STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-K-0389
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL SANTANA WOOLENS, ET AL. * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 555-235, SECTION “E” Judge Rhonda Goode-Douglas ****** Judge Dale N. Atkins ****** (Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Rachael D. Johnson)
Mary Ella W. Simmons Orleans Public Defenders 2601 Tulane Avenue, Suite 700 New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, Santana Woolens
WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED AUGUST 9, 2024 DNA
DLD
RDJ
Relator, Santana Woolens (“Mr. Woolens”), seeks review of the district
court’s May 30, 2024 ruling, which denied his Motion to Sever. For the following
reasons, we grant Mr. Woolens’ writ application but deny relief.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 18, 2022, the State of Louisiana (“State”) charged Mr. Woolens
and Toshiba Ancar (“Ms. Ancar”) by bill of information with one count of armed
robbery with a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3, and three counts of
second-degree kidnapping, in violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1. At his August 25,
2022 arraignment, Mr. Woolens pled not guilty to these charges. On December 8,
2022, Ms. Ancar also pled not guilty.
During a probable cause hearing in this matter, the district court heard
testimony from Detective Roshain Mitchell (“Detective Mitchell”), who stated that
he worked with the New Orleans Police Department’s Sixth District Violent
Crimes Unit. Detective Mitchell explained that on June 19, 2022, he was
dispatched to an armed robbery that occurred at Surrey’s Café on Magazine Street,
and he interviewed several witnesses and victims. According to Detective Mitchell,
he learned that at approximately 3:20 p.m., the employees of Surrey’s Café were
1 counting the money earned that day when “a male subject . . . entered the rear
office armed with a firearm and wearing a ski mask,” while “demanding money.”
Detective Mitchell explained that after speaking with the employees who were the
victims of the crime (hereinafter “victims”), he obtained surveillance footage from
the area that demonstrated:
a red or maroon Nissan Murano travel up Euterpe Street from Coliseum Street. It parked in the 1000 block of Euterpe Street near the intersection of Magazine Street. A male subject was observed exiting the driver’s side of that vehicle. And . . . throughout the course of the video, he kept going back and forth from the vehicle towards the restaurant.
Detective Mitchell testified that he subsequently presented a picture of the vehicle
from the surveillance footage to the victims and asked if they recognized the
vehicle. Per Detective Mitchell, they responded that the vehicle belonged to Ms.
Ancar and Mr. Woolens who were employees of Surrey’s Café. Detective Mitchell
testified that when officers subsequently questioned Mr. Woolens, he “stated he
clocked out at 2:25 p.m. that day. He stated he took the bus home and that Ms.
Ancar was the one that was in possession of the vehicle.” By contrast, according to
Detective Mitchell, Ms. Ancar informed officers that “Mr. Woolens was the one
that was in possession of the vehicle” that day. Further, Detective Mitchell testified
that Ms. Ancar reported “[t]hat just before Mr. Woolens committed the robbery, he
had asked her to clock him out,” which she did.
On May 14, 2024 Mr. Woolens filed a “Motion to Sever Defendants”
(“Motion to Sever”).1 Therein, he stated: “According to the police report, Ms.
Ancar allegedly told officers that Mr. Woolens had possession of their car on the
date of the robbery, which was allegedly used in the robbery.” Mr. Woolens
1 Ms. Ancar also filed a Motion to Sever.
2 contended that trial of Mr. Woolens and Ms. Ancar together would violate his
confrontation clause and due process rights.
On May 30, 2024, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Woolens’ Motion
to Sever. In pertinent part, counsel for Ms. Ancar stated that his “defense for [his]
client [was] going to be antagonistic towards the other side,” and that in his
opening and closing statements he would state that Mr. Woolens committed the
armed robbery. However, counsel for Ms. Ancar also stated that he had not
decided if Ms. Ancar would take the witness stand. In response, counsel for Mr.
Woolens argued that “[a]ny of those statements would obviously be extremely
prejudicial to [Mr. Woolens]” and “put him in the position of . . . battling . . . the
[S]tate and his codefendant.” The district court denied Mr. Woolens’ Motion to
Sever “because there has not been a substantial showing that the defenses are
antagonistic.” Thereafter, Mr. Woolens noticed his intent to seek supervisory
review and timely filed his writ application with this Court.
DISCUSSION
Regarding severance, La. C.Cr.P. art. 704 provides:
Jointly indicted defendants shall be tried jointly unless:
(1) The state elects to try them separately; or
(2) The Court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a severance.
“[A] policy consideration implicit in [La. C.Cr.P. art.] 704 situations is the
reasonableness of presenting the entire case at one time.” State v. Williams, 416
So.2d 914, 916 (La. 1982). That is, “[p]iecemeal litigation is not sanctioned by the
courts and, where the same witnesses would be called to testify, judicial economy
dictates that there be one trial.” State v. Hicks, 2017-696, p. 15 (La. App. 5 Cir.
