Judgment rendered January 14, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,710-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
ANTHONY J. HOLLIS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 397,853
Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT Counsel for Appellant SERVICE By: Remy V. Starns Michael A. Mitchell Barry S. Ranshi
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON Assistant District Attorney
Before STONE, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ. HUNTER, J.
Defendant, Anthony J. Hollis, appeals a jury verdict finding him
guilty of sexual battery and a sentence of 90 years at hard labor under La.
R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2). For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s
conviction and sentence.
FACTS
On November 16, 2023, a Caddo Parish grand jury indicted Anthony
J. Hollis (“Defendant”) for first degree rape of C.C., a child under the age of
13, with the incident alleged to have occurred around November 14, 2020,
through November 13, 2022. C.C. disclosed the alleged abuse to a family
friend months after the final incident occurred on September 16, 2023.
C.C.’s mother, Alicia, and Defendant were married from August 2018
to 2024, and their relationship was described as “tumultuous.” In early July
of 2023, Alicia witnessed Defendant kiss C.C. on the lips when they were
moving furniture. Although Alicia asked him if “anything” had happened,
C.C. stated that at the time, he was too uncomfortable to describe the
incidents of alleged sexual abuse that occurred when he was around 11 or 12
years old. In addition, Alicia’s close friend, Delores Boyd (“Ms. Boyd”),
spoke with C.C. in the summer of 2023 and he informed Ms. Boyd of the
molestation that occurred when he was 11 years of age. This revelation
prompted Alicia to file a report with law enforcement.
Detective Breanna Gerbine, a detective with the Caddo Parish
Sheriff’s Office, investigated the case. A Gingerbread interview was
scheduled with Meghan Hughes (“Ms. Hughes”), a forensic interviewer.1 Ms. Hughes explained the Children’s Advocacy Center’s
standardized approach for contextualizing the child’s statements.
During the interview with Ms. Hughes, C.C. described several
incidents of sexual abuse. C.C. stated that when he was between the ages of
11 or 12, Defendant grabbed his penis. Detective Gerbine testified that C.C.
told Ms. Hughes about several incidents. C.C. also alleged that when he was
around the same age, Defendant instructed him to get on his knees to “suck
him off,” and then pushed his penis into C.C.’s mouth. Another instance
occurred where Defendant kissed C.C. on the lips in his bedroom, called him
a “good kisser,” and tried to insert his finger into C.C.’s rectum.
Detective Gerbine interviewed Defendant. During the interview,
Defendant initially stated he kissed C.C. on his forehead. Later, he changed
his statement and admitted to kissing C.C. on his lips. Defendant also stated
he believed C.C. was homosexual. Defendant also asserted C.C. came to his
room, got on top of him, and obtained an erection.
An amended bill of indictment was filed on February 1, 2024,
charging Defendant with first degree rape. Counsel for the defense filed
pretrial motions, specifically for bond reduction, preliminary examination,
discovery, and motion for a speedy trial. A jury trial commenced on
November 18, 2024, and the evidence introduced by the State included the
testimony of C.C., Alicia, Ms. Boyd, Detective Gerbine, and Ms. Hughes.
Defendant testified on his own behalf.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the district court instructed the
jury on sexual battery, defining it as the intentional touching of the victim’s
1 The State used Ms. Hughes’ testimony to describe the interviewing process and played the recorded interview for the jury. 2 intimate areas either without consent or when the victim is under fifteen and
at least three years younger than the offender, regardless of the offender’s
knowledge of age. After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict
finding Defendant guilty of sexual battery, a responsive verdict of first
degree rape.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. He maintains the State relied solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of C.C., which he claims arose in a highly suggestive, contentious
family environment during the marital breakup of Defendant and C.C.’s
mother. According to Defendant, the timing of the disclosure, occurring on
the same day he informed C.C.’s mother of his intent to divorce and her
seeking a protective order, shows C.C. had a motive to fabricate allegations.
