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On Appeal from the 22nd judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 1952- F- 2022, Section I
Jane C. Hogan Attorney for Appellant, Hammond, LA William Eugene Naulty
J. Collin Sims Attorneys for Appellee, Matthew Caplan State of Louisiana Covington, LA HESTER, J.
The defendant, William Eugene Naulty, was charged by amended bill of
information with sexual battery involving a victim under the age of thirteen ( Count
1) in violation of La. R.S. 14:43. 1( C)( 2) and indecent behavior with juveniles under
the age of thirteen ( Count 2) in violation of La. R.S. 14: 81( A)( 1) and ( H)(2). The
defendant pled not guilty to the charges. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty 11 qipiipie ig lip
for post -verdict judgment of acquittal, both of which the trial court denied. The trial
court subsequently sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment at
hard labor on count one and two years imprisonment at hard labor on count two.
The trial court ordered the sentences on both counts to be served concurrently and
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now
appeals, alleging four assignments of error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
the convictions and sentences.
In October 2021, V.B. contacted the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff s Office and
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they had been sexually abused by their mother' s boyfriend, the defendant.' The
victims indicated the incidents occurred years earlier when they were living with
their mother and the defendant in Slidell. C.B. and J.B. were interviewed separately
at the Children' s Advocacy Center (" CAU). Following an investigation, the
defendant was arrested.
1 Initials are being used to protect the identity of the minors in this case. See La. R.S. 46: 1844( W)(3).
0 In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the convictions for sexual battery involving a victim under the
age of thirteen and indecent behavior with ajuvenile. He argues that his convictions
are based on internally inconsistent statements from two young girls who admittedly
I0 1111 1; 11111111111 1• ii 1 16TIMmll 13=
insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const.
amend. XIV; La. Const. art. 1, § 2. The constitutional standard for testing the
sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99
S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979) and adopted by the Louisiana Legislature in
enacting La. Code Crim. P. art. 821, requires that a conviction be based on proof
sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Dunn, 2021- 0630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 22/ 21, 340 So. 3d
77, 83, writ denied, 2022- 00095 ( La. 4/ 5/ 22), 335 So3d 834.
The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds
of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Higgins, 2003-
us -i
163 L.Ed.2d 187 ( 2005). The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in
part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony
about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the
credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its
sufficiency. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a
factfinder' s determination of guilt. State v. Jenkins, 2022- 0562 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.
12/ 22/ 22), 357 So. 3d 840, 844. An appellate court errs by substituting its
appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder
and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of
9 innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway,
Sexual Battery
In count one, the defendant was found guilty of sexual battery of C.B.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 14: 43. 1( A)( 1) and ( 2), sexual battery is defined, in pertinent
part, as the intentional touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the offender
using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the offender, directly or through
clothing, when the offender acts without the consent of the victim or when the victim
has not yet attained fifteen years of age and is at least three years younger than the
offender. Sexual battery is a general intent crime. Thus, the only intent necessary
to sustain a conviction is established by the very doing of the proscribed act. See
La. R.S. 14: 11; State v. Brown, 2020- 0150 ( La. App. I st Cir. 2/ 19/ 21), 2021 V&
General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent and also when
the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human
experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as
reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14: 10( 2).
C.B. testified that her date of birth is July 23, 2010. At the time of trial, she
from visiting her maternal grandmother in Tennessee, the defendant had moved into
their home in Slidell. During that time, her mother was employed as a nurse, and
she worked a lot. In the mornings, as C. B. prepared for school, her mother would
leave for work and would not return until after she had arrived home from school.
According to C.B., the defendant was at home with her and her siblings when their
mother was away, and he often was the only adult there.
C. B. testified that the defendant inappropriately touched her vagina when she
was approximately six years old. She indicated the touching only occurred when
rd they were alone in a room. The first incident occurred when she was sitting on the
edge of her bed. The defendant walked into the room, closed the door, walked over
to her, and grabbed her vagina over her clothes with one of his hands, which hurt
and was uncomfortable. Then he left the room without saying anything. C.B. was
C. B. also recalled a time when the defendant was sitting next to her on the
living room couch and he placed his hand on her leg, so she scooted away. The
defendant scooted closer and grabbed her vagina over her clothes.