3 10/17/18), 258 So.3d 1039, 1050 (citing State v. Williams, 2016-417, p. 35 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 8/30/17), 227 So.3d 371, 395). Further, “[j]oinder expedites the
administration of justice, reduces the congestion of the trial dockets, conserves
judicial time, lessens the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and
money to serve on juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who
would otherwise be called upon to testify only once.” State v. Duckett, 2012-578,
p. 15 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13), 119 So.3d 168, 177 (quoting State v. Bradford, 367
So. 2d 745, 747 (La. 1978)). But, as this Court has explained, “[a] severance is
necessary if the defenses of the co-defendants are mutually antagonistic to the
extent that one co-defendant attempts to blame the other causing each defendant to
defend against his co-defendant and the state.” State v. Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 19
(La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So.3d 289, 303 (quoting State v. Everett, 2011-0714,
p. 33 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 605, 629). “Severance is not required,”
however, if “neither defendant attempts to introduce evidence of [the] other’s guilt,
or to place blame on the other, and neither [has] to convict the other to go free, so
that neither [is] in the position of having to do battle with both the State and his
codefendant.” State v. Banks, 2000-0525, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/17/01), 800
So.2d 28, 35 (citation omitted).
“Whether justice requires severance must be determined by the facts of each
case.” Id. A defendant who seeks a severance must “show by convincing evidence
that a severance is . . . required.” Id. The decision whether to grant a severance is
within the sound discretion of the district court. Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 20, 165
So.3d at 303. Accordingly, an appellate court will not reverse the district court’s
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STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-K-0389
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL SANTANA WOOLENS, ET AL. * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 555-235, SECTION “E” Judge Rhonda Goode-Douglas ****** Judge Dale N. Atkins ****** (Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Rachael D. Johnson)
Mary Ella W. Simmons Orleans Public Defenders 2601 Tulane Avenue, Suite 700 New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, Santana Woolens
WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED AUGUST 9, 2024 DNA
DLD
RDJ
Relator, Santana Woolens (“Mr. Woolens”), seeks review of the district
court’s May 30, 2024 ruling, which denied his Motion to Sever. For the following
reasons, we grant Mr. Woolens’ writ application but deny relief.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 18, 2022, the State of Louisiana (“State”) charged Mr. Woolens
and Toshiba Ancar (“Ms. Ancar”) by bill of information with one count of armed
robbery with a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3, and three counts of
second-degree kidnapping, in violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1. At his August 25,
2022 arraignment, Mr. Woolens pled not guilty to these charges. On December 8,
2022, Ms. Ancar also pled not guilty.
During a probable cause hearing in this matter, the district court heard
testimony from Detective Roshain Mitchell (“Detective Mitchell”), who stated that
he worked with the New Orleans Police Department’s Sixth District Violent
Crimes Unit. Detective Mitchell explained that on June 19, 2022, he was
dispatched to an armed robbery that occurred at Surrey’s Café on Magazine Street,
and he interviewed several witnesses and victims. According to Detective Mitchell,
he learned that at approximately 3:20 p.m., the employees of Surrey’s Café were
1 counting the money earned that day when “a male subject . . . entered the rear
office armed with a firearm and wearing a ski mask,” while “demanding money.”
Detective Mitchell explained that after speaking with the employees who were the
victims of the crime (hereinafter “victims”), he obtained surveillance footage from
the area that demonstrated:
a red or maroon Nissan Murano travel up Euterpe Street from Coliseum Street. It parked in the 1000 block of Euterpe Street near the intersection of Magazine Street. A male subject was observed exiting the driver’s side of that vehicle. And . . . throughout the course of the video, he kept going back and forth from the vehicle towards the restaurant.
Detective Mitchell testified that he subsequently presented a picture of the vehicle
from the surveillance footage to the victims and asked if they recognized the
vehicle. Per Detective Mitchell, they responded that the vehicle belonged to Ms.
Ancar and Mr. Woolens who were employees of Surrey’s Café. Detective Mitchell
testified that when officers subsequently questioned Mr. Woolens, he “stated he
clocked out at 2:25 p.m. that day. He stated he took the bus home and that Ms.
Ancar was the one that was in possession of the vehicle.” By contrast, according to
Detective Mitchell, Ms. Ancar informed officers that “Mr. Woolens was the one
that was in possession of the vehicle” that day. Further, Detective Mitchell testified
that Ms. Ancar reported “[t]hat just before Mr. Woolens committed the robbery, he
had asked her to clock him out,” which she did.
On May 14, 2024 Mr. Woolens filed a “Motion to Sever Defendants”
(“Motion to Sever”).1 Therein, he stated: “According to the police report, Ms.
Ancar allegedly told officers that Mr. Woolens had possession of their car on the
date of the robbery, which was allegedly used in the robbery.” Mr. Woolens
1 Ms. Ancar also filed a Motion to Sever.
2 contended that trial of Mr. Woolens and Ms. Ancar together would violate his
confrontation clause and due process rights.
On May 30, 2024, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Woolens’ Motion
to Sever. In pertinent part, counsel for Ms. Ancar stated that his “defense for [his]
client [was] going to be antagonistic towards the other side,” and that in his
opening and closing statements he would state that Mr. Woolens committed the
armed robbery. However, counsel for Ms. Ancar also stated that he had not
decided if Ms. Ancar would take the witness stand. In response, counsel for Mr.
