NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-328
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
LARRY J. JULIAN, JR.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 70,904 HONORABLE GLENNON P. EVERETT, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Michael G. Sullivan, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
David M. Smith Michael Harson District Attorney 15th Judicial District Court P.O. Box 288 Crowley, LA 70527 (337) 788-8831 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana Samuel David Abraham Attorney at Law P.O. Drawer 2309 Lafayette, LA 70502-2309 (337) 234-4523 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Larry J. Julian, Jr. DECUIR, Judge.
Defendant, Larry J. Julian, Jr., was convicted of distribution of cocaine, a
violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and was sentenced to serve fifteen years at hard labor
with credit for time served. Defendant is now before this court on appeal, asserting
three assignments of error which challenge his conviction.
FACTS
On May 25, 2006, Defendant sold a small bag of cocaine to Agent Heidi Stagg,
an undercover officer for the Acadia Parish Sheriff’s’ Office.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that his conviction should be overturned because the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense.
The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981).
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967, it is unlawful to knowingly or intentionally
distribute cocaine, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. In the
instant case, Defendant challenges his identity as the person from whom Agent
Stagg purchased cocaine on May 25, 2006.
Defendant argues that his conviction was achieved by the uncorroborated
testimony of one witness, Agent Stagg. Further, Defendant asserts that the State
failed to secure the presence of its confidential informant, a participant in the transaction, thereby creating a presumption that the confidential informant would
have testified unfavorably to the State’s case. As such, Defendant contends that this
presumption creates an internal contradiction as to Defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator and, thus, renders Agent Stagg’s testimony legally insufficient to support
a conviction.
In support of his argument, Defendant refers to a civil case, Lowenburg v.
Labor Pool of America, Inc., 296 So.2d 846, 849 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writs denied, 300
So.2d 191 (La.1974), wherein the court said:
Where the unexplained failure of a litigant to call a witness who possesses peculiar knowledge essential to that party’s cause, which witness is available to him and is under his control raises a presumption that that witness’ testimony would be detrimental to the party’s cause. (See also New Amersterdam Casualty Co. v. Culotta, La.App., 230 So.2d 339 (1970) and Marshall v. So. Farm Bureau Gas Co., La.App., 204 So.2d 665 writ refused, 251 La. 860, 206 So.2d 711 cert. denied 393 U.S. 883, 89 S.Ct. 189, 21 L.Ed.2d 158 (1967)).
The doctrine in Lowenburg is not applicable to the instant case. In Lowenburg,
the testimony of the absent witness was essential to the defense. In the instant case,
a review of the record indicates that two witnesses for the State, Acadia Parish
Sheriff’s Lieutenant Kevin Trahan and Agent Stagg, testified about Defendant’s
identity, and, thus, the confidential informant’s testimony was not essential to the
State’s case against Defendant.
At trial, Lieutenant Trahan testified that he was a sergeant in the narcotics
division in 2006. On May 25, 2006, Officer Chris McBride and Agent Stagg, an
undercover agent, were assisting Lieutenant Trahan on a detail. Lieutenant Trahan
and Officer McBride were monitoring an audio transmission of the transaction while
Agent Stagg was going to make the buy. A confidential informant, Freddie Wheeler,
2 was to accompany Agent Stagg to identify the person making the sale. Lieutenant
Trahan gave Agent Stagg money to make the purchase.
Lieutenant Trahan testified that he heard Agent Stagg make contact with a male
subject and that a drug transaction took place. Afterwards, Lieutenant Trahan met
with Agent Stagg, who turned over the evidence. About a week later, Lieutenant
Trahan presented a lineup to Agent Stagg who identified Defendant from the lineup
as the person from whom she purchased the cocaine.
As noted above, Mr. Wheeler’s testimony was not essential in proving that
Defendant sold cocaine to Agent Stagg. Mr. Wheeler provided Agent Stagg with the
name of the person from whom she purchased cocaine. She later identified Defendant
from a lineup who turned out to be the person that was named by Mr. Wheeler. Mr.
