State of Louisiana v. Jaime Brooks Day AKA - Jamie Day

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 23, 2015
DocketKA-0015-0564
StatusUnknown

This text of State of Louisiana v. Jaime Brooks Day AKA - Jamie Day (State of Louisiana v. Jaime Brooks Day AKA - Jamie Day) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Louisiana v. Jaime Brooks Day AKA - Jamie Day, (La. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-564

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JAIME BROOKS DAY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 15589-10 HONORABLE CLAYTON DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX CHIEF JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, James T. Genovese, and David Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John Foster DeRosier District Attorney – 14th Judicial District Karen C. McLellan Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District Lori Theresa Lewis Nunn Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District Carla Sue Sigler Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District P. O. Box 3206 Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206 Telephone: (337) 437-3400 COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana William Todd Fontenot Fontenot & Fontenot Law Firm 720 Kirby Street Lake Charles, LA 70601 (337) 491-3864 COUNSEL FOR: Defendant/Appellant - Jaime Brooks Day THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Jaime Brooks Day appeals as excessive the ten-year sentence imposed

by the trial court on remand, for the crime of second degree cruelty to a juvenile,

pursuant to La.R.S. 14.93.2.3. Concluding that the sentence imposed on remand

was not excessive, we affirm the ten-year sentence.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the trial rejected this court’s findings and imposed a prison sentence based upon contrary findings of its own; and

(2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by failing to properly apply the factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant, Jaime Brooks Day, was convicted of second degree

cruelty to a juvenile, her step-son, G.H.1 She was sentenced to thirty years at hard

labor pursuant to La.R.S. 14.93.2.3. The statute allows for a maximum sentence of

forty years at hard labor. In a previous appeal, State v. Day, 14-708 (La.App. 3

Cir. 12/23/14), 158 So.3d 120,2 this court affirmed Day’s conviction but vacated

the sentence, finding it excessive and remanding the case to the trial court for

resentencing consistent with the opinion.

1 The victim’s initials are used in accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W). 2 The decision was rendered with one judge concurring and one judge dissenting. On remand, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve ten years

at hard labor. A motion to reconsider the sentence was filed and denied. On

appeal, Ms. Day asserts two assignments of error. She contends that the trial court

committed legal error by rejecting this court’s findings and imposing a ten-year

prison sentence based upon contrary findings of its own. She further asserts that

the trial court failed to properly apply the factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art.

894.1, resulting in an excessive sentence.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01- 838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar

2 crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99- 433 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005-06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Excessiveness of Sentence

Jaime Day contends that the ten-year sentence imposed by the trial

court on remand was excessive and does not reflect this court’s instructions. We

disagree. It is undisputed that G.H. was in the care of Jaime Day. The pictures,

testimony, and Day’s own video indicate severe and hateful emotional cruelty by

Jaime Day as well as criminal physical neglect by Jaime Day.

G.H.’s aunt, Katy Day, found him alone in the middle of a school day

on February 19, 2010. He was thirty-eight pounds at age nine, cold, shivering, and

starving, on the floor, in an otherwise empty room, except for a thin mattress and a

Bible. While this court previously found that thirty years was excessive because

all of the harm by Jaime Day may not have been intentional, the record reflects that

the neglect was deliberate and cruel. And, there is overwhelming testimony that

3 G.H. did not self-starve or self-inflict the physical wounds with which he was

found: a large circular burn wound in the middle of his boney back with a total

diameter of seven or eight inches; ligature marks on the fronts of both ankles; cuts

on his head and inside his mouth and ear; bruises and scars on his eye, lips,

stomach, arms, and legs; facial and body hair, called “lunago,” indicating

starvation.

The statute governing Jaime Day’s conviction by the jury is La.R.S.

14.93.2.3, entitled “Second degree cruelty to juveniles.” It provides in pertinent

part:

A. (1) Second degree cruelty to juveniles is the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone over the age of seventeen to any child under the age of seventeen which causes serious bodily injury or neurological impairment to that child.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. McKeever
407 So. 2d 662 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1981)
State v. Barling
779 So. 2d 1035 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2001)
State v. Telsee
425 So. 2d 1251 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1983)
State v. Cook
674 So. 2d 957 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1996)
State v. Pigford
922 So. 2d 517 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2006)
State v. Sepulvado
367 So. 2d 762 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1979)
State v. Smith
846 So. 2d 786 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2003)
State v. Lisotta
726 So. 2d 57 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1998)
State v. Etienne
746 So. 2d 124 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1999)
State v. Batiste
594 So. 2d 1 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1991)
State v. Campbell
404 So. 2d 1205 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1981)
State v. Day
158 So. 3d 120 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2014)
Day v. Allen
129 So. 260 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1930)
State v. Dixon
852 So. 2d 471 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2003)
State v. Vance
879 So. 2d 862 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2004)
State v. Davis
890 So. 2d 708 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2004)

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