C.B. recalled another incident when no one else was in the kitchen, and the
defendant grabbed her vagina over her clothes. She was six years old at that time.
The last incident that C. B. could recall occurred after she had just woken up and
went to the defendant' s room to ask him to make her something to eat. Her siblings
were asleep, and her mother was not at home. The defendant got up, closed the
removed her clothes, sat behind her, reached over her shoulder, and grabbed her
vagina with his hand. She testified he put his fingers inside her vagina, which hurt.
C.B. bit the defendant on his arm, which caused him to yank his arm back. Then she
got up, grabbed her clothes, and left the bedroom. During the last incident the
defendant told her she deserved it because she was a bad kid, which convinced her
that maybe she was bad and that some of this was her fault.
C. B. testified that after some of the incidents occurred, the defendant
instructed her not to tell her mother or anyone else; otherwise, he would hurt her.
C. B. believed he was serious. According to C.B., she did not tell anyone about the
inappropriate touching because she was scared that either they would not believe
her, they would become mad, or that the defendant would do something. After she
was removed from her mother' s custody, the inappropriate touching ceased.
5 C. B. indicated when she returned to school in August 2021, she was bullied.
As a result, she began cutting her arm, resulting in her being admitted to Children' s
Hospital in New OrleansWhile at the hospital, a doctor asked C. B. if she had been
sexually abused, and she responded in the negative. She explained the sexual abuse
was not relevant to why she was in the hospital. C.B. further explained she was not
familiar with the hospital staff. Therefore, she did not feel comfortable telling them
about the sexual abuse. In 2021, C. B. told a friend about the sexual abuse after her
friend disclosed an experience she had with her own stepbrother. C. B., who was
eleven years old at the time, felt comfortable telling her friend and felt like the friend
would believe her.
The first adult C. B. told about the abuse was the school counselor, who she
had been seeing regarding the bullying incidents. Thereafter, she told her paternal
testified she was honest about everything she stated the defendant had done to her 2 when she was around six years old. C. B. explained that she came forward when
she felt comfortable that people would believe her, that it was not her fault, and that
C.B. further explained no one told her that she was going to be forced to move I
Tennessee to live full-time with her mother and the defendant. C. B.' s testimony was
consistent with her CAC interview.
On cross- examination, C.B. testified that everything she told the staff while
at Children' s Hospital is accurate, except when she denied being sexually abused.
C.B. testified that she did not tell J.B., who was older, about the abuse, noting: " I
didn' t know it happened to her, too. So, I just felt kind of singled out by it." She
2 At trial, Cally Huggins, a senior forensic interviewer at the CAC, testified for the State. Ms. Huggins indicated that on November 15, 2021, she conducted separate forensic interviews of J.B. and C. B., which were recorded on audio and video. The interviews were played for the jury.
In acknowledged that she told her grandmother that she did not want to move to
Tennessee. C.B. indicated she wanted to stay in Slidell because of her relationship
with her girlfriend,' and she did not want to hurt her mother' s feelings or make her
think she was a s.• • • when questioned -•. her motives •
coming forward, C.B. denied making up the allegations to avoid being separateN
from her girlfriend.
At trial, C.B. testified regarding several incidents where the defendant
intentionally touched her vagina in an inappropriate manner. She specifically
her clothes, grabbed her vagina with his hand, and put his fingers inside her vagina.
C.B. testified regarding two other occasions when the defendant touched her vagina
through her clothes— once while she was alone in her bedroom and another time
while she was alone in the kitchen. These incidents occurred when they lived in
Slidell and she was between the ages six and seven years old. At the time of the
thirty years old.' The record supports a finding that the State presented sufficient
evidence at trial to establish each element of the offense of sexual battery for which
the defendant was convicted.
