State of Louisiana v. Michael Charles Magdaleno

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 1, 2003
• Docket: KA-0003-0618
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 03-618

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MICHAEL CHARLES MAGDALENO

**********

APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 263,233 HONORABLE THOMAS MARTIN YEAGER, DISTRICT JUDGE

MARC T. AMY JUDGE

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Marc T. Amy, and Glenn B. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

James C. Downs District Attorney Loren M. Lampert Assistant District Attorney 9th Judicial District Court Post Office Drawer 1472 Alexandria, LA 71309 (318) 473-6650 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana Paula Corley Marx Louisiana Appellate Project Post Office Box 80006 Lafayette, LA 70598-0006 (337) 991-9757 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Michael Charles Magdaleno

Michael Charles Magdaleno Pro Se 1506 Marilyn Drive Alexandria, LA 71303 AMY, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. A sentence of three

years at hard labor was imposed, with boot camp recommended. The defendant

appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On or about April 23, 2001, Detectives Reginald Cooper and James Fields of

the Alexandria Police Department, Metro Narcotics division, arrested the defendant

and another man, Christopher Ducote, for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

The detectives had received a tip that suspected drug activity was taking place at a

hotel where the defendant and Ducote had rented a room. When the defendant and

Ducote returned to the hotel after a night out, the detectives, who had been

conducting surveillance, approached and presented the defendant with a consent-to-

search form for the room, which defendant read and signed. Upon entry, the

detectives saw a small bag of cocaine on a table. Larger bags of cocaine were

discovered under the mattresses of each of the room’s two beds. In addition, baggies,

a scale, and scissors were found. A total of twenty-two grams of cocaine was seized

from the room, and a smaller quantity was seized from Ducote’s person.

The defendant and Christopher Ducote were charged by the same bill of

information with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous

substance, Schedule II, cocaine, in an amount less than twenty-eight grams, in

violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). Ducote pled guilty to possession of cocaine, a

violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C), in exchange for three years’ probation and a five

hundred dollar fine. A jury trial was held in the matter with respect to the defendant

in January, 2003. The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense

of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, Schedule II, cocaine, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C). The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve three years at

hard labor and recommended boot camp.

The defendant appeals his conviction, asserting in his sole assignment of error

that the jury verdict fails to meet the legal standard of sufficiency of evidence to

convict him of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, Schedule II, cocaine.

Discussion

Errors Patent

Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, this court reviews all appeals for errors

patent on the face of the record. We find no such errors.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant argues that the verdict convicting him of possession of cocaine

is erroneous because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that he had

possession of or dominion and control over the cocaine and that he had the requisite

guilty knowledge.

The standard for determining whether a conviction meets the legal standard for

sufficiency of the evidence was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). In Jackson, the Court noted

that appellate courts must uphold a conviction when, “after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2788. In cases where circumstantial evidence has played a

significant role in conviction, La.R.S. 15:438 also provides: “The rule as to

circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends

to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

2 innocence.” See State v. Antoine, 01-1036 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/01), 804 So.2d 869.

Moreover, if the trier of fact rejects the defendant’s hypothesis of innocence, that

hypothesis fails, and the defendant is guilty unless another hypothesis presented

creates reasonable doubt. State v. Marston, 00-0589 (La. 3/16/01), 780 So.2d 1058,

citing State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984).

In the instant matter, the State presented key evidence in the form of testimony

from Christopher Ducote, who was arrested with the defendant and who later pled

guilty to possession of cocaine.

At the defendant’s trial, Ducote testified that he and the defendant had been

partying together during the weekend of their arrest. Ducote recalled that he had two

to three grams of cocaine with him when the two went out the night before their

arrest, and that he shared part of it with the defendant. Later that same night, the pair

met two women at a local bar and decided to rent a room at a local hotel. The next

day, Ducote testified, he and the defendant went swimming at the hotel pool, and

some friends of Ducote’s came by to purchase the remainder of his cocaine. Ducote

explained that he wanted to acquire more cocaine, and he was hesitant to purchase

from his usual suppliers because he had a feeling they were being watched by the

police. Ducote testified that he asked the defendant if he knew anyone who would

be willing to sell to him. The defendant provided Ducote with a dealer’s phone

number, and Ducote arranged to purchase an ounce of cocaine. Ducote stated that

while the defendant was at his house showering, Ducote went to pick up the cocaine.

