Judgment rendered September 27, 2023. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 55,262-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
ANTHONY D. CARTER Appellant
Appealed from the Fifth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Richland, Louisiana Trial Court No. F-202106
Honorable Stephen Gayle Dean, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Edward K. Bauman
PENNY WISE DOUCIERE Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
KENNETH DOUGLAS WHEELER AMANDA MICHELE WILKINS Assistant District Attorneys
Before COX, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. COX, J.
This criminal appeal arises out of the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Richland Parish, Louisiana. A unanimous jury convicted Anthony Carter
(“Carter”) as charged with one count of first degree vehicular negligent
injuring in violation of La. R.S. 14:39.2, and one count of hit-and-run
driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury, in violation of La. R.S.
14:100. The trial court sentenced Carter to 5 years at hard labor for the first
count and 10 years at hard labor for the second count, with each sentence to
be served concurrently. Carter now appeals, alleging insufficiency of
evidence and excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm
Carter’s convictions and sentences.
FACTS
On January 19, 2021, Carter was charged by bill of information with
one count of first degree vehicular negligent injuring and one count of hit-
and-run driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury. On April 18,
2022, trial commenced, wherein the following testimony was adduced:
First, Raven Lampley (“Lampley”), the victim in this matter, testified
and identified Carter in open court. Lampley stated that she and Carter had
previously dated. Regarding the incident, Lampley testified that she went to
a Halloween party at the Delhi Civic Center (“Civic Center”) on October 31,
2020, with Lakeisha Hale (“Hale”) and a few other friends. Lampley
acknowledged that while en route to the party, she drank about half of a
frozen daquiri, but stated that she did not “feel the effects” of the drink.
Lampley explained that when she arrived at the party, she parked on the
right side of the road near a ditch, across from the Civic Center, facing south
so the driver’s side door was exposed to the road. Lampley stated that before she went into the Civic Center, she saw a
man carrying Carter out of the building and that Carter was “acting a fool,”
and appeared to be intoxicated. Lampley testified that she had been at the
party for about an hour before she went outside with Hale to call her
boyfriend and get something from her car. Lampley explained that although
she had to cross the street and walk some distance down from the Civic
Center to get to her car, she did not have any trouble seeing her surroundings
because there were “a lot of light poles” and people outside. She stated that
when she and Hale crossed the street, she made another phone call, and
noticed that a black Charger exited the Civic Center parking lot, which
paused at a stop sign at the end of the road, and began spinning.
Lampley stated that because the Charger was about five cars away
from her, and she was almost to her car, she thought she was in a safe
location. Lampley testified, however, that when she got to the car door,
Hale yelled at her to watch out, but before she could react, the Charger
crashed into her and pinned her against the car. Lampley stated that she did
not know who hit her until the Charger left the scene and other people began
yelling that “Ink” ran into her. She then clarified that “Ink” was Carter’s
nickname. Lampley testified that she was unable to move after she was hit,
and she was eventually airlifted to University Medical Center in Jackson,
Mississippi.
Lampley then recalled the extent of her injuries, which included two
broken legs, a dislocated knee, a fractured hip, a hematoma, a shift in her
pelvic bones, and the tissue from the bottom of her leg was torn and
shredded off. Lampley then generally explained that she underwent
numerous medical procedures and surgeries, and was still awaiting further 2 procedures to address additional issues and complications. Lampley
testified that since the accident, she was unable to keep her jobs as a CNA
and Sonic employee, she had to learn to walk again, struggled climbing
stairs, and had a diminished relationship with her four-year-old son, in part,
because she could no longer pick him up.
Lampley then testified that she received several Facebook messages
from Carter after he was released. The State introduced the initial message
Carter sent, and Lampley read as follows:
Hey, I am sorry. I didn’t know I hit nobody. I thought I just hit the ditch. But you know if I knew I hit anybody, especially you, I wouldn’t got out the car. I just got out last night. I wanted to come see you and check on you but with the charges and everything, people saying it might not be a good idea because all y’all mad at me. And I don’t need to be in no more that I am in now. But I do deeply apologize. I don’t know what it might mean to you but I am. And if you don’t mind me coming to check on you, I’m gonna ask momma to bring me. But if not, I can understand that too. But my number is ***- ***-2748, if you need anything and you can “Inbox” or text back? I can come. Hope you doing all right. Get well.
Lampley stated that Carter contacted her several times thereafter, and in
March of 2022, Carter asked her to drop the charges against him, and in turn,
he would pay her medical bills, as well as additional money for pain and
suffering. Lampley explained that she never received any money from
Carter, and because he had not contacted her in almost a year, felt that he
only contacted her because he needed help.