Indecent Behavior with Juveniles
In count two, the defendant was found guilty of indecent behavior with
juveniles, which is defined, in pertinent part, as the commission of "[a] ny lewd or
lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the age of
seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two years between the
two persons" with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either
3 C.B. testified that in 2021, she was dating a girl. She indicated they would hang out together and do things like go skating. 4 According to the bill of information, the defendant' s date of birth is September 2, 1986. Therefore, he was twenty-nine years old when he began dating C.B. and J.B.' s mother in 2016.
0 person. La. R. S. 14: 81( A)( 1). The Louisiana Supreme Court has defined " lewd and
lascivious conduct" very broadly as any conduct which is " lustful, obscene, indecent,
tending to deprave the morals in respect to sexual relations, and relating to the sexual
impurity or incontinence carried on in a wanton manner." See State v. Jones, 2010-
0762 (La. 9/ 7/ 11), 74 So.3d 197! 204. See also State v. Boudreaux, 2023- 0993 ( LI
So. 3d —, in which this court noted that " lewd" means lustful or indecent and
signifies that form of immorality that relates to sexual impurity carried on in a
wanton manner and is identified with obscenity and measured by community norms
for morality and that " lascivious" means tending to incite lust, indecent, obscene,
and tending to deprave the morals in respect to sexual relations.
Indecent behavior with juveniles is a specific intent crime where the State
must prove the defendant' s intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires by his actions
with a child. State v. Hartley, 2023- 0698 ( La. App. lst Cir. 1/ 23/ 24), 2024 WL
242792, * 2 ( unpublished). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind that exists
when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14: 10( 1). Specific
intent need not be proven as a fact, It may be inferred from the circumstances of the
transaction and the actions of the defendant. Specific intent is an ultimate legal
conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. State v. McKinney, 2015- 1503 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 4/ 25/ 16), 194 So. 3d 699, 703, writ denied, 2016- 0992 ( La. 5/ 12/ 17),
J.B. testified that her (late of birth is May 30, 2007. At the time of trial, she
was fifteen years old and in the tenth grade. Similar to her sister, J.B. testified that
her mother would sometimes already be gone before they woke up in the morning
and would not return fromwork until after she arrived home from school. She
11. agreed the defendant was home more often than their mother and that he was often
the only adult in the home.
J.B. testified the defendant touched her in an inappropriate manner. On the
day in question, she had woken up early and gotten out of bed. She saw tj
defendant as she was walking down the hallway and greeted him. As the defendant
walked past her, he grabbed her butt, which she indicated felt intentional because he
squeezed it. After she laid down on the couch in living room, he followed her and
touched her butt again. At that point, she returned to her bedroom because she felt
uncomfortable. J. B. did not believe her mother was home at the time and no one
else was in the room. J. B., who was nine years old when this occurred, did not tell
her mother or grandmother about the incident.
J.B. confirmed that, after her sister' s disclosure in late 2021, she felt less alone
and began telling people the defendant had done inappropriate things to her when
they lived with him. J.B. stated: " I finally had an opportunity to get some kind of
justice eventually." J.B. testified she did not know or see what was happening to her
sister.
felt like people would have thought she was lying or that she was just a kid. She
stated, however, knowing that something happened to both her and her sister made
her feel like she had somebody to fall back on. In 2021, when she came forward
with the disclosure, she was in a mental hospital because she was harming herself.
J.B. denied that she and her siblings were about to be forced to leave Slidell and go
live with their mother. J. B. stated she was honest with the forensic interviewer
concerning what happened when the defendant lived in her home. Her testimony
was consistent with the statements she made during her CAC interview wherein she
indicated the defendant touched her " ass once" and grabbed her butt in the hallway
one morning when she was nine years old. J. B. explained that the text she sent to her grandmother stating she wanted to
move to Tennessee to live with her mother was sent in February 2022, after the
defendant had been arrested. J.B. was asked to clarify her text message: "[ 1] didn' t
sic] really have anything happen to me other than him neglecting ud [ sic]." J. B.
explained that this was texted to her grandmother during a conversation about what
happened to C.B. She clarified that she was telling her grandmother that, in
comparison to • had happened to C. B., • really • bad happened to me."