Wheeler had nothing to do with the lineup. Additionally, Agent Stagg identified
Defendant at trial as the person who handed her the bag of cocaine. Accordingly, the
State’s failure to call Mr. Wheeler to testify did not create a presumption that he
would have testified unfavorably to the State’s case. As such, Defendant has not
shown that an internal contradiction exists as to Defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator.
Further, as noted by this court in State v. Cash, 03-853, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir.
12/10/03), 861 So.2d 851, 855-56, writ denied, 04-27 (La. 4/30/04), 872 So.2d 472,
and writ denied, 04-232 (La. 5/7/04), 872 So.2d 1080:
It is well-established that the State has discretion regarding how to make out its case. Presence or absence of evidence, and weight of the evidence produced, are matters to be assessed by the factfinder. For example, there is no legal requirement for the State to test for fingerprints, produce fingerprint evidence, test certain evidence, or call certain witnesses to satisfy the elements of the offense at issue. See State v. Green, 94-986 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 435.
3 See also State v. Hargrave, 05-1027 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 926 So.2d 41, writ
denied, 06-1233 (La. 11/22/06), 942 So.2d 552. As such, the State was not required
to call the confidential informant as a witness at trial.
Although Defendant maintained at trial that he did not provide drugs to Agent
Stagg on May 25, 2006, and that he had never met Agent Stagg, the jury did not find
Defendant’s testimony to be credible. Instead, the jury chose to believe Agent
Stagg’s identification of Defendant. In State v. Bernard, 98-994, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/3/99), 734 So.2d 687, 691 (citations omitted), this court stated, “It is well settled in
Louisiana law that a jury may rely on a single witness’s testimony to establish a
factual element required to prove guilt, provided there is no internal contradiction or
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-328
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
LARRY J. JULIAN, JR.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 70,904 HONORABLE GLENNON P. EVERETT, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Michael G. Sullivan, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
David M. Smith Michael Harson District Attorney 15th Judicial District Court P.O. Box 288 Crowley, LA 70527 (337) 788-8831 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana Samuel David Abraham Attorney at Law P.O. Drawer 2309 Lafayette, LA 70502-2309 (337) 234-4523 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Larry J. Julian, Jr. DECUIR, Judge.
Defendant, Larry J. Julian, Jr., was convicted of distribution of cocaine, a
violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and was sentenced to serve fifteen years at hard labor
with credit for time served. Defendant is now before this court on appeal, asserting
three assignments of error which challenge his conviction.
FACTS
On May 25, 2006, Defendant sold a small bag of cocaine to Agent Heidi Stagg,
an undercover officer for the Acadia Parish Sheriff’s’ Office.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that his conviction should be overturned because the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense.
The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981).
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967, it is unlawful to knowingly or intentionally
distribute cocaine, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. In the
instant case, Defendant challenges his identity as the person from whom Agent
Stagg purchased cocaine on May 25, 2006.
Defendant argues that his conviction was achieved by the uncorroborated
testimony of one witness, Agent Stagg. Further, Defendant asserts that the State
failed to secure the presence of its confidential informant, a participant in the transaction, thereby creating a presumption that the confidential informant would
have testified unfavorably to the State’s case. As such, Defendant contends that this
presumption creates an internal contradiction as to Defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator and, thus, renders Agent Stagg’s testimony legally insufficient to support
a conviction.
In support of his argument, Defendant refers to a civil case, Lowenburg v.
Labor Pool of America, Inc., 296 So.2d 846, 849 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writs denied, 300
So.2d 191 (La.1974), wherein the court said:
Where the unexplained failure of a litigant to call a witness who possesses peculiar knowledge essential to that party’s cause, which witness is available to him and is under his control raises a presumption that that witness’ testimony would be detrimental to the party’s cause. (See also New Amersterdam Casualty Co. v. Culotta, La.App., 230 So.2d 339 (1970) and Marshall v. So. Farm Bureau Gas Co., La.App., 204 So.2d 665 writ refused, 251 La. 860, 206 So.2d 711 cert. denied 393 U.S. 883, 89 S.Ct. 189, 21 L.Ed.2d 158 (1967)).