Next, Hale testified that she attended the party with Lampley. Hale
admitted she also had a daquiri, but did not “feel [any] effects,” and that
Lampley did not appear intoxicated that night. Hale testified that at some
point, she and Lampley left the building so Lampley could get something
from her car. Hale explained that they crossed the street and walked a little 3 further down from the Civic Center to get to Lampley’s car. Hale stated that
when she and Lampley approached the car, they noticed a black Charger
near a stop sign at the end of the road. Hale admitted she was not alarmed
when she first saw the Charger because she did not think it would come
toward them.
Hale then explained that because she was behind Lampley, she saw
the Charger hit and pin Lampley to her car. She testified that the driver
never got out, and instead, reversed and left the scene. On cross-
examination, Hale acknowledged she initially told officers the driver hit
Lampley’s car and then Lampley, but stated the officer misinterpreted her
statement. Hale then read from her written report, in which she primarily
provided that she saw the driver of a black Charger hit Lampley and then
Lampley’s car.
The State then called Lakendra Finley (“Finley”), who identified
Carter in open court. Finley testified she was parked in the Civic Center
parking lot when she noticed a black Charger in the lot “spinning and
burning rubber” before it exited the lot, went across the street, “fishtailed,”
and hit Lampley. Finley stated she called 911 and pursued the Charger
when the driver drove away from the scene. Finley recalled that the driver
was speeding, swerving, and at one point, ran off the side of the road. She
then stated that after she gave the operator the Charger’s plate numbers, she
provided directions until an officer found them, and the driver returned to
the Civic Center parking lot.
Next, Officer Tyrone Williams (“Officer Williams”), with the
Louisiana State Police (“LSP”), testified that he was dispatched to the Civic
Center concerning a pedestrian injury following a hit-and-run. Officer 4 Williams stated that when he arrived, he observed approximately 75 to 100
people in the area, Lampley was lying in a ditch, with a lot of blood around
her, and had several open cuts that he described as almost unbearable to see.
Officer Williams testified that dispatch then informed him that a concerned
citizen followed and identified the vehicle involved as a black 2006 Charger.
Officer Williams stated that when he came in contact with the Charger, it
was swerving, and he followed it back to the Civic Center parking lot, where
he identified Carter as the driver.
Officer Williams testified he could detect a strong odor of alcohol on
Carter and observed an open bottle of beer between the driver and passenger
seats as well as a half-empty bottle of gin on the passenger side floor.
Officer Williams explained that because he smelled alcohol, and because
Carter stumbled out of the vehicle and struggled to stand up, it was not safe
to administer a field sobriety test; instead he arrested Carter and transported
him to the Delhi Police Department, where an Intoxilyzer was administered.
Trooper Jason Henson (“Tpr. Henson”), of the LSP, testified that he
administered the Intoxilyzer for Carter. He explained that to administer the
test, he instructs people to blow air into the Intoxilyzer tube for several
seconds; if the person expels air with enough force, the Intoxilyzer will
indicate a sufficient breath was given to capture a sample. Tpr. Henson
noted that the more impaired a person is, there is an increased difficulty in
providing a sufficient sample. After he reviewed the video of Carter’s
Intoxilyzer test, Tpr. Henson testified Carter was argumentative,
uncooperative, and struggled to expel a sufficient amount of air to yield a
proper result. Tpr. Henson stated that during the second administration, the
Intoxilyzer indicated that Carter’s BAC was .256 grams percent. On cross- 5 examination, Tpr. Henson clarified that the Intoxilyzer functioned properly
at all times and Carter’s speech was not severely slurred so he understood
what Carter said during the administration.
Mark Troha (“Troha”), an EMT paramedic for Northeast Louisiana
Ambulance Service, testified he was dispatched to the Civic Center to assist
with injuries related to a hit-and-run. Troha stated when he approached
Lampley, she was in a ditch across from the Civic Center and appeared as
though she had been run over, with open wounds and bones protruding from
her leg. Troha stated the area was “pitch black” and he had to use phone
lights from pedestrians at the scene and the light he brought with him, but
transported Lampley to a nearby baseball field for better lighting to properly
treat her injuries.
