Judgment rendered March 9, 2022. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 54,280-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
Versus
CARTEZ S. COLLINS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 370551
Honorable Charles Gordon Tutt, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Peggy J. Sullivan
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
REBECCA A. EDWARDS WILLIAM C. GASKINS BRITTANY B. ARVIE TOMMY J. JOHNSON Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, STONE, and STEPHENS, JJ. STEPHENS, J.
This criminal appeal by defendant, Cartez S. Collins, arises from the
First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana. Collins
was convicted of aggravated battery, adjudicated a second-felony offender,
and sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation or
suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, Collins’s conviction and
sentence are affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 16, 2019, Collins was involved in a physical altercation
with his two brothers, J.B. and Livontae, which concluded with Collins
stabbing J.B. below his right ribcage. J.B., who suffered a punctured lung
and a lacerated diaphragm and liver, received medical treatment and
survived his injury. Collins was subsequently arrested and charged by bill of
information with attempted second degree murder. Following a jury trial
commencing on October 28, 2020, a unanimous verdict of guilty of
aggravated battery was returned. Collins filed a motion for post-verdict
judgment of acquittal, which was denied prior to sentencing. The State filed
a second-felony habitual offender bill of information. After a hearing on
December 7, 2020, Collins was adjudicated a second-felony offender and
sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation or
suspension of sentence. His motion to reconsider sentence was denied
without hearing. This appeal by Collins ensued.
DISCUSSION
Overview of Relevant Testimony
The State called Brandy Beverly as its first witness. Brandy testified
she was the mother of the victim, the defendant, and Livontae. At the time of the incident, J.B. was 17 and Collins was 25.1 Collins’s girlfriend, Molly
Baker, and Brandy’s sister, Sharon Arthur, were also present during the
altercation. 2 Brandy, Sharon, Livontae, and J.B. arrived at Brandy’s home
in Sharon’s minivan after having been to the store. Upon their arrival,
Collins exited the home, approached the group, and asked Sharon for a
cigarette. Sharon and Collins began to argue about her son. Livontae and
J.B. joined the argument, and a fistfight began when Collins swung at
Livontae while he was still inside the van. Livontae exited the vehicle and
engaged in an altercation with Collins. Collins then went around to the
passenger side of the vehicle and punched J.B. through the open window,
causing J.B. to begin bleeding from his mouth. J.B. exited the van, and a
fistfight between the three brothers ensued, with Brandy and Sharon trying
to break them up. Eventually, Livontae and J.B. heeded Brandy’s
instruction to get back into Sharon’s van. At that point, Brandy had not seen
any weapons. Livontae got in the backseat of the van while J.B. returned to
the front passenger seat. Brandy noted Livontae entered the van from the
driver’s side because the back passenger door of the van was broken and
unable to open. Sharon returned to the driver’s seat and was about to drive
away when Collins ran quickly in and out of the house and crossed in front
of Sharon’s vehicle to the passenger side, where he reached through the open
front passenger window and stabbed J.B. Brandy noted Sharon had to stop
to keep from hitting Collins as he crossed in front of the van. Brandy
witnessed Collins stab J.B. under the ribcage. Collins stabbed J.B. quickly
1 Brandy clarified on cross-examination that Collins was actually 24 at the time of the incident. 2 Molly Baker was identified by law enforcement as Jasmine Hill, although she is referred to as Molly Baker during the trial and throughout this opinion. 2 but at least two times. She described the knife as having ridges on one side
of the blade and brass knuckles on the handle. Brandy pulled Collins away
and applied pressure to J.B.’s wound while Collins then attempted to get to
Livontae. Collins was unable to reach Livontae because the rear passenger
door would not open. Sharon then sped away, taking J.B. to a nearby fire
station. Brandy called 911, while Collins remained on the premises briefly
before walking down the street with Molly, the knife still in his hand.