The doctrine in Lowenburg is not applicable to the instant case. In Lowenburg,
the testimony of the absent witness was essential to the defense. In the instant case,
a review of the record indicates that two witnesses for the State, Acadia Parish
Sheriff’s Lieutenant Kevin Trahan and Agent Stagg, testified about Defendant’s
identity, and, thus, the confidential informant’s testimony was not essential to the
State’s case against Defendant.
At trial, Lieutenant Trahan testified that he was a sergeant in the narcotics
division in 2006. On May 25, 2006, Officer Chris McBride and Agent Stagg, an
undercover agent, were assisting Lieutenant Trahan on a detail. Lieutenant Trahan
and Officer McBride were monitoring an audio transmission of the transaction while
Agent Stagg was going to make the buy. A confidential informant, Freddie Wheeler,
2 was to accompany Agent Stagg to identify the person making the sale. Lieutenant
Trahan gave Agent Stagg money to make the purchase.
Lieutenant Trahan testified that he heard Agent Stagg make contact with a male
subject and that a drug transaction took place. Afterwards, Lieutenant Trahan met
with Agent Stagg, who turned over the evidence. About a week later, Lieutenant
Trahan presented a lineup to Agent Stagg who identified Defendant from the lineup
as the person from whom she purchased the cocaine.
As noted above, Mr. Wheeler’s testimony was not essential in proving that
Defendant sold cocaine to Agent Stagg. Mr. Wheeler provided Agent Stagg with the
name of the person from whom she purchased cocaine. She later identified Defendant
from a lineup who turned out to be the person that was named by Mr. Wheeler. Mr.
Wheeler had nothing to do with the lineup. Additionally, Agent Stagg identified
Defendant at trial as the person who handed her the bag of cocaine. Accordingly, the
State’s failure to call Mr. Wheeler to testify did not create a presumption that he
would have testified unfavorably to the State’s case. As such, Defendant has not
shown that an internal contradiction exists as to Defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator.
Further, as noted by this court in State v. Cash, 03-853, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir.
12/10/03), 861 So.2d 851, 855-56, writ denied, 04-27 (La. 4/30/04), 872 So.2d 472,
and writ denied, 04-232 (La. 5/7/04), 872 So.2d 1080:
It is well-established that the State has discretion regarding how to make out its case. Presence or absence of evidence, and weight of the evidence produced, are matters to be assessed by the factfinder. For example, there is no legal requirement for the State to test for fingerprints, produce fingerprint evidence, test certain evidence, or call certain witnesses to satisfy the elements of the offense at issue. See State v. Green, 94-986 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 435.
3 See also State v. Hargrave, 05-1027 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 926 So.2d 41, writ
denied, 06-1233 (La. 11/22/06), 942 So.2d 552. As such, the State was not required
to call the confidential informant as a witness at trial.
Although Defendant maintained at trial that he did not provide drugs to Agent
Stagg on May 25, 2006, and that he had never met Agent Stagg, the jury did not find
Defendant’s testimony to be credible. Instead, the jury chose to believe Agent
Stagg’s identification of Defendant. In State v. Bernard, 98-994, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/3/99), 734 So.2d 687, 691 (citations omitted), this court stated, “It is well settled in
Louisiana law that a jury may rely on a single witness’s testimony to establish a
factual element required to prove guilt, provided there is no internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence.” Accordingly, Agent Stagg’s
testimony was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.
NEW TRIAL
By this assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a new trial.
Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial asserting that prior to trial, he
requested the presence of the confidential informant, Freddie Wheeler. Defendant
conceded that the State revealed the name of Mr. Wheeler, but alleged that the State
denied knowledge of his location. Defendant maintained that he had no time to locate
Mr. Wheeler prior to trial. After trial, however, Defendant located Mr. Wheeler.