In addition, Defendant asserts that his own testimony at trial, during which
he denied the allegations, created reasonable doubt regarding C.C.’s
testimony. Defendant further argues the jury’s request to rewatch the video
of C.C.’s forensic interview indicates their verdict rested on questionable
testimony and that the State failed to rebut the reasonable hypothesis that the
accusations stemmed from family conflict rather than criminal conduct.
The standard of appellate review for the sufficiency of the evidence to
uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. 3 Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124
S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Ward, 50,872 (La. App. 2
Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 228, writ denied, 17-0164 (La. 9/22/17), 227 So.
3d 827.
The appellate court’s function is not to assess credibility or weigh the
evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. The
reviewing court must afford great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or
reject the testimony. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So.
2d 622, writ denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So. 2d 566. “Where there is
conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends
upon a determination of credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the
weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.” State v. Allen, supra, at 626.
When a witness’s testimony contains no internal contradictions and does not
conflict with physical evidence, that testimony alone can be sufficient to
support a factual finding, even without supporting medical, scientific, or
physical evidence. State v. Felix, 56,367 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 419 So.
3d 427. To convict a defendant based upon circumstantial evidence, every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence must be excluded. La. R.S. 15:438; State
v. Barakat, 38,419 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/23/04), 877 So. 2d 223.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:43.1(A)(1) and (2), sexual battery is defined,
in pertinent part, as the intentional touching of the anus or genitals of the
victim by the offender using any instrumentality or any part of the body of
the offender, directly or through clothing, when the offender acts without the
consent of the victim or when the victim has not yet attained fifteen years of
age and is at least three years younger than the offender. State v. Coliston,
4 56,332 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 420 So. 3d 284; State v. Naulty, 24-0118
(La. App. 1 Cir. 2/27/25), 406 So. 3d 1231.
In the instant case, the evidence established that during the time the
sexual abuse was committed, from November 14, 2020, through November
2022, C.C. was under the age of 13 (born November 14, 2009) and
Defendant (born June 1, 1972) was at least over 45 years old. Further, during
the trial, C.C. testified. During his testimony, the video of the forensic
interview was played, and C.C. confirmed he was telling the truth during the
interview. During the interview, C.C. stated that the first incident of sexual
abuse occurred when he was 11 or 12 years old, when Defendant entered the
bathroom while he (C.C.) was in the shower. He stated Defendant opened
the shower curtain, looked down at his penis, grabbed his penis, and began
to “stroke” it. The interaction stopped when C.C.’s mother called Defendant,
and Defendant told C.C. not to tell anyone. C.C. also described another
incident during which Defendant entered his bedroom, began to kiss him,
and grabbed his “butt” and his penis. C.C. stated Defendant put his hands
inside of his shorts and tried to “stroke his penis.” Additionally, C.C.
described an incident when Defendant approached him, began to kiss him,
and told him he wanted him to “suck him off.” C.C. stated Defendant
directed him (C.C.) to kneel in front of him (Defendant) and open his mouth;
he complied and Defendant inserted his penis into his mouth and began to
moan.
At trial, C.C. unequivocally described the acts committed by
Defendant, including kissing him on the lips, directing him to “get down”
and “suck him off.” C.C. stated, “He had me open my mouth and he put [his
penis] in my mouth . . and told me to suck on it.” C.C. testified that he 5 initially complied, but he stopped because “I felt like I had to vomit.”
Thereafter, Defendant told him, “[Y]ou almost got me,” which C.C.
understood Defendant to mean that he almost ejaculated. C.C. stated that on
one occasion, his mother witnessed Defendant kissing him on the lips, and
that was the last time he was in the house with Defendant. He stated he did
not initially disclose the sexual abuse to his mother because he “just didn’t
want her to feel that guilt[.]”