On cross-examination, Brandy confirmed she actually saw Collins
stab J.B. and testified she was certain the van door was closed at the time
because the side mirror was broken off when Collins reached through the
window to stab J.B. She admitted the brothers had fought in the past,
including altercations in which they hit one another with sticks. She also
confirmed Collins had previously reported to her that his brothers had
threatened to kill him. She testified all of her sons claim to have guns but
she had never seen any of them with one. However, Brandy later stated,
“I’ve only saw Cartez with a gun but, I mean, my son, my other son, I’ve
seen him with a gun which it wasn’t his, and I’m not sure if the one that
Cartez had was his, which he had pictures.” Brandy confirmed she had been
convicted of cruelty to juveniles involving her sons.3 She denied having a
special fondness for J.B. and stated she tries to protect all of her children.
She further testified she has never lied to the police.
Sharon Arthur testified Brandy was her best friend, and they refer to
one another as sisters. She echoed Brandy’s testimony regarding the trip to
the grocery store, who was present for the altercation, the van’s broken
3 Defense counsel asked Brandy if her conviction was for not reporting other people’s abuse of her sons, but the State objected before she answered. 3 passenger side back door and side mirror, and the general chain of events of
the fight between the three brothers. However, Sharon recalled that only she
and Brandy had been to the store, but when they arrived at Brandy’s home,
the three brothers approached the vehicle to unload the groceries. Like
Brandy, she testified an argument between the brothers began after she
refused Collins’s request for a cigarette. She further testified that the
physical altercation began when Collins punched J.B. through the passenger
side of her car, at which point J.B. and Livontae jumped out and began
fighting with Collins. Once the altercation ended, Livontae and J.B. got
back into the van, while Collins ran into the house. Prior to that point,
Sharon had not seen any weapons in the fight. She first saw the knife when
Collins reached through the open window and stabbed J.B. what she
believed to be a single time. She stated Collins then tried to reach Livontae
with his knife but was unable to because of the broken door. Sharon
described the knife as looking like a hunting knife, with ridges on the blade.
She stated she initially could not start her car before Collins approached
because she panicked and froze. After Brandy pulled Collins away from the
van, Sharon drove away and took J.B. to a nearby fire station, where he was
transferred into an ambulance and transported to the hospital.
J.B. testified, consistent with Brandy, that he and Livontae had been
to the grocery store with Sharon when they arrived home in Sharon’s van.
Thereafter, a fistfight began between Livontae and him on one side and
Collins on the other. Eventually, his mother broke up the fight, and he and
Livontae got back into Sharon’s van—him in the front passenger seat and
Livontae in the back behind the driver. Sharon returned to the driver’s seat.
He did not see Collins enter the house, but testified that while he was sitting 4 in the van, Collins appeared and stabbed him with a knife through the open
window. In addition to the stab wound to his abdomen, he was also suffered
cuts to each of his arms. J.B. testified he was in the hospital for a couple of
weeks due to injuries sustained to his lungs, liver, and diaphragm.
On cross-examination, J.B. denied ever having threatened Collins or
having been involved in prior fights with him. He denied ever hitting
Collins with sticks or owning/handling firearms. J.B. recognized the knife,
having seen it in the home prior to this incident.
Livontae Beverly was called by the State and testified as a hostile
witness. He confirmed he, J.B., Brandy, and Sharon arrived at the home in
Sharon’s minivan after having been to the grocery store. The group exited
the vehicle to unload groceries. Collins was in the yard. A fistfight between
the three brothers ensued. The fight ended, and Livontae and J.B. got back
in the van. Livontae saw Collins go inside the house then return to the van,
at which point he stabbed J.B. through the open passenger window. Collins
then attempted to reach into the backseat to stab Livontae before Sharon
drove away. Livontae confirmed one side of the knife blade was smooth and
the other was jagged, and there were brass knuckles on the handle. Livontae
also confirmed that in addition to trying to stab him through the open
window, Collins attempted to open the broken back passenger door of the
van in order to gain access to him. No weapons were used in the fight prior
to Collins returning from the house with the knife.
On cross-examination, Livontae denied having seen J.B. and Collins
fight previously. He also denied ever using any weapons, including sticks,
in a fight. When asked if he’d ever threatened to kill Collins, he responded,
“I said what I said out of anger.” When asked what he said, he replied, “I 5 can’t remember right off, but I know I said some f***ed up stuff.” Livontae
confirmed he had seen the knife before in the home, admitted it was his, but
claimed he had never used it.
