State of Louisiana v. Dionte Eugene Daugherty

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 7, 2015
• Docket: KA-0015-0400
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-400

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DIONTE EUGENE DAUGHERTY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 32246-12 HONORABLE DAVID KENT SAVOIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

JOHN E. CONERY JUDGE

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, James T. Genovese, and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John F. DeRosier District Attorney Karen C. McLellan Assistant District Attorney 14th Judicial District 901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800 Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601 (337) 437-3400 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana Edward J. Marquet Louisiana Appellate Project Post Office Box 53733 Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-3733 (337) 237-6841 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Dionte Eugene Daugherty CONERY, Judge.

A grand jury indicted Defendant, Dionte Eugene Daugherty, for attempted

second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27, and 14:30.1, and for home

invasion, a violation of La.R.S. 14:62.8. A jury unanimously convicted Defendant

on both counts as charged, and the trial court then sentenced Defendant to forty

years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence

for attempted second degree murder and to ten years at hard labor for home

invasion. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to run concurrently.

Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider his sentences.

Defendant now appeals his sentence for attempted second degree murder,

arguing it is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant and an accomplice entered the home of the victim, Bradford

Jacob, dressed in black and wearing ski masks and gloves. They held guns to the

victim’s head and demanded money. Defendant struck the victim in the head with

the butt of a gun. After a brief struggle, Defendant shot the victim in the lower

right back area, causing life-threatening injuries. After the shooting, Defendant

and his accomplice left the victim for dead and “nonchalantly walk[ed] down the

driveway.”

Shortly thereafter, the police were called to the scene, and investigators

collected a ski mask and gloves from a dumpster next to the victim’s house. Tests

showed DNA on the ski mask and one of the gloves matched that of Defendant,

and his DNA was also included in the mixture found in the other glove. ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there is

one error patent but that no action is required by our court.

Defendant’s sentence for home invasion is illegally lenient. At the time of

the commission of the offense in October 2011, La.R.S. 14:62.8(B)(1) required at

least five years of the sentence to be imposed without the benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence. 1 Although the court minutes of sentencing

reflect that the sentence for home invasion was imposed without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, the transcript does not. The transcript

reveals that the court imposed a forty-year sentence for attempted second degree

murder without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, but the

concurrent ten-year home invasion sentence was not imposed without benefits.

“[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v.

Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied,

00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Because the trial judge failed to impose any

portion of the home invasion sentence without benefits, the Defendant’s sentence

is technically illegally lenient. See State v. Sanmiguel, 626 So.2d 957 (La.App. 3

Cir. 1993), State v. Jones, 02-1176 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 839 So.2d 439, writ

denied, 03-886 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 516. However, the illegally lenient

sentence was not raised as an error, and thus, no action need be taken by the court.

See State v. Smith, 10-830 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/9/11), 58 So.3d 964, writ denied, 11-

503 (La. 9/30/11), 71 So.3d 279.

1 Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:62.8(B)(1) no longer carries this restriction of benefits.

2 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court failed to sufficiently consider the

factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and subsequently imposed a

constitutionally excessive sentence for attempted second degree murder in

violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The law is well-settled regarding the standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

[Louisiana Constitution Article 1], ' 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate.

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d

1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331 (citations omitted).

Further, even though a penalty falls within the statutory sentencing range, it

may still be unconstitutionally excessive:

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or makes no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, an appellate court may consider several factors including the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.”

3 State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ

denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061 (citations omitted). “[T]he trial

judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance outlined

in art. 894.1[;] the record must reflect that he adequately considered these

guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the defendant.” State v. Smith, 433

So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983) (citing State v. Ray, 423 So.2d 1116 (La.1982); State v.

Keeney, 422 So.2d 1144 (La.1982); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982)).

“The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record

supports the sentence imposed.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.4(D).

In this case, however, Defendant did not object to his sentence when

announced, nor did he file a motion to reconsider sentence. Therefore, this issue

was not raised in the trial court and “cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”

See State v. Hebert, 08-542 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 688; State v.

White, 03-1535 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/28/04), 872 So.2d 588; State v. Prudhomme, 02-

511 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 829 So.2d 1166, writ denied, 02-3230 (La.