According to Defendant, Mr. Wheeler stated that at no time did Defendant sell drugs
in his presence. Defendant concluded that the exculpatory information should have
been revealed to him by the State and that there could be no confidence in the verdict
in light of the new evidence.
4 Defendant concluded his motion, asserting that the State was in control of Mr.
Wheeler at the time the offense was committed and should have been required to
produce Mr. Wheeler. In the alternative, Defendant maintained that the trial court
should have granted an instruction, indicating that an adverse presumption attached
due to the State’s failure to produce Mr. Wheeler whose testimony would have been
adverse to the State. The motion was summarily denied by the trial court on February
2, 2009.
On appeal, Defendant contends the defense requested all exculpatory evidence,
including the names of informers whose testimony would be favorable to the defense.
Defendant then complains that despite his requests, Freddie Wheeler’s name was not
revealed until the morning of trial. Defendant contends that the State withheld Mr.
Wheeler’s name, knowing that the informant’s testimony would be favorable to the
defense. Further, Defendant asserts that Mr. Wheeler’s identity should have been
timely revealed to afford him sufficient time to secure Mr. Wheeler’s presence.
The record is void of any attempt by Defendant to seek the disclosure of the
confidential informant’s identity other than Defendant’s blanket requests for
production of exculpatory evidence. Defendant did not file a motion to disclose the
informant’s identity to overcome the State’s privilege. Defendant had the opportunity
prior to trial to seek the disclosure of the informant’s identity, but failed to do so.
On the day of trial, the State disclosed the name of the confidential informant,
but the informant was not called to testify. Defendant made no attempt to postpone
trial, nor did he claim that the State withheld exculpatory evidence to benefit the
prosecution. Defense counsel attempted to find Mr. Wheeler after Mr. Wheeler’s
name was disclosed, but was unable to locate the informant. Defendant now
5 complains that he did not have sufficient time at that late date to locate Mr. Wheeler
and that the State withheld exculpatory evidence. Defendant, however, has not
shown that the State knew of the alleged exculpatory evidence prior to or during trial.
Defendant’s allegations are purely speculative.
After trial, Defendant was able to locate Mr. Wheeler and now maintains that
Mr. Wheeler’s testimony would show that he did not sell any drugs in Mr. Wheeler’s
presence. However, Defendant has not shown that he exercised due diligence in
discovering the alleged new and material evidence before or during trial as required
by La.Code Crim.P. art. 851. Instead, Defendant contends that the State allegedly
withheld exculpatory information.
Defendant bases his allegation on the assertion that Mr. Wheeler participated
in the offense, and, thus, his identity should have been disclosed to him. In support
of his argument, Defendant refers to State v. Thornton, 94-1470, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 1
Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So.2d 481, 484, wherein the court stated:
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the informer privilege. The burden is on defendant to show exceptional circumstances warranting disclosure of the name of the CI. State v. Davis, 411 So.2d 434, 436 (La.1982). The trial court is accorded great discretion in making such a determination. State v. James, 396 So.2d 1281, 1284 (La.1981).
As a general rule, the State is permitted to withhold the identity of the informer from the accused. This privilege is founded upon public policy and seeks to further and protect the public interest and law enforcement by encouraging persons to supply information to the police without fear of reprisal by the person to whom the information pertains. Thus, the identity of an informant should be made known to the accused only when his right to prepare his defense outweighs the need for protection of the flow of information. State v. James, 396 So.2d at 1284. When the State’s case shows the informer participated in the crime, his identity should be disclosed to defendant. In such cases, the informer does more than furnish a tip that enables the police to make an arrest. While working with the police, he takes part in the illegal transaction itself. State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594, 606
6 (1971) (on rehearing), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913, 93 S.Ct. 242, 34 L.Ed.2d 173 (1972).
In Thornton, the court found that the confidential informant did not participate in the
crimes. The purpose of having the informant in the car with the officer during the
transactions was to blend the officer into the surroundings. If people saw the officer
with the informant who was from the area, they would automatically feel comfortable
selling drugs to the officer. Also, the informant was given strict instruction to remain
silent and refrain from touching any money.
In the instant case, the record clearly established that Mr. Wheeler did not
participate in the offense. Lieutenant Trahan testified that the purpose of using a
confidential informant is for identification only. Lieutenant Trahan explained that the
informant tells the agent where to go, the agent and informant proceed to the area and
then the agent initiates the conversation and makes the buy. Afterwards, the
informant identities the person involved in the transaction with the agent.
With regard to the instant transaction, Lieutenant Trahan testified that Mr.
Wheeler directed Agent Stagg to the area where she could buy drugs, and then Agent
Stagg talked to Defendant to try and buy drugs. Lieutenant Trahan maintained that
he did not hear Mr. Wheeler’s voice on the audio transmission during Agent Stagg’s
transaction with Defendant.
Agent Stagg testified that a confidential informant is not allowed to drive or
make any purchases. The informant is not issued any buy money and is searched
before getting into the vehicle with the agent. Lastly, Agent Stagg confirmed that it
was not possible for an informant to make a purchase while working with her because
the passenger’s side window does not roll down, preventing access to the informant.
7 Considering the testimony of Lieutenant Trahan and Agent Stagg, we find that
Mr. Wheeler did not participate in the transaction, and, thus, Defendant failed to
establish exceptional circumstances justifying disclosure of his identity.
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
By this assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
admitting State’s Exhibits 2 and 3 over the defense’s objection as to improper
foundation and chain of custody. Defendant asserts that the State did not prove that
the evidence obtained by Lieutenant Trahan and put in the evidence locker had ever
left the evidence locker for testing. Without such evidence, Defendant maintains
there was no proof that the white powdery substance was cocaine or any substance
prohibited under La.R.S. 40:967.
The supreme court in State v. Cosey, 97-2020, pp. 3-4 (La. 11/28/00), 779
So.2d 675, 678, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 907, 121 S.Ct. 2252 (2001), stated:
To be admissible at trial, demonstrative evidence must first be identified. La. C.E. art. 901. Identification can be visual or by chain of custody of the object. State v. Landry, 388 So.2d 699, 704 (La.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 968, 101 S.Ct. 1487, 67 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981); State v. Overton, 596 So.2d 1344, 1354 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 599 So.2d 315 (La.[1997-2020 La. 4] 1992). The identification need not be absolute, certain or wholly unqualified. State v. Mills, 505 So.2d 933 (La.App. 2nd Cir.) (sufficient that a preponderance of evidence establishes that it is more probable than not, the evidence is connected with the case, “... the weight to be given to the evidence is a question for the jury.”), writ denied, 508 So.2d 65 (La.1987).
At trial, Agent Stagg testified that after the transaction with Defendant, she
drove to a secure location and put the small bag of cocaine received from Defendant
into a brown envelope. On the envelope, Agent Stagg wrote Defendant’s name, time,
date, and location of the transaction and then secured the envelope in her vehicle.
Agent Stagg then met with Lieutenant Trahan and Officer McBride and handed over
8 the evidence. Agent Stagg identified the small bag of cocaine at trial to be the bag
she purchased from Defendant.
Lieutenant Trahan testified that Agent Stagg turned the evidence over to him
in a brown envelope on May 25, 2006. Also, the brown envelope submitted into
evidence at trial was identified by Lieutenant Trahan as the one Agent Stagg gave to
him following the transaction. Lieutenant Trahan explained that the time the
evidence was picked up from Agent Stagg is entered on a log.
When Lieutenant Trahan returned to his office, he placed the evidence in an
evidence bag which reflected the case number, N06158, and then sealed and initialed
the bag. The bag was then placed in a safe until it was picked up by the evidence
officer and transported to the lab for testing. Lieutenant Trahan also filled out a
report with duplicate copies and stated that one copy was submitted to the lab with
the evidence. Lieutenant Trahan identified the copy of the report, State’s Exhibit 2.
State’s Exhibit 2 is a Request for Scientific Analysis, ACL- 06-3557, which
purports to submit for analysis an evidence bag containing one plastic bag of off-
white powder-like substance. The person requesting the report was Lieutenant Kevin
Trahan. The suspect was identified as Larry Julian, Jr. The person making delivery
to the lab was T. Hanley, and the evidence was received by Wanette B. Haycock on
June 1, 2006.
State’s Exhibit 3 is a report from the Acadiana Criminalistics Laboratory
directed to Lieutenant Trahan, lab case #ACL-06-3557 and dated July 27, 2006. The
report indicates that on June 1, 2006, Wanette Haycock received evidence for lab case
#ACL-06-3557 from the Acadia Parish Sheriff’s Office via Tamara Hanley. The
contents of the plastic bag containing white powder was found to be .83 grams of
9 cocaine. The lab results were then returned with the same identifying case and lab
numbers. Lieutenant Trahan identified the results received from the crime lab, State’s
Exhibit 3.
Detective Sergeant Phyllis Lejeune, a detective and evidence officer at the
Acadia Parish Sheriff’s Office, testified that she was not the person who brought the
evidence involved in the instant case to the crime lab, nor was she the person who
received the evidence when it was returned from the crime lab. For the purpose of
trial, Detective Lejeune pulled the evidence from the evidence locker and transported
the evidence to court. According to Detective Lejeune, the evidence had not been
checked out since its return to the evidence locker. Detective Lejeune explained that
when evidence is checked out, it has to be signed out. The log for this evidence
indicated that the evidence was never checked out.
Following Detective Lejeune’s testimony, Defendant objected to the
introduction of the State’s exhibits as to the chain of custody, asserting that all the
persons who had custody of the evidence had not been called to testify. The trial
court overruled the objection without any further discussion.
On appeal, Defendant complains that according to Officer Lejeune, the
evidence was never checked out of the evidence locker and that no one testified that
the evidence was removed from the locker, taken to the crime lab for testing, and then
returned to the locker. Also, Defendant maintains that the State’s attempt to show
that Officer T. Hanley brought the evidence to the crime lab “fails” because the lab
number checked in is not the lab number checked out. Defendant refers to State’s
Exhibit 2, asserting that it shows the lab number as 06-3551, not 06-3557.
10 Although Defendant is correct that no one testified that the evidence was
removed from the locker, taken to the crime lab for testing, and then returned to the
locker, the lab receipt and report, State’s Exhibits 2 and 3, indicate otherwise. Also,
there was no evidence or testimony at trial to challenge or contradict the fact that the
evidence had been taken to the lab for testing.
Additionally, the lab number assigned to the request is the same number as that
of the report. The handwritten lab number located in the top right corner reads “06-
3557.” The number seven has a line in the middle to clearly differentiate the
character from the number one. Lastly, there was no evidence or testimony at trial to
suggest or show that the handwritten number is not a number seven, but instead, a
number one.
Although there is no testimony from the persons who removed the evidence
from the evidence room for testing or who received the evidence for testing, the
physical evidence of the lab request and report indicate that the evidence was tested.
Lieutenant Trahan testified that he filled out the request form that identified the
evidence to be tested and then the evidence was assigned ACL No. 06-3557 upon
receipt by lab personnel. The number is clearly reflected on the request form and is
the same number on the lab report. Additionally, at trial, Agent Stagg identified the
cocaine she purchased from Defendant. Accordingly, we find that the chain of
custody as established by the State indicates that the cocaine tested by the lab was
more probably than not the cocaine connected with the instant case, and, thus, the
trial court did not err in admitting State’s Exhibits 2 and 3.
11 DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.