James Harvey testified he was employed with the Shreveport Fire
Department and was an EMT at the time of this. He stated J.B. presented
with a wound to the lower right abdomen that was two to three inches in
length, and that J.B. reported the wound was inflicted with a knife which
was approximately six inches in length. J.B. was transported to the hospital
by ambulance after his wounds were bandaged, an IV was started, and he
was assessed for other injuries.
Corporal David Ware testified he was employed with the Shreveport
Police Department and investigated this incident, having responded to a call
from the fire department for an officer to come to the scene. When he
arrived at the fire station, he observed J.B. with a stab wound to his right rib
cage. He spoke only briefly with J.B. because he had difficulty talking due
to the amount of pain he appeared to be suffering. Corporal Ware then
drove to Brandy’s residence, where he and another officer searched the
home for Collins; neither Collins nor any weapons were found there. He
then spoke with Brandy, who advised Collins had left and taken the knife
with him.
On cross-examination, Cpl. Ware stated he has worked in law
enforcement for 15 years, with probably 13 of those years in the
neighborhood in which this incident occurred. He confirmed Sharon, J.B.,
and Livontae were all at the fire station when he arrived, and that after
visiting Brandy’s home and speaking with her, he went to the hospital where
he observed J.B. to be in too much pain to complete an interview. Corporal 6 Ware stated he had no personal knowledge, based on his years of working in
the neighborhood, of any reason Collins would have had to be concerned
one of his brothers would hurt him.
Detective Jason Saiz testified he was a Shreveport Police Department
homicide/violent crimes investigator. He was put into contact with Cpl.
Ware and met him at the hospital. J.B. was unable to give a statement at that
time, so Det. Saiz returned the next day to interview J.B. He also
interviewed the other witnesses from the scene. Collins was subsequently
arrested two days after the incident.
On cross-examination, Det. Saiz confirmed the initial police report
listed the charges as domestic abuse battery and property damage. On
redirect, Det. Saiz confirmed it was his decision, after conducting an
investigation, to amend the charge to attempted second degree murder.
The defense first called Ronaco Johnson, who testified he had lived
four houses down from Brandy and her sons. He had witnessed multiple
altercations between the three brothers, and Collins was always on the
opposite side of one or two of his brothers, including one fight where J.B.
and Livontae were fighting against Collins and hit him with what appeared
to be a big stick or a pole. Ronaco stated he had seen J.B. with a gun on a
previous occasion, while walking down the street, and that he knew of an
incident where J.B. was involved in an altercation with some other
individuals, police responded, and J.B. was accused of having a gun.
On cross-examination, Ronaco confirmed he had a misdemeanor
conviction for illegal carrying of a weapon as well as felony convictions for
possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance and possession of
Schedule I dangerous substance with intent to distribute. 7 Collins testified that when J.B., Livontae, Sharon, and Brandy
returned from the store, he went outside to help unload the groceries; at that
time, he asked Sharon for a cigarette. Sharon denied his request and accused
him of “always getting into it” with her son, which Collins disputed. He
claimed Sharon’s son, J.B., and Livontae always threatened him, and Brandy
and Sharon always took up for them. They threatened to kill and shoot him,
while brandishing guns, and had previously jumped him and beaten him
with sticks. Collins stated he saw them with guns the morning of this
incident before they left for the store. He described the guns as black and
silver. Collins claimed this fight began when Livontae exited the van and
rushed him, then J.B. joined Livontae, to fight against Collins. He admitted
to punching J.B. after he exited the van and joined the fight. Collins testified
that one brother is bigger than him and the other is almost the same size.