On cross- examination, J.B. explained that she told her mother that she did not like
the defendant when he first moved in with them, which she believed was before he
J.B.' s testimony and her statements during the CAC interview were
consistent. She stated that the defendant grabbed her butt with his hands and
squeezed it twice. J. B. made independent, consistent, and detailed statements
regarding the defendant' s acts of sexual misconduct, which the jury found credible.
Therefore, the record supports a finding that the State presented evidence at trial to
establish each element of the offense of indecent behavior with juveniles and that
J. B. was under the age of thirteen at the time of the offense, and the defendant, who
was twenty-nine years old, was more than two years older than her. Accordingly,
we find that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
had the specific intent to commit a lewd and lascivious act upon the juvenile victim
and committed an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the
accomplishing of this act.
The defendant argues there are multiple internal contradictions between
C. B.' s statement to CAC and her trial testimony and that C. B. had motive to accuse
the defendant as she was trying to avoid being sent to Tennessee to live with her
mother. He also argued J. B.' s accusations are unbelievable because she did not
accuse the defendant until after C.B. had already done so and " later admitted in a
flu# text exchange that [ the defendant] was only neglectful and not sexually abusive."
He asserts that C.B. and J.B. 's testimony is simply insufficient to support the sexual
battery conviction. The jury watched the CAC interview and, therefore, was aware
of any alleged inconsistencies in C.B.' s trial testimony and still found the defendant
guilty of sexual battery of a victim under the age of thirteen. The arguments raised
by the defendant concern credibility issues. The jury heard all of the testimony and
chose to believe C.B.' s and J.B.' s accounts of the incidents in question.
We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a " thirteenth juror" in
assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. See State v. Mitchell, 99-
3342 ( La. 10/ 17/ 00), 772 So. 2d 78, 83. The fact that the record contains evidence
that conflicts with the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the
evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient. The testimony of the victim alone
is sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. State v. Clouatre, 2012- 0407 (La.
App. I st Cir. 11/ 14/ 12), 110 So.3d 1094, 1100. When a case involves circumstantial
evidence and the trier of fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence
presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless
there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Petitto, 2012-
1670 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 4/ 26/ 13), 116 o. 3d 761, 769, writ denied, 2013- 1183 ( La.
11/ 22/ 13), 126 o. 3d 477.
After a thorough review of the record, we find the evidence supports the jury' s
verdicts. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational
trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of sexual
battery (victim under the age of thirteen years) of C.B., as well as indecent behavior
with ajuvenile, J.B. This assignment of error is without merit.
11 In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in
granting the State' s motion in limine. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine
wherein it moved the trial court to prohibit the defendant from questioning the
victims about whether they have voluntarily or involuntarily engaged in sexual
activities with any person other than the defendant. Specifically, the State noted that
police reports revealed C.B. disclosed in her CAC interview that a juvenile she
identified as H.L. committed sexual battery against her in the summer of 2421. The
defendant filed a response to the motion. At the hearing on the State' s motion,
following argument by the parties, the trial court ordered that the portion of C.B.' s
CAC interview referencing the accusation against H.L. be redacted. In response to
defense counsel' s request for clarification, the trial judge subsequently stated, in
pertinent part: " I think [La. Code Evid. art. 412] applies because ... the passage of
time ... and because there' s no information that would indicate that those statements
were false." The judge also found that the prior accusation was irrelevant.
The defendant argues that the exclusion of any mention of C.B.' s accusation
against H.L. violated of his fundamental right to confrontation. During the CAC
interview, C.B. was questioned whether anyone else had sexually abused her. C. B.
answered that a fourteen -year-old boy, H.L., also grabbed her crotch in an identical
manner as the defendant, The State asserts the trial court properly excluded any
mention of the other accusations against H.L. based upon the conclusion there is no
information that would indicate those statements were false.
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ( 1967). The Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 16 of the Louisiana
Constitution guarantee an accused in a criminal prosecution the right to confront and
cross- examine witnesses. See State v. Trosclair, 584 S4. 2d 270, 275 ( La. App. I!M 12 Cir.), writ denied, 585 So. 2d 575 ( La. 1991). The right to present a defense and to
confront witnesses includes the right of a defendant to attack the credibility of a
witness by examining him or her concerning any matter having a reasonable
tendency to disprove the tnithfulness of his or her testimony. See La. Code Evid.