Troha testified that in his cursory examination of Lampley, there was
no evidence she was intoxicated because she was alert, could provide her
name, date, and location, but he noted Lampley was in a lot of pain. In his
review of the extent of Lampley’s injuries, Troha testified Lampley had a
visibly open hole in her left leg where the bone broke through the skin and
re-entered the body; the bone in her right leg was exposed and protruded
outward; and he was unable to put her leg in a splint because body tissue
immediately began to fall when her pant leg was cut. Troha testified that
Lampley was labeled as a trauma patient and was administered 100
micrograms of Fentanyl, which he noted was about 50 times more potent
than morphine and could have made Lampley appear to be intoxicated later.
6 Finally, Kerry Johnson (“Johnson”),of LSP’s Applied Technology
Unit,1 was entered as an expert witness regarding Intoxilyzers and breath
analysis. Johnson primarily testified that he repairs, inspects, and certifies
Intoxilyzers. Johnson explained that in general, some factors can prevent
Intoxilyzers from yielding a result; however, the instrument notifies the
administrator of any error and no test can be given until the issue is resolved.
Johnson stated that the Intoxilyzer issued to the Delhi Police Department
was fairly new, was checked for calibration every four months, and the
instrument itself is self-checking. Regarding the Intoxilyzer administered to
Carter, Johnson stated the instrument was functioning properly eight days
before and the day it was administered to Carter. After Johnson viewed the
video of Carter using the Intoxilyzer, Johnson stated that nothing indicated
the test was administered improperly, and Carter’s results yielded a result of
.256 grams percent, three times the legal limit.
After the State rested, Carter testified on his behalf.2 First, Carter
acknowledged his previous criminal history, which consisted of a 2016
misdemeanor conviction for disturbing the peace. Carter then testified that
his sister hosted the party at the Civic Center. He stated he had only been at
the party for a few hours before he decided to leave after an argument with
some men at the party. Carter explained that after he left the parking lot, he
drove to the stop sign at the end of the road, pressed the gas pedal too hard,
1 Eugene Williams, an officer in the same unit, testified that the Intoxilyzers have built-in mechanisms to detect if anything interfered with the results. He also confirmed that the Intoxilyzer issued to the Delhi Police Department was functioning properly and yielded accurate results.
2 Defense counsel recalled Lampley, who admitted she filed an insurance claim against Carter, but was informed Carter did not have insurance. Lampley stated she never received any money for her injuries or damages to her car. 7 and lost control of the vehicle. He stated that he tried to gain control of the
vehicle but “fishtailed” instead. Carter stated that because it was dark, he
thought he hit a ditch and left the scene.
Carter stated that after he left, he noticed a car followed him, so he
stopped at his aunt’s home and returned to the Civic Center when the car
passed him because he thought something was wrong. He stated that when
he got back to the parking lot, Officer Williams pulled him over and arrested
him. Carter testified that after he was released, he never filed a report with
his insurance company because his vehicle was not damaged, and he was
never contacted about property damage stemming from the night in question.
Carter then admitted he offered to pay Lampley’s medical bills and asked
her to drop the charges against him; he explained that he believed Lampley
was the only one who could help him and his offer was a “good-faith
showing.”
On cross-examination, Carter stated he was sober when the incident
occurred, he only had one cup of punch while at the party, and the two open
bottles of alcohol Officer Williams found belonged to his brother. He then
acknowledged that his Intoxilyzer results yielded a BAC of .256 grams
percent. Carter admitted that there were cars parked on either side of the
road and there were a lot of people at the party, but maintained that he never
saw anyone outside. Carter admitted he had headlights on, but stated it was
dark and did not realize he hit Lampley or her car. Carter reiterated he went
back to the Civic Center because he felt something was wrong. Carter stated
that he noticed that an officer followed him, but he did not pull over because
the officer did not activate his lights.
8 After closing arguments, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict
for both charges. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed
Lampley’s impact statement and Carter’s PSI and letter to the court. The
trial court explained that although Carter’s criminal history consisted only of
a misdemeanor conviction and a misdemeanor charge, it noted that
Lampley’s injuries were severe and several aspects of her life were now
significantly impaired. Moreover, the trial court highlighted that Carter
never expressed remorse for his actions and his letter submitted to the court
focused only on the hardships and difficulties he would face.
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Carter to five years at hard labor
for the first count and 10 years at hard labor for the second count, with each
sentence to be served concurrently. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the case in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658
(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,
158 L.Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17),
245 So. 3d 224, writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797. The
Jackson standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does
not afford appellate courts with a means to substitute its own appreciation of
the evidence for that of the fact finder. Steines, supra.
9 The Jackson standard also applies in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. An appellate court which reviews the sufficiency
of the evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence
by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
When the direct evidence is viewed as such, the facts established by the
direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that
evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of
the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983).