Collins claimed he never entered the house to retrieve the knife. He testified
instead that the knife was outside in a nearby ditch all along, where Livontae
had stashed it previously for safekeeping in case he needed to access it
quickly, given the violent nature of the neighborhood. Collins asserted the
victim and witnesses collaborated to fabricate the story that Collins retrieved
the knife from inside the house. He stated he fell into the ditch mid-fight,
grabbed the knife, and proceeded to defend himself by making a stabbing
motion with the knife as his two brothers charged him. He testified, “I pick
the knife up, and I really didn’t look where I stabbed at with the knife, I just
thrust my hand out with the knife.” He further claimed he stabbed J.B. only
once because he did not want to harm his little brother because he loved him
“to death.” Collins stated J.B. was never stabbed in the van, noting if that
were the case, there would have been blood in the vehicle. After he stabbed 8 J.B., the fight ended, and he instructed J.B. to put pressure to the wound.
J.B. got into Sharon’s van, and she drove him to the fire station. Collins
testified he never ran in front of the vehicle to stab J.B. through an open
window. Collins confirmed he has a prior felony conviction for aggravated
battery. On cross-examination, Collins testified that he was sentenced to six
years on his prior conviction.4
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assignment of error, Collins asserts his conviction for
aggravated battery was not supported by sufficient evidence because the
testimony shows he was acting in self-defense when he stabbed J.B. He
argues he was afraid for his safety when he happened to locate a weapon
with which to defend himself in the midst of a fight against two people who
had previously struck him with sticks, brandished firearms, and threatened to
kill him.
The State asserts the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Collins committed an aggravated battery upon J.B. and did not act in self-
defense. The State argues the jury made a credibility determination in
believing the State’s witnesses and in disbelieving Collins’s self-serving,
unsupported version of events.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
4 The defense rested at the conclusion of Collins’s testimony. Molly Baker was subpoenaed by the defense to testify at trial but did not appear. A writ of attachment was issued, and she was expected to be produced to testify the next day, but the defense elected to rest without her testimony.
9 Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,
124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively
embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with
a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the
fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State
v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 2009-
0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.
The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or
reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 1999-0023 (La.
1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L.
Ed. 2d 62 (2000); State v. Walker, 53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So.
3d 1154, writ denied, 2021-01334 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 8. The
appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v.
Smith, 1994-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v. Green, 49,741
(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So. 3d 331. A reviewing court affords great
deference to the trier of fact’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a
witness in whole or in part. State v. Broadway, 53,105 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1/15/20), 288 So. 3d 903, writ denied, 2020-00372 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So. 3d
78.
In a non-homicide situation, a claim of self-defense requires a dual
inquiry: first, an objective inquiry into whether the force used was
reasonable under the circumstances; and, second, a subjective inquiry into
whether the force used was apparently necessary. State v. Broadway, supra.
The burden of proving self-defense in a non-homicide case rests with the
10 defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. State v.
Walker, supra.
The offense of aggravated battery is defined as a battery committed
with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:34(A). A battery is defined as the
intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. La. R.S.
14:33.
The record clearly shows Collins committed an aggravated battery
upon his brother J.B. when he stabbed him with a knife. Aside from Collins,
the testimony of each eyewitness supports the finding that Collins’s action
unequivocally constituted an intentional use of force or violence against J.B.
Furthermore, testimony at trial does not support Collins’s claim of self-
defense. The testimony of the State’s witnesses was consistent as to the
pertinent facts of what happened, including, significantly, that the fight was
over and both J.B. and Livontae were seated in Sharon’s van when Collins
stabbed J.B. through the open window, and that prior to that time, no
weapons had been present during the fight between the three brothers.
Despite his claims of being bullied by his younger brothers in the past,
Collins failed to prove that, in this instance, his stabbing J.B. was both
reasonable and necessary. This assignment of error is without merit.
Excessive Sentence
In his second assignment of error, Collins asserts the sentence
imposed is unconstitutionally harsh and excessive given the facts and
circumstances of the case. He argues that although his sentence falls within
the statutory limits, it is nonetheless constitutionally excessive. In particular,
Collins asserts the trial court’s application of the article 894.1 factors was
erroneous. He argues that as he acted in self-defense, his offense should not 11 have been deemed to manifest deliberate cruelty to the victim. He also
asserts his offense did not create a risk of death or great bodily harm to more
than one person. Collins further notes that the crime of aggravated battery
requires the State to prove a dangerous weapon was used to commit a battery
(actual violence); therefore, the use of actual violence and use of weapon
should not have been considered as aggravating factors during his
sentencing. Additionally, Collins asserts the trial court failed to consider his
personal or employment history, his young age, or the fact that he is a father.