MOMMM
However, the right of an accused sex offender to present a defense is balanced
against the victim' s interests under La. Code Evid. art. 412 ( the rape shield statute),
which is meant to protect the victim of sexual assault from having her sexual history
made public. See State v. Curtin, 2022- 1110 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 5/ 23), 376 So. 3d
seeks to introduce evidence that the victim made prior false allegations of
molestation, the trial judge must evaluate the evidence presented to determine
whether reasonable jurors could find, based on the evidence presented by the
defendant, that the victim had made prior false accusations and whether all other
requirements of the Code of Evidence have been satisfied. See State v. Smith, 98 -
Two requirements exist before evidence of prior sexual activity can be
admitted for impeachment purposes, assuming this evidence is otherwise admissible.
First, the activity must be of a sexual nature. Second, there must be evidence that
the statement is false. State v. Richard, 2001- 1112 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 15/ 02), 812
So. 2d 737, 739, writ denied, 2002- 1264 ( La. 11/ 22/ 02), 829 So. 2d 103 8. Assuming
this initial burden is met, all other standards for the admissibility of evidence apply.' L
denie , 2007- 2129 (La. 3/ 14/ 08), 977 So.2d 93 0. Thus, constitutional guarantees dl
5 The admissibility of such evidence is still subject to all other standards for admissibility under La. Code Evid. arts. 403, 404, 607, 608, and 613. State v. Bolden, 2021- 283 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 6/ 30/ 21), 325 So. 3d 602, 605.
IN not assure the defendant the right to the admissibility of any type of evidence, but
rather only that which is deemed trustworthy and has probative value. See State v.
are discretion calls for the trial court and should not be overturned absent a clear
abuse of that discretion. State v. Guzman, 2022- 0502 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 11/ 17/ 22),
In Freeman, 970 Sold at 625, this court disagreed with the defendant' s
argument that the mere fact that the trial on the prior allegations resulted in an
acquittal indicated the victim' s allegations were false, noting the fact that another
individual accused of raping the victim was acquitted does not establish that the
accusation against that individual is false. It was further noted that at best, this
evidence proves only that the State failed to meet its burden of proving the offenses
charged. See Freeman, 970 So.2d at 625- 26. This court found that the evidencM
presented at the hearing was not sufficient evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the victim made a prior false accusation of sexual behavior.
Moreover, the trial court stated the evidence was otherwise inadmissible under La.
Code Evid. art. 403, as it was speculative and only minimally relevant, and its
probative value would be greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Freeman,
2111NOW4
Here, the defendant argues it is undisputed the State never charged H.L. with
any crime, which " highly suggests" that the accusation was deemed not credible.
Citing Smith, 743 p. 2d at 202, the defendant alleges as this was a prior false
accusation that C.B. made against someone other than the defendant, he was entitled
to use this false accusation for impeachment purposes. Smith is distinguishable
from the instant case in that the defendant herein has offered no evidence that the
victim ever retracted the prior allegation of sexual misconduct by H.L., and there
was no independent witness to testify that the allegation was false. Based on the
14 foregowe agree that the trial court properly excluded any mention of C.B. 1
accusation against H.L. This assignment of error is without merit.
2111, AL TA I LA M
In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in
denying his motion for new trial based on a Brady 6 violation. Prior to sentencing,
the defendant moved for a new trial on count one based upon several allegations,
including the contention the State intentionally withheld crucial Brady information
that impeded the defendant' s ability to present a complete defense.' Specifically,
the defendant alleged the State intentionally failed to provide additional text
messages between J.B. and her maternal grandmother that directly related to J.B.' s
testimony and contained Brady information. The defendant alleged his counsel only
learned of the existence of additional texts during cross- examination of J.B. The
defendant argued the entire text conversations should have been provided to him
prior to trial under the State' s continuing discovery obligation.
The grounds for a new trial are contained at La. Code Crim. P. art. 851. The
motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that injustice has been done the
defendant, and, unless such is shown to have been the case the motion shall be
denied, no matter upon what allegations it is grounded. La. Code Crim. P. art.