Woolens argued that “[a]ny of those statements would obviously be extremely
prejudicial to [Mr. Woolens]” and “put him in the position of . . . battling . . . the
[S]tate and his codefendant.” The district court denied Mr. Woolens’ Motion to
Sever “because there has not been a substantial showing that the defenses are
antagonistic.” Thereafter, Mr. Woolens noticed his intent to seek supervisory
review and timely filed his writ application with this Court.
DISCUSSION
Regarding severance, La. C.Cr.P. art. 704 provides:
Jointly indicted defendants shall be tried jointly unless:
(1) The state elects to try them separately; or
(2) The Court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a severance.
“[A] policy consideration implicit in [La. C.Cr.P. art.] 704 situations is the
reasonableness of presenting the entire case at one time.” State v. Williams, 416
So.2d 914, 916 (La. 1982). That is, “[p]iecemeal litigation is not sanctioned by the
courts and, where the same witnesses would be called to testify, judicial economy
dictates that there be one trial.” State v. Hicks, 2017-696, p. 15 (La. App. 5 Cir.
3 10/17/18), 258 So.3d 1039, 1050 (citing State v. Williams, 2016-417, p. 35 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 8/30/17), 227 So.3d 371, 395). Further, “[j]oinder expedites the
administration of justice, reduces the congestion of the trial dockets, conserves
judicial time, lessens the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and
money to serve on juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who
would otherwise be called upon to testify only once.” State v. Duckett, 2012-578,
p. 15 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13), 119 So.3d 168, 177 (quoting State v. Bradford, 367
So. 2d 745, 747 (La. 1978)). But, as this Court has explained, “[a] severance is
necessary if the defenses of the co-defendants are mutually antagonistic to the
extent that one co-defendant attempts to blame the other causing each defendant to
defend against his co-defendant and the state.” State v. Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 19
(La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So.3d 289, 303 (quoting State v. Everett, 2011-0714,
p. 33 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 605, 629). “Severance is not required,”
however, if “neither defendant attempts to introduce evidence of [the] other’s guilt,
or to place blame on the other, and neither [has] to convict the other to go free, so
that neither [is] in the position of having to do battle with both the State and his
codefendant.” State v. Banks, 2000-0525, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/17/01), 800
So.2d 28, 35 (citation omitted).
“Whether justice requires severance must be determined by the facts of each
case.” Id. A defendant who seeks a severance must “show by convincing evidence
that a severance is . . . required.” Id. The decision whether to grant a severance is
within the sound discretion of the district court. Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 20, 165
So.3d at 303. Accordingly, an appellate court will not reverse the district court’s
decision unless the district court abused its discretion. Id. See also Banks, 2000-
0525, p. 10, 800 So.2d at 35 (citing State v. August, 1996-2777, p. 7 (La. App. 4
4 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So.2d 536, 541). In State v. Craddock, the Louisiana Supreme
Court explained that it has “jurisprudentially developed the ‘antagonistic defense’
standard as a means of testing the [district] court’s exercise of its discretion.”
2023-01147, pp. 1-2 (La. 11/15/23), 373 So. 3d 47, 47-48 (first citing State v.
Lavigne, 412 So.2d 993, 996-97 (La. 1982); then citing State v. Thibodeaux, 315
So.2d 769, 770 (La. 1975); and then citing State v. McGraw, 366 So.2d 1278 (La.
1978). Under the antagonistic defense test, the district court abuses its discretion in
not granting a motion for severance if the district court is aware that one
“defendant intends to lay blame for the offense at the feet of a co-defendant.” Id.
(first citing State v. Webb, 424 So. 2d 233, 236 (La. 1982); and then citing Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1628, 20 L.E.2d 476 (1968)).
The evidence presented at the probable cause hearing reflected that Ms.
Ancar reported to law enforcement that Mr. Woolens alone had use of their shared
vehicle during the period in which the armed robbery occurred. She also claimed
that Mr. Woolens asked her to clock him out just before he committed the armed
robbery. These statements implicate Mr. Woolens as the likely perpetrator of the
armed robbery and kidnappings; but, at the hearing on Mr. Woolens’ Motion to
Sever, counsel for Ms. Ancar stated that he had not yet made the decision whether
Ms. Ancar would testify. In light of the fact that counsel for Ms. Ancar had not yet
made this decision, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Mr. Woolens’ Motion to Sever. However, we hold that if the State
chooses to proceed with a joint trial, it cannot introduce Ms. Ancar’s statements
which implicate Mr. Woolens unless Ms. Ancar testifies at trial. That is, if Ms.
Ancar testifies in a joint trial at which the State uses her statements, Mr. Woolens
will have the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Ancar, thereby upholding his
5 confrontation and due process rights under United States and Louisiana
Constitutions.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we grant Mr. Woolens’ writ application but deny
relief at this juncture. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its May 30,
2024 ruling denying Mr. Woolens’ Motion to Sever because Ms. Ancar’s counsel
has not yet made the decision as to whether she will testify if the State proceeds
with a joint trial.
WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED