STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
11-704
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JOHN D. SKINNER
**********
APPEAL FROM THE THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 80337 HONORABLE VERNON B. CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE
MARC T. AMY JUDGE
Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Asa A. Skinner District Attorney Post Office Box 1188 Leesville, LA 71496-1188 (337) 239-2008 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana
Terry W. Lambright Attorney at Law 118 S. Third Street, Suite A Leesville, LA 71446 (337) 239-6557 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana Edward K. Bauman Louisiana Appellate Project Post Office Box 1641 Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641 (337) 491-0570 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: John D. Skinner AMY, Judge.
After failing to appear for a hearing in an unrelated case, the defendant was
charged with jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:110.1. As part of a plea
agreement with the State, the defendant pled guilty to jumping bail and, in a
separate case, theft over $500.1 The trial court sentenced the defendant to two
years at hard labor, to run concurrently with the sentence for his theft over $500
charge. Additionally, the trial court imposed restitution in the amount of
$4,898.90. The defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
According to the record, the defendant was arrested and charged with theft
over $500. Minutes from the theft case indicate that the defendant failed to appear
at two hearings. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to one
count of jumping bail and, in a separate docket number, one count of theft over
$500, a violation of La.R.S. 14:67. As part of the plea agreement, the State
dropped several other pending charges against the defendant, including charges of
principal to theft, theft of firearms, and another count of jumping bail. The State
also agreed to recommend that the defendant’s sentence on the jumping bail charge
run concurrently with his sentence on the theft charge, and agreed not to institute
habitual offender proceedings.
For the jumping bail charge, the trial court sentenced the defendant to two
years at hard labor, to run concurrently with his sentence in the theft case. The
trial court also imposed restitution in the amount of $4,898.90. The defendant
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied
without reasons.
1 The defendant has also appealed his sentence for the theft over $500 charge. See State of Louisiana v. John D. Skinner, 11-703 (La.App. 3 Cir. _/_/12), __ So.3d __. The defendant appeals, asserting as his sole assignment of error that “[t]he
Trial Court erred in that the sentences imposed [ … ] are constitutionally excessive
and imposed without sufficient consideration of Art. 894.1.”
Discussion
Errors Patent
Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors
patent. An error patent is “[a]n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of
the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La.Code
Crim.P. art. 920(2). After reviewing the record, we find no errors patent.
Excessiveness of Sentence
The defendant contends, in his sole assignment of error, that the trial court
failed to consider the sentencing factors contained in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1
and that his sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.
First, we turn to the defendant’s contention that the trial court failed to
adequately consider the sentencing factors delineated in La.Code Crim.P. art.
894.1. The record must indicate that the trial court adequately considered the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in particularizing a defendant’s sentence,
but there is no requirement that the trial court list all of Article 894.1’s sentencing
factors. State v. Jones, 09-751 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 29 So.3d 689, writ denied,
10-659 (La. 3/25/11), 61 So.3d 655. Further, Article 894.1(C) requires that the
trial court state on the record the factors taken into account and the factual basis for
the sentence imposed.
A review of the record indicates that the trial court was privy to a pre-
sentence report. Further, the trial court specifically noted that it considered the
factors of Article 894.1, including the defendant’s age, family history, education,
employment history, history of drug and alcohol problems, and participation in a 2 drug treatment program. The trial court additionally noted that there was economic
harm to the victim2 and that the defendant had at least two prior felony convictions
and four misdemeanor convictions. As a result of his plea agreement, the
defendant’s sentencing exposure was substantially reduced, as the State dropped
three other pending cases, recommended that the defendant’s sentences run
concurrently, and agreed not to seek the defendant’s adjudication as a habitual
offender. Given these considerations and the trial court’s specific reference to the
factors it considered applicable in this case, we find the record supports a finding
that the trial court adequately considered Article 894.1.
Accordingly, we next examine the defendant’s assertion that the sentence
imposed for jumping bail is unconstitutionally excessive. The trial court imposed a
sentence of two years at hard labor, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed
in the defendant’s theft case. The trial court also imposed restitution in the amount
of $4,898.90, as ordered in the defendant’s theft case.3 See La.Code Crim.P. art.
883.2.
A panel of this court reiterated the law applicable to excessive sentence
claims in State v. Planco, 96-812, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/97), 692 So.2d 666,
670-71, stating:
Article 1, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, prohibits “cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment,” and a sentence which falls within the statutory limits may nevertheless be excessive under the circumstances. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979); State v. Naquin, 527 So.2d 601 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988). If a reviewing court 2 In this regard, the district attorney stated at the defendant’s plea hearing that “the State would dismiss bill of information 79,520 and 521, however Mr. Skinner acknowledges these charges for the purpose of restitution. It is my understanding, Your Honor, that the total restitution amount was four thousand eight hundred ninety-eight dollars and ninety cents. Also, my understanding that the co-defendant, who’s paid part of that, and insurance he’s paid part of it [sic], so if there is any restitution, he’s acknowledging it for that purpose.” At the same hearing, when questioned by the trial court, the defendant agreed that the State’s recitation of the plea agreement was the agreement he had with the State. 3 In his theft case, in addition to restitution, the defendant was sentenced to seven years at hard labor and a fine of $1,500.00. 3 finds that a penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is nothing more than needless imposition of pain and suffering then that sentence is excessive. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981); State v. Everett, 530 So.2d 615 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1233 (La.1989).
....
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STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
11-704
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JOHN D. SKINNER
**********
APPEAL FROM THE THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 80337 HONORABLE VERNON B. CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE
MARC T. AMY JUDGE
Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Asa A. Skinner District Attorney Post Office Box 1188 Leesville, LA 71496-1188 (337) 239-2008 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana
Terry W. Lambright Attorney at Law 118 S. Third Street, Suite A Leesville, LA 71446 (337) 239-6557 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana Edward K. Bauman Louisiana Appellate Project Post Office Box 1641 Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641 (337) 491-0570 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: John D. Skinner AMY, Judge.
After failing to appear for a hearing in an unrelated case, the defendant was
charged with jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:110.1. As part of a plea
agreement with the State, the defendant pled guilty to jumping bail and, in a
separate case, theft over $500.1 The trial court sentenced the defendant to two
years at hard labor, to run concurrently with the sentence for his theft over $500
charge. Additionally, the trial court imposed restitution in the amount of
$4,898.90. The defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
According to the record, the defendant was arrested and charged with theft
over $500. Minutes from the theft case indicate that the defendant failed to appear
at two hearings. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to one
count of jumping bail and, in a separate docket number, one count of theft over
$500, a violation of La.R.S. 14:67. As part of the plea agreement, the State
dropped several other pending charges against the defendant, including charges of
principal to theft, theft of firearms, and another count of jumping bail. The State
also agreed to recommend that the defendant’s sentence on the jumping bail charge
run concurrently with his sentence on the theft charge, and agreed not to institute
habitual offender proceedings.
For the jumping bail charge, the trial court sentenced the defendant to two
years at hard labor, to run concurrently with his sentence in the theft case. The
trial court also imposed restitution in the amount of $4,898.90. The defendant
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied
without reasons.
1 The defendant has also appealed his sentence for the theft over $500 charge. See State of Louisiana v. John D. Skinner, 11-703 (La.App. 3 Cir. _/_/12), __ So.3d __. The defendant appeals, asserting as his sole assignment of error that “[t]he
Trial Court erred in that the sentences imposed [ … ] are constitutionally excessive
and imposed without sufficient consideration of Art. 894.1.”
Discussion
Errors Patent
Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors
patent. An error patent is “[a]n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of
the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La.Code
Crim.P. art. 920(2). After reviewing the record, we find no errors patent.
Excessiveness of Sentence
The defendant contends, in his sole assignment of error, that the trial court
failed to consider the sentencing factors contained in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1
and that his sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.
First, we turn to the defendant’s contention that the trial court failed to
adequately consider the sentencing factors delineated in La.Code Crim.P. art.
894.1. The record must indicate that the trial court adequately considered the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in particularizing a defendant’s sentence,
but there is no requirement that the trial court list all of Article 894.1’s sentencing
factors. State v. Jones, 09-751 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 29 So.3d 689, writ denied,
10-659 (La. 3/25/11), 61 So.3d 655. Further, Article 894.1(C) requires that the
trial court state on the record the factors taken into account and the factual basis for
the sentence imposed.