851( A). The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever the
shows prejudicial error, see La. Code Crim. P. art. 851( 13)( 2), or if the court is of the
opinion that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a new trial,
although the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal
right, see La. Code Crim. P. art. 851( 13)( 5).
6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S, Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 ( 1963). The defendant also moved for post -verdict judgment of acquittal on count two, alleging that because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State is insufficient and does not reasonably permita finding of guilt under La. R.S. 14: 81( H)(2). ILI 215 ( 1963), the United States Supreme Court held that suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused after receiving a request for the
evidence violates a defendant' s due process rights where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, without regard to the good or bad faith of the
prosecution. See also Stricklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 194603 144 L.Ed.2d 286 ( 1999). The Brady rule encompasses evidence which impeaches
the testimony of a witness when the reliability or credibility of that witness may
determine guilt or innocence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 i•
I I 11' 11 1
that not every violation of the broad duty of disclosure constitutes a Brady violation.
A prosecutor does not breach any constitutional duty to disclose favorable evidence
unless the " omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the
defendant' s rialit to a fair trial." State v. Bright, 2002- 2793, 2003- 2796 ( La.
S. Ct. 2392124005 49 L.Ed.2d 342 ( 1976)). However, "[ flhe mere possibility that an
item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have
affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ' materiality' in the constitutional
sense." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109- 110, 96 S. Ct. at 2400. Evidence is material only if
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense. A " reasonable
probability" has been interpreted as " a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." State v. Strickland, 94- 0025 ( La. ll/ 1196), 683 So. 2d
M Thus, the reviewing court does not put the withheld evidence to an outcome -
determinative test in which it weighs the probabilities that the petitioner would have
obtained an acquittal at trial or might ®• so at a second trial. Bright, 875 So.2d a 42. Instead, a Brady violation occurs when the " evidentiary suppression
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
Here, the alleged Brady violation arises from a text message conversation
between J.B. and her maternal grandmother. According to the defendant, an excerpt
of the text message exchange was provided by the victims' mother to defense
counsel in February or March 2022, when the victims' mother was still romantically
involved with the defendant. The excerpt in question read as follows:
J.B.: [ 1] wanna [ sic] move r1ly [ sic] badly but apparently its " illegal" for me to go out of her custody during a trial that [ 1] don' t [sic] wanna [ sic] have anything to do with
Nana: Did anything happen with you?
Nana: Ask the detective if it' s illegal
J.B.: [ 1] love you too goodnight and [1] didnt [sic] really have anything happen to me other than him neglecting ud [ sic]
On direct examination, J.B. clarified the context of the text message.' Defense
counsel asked: " And when the State went over these with you, when... [ you] got
here last Friday or whenever, did they ask you to provide the rest of that
conversation?" J.B. responded: " They didn' t ask. But I was able to pull up the
8 See discussion supra.
17 conversation on my phone and give further context on it." J. B. admitted that she
showed the State the full text conversation when they were preparing for trial.
At that time, the defendant did not object to the State' s failure to provide the
additional text messages. Instead, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, the
defendant identified as Brady material the fact that the maternal grandmother
touched C.B. At the hearing on the motion, following argument by the parties, the
trial court indicated defense counsel' s best argument was concerning the text
messages discovered during the course oftrial and, in pertinent part, ruled as follows:
But my understanding of Brady is that it' s got to be something that could have affected the outcome. I don' t believe it would have. I mean, the evidence in this case really relies on the believability and the credibility of the two victims who testified and whether or not the jury believed them or not.
I do find that all the allegations about Mr. Woodside to be a bit of a red herring, which I consider, even if it' s completely true, he wasn' t on trial here. That was a single separate incident unrelated to the allegations against [ the defendant].
And to try to project it all onto Mr. Woodside and not [ the defendant] is maybe somehow the girls made a mistake. I' m just not convinced of it. I' m not convinced it could have made a difference.
And for those brief reasons ... I deny the motion for new trial and also the motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal.