Ms. Boyd testified she and Alicia met at work, and she had known
C.C. since he “was just a baby in diapers.” She stated that in 2023, Alicia
voiced some concerns to her about C.C., and she had noticed a “big change”
in him. According to Ms. Boyd, C.C. had gone from a well-groomed
“happy-go-lucky kid,” to being “distant” and wearing his hair “in his face
hiding his eyes.” She stated she asked C.C. about “hiding” his face and eyes,
and he told her he was afraid because his mother and Defendant were
“always fighting” and that “something went on with him.” Ms. Boyd further
testified that C.C. expressed to her that Alicia had seen Defendant kiss him
“in the mouth” and he became afraid when Alicia began screaming. She also
stated that C.C. told her that Defendant had him perform oral sex on him,
and the abuse “had been going on three years since he was eleven[.]”
Alicia also testified at trial. She stated she and defendant married in
2018, and they divorced in January 2024. She testified that after C.C.
disclosed the sexual abuse to Ms. Boyd, he told her, “something happened.”
Therefore, she decided to call law enforcement, and a police officer
scheduled the forensic interview. According to Alicia, C.C. never disclosed
any specific acts of sexual abuse to her; however, she saw Defendant “right
6 up against [C.C.] kissing him.” She described the kiss as “an intimate kiss.”
She stated she screamed, and Defendant left the house and never returned.
During cross-examination, Alicia testified that her relationship with
Defendant was tumultuous, primarily due to his “addiction issues.” She also
testified that at the time she saw Defendant kissing C.C., Defendant was no
longer living in the home. Alicia further stated that Defendant and C.C. “just
didn’t get along a lot” because of “discipline-type issues.”
Detective Gerbine, a juvenile detective specializing in sexual and
physical abuse of children, also testified at trial. Detective Gerbine explained
that police officers do not typically interview child victims of abuse;
therefore, she arranged for C.C. to be interviewed by a forensic examiner.
She stated she witnessed the interview from a separate room, and she
testified as to what C.C. conveyed during the interview.
Ms. Hughes was accepted by the trial court as an expert in forensic
interviewing. She described the interviewing process as “a completely non-
biased” procedure designed to obtain information from the child. Ms.
Hughes explained that some children, like C.C., are “delayed” disclosers of
abuse, who wait months or years before disclosing abuse. She stated that
during the interview, she could tell that C.C. “was ready to talk about it.”
However, she could tell from C.C.’s demeanor that he felt shame and guilt
due to the acts he was forced to perform.
Defendant testified during the trial. He stated he and Alicia met when
he was incarcerated in Texas, and she volunteered in prison ministry. They
married within months of his release from prison. Defendant described his
on-and-off relationship with Alicia. He admitted he kissed C.C. and stated
that he had kissed C.C. and his sister “probably hundreds of times.” 7 However, Defendant explained he grew up kissing his parents, but “never in
a passionate way.” He stated he left Alicia’s house “for good that day”
because he could not handle being accused of behaving inappropriately with
C.C. Defendant also described Alicia as controlling, and he stated she had a
problem because he refused to stop drinking alcohol. He stated she placed a
“tracker” on his phone to “control” him. He stated he was arrested for
sexually abusing C.C. two weeks after he told Alicia he was divorcing her.
Defendant denied ever touching C.C.’s genital area or forcing C.C. to
perform oral sex on him. He also denied touching C.C.’s “butt.” Defendant
stated Alicia did not take C.C. for a forensic interview until three months
after she witnessed the alleged kiss. According to Defendant, Alicia and
C.C. are lying about the allegations, and C.C. “got exactly what he wanted”
because he “wanted his mom to himself [and] he didn’t like sharing her with
me.”
Our review of the record reveals C.C.’s testimony regarding the acts
of sexual abuse was consistent with the statements he made during his
forensic interview. The testimony was also supported by the testimony of
Alicia, Detective Gerbine, and Meghan Hughes. One witness’s testimony, if
believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual
conclusion. State v. Walker, 55,255 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 369 So. 3d
488; State v. Gullette, 43,032 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975 So. 2d 753. This
principle is equally applicable to victims of sexual assault; such testimony
alone is sufficient even when the state offers no medical, scientific, or
physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the
defendant. State v. Walker, supra; State ex rel. P.R.R., Jr., 45,405 (La. App.
