits. See La.
R.S. 14:95.10. Where there is a discrepancy between the transcript and the minute
entry, the transcript generally prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La.
1983). Accordingly, we remand the matter for correction of the sentencing minute
entry and the UCO to correct this inaccuracy as to count five.
Once the UCO is corrected as to counts one and five, the Clerk of Court for
the 24th Judicial District Court is ordered to transmit the corrected UCO to the
appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and the
Department of Corrections’ legal department. See State v. Ordonez, 16-619 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 3/15/17), 215 So.3d 473, 479; State v. Doucet, 17-200 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/27/17), 237 So.3d 598, writs denied, 18-0077 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So.3d 789 and
18-0196 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So.3d 1052, cert. denied, --U.S.--, 139 S.Ct. 2676, 204
L.Ed.2d 1079 (2019); State v. Long, 12-184 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/12), 106 So.3d
1136, 1142.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions, and we affirm
his sentences for counts two through five. We amend defendant’s sentence as to
19-KA-377 13 count one, and affirm as amended. We also remand for correction of the UCO.
Finally, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES ON COUNTS 2-5 AFFIRMED; SENTENCE ON COUNT 1 AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF THE UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
19-KA-377 14 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK HANS J. LILJEBERG JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
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19-KA-377 E-NOTIFIED 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HONORABLE CORNELIUS E. REGAN (DISTRICT JUDGE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) CYNTHIA K. MEYER (APPELLANT)
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