He also notes the trial court failed to order a presentence investigation to
assist in sentencing.
In response, the State notes that in 2013, Collins pleaded guilty to
aggravated battery after being charged with attempted second degree
murder. In that matter, Collins got into an argument with the victim and
another man walking by his house. During the argument, he went inside,
returned with a firearm and fired it, hitting one of the men. He received a
six-year hard labor sentence. The State argues the facts established at trial
supported the aggravating factors found applicable by the trial court and
asserts that this midrange sentence for a second-felony offender, whose
offense was similar to his prior offense for which he served a six-year
sentence, is clearly not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or
shocking to the sense of justice.
An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence
for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took
cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial judge
is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long
as the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the 12 article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. West, 53,526 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081. The articulation of the factual basis
for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical
compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982);
State v. West, supra. The important elements which should be considered
are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health,
employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and
the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981);
State v. West, supra. There is no requirement that specific matters be given
any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Shumaker, 41,547 (La. App. 2
Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So. 2d 277, writ denied, 2007-0144 (La. 9/28/07), 964
So. 2d 351. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the
sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full
compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, supra; State v.
DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied,
2016-0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more
than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.
1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime
and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the
sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;
State v. Meadows, 51,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 639, writ
denied, 2018-0259 (La. 10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1208. 13 The sentencing court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence
within statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive
in the absence of manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 2003-
3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Duncan, 47,697 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1/16/13), 109 So. 3d 921, writ denied, 2013-0324 (La. 9/13/13), 120 So. 3d
280. The trial court is in the best position to consider the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given
broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Cook, 1995-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674
So. 2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S. Ct. 615, 136 L. Ed. 2d 539
(1996); State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 764.
At the time of the offense, the punishment for aggravated battery was
a fine of $5,000, imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than
ten years, or both. La. R.S. 14:34(B). As a second-felony offender, Collins
faced imprisonment for a term not less than one-third of the longest term and
not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. La.
R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Therefore, Collins was exposed to a sentence not less
than 3.33 years and not more than 20 years.
In sentencing Collins to ten years at hard labor, without benefit of
probation or suspension of sentence, the trial court noted it had reviewed the
guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and determined no mitigating
circumstances were found. Furthermore, the trial court found that
subsections 1, 5, 6, and 10 were applicable. Those factors listed by the trial
court provide:
(1) The offender’s conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim.
(5) The offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. 14 (6) The offender used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense.
(10) The offender used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1
The record clearly shows the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Collins. While we agree with Collins that factors (6) and (10) of
La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 are redundant to consider when imposing a sentence
for the crime of aggravated battery, and concede that factor (5) is arguably
inapplicable in this case, factor (1) applied by the trial court is irrefutably
applicable.
As discussed above, Collins’s claim of self-defense is without merit;
therefore, such claim does not dispense with the aggravating factor found by
the trial court that Collins conduct manifested deliberate cruelty to the
victim. It is obvious to this Court that by stabbing his younger brother in the
abdomen with a large knife while J.B. was seated, defenseless in a vehicle
with the door shut, Collins manifested deliberated cruelty upon him.
Additionally, in sentencing Collins, the trial court specifically stated it
did not find any mitigating factors—the trial court did not fail to consider
such factors; it merely found that they were inapplicable to the case. Such
finding was within the trial court’s vast discretion. Furthermore, while this
Court is disappointed the trial court did not avail itself of a presentence
investigation, a useful sentencing resource, the trial court was certainly not
required to do so. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 875; State v. Wilson, 53,913 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/26/21), 317 So. 3d 923.
15 The record clearly contains an adequate factual basis for Collins’s
sentence. J.B. suffered grave injuries at the hand of his brother and could
have been killed. This midrange sentence of 10 years hard labor, for a
perpetrator with a prior violent felony conviction for which he was
sentenced to six years hard labor, does not shock the sense of justice.
Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence and conviction of Cartez S.
Collins are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.