2 Cir. 5/19/10), 36 So. 3d 1138. 8 Herein, the jury was able to observe the testimony of C.C., as well as
the testimony of Defendant. It is clear from the verdict; the jury did not
believe defendant’s assertion that the allegations arose out of the marital
issues between him and Alicia. When viewed under the Jackson standard,
we find the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. This
assignment of error lacks merit.
Expert Credibility
Defendant also contends the Gingerbread House forensic interview
violated State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993), because the interviewer,
Ms. Hughes, indirectly bolstered C.C.’s credibility by explaining general
behaviors of child victims and “types of disclosure.” He also asserts that the
verdict turned on credibility and was reduced from first degree rape to a
lesser charge after jurors viewed the expert-framed interview, which
demonstrates the undue influence of Ms. Hughes’ testimony. Therefore, he
asserts the interviewer’s testimony exceeded the limits set forth in Foret and
contributed to an unfair trial.
Louisiana law permits expert testimony to help jurors understand
specialized topics but prohibits experts from vouching for a witness’s
credibility or influencing the jury’s assessment of a child’s truthfulness.
State v. Foret, supra. Expert testimony must remain within the limits set by
the Louisiana Code of Evidence, which bars credibility-based opinions and
excludes evidence whose prejudicial impact outweighs its value. La. C.E.
art. 702; La. C.E. art. 608(A); La. C.E. art. 403.
Louisiana jurisprudence requires an objection in the trial court to
claim error on the appeal. La. C.Cr. P. art. 841. The purpose of the
contemporaneous objection rule is to put the trial judge on notice of an 9 alleged irregularity, allowing him the opportunity to make the proper ruling
and correct any claimed prejudice to the defendant, procedural irregularity,
or evidentiary mistake. State v. Benoit, 17-187 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/17),
237 So. 3d 1214. Further, a defendant is limited to the grounds for objection
that he articulated in the trial court, and a new basis for the objection may
not be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Taylor, 04-346 (La. App. 5
Cir. 10/26/04), 887 So.2d 589, 594.
In State v. Tabb, 383 So. 3d 155, 514 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 383
So. 3d 1066, writ denied, 24-00617 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So. 3d 648, on
appeal, the defendant argued that the State’s use of a codefendant’s plea
agreement violated his due process rights. The State countered that he
waived this claim because he made no contemporaneous objection at trial.
This Court agreed, holding that appellate review is limited to issues
preserved at trial, and new objections cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. La. C. Cr. P. art. 841 (A). Because the defendant failed to object
contemporaneously, he waived the claim, and this Court found no merit in
his argument.
In State v. Sajna, 23-0893 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So. 3d 667,
writ denied, 24-01290 (La. 2/19/25), 400 So. 3d 926, the defendant was
convicted of two counts of aggravated rape of a victim under the age of 13
and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court improperly admitted the expert testimony of a doctor specializing in
child maltreatment. However, because the defendant did not make a
contemporaneous objection to any part of the doctor’s testimony at trial, he
waived the right to appellate review. The court concluded that the lack of
objection waived the issue on appeal. 10 In the instant case, the record does not reflect any objection made by
Defendant to Ms. Hughes’ testimony. Furthermore, Defendant testified in
his own defense and stated he had “no objection” to the Gingerbread House
interview being played for the jury. Accordingly, this assignment of error
lacks merit.
Denial of Motion to Reconsider Sentence & La. C. CR. P. art. 814(A)(12)
Defendant’s third assignment of error claims the trial court should
have given the jury an “under thirteen” responsive verdict under La. C. Cr.
P. art. 814 because the charged first degree rape occurred within a time span
that included both before and after the C.C.’s thirteenth birthday. He argues
that, since some alleged acts happened when the victim was under thirteen
and others after C.C. turned thirteen, the jury needed the proper responsive
verdict options to determine which acts occurred when. By failing to provide
this option, defendant contends, the court improperly took away the jury’s
fact-finding role contrary to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.
Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d (U.S. 2000), creating a structural error that requires
his sentence to be vacated.
Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 814(A)(11), the jurors in this case were
provided with the following responsive verdicts to first degree rape
(formerly aggravated rape):
1) Guilty of First Degree Rape 2) Guilty of Attempted First Degree Rape 3) Guilty of Second Degree Rape 4) Guilty of Attempted Second Degree Rape 5) Guilty of Third Degree Rape 6) Guilty of Attempted Third Degree Rape 7) Guilty of Sexual Battery 8) Guilty of Molestation of a Juvenile 9) Guilty of Attempted Molestation of a Juvenile 10) Guilty of Indecent Behavior with a Juvenile
11 11) Guilty of Attempted Indecent Behavior with a Juvenile 12) Not guilty
The jury returned with a verdict of “guilty of sexual battery.” The jury did
not indicate on the verdict form that the defendant was older than 17 years of
age or that the victim was under the age of 13.
In Apprendi, supra, the petitioner pleaded guilty to a state offense
with a sentencing range of five to ten years. However, the trial court
imposed a twelve-year sentence pursuant to a hate crime statute that allowed
a sentence to be enhanced if the trial judge found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the crime was motivated by racial bias. Id., 530 U.S. at 470,
120 S. Ct. at 2348. The Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d
35 (1999), the United States Supreme Court held that “a [jury] instruction
that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal
trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence,” and harmless error analysis may be appropriate. Id., 527 U.S. at
8-9, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the Neder Court
found that if a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence,
such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the
erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. Id.
In State v. Gibson, 09-486 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/9/10), 38 So. 3d 373,
writ denied, 10-0802 (La. 11/5/10), 50 So. 3d 814, the defendant was
12 initially charged with aggravated rape but was found guilty of the responsive
verdict of sexual battery. The defendant argued that the trial court erred in
sentencing him in accordance with the penalty provision of La. R.S.
14:43.1(C)(2), an enhanced penalty imposed when the offense involves a
victim under 13 years old, and the offender is 17 years or older. The
defendant asserted that neither the jury’s verdict nor the jury instructions
referenced the additional age requirements of La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2). The
jury, however, did not indicate on the verdict form that the defendant was
older than 17 years of age or that the victim was under the age of 13. The
Court held that the failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not a
structural error and is subject to harmless error analysis. Ultimately, the
Court concluded despite the Apprendi violation, the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to establish the
defendant was 17 or older and the victim was under the age of 13 at the time
of the offense.
In State v. Wagar, 54,941 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 357 So. 3d 984,
the defendant appealed his conviction for sexual battery, arguing in part, that
the bill of information, as amended, and the jury instructions were defective
because they did not require the jury to find that the victim was under the
age of 13. This Court found an Apprendi violation, conducted a harmless
error analysis, and concluded the error was harmless.
In this case, Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with first
degree rape of a child under the age of 13, in violation of La. R.S.
14:42(A)(4). The bill of indictment contains the victim’s initials, the
victim’s date of birth, Defendant’s date of birth, and the time frame of the
sexual offense. The jury was charged with the elements of first degree rape, 13 as well as sexual battery. Although the verdict form does not explicitly
reference sexual battery of a child under the age of 13, Defendant was
placed on notice that he was being charged with committing sexual acts
(aggravated rape) against a child under the age of 13. The kiss on the lips,
witnessed by C.C.’s mother, occurred in July 2023, after C.C. turned 13;
however, this does not negate that the jury was presented with evidence that
much of the sexual abuse occurred when C.C. was between the ages of 11
and 12. Accordingly, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that C.C.
was under 13 years of age when the abuse began in 2020, and 13 years old
when it ended in 2022. Although the trial court committed an Apprendi
violation, we find the error harmless. This argument lacks merit.
Denial of the Post-Verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (La. C. Cr. P. art. 821)
In the final assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court
erred in denying the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal under La.
C. Cr. P art. 821 reviewed under the Jackson framework. However, upon
review, this argument was addressed in the assignment of error regarding
sufficiency of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s conviction and sentence
is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.