10/10/03), 855 So.2d 324. Defendant is thus precluded from review of his

sentence for his failure to object or file a motion to reconsider his sentence. In the

interest of justice, however, we review Defendant’s sentence for bare

excessiveness. See State v. Maggio, 14-1148 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/15), 157 So.3d

1290.

In reviewing sentences for bare excessiveness, our court has consistently

stated:

In order to decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has stated:

4 [An] appellate court may consider several factors including the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Day, 05-287 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 915 So.2d 950 (quoting State v.

Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-

562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061).

At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge spoke of the seriousness of

Defendant’s crime, how “basically it started off as an armed robbery to get money;

and then to shoot someone in the back and leave them there to bleed to death,

pretty serious stuff.”

The trial judge stated on the record he did not know Defendant’s criminal

history. The record is not clear about that history. Defense counsel agreed it was

“fair to say . . . from the rap sheet” that Defendant had one prior felony conviction.

The State was not aware of prior convictions but thought Defendant might have a

juvenile record from California. The State explained Defendant was in jail at the

time of his arrest in this matter. At the time of trial, Defendant had pending

charges for illegal possession of a stolen firearm, illegal use of weapons or

dangerous instrumentalities, and misdemeanor aggravated assault. The State

agreed to dismiss those three charges as a result of Defendant’s conviction in this

5 case. The trial judge considered Defendant to “have a propensity to violence”

based on those charges and stated Defendant “want[ed] to be known as somebody

you don’t fool with[.]”

Further, Defendant was exposed to a sentence of ten to fifty years for his

conviction for attempted second degree murder. La.R.S. 14:27, 14:30.1. His forty-

year sentence is above the midrange but less than the maximum possible fifty-year

sentence.

Similar to Defendant in this case, the defendant in State v. Williams, 11-414

(La.App. 4 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So.3d 759, writ denied, 12-708 (La. 9/21/12), 98

So.3d 326, was convicted of attempted second degree murder and aggravated

burglary. The trial court sentenced him to forty-nine years at hard labor for

attempted second degree murder and to twenty-nine years at hard labor for

aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run consecutively. The defendant shot

the victim in the face in the presence of their son, approximately eight years old,

and fled. The defendant had no prior convictions. The transcript showed the trial

court complied with the mandate of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 even though it did

not mention the article. The fourth circuit held the sentences were not excessive

but remanded the matter for resentencing because the trial court failed to articulate

reasons for imposing them consecutively.

Again, in a similar case, in State v. Richard, 12-310, 12-311 (La.App. 5 Cir.

4/24/13), 115 So.3d 86, writ denied, 13-1220 (La. 12/2/13), 126 So.3d 497, the

defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder and aggravated

burglary. The record showed the crime was premeditated and violent in nature.

The defendant had an extensive criminal history that included other crimes of

violence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifty years at hard labor on the

6 attempted second degree murder conviction and for thirty years at hard labor, both

without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The fifth circuit

upheld the terms but amended the aggravated burglary sentence to delete the

benefits restriction.

In State v. Napoleon, 01-1222, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 980,

983, the fifth circuit noted:

A review of the jurisprudence indicates that similar sentences have been upheld for defendants without prior felony records. In State v. Ethridge, 96-1050 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97), 688 So.2d 1274, 1276, the Third Circuit upheld defendant’s 45 year sentence for attempted second degree murder despite the fact defendant had no prior criminal record. The defendant had fired six shots into the victim’s residence through a bedroom window severely wounding the victim.

In State v. Owens, 606 So.2d 876 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992), the Second Circuit affirmed defendant’s 30 year sentence for attempted second degree murder despite defendant’s claim the sentence was excessive based on his youthful age of 25 years old and the fact he had no prior felony convictions. Defendant had fired several shots at the victim in a crowded barroom.

In State v. Camese, 00-1943 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/11/01), 791 So.2d 173, the Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant’s 50-year sentence for attempted second degree murder despite the fact defendant had no prior criminal record. Defendant approached the victim at the security gate of the victim’s apartment, pointed a gun to his head, and demanded the victim’s car. The victim gave defendant the car at which time defendant shot him in the head.

In line with the jurisprudence and facts considered by the trial court in this

case, we find that Defendant’s sentence for attempted second degree murder is not

excessive. The sentence is appropriate considering the nature of the offense, the

circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, and a

comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.

7 DISPOSITION

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.