Judgment rendered December 17, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,697-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
RAPHEAL CLARK Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 399,096
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant By: Remy V. Starns Michael A. Mitchell Caitlin Fowlkes
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
ASHLIN N. THOMAS ERIC M. WHITEHEAD Assistant District Attorneys
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.
Rapheal Clark pled guilty to theft of merchandise valued between
$1,000 and $5,000. Clark was also on parole for a felon in possession of a
firearm conviction, and the plea was made with the understanding the state
would not file a habitual offender bill, but no agreement was made regarding
sentencing. The trial court ultimately sentenced Clark to serve four years at
hard labor, consecutive to any other sentence, which Clark now appeals as
being constitutionally excessive. Finding no merit to this argument, we
affirm.
FACTS
Clark pled guilty as charged to theft of merchandise after he and a
codefendant, Ashtari Draper, stole three backpack leaf blowers, a chainsaw,
and a generator, valued collectively at $3,655, from Lowe’s in Shreveport on
November 9, 2023. Clark elected to revoke his parole prior to sentencing.1
At sentencing, defense counsel provided the trial court with information
about Clark’s sickle cell anemia diagnosis and his contention he failed to
receive proper medical treatment while incarcerated. Counsel also informed
the trial court about Clark’s strong family ties to the area, which included his
mother, two sisters, two children, and a grandchild born while Clark was
incarcerated pending trial. Finally, Clark’s educational background and
work history were discussed, as well as his role in the theft from Lowe’s.
Clark expressed remorse for his crimes.
The trial court found an undue risk that Clark would commit another
crime if he received a suspended sentence, and any lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of the underlying offense. Clark’s fairly extensive
criminal history was noted, which included: a conviction in Caddo Parish for aggravated battery in 2012; Texas convictions for attempted unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony possession of a
controlled dangerous substance in 2017; a Texas conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 2018; and convictions in
Caddo Parish for felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent
to distribute a schedule II controlled dangerous substance in 2021; the
instant theft was Clark’s seventh felony conviction. The trial court also
noted Clark had been on parole for only about six months at the time he
committed the theft. The sole mitigating factor found applicable was
Clark’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily harm. Clark
was sentenced to serve four years at hard labor, consecutive to any other
sentence, with credit for time served.
Clark filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing it was excessive
and in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
Clark makes several arguments in support of why he believes his
sentence is excessive and should be set aside. He first argues the trial court
did not adhere to the requirements set out in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 when it
failed to consider as mitigating factors his significant medical condition
(sickle cell anemia), his lack of access to necessary healthcare for that
condition (he contends no medication or treatment has been rendered for his
sickle cell anemia since his initial incarceration), his ties to the community,
and family obligations. Clark points out his sentence is harsher than his
codefendant, Draper, who Clark believes was more culpable in the theft 2 from Lowe’s. Clark contends near-maximum sentences are reserved for the
worst offenders, which he cannot be because his conduct did not endanger
anyone’s safety, and he argues his conduct is unlikely to reoccur because it
was an isolated incident. Clark also claims the four-year sentence violates
the Constitution because it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of
the offense.
The state first argues Clark failed to raise the claims of lack of
compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 with sufficient specificity in his
motion to reconsider sentence and, therefore, his right to make those claims
on appeal was not preserved. As such, the state argues this court’s
consideration of Clark’s appeal of his sentence is limited to bare
constitutional excessiveness.
In the alternative, the state argues the record clearly shows the trial
court complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and specifically tailored its
sentence to Clark. The state points to Clark’s criminal history, which
includes previous convictions for aggravated battery, felony drug
possession, and felon in possession of a firearm. The state contends the
four-year sentence is especially appropriate in this case as Clark’s previous
unsuccessful attempts at probation in no way deterred his continued
participation in criminal endeavors, and asks us to affirm.
Appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-pronged
inquiry. State v. Caldwell, 56,269 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), 411 So. 3d 934,
citing State v. Benavides, 54,265 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 336 So. 3d
114. First, the record must show that the court complied with La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1. The court need not list every aggravating or mitigating factor so
long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines. Id. 3 No sentencing factor is accorded greater weight by statute than any other
factor. Id.
The second prong is constitutional excessiveness. A sentence violates
La. Const. art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of
the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering. Id. A sentence is deemed grossly disproportionate if,
when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to
society, it shocks the sense of justice or makes no reasonable contribution to
acceptable penal goals. Id.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). A trial judge is in the best
position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a
particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State
v. Williams, 56,184 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 409 So. 3d 306, writ denied,
25-00372 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So. 3d 218, citing State v. Bell, 53,712 (La.
App. 2 Cir.
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Judgment rendered December 17, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,697-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
RAPHEAL CLARK Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 399,096
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant By: Remy V. Starns Michael A. Mitchell Caitlin Fowlkes
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
ASHLIN N. THOMAS ERIC M. WHITEHEAD Assistant District Attorneys
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.
Rapheal Clark pled guilty to theft of merchandise valued between
$1,000 and $5,000. Clark was also on parole for a felon in possession of a
firearm conviction, and the plea was made with the understanding the state
would not file a habitual offender bill, but no agreement was made regarding
sentencing. The trial court ultimately sentenced Clark to serve four years at
hard labor, consecutive to any other sentence, which Clark now appeals as
being constitutionally excessive. Finding no merit to this argument, we
affirm.