Here, J.B.' s testimony the • • the text messages made clear
that while she was inappropriately touched by the defendant, she felt the sexual
WHO
Her testimony, along with the CAC video wherein she consistently stated the
defendant grabbed her butt is sufficient to overcome any small impeachment value
the defense could have obtained using the text messages. Thus, the absence of the
additional text messages did not undermine the outcome of the trial. Accordingly,
we do not find there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would
have been any different had the defendant had a copy of the text messages in question
18 prior to trial instead of (luring the course of trial. As such, we do not find any
discovery violation by the State. In light of the relevant jurisprudence, and based
upon our review of the entire record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for new trial. See State v. Ruffin, 2016- 0264 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
9/ 20/ 16), 277 So. 3d 319, 325, writ denied, 2016- 1913 ( La. 9/ 15/ 17), 225 o. 3d 483.
This assignment of error is without merit.
In his fourth and final assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court
erroneously permitted the testimony of Dr. Paige Culotta. The trial court accepted
Dr. Culotta as an expert in pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics, ruled that she may
testify in the form of an opinion thereto, and overruled the defense' s general
objection. The defendant asserts Dr. Culotta did not merely testify about general
reasons for delayed disclosures or lack of injuries in child sexual abuse cases. He
contends her testimony exceeded the permissive scope when she opined that both
C.B.' s and J. B.' s disclosures were consistent with sexual abuse. The State argues
this assignment of error is not properly before this court because the defendant failed
to lodge a specific objection on the grounds that Dr. Culotta' s testimony exceedem the scope of her expertise. The State further argues even if this assignment of error
were preserved for review, it lacks merit. Specifically, the defendant points to the
following questioning of Dr. Culotta on direct by the State.
Q. If a child is hospitalized for an unrelated reason ... and if they were asked about child sexual abuse or physical abuse, would
you be surprised they wouldn' t disclose or deny any kind of prior sexual abuse in that environment?
A. I wouldn' t be surprised about that, no.
Even if they had been abused in the past?
A. Correct.
M Culotta, there was no specific objection to the foregoing testimony. A review of the
record does not reveal that the trial court gave defense counsel a continuing objection
to this line of questioning. It is well settled that defense counsel must state the basis
for an objection when it is made, pointing out the specific error to the trial court.
The grounds for objection must be sufficiently brought to the court' s attention to
allow it the opportunity to make the proper ruling and prevent or cure any error. See
La. Code Evid. art. 103( A)( 1); State v. Williams, 20104392 ( La. App. Ist Cir.
2/ 11/ 11), 2011 VVI, 2178767, * 5 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2011- 1028 ( La. 3/ 9/ 12),
ofthe complained -of comments or questions on the basis they were outside the scope
of Dr. Culotta' s expertise, the defendant is procedurally barred from having this
claim reviewed. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841; State v. Duhon, 2018- 0593 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 12/ 28/ 18), 270 So. 3d 597,, 631, writ denied, 2019- 0124 ( La. 5/ 28/ 19),
273 o. 3d 315.
Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920( 2), this court routinely conducts a
review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and
proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023- 0117
La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 3/ 23), 378 So3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024- 00027 ( La.
5/ 21/ 24), 385 So3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one
error. The record reflects the trial court advised the defendant: " Any applications
for post[-] conviction relief pursuant to Art. 930. 8 of the criminal code must be filed
within three years of your sentence becoming final."
A defendant generally has two years after the judgment of conviction and
sentence have become final to seek post -conviction relief. See La. Code Crim. P.
art. 930. 8( A). Thus, the trial court provided incorrect advice regardina tI9
M prescriptive period for seeking post -conviction relief. However, the trial court' s
failure to properly advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not
grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. See State v. LeBoeuf,
2621 ( La. 8/ 15/ 07), 961 So.2d 1158. Accordingly, this error is not reversible, and
Rather, we advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930. 8( A) generally
provides that no application for post -conviction relief, including applications which
seek an out -of t-ime appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years aftl the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of
La. Code Crim. P. art. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1141,
Based on the foregoing, the convictions and sentences of the defendant,
William Eugene Naulty, are affirmed.