He then picked up scales and baggies from his house and went back to the hotel to

“cut” the cocaine for later resale. Later that afternoon, Ducote met up with the

defendant at his home, and the two went out to eat and then to local bars. Ducote

3 noted that he had left the bulk of the cocaine at the hotel, but he had brought some

with him to sell while he was out. Ducote testified that he and the defendant used

some of this cocaine, and he sold some of it later while at a bar. At the end of the

night, the two went back to the hotel, but upon arriving, they discovered that the key

to their room no longer worked. While the defendant went to the front desk to get a

new key, Ducote remained outside the room. At this point, Ducote recalled,

Detectives Cooper and Fields approached Ducote, told him who they were, and asked

him to identify himself. The defendant returned with a new key, and the detectives

presented him with a consent form to search the hotel room. The defendant signed

the form and allowed the detectives to search the room, where they found the cocaine

on the table and under the mattresses. Cocaine was also found in Ducote’s pocket.

Regarding the charge of possession, the State is not required to prove that the

defendant was in actual possession of the cocaine; instead, the defendant may be

found to have been in constructive possession. State v. Scott, 00-113 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/7/00), 768 So.2d 112, citing State v. Montgomery, 98-775 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/27/99),

734 So.2d 650. If the State’s case is premised upon constructive possession, the State

must prove that the controlled dangerous substance was within the defendant’s

dominion and control or in his joint possession. Scott, 768 So.2d 112, citing State v.

Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983), and State v. President, 97-1593 (La.App. 3 Cir.

7/15/98), 715 So.2d 745, writ denied, 98-2115 (La. 12/11/98), 729 So.2d 590. Joint

possession is described in State v. Segura, 546 So.2d 1347 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989), as

two people willingly and knowingly sharing a direct right in the thing and an ability

to exercise control over it. Constructive possession is established by reference to the

factors set forth in State v. Toups, 01-1875 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, in an

4 examination of the facts at hand: for example, the defendant's knowledge that illegal

drugs are in the area; the defendant's relationship with the person who has physical

possession of the drugs; the defendant's access to the area where the drugs were

found; evidence of recent drug use by the defendant; and the defendant's physical

proximity to the drugs. A sixth factor given parenthetical reference in Toups is

“evidence that the area was frequented by drug users.” Toups, 833 So.2d at 913,

citing Bujol v. Cain, 713 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1049, 104

S.Ct. 726 (1984). In addition, the State must prove the defendant’s guilty knowledge.

Toups, 833 So.2d at 913. However, the mere presence of someone in the area where

the controlled dangerous substance is located or mere association with the person

found to be in possession of the controlled dangerous substance does not constitute

constructive possession. Id.; see also State v. Walker, 369 So.2d 1345 (La.1979),

State v. Cann, 319 So.2d 396 (La.1975).

When we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

we determine that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of

possession of cocaine. The prosecution provided the jury with the testimony of

Christopher Ducote, which tended to show each of the factors listed in Toups for

determining constructive possession, discussed above. (1) Ducote testified that while

he and the defendant were out together during the weekend of their arrest, Ducote had

cocaine with him at almost all times. The evidence supports the view that the

defendant knew that illegal drugs were in Ducote’s pocket or in the hotel room when

the two were there. (2) Ducote explained that he and the defendant were friends and

that they spent a lot of time drinking together. They spent the majority of the

weekend in question in each other’s company. He also confirmed that the defendant

5 was aware that Ducote was a drug dealer. The record supports the inference that the

defendant and Ducote had a close relationship. (3) Ducote noted further that he

would share his cocaine with the defendant when the two were out partying.

Likewise, the defendant and Ducote paid for the hotel room where the cocaine was

found, and the room had been rented in the defendant’s name. Defendant had access

to the hotel room. Consequently, there is no question of defendant’s access to the

area where the cocaine was. (4) Ducote testified that he and the defendant had used

cocaine that weekend, which constitutes evidence of the defendant’s recent drug use.

(5) The defendant was in close physical proximity to the cocaine throughout the

weekend and at the time of his arrest. As mentioned, Ducote testified that he and the

defendant went out together, and Ducote brought cocaine along for their use; when

they went back to the hotel, there was cocaine there, as well. (6) Ducote testified that

while he and the defendant were at the hotel, his friends had come there to purchase

cocaine. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant was unaware

of that deal.

On appeal, counsel for the defendant stresses that it was Ducote, not the

defendant, who was in possession, that it was Ducote’s cocaine, and that defendant’s

having voluntarily signed the consent-to-search form evinces his lack of guilty

knowledge regarding the presence of cocaine. We find that, despite the argument

regarding actual possession, the record supports the position that the defendant had

constructive possession. Moreover, although the defendant may not have had guilty

knowledge as regarding the exact amount of cocaine at the hotel room, he knew that

Ducote was in possession of cocaine because Ducote had produced the drug from his

very pocket for their consumption earlier in the evening.

6 The jury’s verdict of guilt reflects a rejection of the defendant’s hypothesis of

innocence. Given the evidence in the record, this rejection was reasonable, as was

the jury’s determination of guilt. This assignment lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of the defendant, Michael Charles

Magdaleno, is affirmed.