A review of the record indicates that the trial court was privy to a pre-
sentence report. Further, the trial court specifically noted that it considered the
factors of Article 894.1, including the defendant’s age, family history, education,
employment history, history of drug and alcohol problems, and participation in a 2 drug treatment program. The trial court additionally noted that there was economic
harm to the victim2 and that the defendant had at least two prior felony convictions
and four misdemeanor convictions. As a result of his plea agreement, the
defendant’s sentencing exposure was substantially reduced, as the State dropped
three other pending cases, recommended that the defendant’s sentences run
concurrently, and agreed not to seek the defendant’s adjudication as a habitual
offender. Given these considerations and the trial court’s specific reference to the
factors it considered applicable in this case, we find the record supports a finding
that the trial court adequately considered Article 894.1.
Accordingly, we next examine the defendant’s assertion that the sentence
imposed for jumping bail is unconstitutionally excessive. The trial court imposed a
sentence of two years at hard labor, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed
in the defendant’s theft case. The trial court also imposed restitution in the amount
of $4,898.90, as ordered in the defendant’s theft case.3 See La.Code Crim.P. art.
883.2.
A panel of this court reiterated the law applicable to excessive sentence
claims in State v. Planco, 96-812, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/97), 692 So.2d 666,
670-71, stating:
Article 1, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, prohibits “cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment,” and a sentence which falls within the statutory limits may nevertheless be excessive under the circumstances. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979); State v. Naquin, 527 So.2d 601 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988). If a reviewing court 2 In this regard, the district attorney stated at the defendant’s plea hearing that “the State would dismiss bill of information 79,520 and 521, however Mr. Skinner acknowledges these charges for the purpose of restitution. It is my understanding, Your Honor, that the total restitution amount was four thousand eight hundred ninety-eight dollars and ninety cents. Also, my understanding that the co-defendant, who’s paid part of that, and insurance he’s paid part of it [sic], so if there is any restitution, he’s acknowledging it for that purpose.” At the same hearing, when questioned by the trial court, the defendant agreed that the State’s recitation of the plea agreement was the agreement he had with the State. 3 In his theft case, in addition to restitution, the defendant was sentenced to seven years at hard labor and a fine of $1,500.00. 3 finds that a penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is nothing more than needless imposition of pain and suffering then that sentence is excessive. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981); State v. Everett, 530 So.2d 615 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1233 (La.1989).
....
However, the trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and a sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be deemed excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210 (La.1982).
The defendant was charged with jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S.
14:110.1. The applicable penalty for this charge is contained within La.R.S.
14:110.1(C), which states “[w]hoever commits the crime of jumping bail when the
bail is to assure the presence of the defendant for those cases defined as felonies in
this Title and in the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not more than two years.” Therefore, the defendant
received the maximum sentence.
A review of comparable cases indicates that in State v. Cruz, 438 So.2d 1251
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1983), a panel of this court upheld a one-year sentence for jumping
bail. Therein, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to attempted
aggravated battery and jumping bail. For the attempted aggravated battery charge,
the defendant was sentenced to three years, and for the jumping bail charge, the
defendant was sentenced to one year, to run consecutively with his sentence for
attempted aggravated battery. In reviewing the defendant’s sentence, the appellate
court noted that, although the defendant was married and had two young children,
he was a second felony offender, had an extensive out-of-state criminal history,
and had a history of drug use.
4 The record here indicates that, although the defendant pled guilty to only one
count of jumping bail, he failed to appear at two scheduled court appearances, one
on May 10, 2010 and one on May 18, 2010. Further, the defendant has several
misdemeanor convictions, as well as prior felony convictions for simple burglary
and two counts of theft, aggravated burglary, and attempted second degree battery.
As previously discussed, the defendant’s sentencing exposure was substantially
reduced as part of his plea agreement. Further, his sentence in this case is to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed in his theft case. Accordingly, we find that
an adequate basis for this sentence exists in the record. The defendant’s sentence
for jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:110.1, is not unconstitutionally
excessive.
The defendant’s assignment of error is without merit.
DECREE
The defendant’s sentence for jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:110.1,
is affirmed.