FACTS
Clark pled guilty as charged to theft of merchandise after he and a
codefendant, Ashtari Draper, stole three backpack leaf blowers, a chainsaw,
and a generator, valued collectively at $3,655, from Lowe’s in Shreveport on
November 9, 2023. Clark elected to revoke his parole prior to sentencing.1
At sentencing, defense counsel provided the trial court with information
about Clark’s sickle cell anemia diagnosis and his contention he failed to
receive proper medical treatment while incarcerated. Counsel also informed
the trial court about Clark’s strong family ties to the area, which included his
mother, two sisters, two children, and a grandchild born while Clark was
incarcerated pending trial. Finally, Clark’s educational background and
work history were discussed, as well as his role in the theft from Lowe’s.
Clark expressed remorse for his crimes.
The trial court found an undue risk that Clark would commit another
crime if he received a suspended sentence, and any lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of the underlying offense. Clark’s fairly extensive
criminal history was noted, which included: a conviction in Caddo Parish for aggravated battery in 2012; Texas convictions for attempted unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony possession of a
controlled dangerous substance in 2017; a Texas conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 2018; and convictions in
Caddo Parish for felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent
to distribute a schedule II controlled dangerous substance in 2021; the
instant theft was Clark’s seventh felony conviction. The trial court also
noted Clark had been on parole for only about six months at the time he
committed the theft. The sole mitigating factor found applicable was
Clark’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily harm. Clark
was sentenced to serve four years at hard labor, consecutive to any other
sentence, with credit for time served.
Clark filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing it was excessive
and in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
Clark makes several arguments in support of why he believes his
sentence is excessive and should be set aside. He first argues the trial court
did not adhere to the requirements set out in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 when it
failed to consider as mitigating factors his significant medical condition
(sickle cell anemia), his lack of access to necessary healthcare for that
condition (he contends no medication or treatment has been rendered for his
sickle cell anemia since his initial incarceration), his ties to the community,
and family obligations. Clark points out his sentence is harsher than his
codefendant, Draper, who Clark believes was more culpable in the theft 2 from Lowe’s. Clark contends near-maximum sentences are reserved for the
worst offenders, which he cannot be because his conduct did not endanger
anyone’s safety, and he argues his conduct is unlikely to reoccur because it
was an isolated incident. Clark also claims the four-year sentence violates
the Constitution because it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of
the offense.
The state first argues Clark failed to raise the claims of lack of
compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 with sufficient specificity in his
motion to reconsider sentence and, therefore, his right to make those claims
on appeal was not preserved. As such, the state argues this court’s
consideration of Clark’s appeal of his sentence is limited to bare
constitutional excessiveness.
In the alternative, the state argues the record clearly shows the trial
court complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and specifically tailored its
sentence to Clark. The state points to Clark’s criminal history, which
includes previous convictions for aggravated battery, felony drug
possession, and felon in possession of a firearm. The state contends the
four-year sentence is especially appropriate in this case as Clark’s previous
unsuccessful attempts at probation in no way deterred his continued
participation in criminal endeavors, and asks us to affirm.
Appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-pronged
inquiry. State v. Caldwell, 56,269 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), 411 So. 3d 934,
citing State v. Benavides, 54,265 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 336 So. 3d
114. First, the record must show that the court complied with La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1. The court need not list every aggravating or mitigating factor so
long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines. Id. 3 No sentencing factor is accorded greater weight by statute than any other
factor. Id.
The second prong is constitutional excessiveness. A sentence violates
La. Const. art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of
the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering. Id. A sentence is deemed grossly disproportionate if,
when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to
society, it shocks the sense of justice or makes no reasonable contribution to
acceptable penal goals. Id.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). A trial judge is in the best
position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a
particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State
v. Williams, 56,184 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 409 So. 3d 306, writ denied,
25-00372 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So. 3d 218, citing State v. Bell, 53,712 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307. On review, an appellate court does not
determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate but
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La.
12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7, citing State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.
2d 957. As a general rule, maximum or near sentences are reserved for the
worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La.
2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Williams, supra.
Theft is defined as the misappropriation or taking of anything of value
which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the 4 misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or
representations; an intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may
be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential. La. R.S.
14:67(A). When the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value of
$1,000 or more, but less than a value of $5,000, the offender shall be
imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or may
be fined not more than $3,000, or both. La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3).
Clark did not specifically describe the trial court’s lack of compliance
with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 in his motion to reconsider sentence and may
have failed to preserve any claims beyond bare constitutional
excessiveness. Even if this minimal articulation was sufficient to preserve
the issue, there is no support in the record for Clark’s claim the trial court
failed to adequately consider the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth
in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. While the court did not walk through each factor
individually, it is not required to as long as it is clear the factors were fully
considered. The sentencing transcript reflects Clark’s presentation of
mitigating evidence, including information regarding his medical condition
and ties to the community, which supports the state’s contention the trial
court was aware of these factors and took them into consideration when
imposing sentence. We find Clark failed to satisfy the first prong of the test
for excessiveness.
The second prong requires this court to determine if the sentence
imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion because it is grossly out of
proportion with the underlying offense. We cannot say the trial court’s
imposition of a four-year sentence, which is less than the maximum allowed
by statute, shocks the sense of justice in this case. Clark was on felony 5 parole for felon in possession of a firearm when he chose to commit the
underlying crime, his criminal history is extensive including multiple felony
convictions, and there is no indication probationary treatment has effectively
deterred him from criminal behavior when offered previously. For these
reasons, we do not find the sentence imposed is constitutionally
excessive.
CONCLUSION
Rapheal Clark’s four-year sentence for theft of merchandise, with a
value of more than $1,000 and less than $5,000, is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.