Judgment rendered December 17, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,693-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
TERRANCE MALIK DANGERFIELD Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 393,286
Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT Counsel for Appellant SERVICE By: Remy Starns Michael Anthony Mitchell Corrie R. Gallien
TERRANCE MALIK DANGERFIELD Pro Se
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS KODIE K. SMITH CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN Assistant District Attorneys
Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. ROBINSON, J.
Terrance Malik Dangerfield (“Dangerfield”) was indicted by grand
jury on February 15, 2025, on the following four charges:
Count 1: Manslaughter per La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a); Count 2: Manslaughter per La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a); Count 3: Possession of firearm or carrying concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies per La. R.S. 14:95.1; and Count 4: Illegal Carrying of Weapons While in Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance – Second Offense per La. R.S. 14:95(E).
Dangerfield was convicted on all counts after a jury trial held
November 6, 2024. At a hearing on January 23, 2025, the trial court found
Dangerfield guilty of being a fourth felony habitual offender as to Counts 1
and 2, and a third felony habitual offender as to Counts 3 and 4. The trial
court sentenced Dangerfield to a term of life imprisonment each for Count 1
and Count 2; 30 years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence for Count 3; and 40 years without benefits for Count 4. All
sentences were ordered to run consecutively, with credit for time served.
Dangerfield’s trial counsel did not file a motion for reconsideration or
a motion for appeal on his behalf. Dangerfield filed a pro se motion for
appeal, which the trial court initially denied. After writs were taken, this
Court remanded with instructions to treat the appeal as a timely filed post-
conviction relief application requesting an out-of-time appeal. The trial
court granted Dangerfield’s post-conviction relief and motion for appeal.
For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the sentences as
AMENDED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2023, Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) Officer
Aaron Moran (“Officer Moran”) was on patrol when he initiated a traffic stop of a Hyundai vehicle, later determined to be driven by Dangerfield.
Dangerfield failed to pull over and a pursuit ensued, in which Dangerfield
drove in excess of 80 miles per hour. Dangerfield exited Highway 3132,
accelerated and ran the traffic light at the Walker Road intersection, and
collided into the driver’s side of the vehicle driven by Faith Alexander.
Both Faith Alexander and her four-year-old daughter, who was in a car seat
in the rear seat, were transported from the scene to the hospital. Faith
Alexander underwent emergency surgery, but she soon succumbed to her
injuries. Her daughter passed away shortly after arriving at the hospital.
Dangerfield fled the scene into a wooded area, then to a nearby
residence where he called from the resident’s mobile phone for someone to
pick him up. The resident’s phone showed that Dangerfield called his
mother, which was the same number provided by Dangerfield in a later
report. The resident was also able to identify Dangerfield in a lineup, in
which he pointed out distinctive neck tattoos. Dangerfield was ultimately
apprehended on January 11, 2023. Dangerfield’s residence and the Hyundai
were also searched, revealing two handguns and large quantities of
marijuana, which were the basis of Counts 3 and 4. DNA evidence was
obtained affirmatively linking him to the vehicle and handgun.
Dangerfield’s identification as the perpetrator is not disputed.
Dangerfield was convicted as charged of two counts of manslaughter,
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and one count of
illegal carrying of weapons while in possession of a CDS – second offense.
The State filed a habitual offender bill of information on November 7, 2024,
asserting that Dangerfield had the following prior felony convictions:
2 1. Obstruction of Justice, to which he pled guilty on February 20, 2018, in the First Judicial District Court of Caddo, Louisiana in Docket No 345549. He was sentenced to 3 Years Hard Labor.
2. Attempted Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property to which he pled guilty on November 19, 2019, in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court of Bossier, Louisiana in Docket No 219038. He was sentenced to 2 Years Hard Labor Suspended, 2 years Supervised Probation.
3. Illegal Carrying of Weapons While in Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance to which he pled guilty on June 15, 2021, in the First Judicial District Court of Caddo, Louisiana in Docket No 367771. The defendant was sentenced to 5 Years Hard Labor.
The State used Counts 1 and 2 to establish Dangerfield’s fourth felony
conviction and Counts 3 and 4 to establish his third felony conviction.
Dangerfield filed a motion to quash the habitual offender bill on December
27, 2024, which was denied.
The trial court sentenced Dangerfield to life imprisonment at hard
labor for Count 1; life imprisonment at hard labor for Count 2; 30 years
without benefits for Count 3; and 40 years without benefits for Count 4. All
sentences were ordered to run consecutively, with credit for time served.
No motion for reconsideration was filed. Dangerfield’s trial counsel
did not file a motion for appeal on his behalf, but Dangerfield filed a pro se
motion for appeal, which the trial court initially denied. The State filed a
response to Dangerfield’s appeal motion, indicating it had no objection to
Dangerfield filing an out-of-time appeal. On May 14, 2025, this Court
granted Dangerfield’s writ application on the denial of his appeal and
remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to treat the out-of-
time appeal as a timely filed post-conviction relief application requesting an
out-of-time appeal. The trial court granted Dangerfield’s post-conviction
relief and motion for appeal. 3 DISCUSSION
Denial of Motion for Sanity Commission
Defense counsel filed a motion to appoint a sanity commission on
October 30, 2024, approximately one week before trial. The State was not
notified of the filing. No documents were included with the pleading.
According to the State, defense counsel was not present in court when the
matter was called, but he appeared later that morning to present the motion
and submit Dangerfield’s medical records under seal. Defense counsel
explained that he did not file the records with the motion due to HIPAA, but
he felt comfortable filing them in court with his client present. When
presenting the motion, defense counsel informed the trial court that
Dangerfield had difficulty assisting in his own defense, stating in particular:
I was able to show that Mr. Dangerfield has been in and out -- and the only reason we don’t have more documentation of his medical condition is that his mother couldn’t get more because he’s over 18 now, but from 13 to 18 he went to the mental institutions or whatever the proper term is on at least four different occasions, and I’ve been able to give that to the Court.
*** I talked to the client. I talked to the mamma. I talked to everybody to make sure because this thing is as inconvenient for me and my client as it is for the Court because if they find that he’s not competent they are just going to stick him somewhere until they get him competent. So this is not something that I take lightly or anybody should take lightly. It has to be something given the right amount of consideration, but I can’t get into the specifics of our conversations, but after -- when you’re getting ready for trial, the conversations are more frequent and they are longer, and I became concerned about his ability to understand the magnitude or the gravity of the case.
Dangerfield’s motion included the following assertion of mental
incompetency:
Mr. Dangerfield has been charged with Two Counts of Manslaughter. The defense alleges that based on Mr. Dangerfield’s medical history [sic] suggests that he suffers from 4 mental disease, defect or abnormality which precludes him from having the capacity to proceed to trial, to understand the nature of the proceeding against him or to assist his attorney in the defense.
The trial court denied the motion, referring to State v. Lott, 574 So. 2d
417 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 666 (La. 1991), stating
that “the appointment of a sanity commission is not a perfunctory matter or
administerial [sic] duty of the trial court, and it’s not guaranteed in every
case.” It further stated:
Based on everything that I’ve observed - - and, you know, the reports you filed into the record are from 2013 and 2014 where he was admitted because he was homicidal and suicidal because in the eighth grade his girlfriend broke up with him and slept with another guy, that has no bearing on this case. I’ve seen, based on his behavior, nothing to indicate to me that he cannot comprehend the case or assist in his defense, and the Motion to Appoint Sanity Commission is hereby denied.
In State v. Strain, 42,809 (La. App. 2 Cir 12/05/07), 972 So. 2d 1184,
1187, this Court held that:
A person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subject to trial. State v. Nomey, 613 So. 2d 157 (La. 1993). Due process also demands adequate anticipatory, protective procedures to minimize the risk that an incompetent person will be convicted. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1992). Louisiana’s statutory scheme for detecting mental incapacity “jealously guards a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Nomey, supra. Thus, when there is a bona fide question raised regarding a defendant’s capacity, the failure to observe procedures to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial. State ex rel. Seals v. State, 00-2738 (La. 10/25/02), 831 So. 2d 828. Once the determination that a bona fide question has been raised regarding a defendant’s capacity, the failure to resolve the issue of capacity may result in nullification of the conviction and sentence or a nunc pro tunc hearing to determine competency retrospectively. Id. Mental incapacity to proceed exists when, as the result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 641. The defendant’s 5 mental incapacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the defense, the district attorney, or the court. When the question of the defendant’s mental incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be no further steps in the criminal prosecution, except institution of prosecution, until the defendant is found to have the mental capacity to proceed. La. C. Cr. P. art. 642. The court shall order a mental examination of the defendant when it has reasonable ground to doubt the defendant’s mental capacity to proceed. La. C. Cr. P. art. 643.
This Court further discussed the determination of a defendant’s
mental capacity in State v. Gilbert, 55,257 (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/27/23), 372
So. 3d 403, 412, writ denied, 23-01422 (La. 4/3/24), 382 So. 3d 105, as
follows:
“Reasonable ground” refers “to information which, objectively considered, should reasonably raise a doubt about the defendant’s competency and alert the court to the possibility that the defendant can neither understand the proceedings, appreciate the proceedings’ significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense.” State v. Anderson, 06-2987 (La. 9/9/08), 996 So. 2d 973, 992, cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1165, 129 S. Ct. 1906, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (2009). The trial court’s decision regarding a defendant’s competency to stand trial should not turn solely upon whether he suffers from a mental disease or defect but must be made with specific reference to the nature of the charge, the complexity of the case, and the gravity of the decision with which the defendant is faced. A judicial examination of a defendant’s competency focuses primarily on whether he understands the nature of the charge and can appreciate its seriousness. State v. Odenbaugh, 10-0268 (La. 12/6/11), 82 So. 3d 215, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 829, 133 S. Ct. 410, 184 L. Ed. 2d 51 (2012).
The Court goes on to state, “It is not enough that the defense has filed a
motion urging the defense, but there must be sufficient evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt as to such capacity.” Id. at 413.
In its decision in State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529, (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.
2d 877, 892, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S. Ct. 1266, 154 L. Ed. 2d
1089 (2003), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the law as follows:
Simply because a defendant’s capacity to proceed is called into question by formal motion does not mandate a mental examination be ordered and a sanity commission be appointed. 6 La. C. Cr. P. arts. 643, 644; State v. Goins, 568 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 573 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (La. 1991). Appointing a sanity commission is neither a perfunctory matter nor a ministerial duty of the trial court; it is not guaranteed to every accused in every case. State v. Lott, 574 So. 2d 417, 424 (La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 666 (La. 1991). Given the presumption of sanity, before the court is required to appoint a sanity commission, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that reasonable grounds exist to doubt his mental capacity to proceed. State v. Bickham, 404 So. 2d 929, 934 (La. 1981); Goins, supra. A reviewing court owes the trial court’s determination on these matters great weight, and the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Bickham, supra.
The motion to appoint a sanity commission refers to Dangerfield’s
medical records and includes the basic assertion that he suffers from a
mental condition which precludes him from having the capacity to proceed
at trial. Defense counsel stated during the hearing on the motion that he was
concerned about Dangerfield’s ability to understand the magnitude of the
case. However, defense counsel did not elaborate upon the reasoning for his
concern.
It is apparent that the trial court reviewed the medical records, but
they were not included in the appellate record for review. Nonetheless, we
would point out several instances that would bolster the trial court’s
determination that Dangerfield was competent to stand trial. There was
nothing in the record other than defense counsel’s assertions that would
indicate Dangerfield did not understand the proceedings. As shown in
previous court transcripts, Dangerfield was actually actively engaged in the
proceedings such that it was evident he was well versed in legal processes.
Following trial, Dangerfield filed pro se pleadings. Notably, all of the
instances took place after Dangerfield had been admitted into the institutions
as supposedly was shown in the medical records. In addition, the
7 circumstances of the traffic stop itself and resulting fleeing from authorities
indicated that Dangerfield was aware that there would be consequences
resulting from having firearms and drugs in his vehicle.
The trial court observed Dangerfield’s behavior in court and noted
there was nothing to indicate that he lacked capacity to understand the
proceedings or assist in his defense. It also found that the medical records
from years before concerning a teenage breakup had no bearing on
Dangerfield’s mental competency to proceed to trial. Especially given the
presumption of sanity, Dangerfield failed to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that reasonable grounds existed to doubt his mental capacity to
proceed to trial. The decision to grant or deny a motion to appoint a sanity
commission is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Odenbaugh,
supra; Gilbert, supra. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Constitutionally Excessive Sentence
Dangerfield attempts to make certain arguments regarding mitigating
factors for his sentence such as his youth, as well as the circumstances of his
prior convictions used in the State’s habitual offender bill. However, as the
State points out, no motion to reconsider sentence was filed. The failure to
file a motion to reconsider sentence relegates sentencing review to
constitutional excessiveness. La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1(E); State v. Parker,
54,947 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 358 So. 3d 220, writ denied, 23-00417 (La.
10/3/23), 370 So. 3d 1073; State v. Nabors, 53,357 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/22/20), 295 So. 3d 974, writ denied, 20-00709 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So. 3d
527. Therefore, arguments concerning mitigating factors allegedly not
considered are not properly before this Court, and the only issue for review
is that of the constitutional excessiveness of Dangerfield’s sentence. 8 A sentence that is grossly out of proportion to the serious of the
offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain
and suffering is constitutionally excessive in violation of La. Const. art. I,
§20. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Jackson, 52,606
(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1217, writs denied 19-00699 (La.
10/15/19), 280 So. 3d 560 and 19-00797 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So. 3d 1056. A
grossly disproportionate sentence is one, which viewed in light of the harm
done to society, shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La.
1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; Jackson, supra. The reviewing court considers
only whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether some other sentence may have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043,
117 S. Ct. 615, 136 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1996).
Dangerfield urges that his age, lack of maturity, and the context of the
prior convictions establish that consecutive life sentences are grossly
disproportionate, and that a constitutionally proportionate sentence imposed
on someone his age must allow for growth, development, and rehabilitation.
He argues that this Court should weigh these factors together and find that
his sentence is unconstitutionally excessive and nothing more than the
purposeless imposition of pain and suffering.
The trial court noted that the evidence proved Dangerfield fled from
police, failed to stop at an intersection, ran a red light, and slammed into the
side of the vehicle, killing Faith Alexander and her four-year-old daughter.
He then fled the scene, and a search of his vehicle uncovered two Glock
handguns and 1.8 pounds of marijuana. It reasoned that someone speeding
who ran a red light while fleeing police would surely contemplate that his 9 actions could cause or threaten serious harm. The trial court further pointed
out that Dangerfield was on parole at the time of these offenses.
The trial court explained the sentencing ranges for the convicted
offenses. For the manslaughter of Faith Alexander, the range was
imprisonment at hard labor for not more than 40 years. For the
manslaughter of her four-year-old daughter (a person under the age of ten
years), the range was imprisonment at hard labor and without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for not less than 10 nor more
than 40 years. For Count 3, the offense carried a sentence of not less than
five nor more than 20 years at hard labor without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence, and be fined not less than $1,000 nor
more than $5,000. Count 4 carried a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor
for not less than 20 nor more than 30 years without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. However, as a fourth felony offender
for Counts 1 and 2, the sentences are 40 years to life. As a third felony
offender for Count 3, the sentence is 10 to 40 years without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. As a third felony offender for
Count 4, the sentence is 20 to 60 years without the benefit of probation,
parole, or suspension of sentence.
Dangerfield is a repeat offender as shown by his adjudication as a
third and fourth felony offender. He has had ample opportunity for
rehabilitation, but he has chosen not to do so. Even while on parole, he
possessed both firearms and drugs and fled police to avoid being caught with
them. He dangerously drove at excessive speeds and ran a red light, which
resulted in the death of a young mother and her young child. He continued
10 to avoid accountability by fleeing the scene on foot instead of showing any
concern for the welfare of the victims.
The consecutive life sentences for the manslaughter convictions of
Faith Alexander and her daughter were appropriate in light of the
circumstances. The sentences imposed for the two firearm offenses were
midrange. For a habitual offender who showed complete disregard for the
lives of others in order to continue his pattern of committing crimes, the
consecutive sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
offenses or shocking to the sense of justice, and they are not purposeless and
needless inflictions of pain and suffering. The sentences imposed are not
constitutionally excessive, and the trial court did not abuse its sentencing
discretion.
Error Patent Review
Although the trial court correctly referred to the sentencing provisions
for each offense during its explanation of the sentencing ranges, when the
court pronounced Dangerfield’s sentence, it failed to specify that the
sentences were at hard labor as provided in each statute. The minutes of
court reflect that the sentences are to be served at hard labor. The trial
court’s oversight in failing to state whether Dangerfield’s sentences were to
be served at hard labor renders the sentences illegally lenient. State v.
Shannon, 55,697 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/17/24), 399 So. 3d 52, writ denied, 24-
00987 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So. 3d 70; State v. Martinez, 52,882 (La. App. 2
Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 3d 467; State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/22/19), 272 So. 3d 999, writ denied, 19-01045 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So. 3d
61. However, because the statutes for all Dangerfield’s convicted offenses
require the sentences to be served at hard labor, the error is self-correcting. 11 Id. Consequently, all of Dangerfield’s sentences shall be served
at hard labor.
Further, La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A) provides that an illegal sentence may
be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an
appellate court on review. As such, any commitment order should be
corrected to reflect that Dangerfield’s sentences are at hard labor.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated hereinabove, Dangerfield’s sentences are
hereby AFFIRMED as AMENDED to reflect that each are to be served at
hard labor.