Likewise, if a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence,
that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.
R.S. 15:438; see also, State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244
So. 3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. The
appellate court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently
reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d
417; State v. Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584, writ
not cons., 12-0062 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1256.
In the absence of any internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict
with physical evidence, the testimony of the witness, if believed by the trier
of fact, alone is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v.
Elkins, 48,972 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 138 So. 3d 769, writ denied, 14-
0992 (La. 12/8/14), 153 So. 3d 438; State v. Wiltcher, 41,981 (La. App. 2
Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So. 2d 769. Where there is conflicting testimony
concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a 10 determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the
weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36, 180 (La. App.
2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So.
2d 1255. The appellate court neither assesses the credibility of witnesses nor
reweighs evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.
Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to
accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.
Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-
3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422.
Here, Carter was charged with one count of first degree vehicular
negligent injuring, and one count of hit-and-run driving resulting in death or
serious bodily injury. Regarding count one, La. R.S. 14:39.2 provides:
A. First degree vehicular negligent injuring is the inflicting of serious bodily injury upon the person of a human being when caused proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other means of conveyance whenever any of the following conditions exists:
(1) The offender is under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
(2) The offender’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.08 percent or more by weight based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
To establish that an offender committed either vehicular homicide or first
degree vehicular negligent injuring, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the offender’s unlawful blood alcohol concentration at
the time of the accident, combined with his operation of a vehicle, caused
serious bodily injury to someone. La. R.S. 14:39.2; State v. Louis-Juste,
50,806 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 201 So. 3d 308; State v. Christophe, 12-82
11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/12), 102 So. 3d 935, writ denied, 12-2432 (La.
4/19/13), 111 So. 3d 1029.
Here, Carter does not contest that he was driving or that he was under
the influence at the time of the accident. Therefore, the only matter at issue
is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter’s
intoxication was the cause of Lampley’s injuries as a result of the accident.
La. R.S. 14:39.2 further requires the State to establish a causal connection
between the defendant’s unlawful blood alcohol concentration and the
victim’s injuries. Causation is a question of fact to be considered in light of
the totality of circumstances surrounding the ultimate harm and its relation
to the prohibited conduct. State v. Louis-Juste, supra.
In brief, Carter asserts that Lampley having drunk half a daiquiri
contributed to her injuries. However, Lampley testified that although she
drank on the night of the accident, she did not “feel the effects” of the drink.
Moreover, Troha testified that one of his first tasks was to determine
whether Lampley was intoxicated before he could administer any
medication. In his assessment, Troha testified there was no evidence
Lampley was intoxicated as she was alert and could answer several
questions including her name, date, and location.
Carter further asserts that the area around the Convention Center was
“pitch black” so he did not realize he hit Lampley or her vehicle but was
under the impression he ran into a ditch. Although Troha confirmed there
was little lighting at the scene of the accident, Carter testified his headlights
were on during that time and no testimony was presented that there were any
obstacles or roadblocks thwarting Carter’s ability to see clearly; as such, he
should have reasonably been able to see if any pedestrians or other obstacles 12 were on the roadway. Moreover, Finley testified that she witnessed Carter
speeding and swerving, and at one point, witnessed him run off the side of
the road. Likewise, Officer Williams testified that he also witnessed Carter
swerving, could smell a strong odor of alcohol on Carter, observed two open
bottles of alcohol in Carter’s vehicle, and importantly, noted that Carter was
so impaired he stumbled getting out of his vehicle and was unable to safely
perform a field sobriety test.
Given Carter’s excessive BAC, eyewitness testimony that Carter was
swerving while driving, and that Carter had his headlights so he could see
his surroundings, we find that the evidence presented was sufficient to
support the jury’s conclusion that but for Carter’s intoxication, Lampley’s
injuries would not have occurred.
Regarding count two, La. R.S. 14:100 provides:
A. Hit and run driving is the intentional failure of the driver of a vehicle involved in or causing any accident, to stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, to give his identity, and to render reasonable aid.
B. For the purposes of this Section:
(1) “To give his identity,” means that the driver of any vehicle involved in any accident shall give his name, address, and the license number of his vehicle, or shall report the accident to the police.
(2) “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.
In this case, it has been established that Carter operated a motor
vehicle and was involved in the accident that caused Lampley’s injuries.
Moreover, Lampley, Hale, and Finley all testified that after Carter collided
with Lampley, he never stopped to render any form of aid or identify 13 himself. Moreover, Carter also testified that he never got out of his vehicle
to see what happened, but instead, reversed and left the scene. Although
Carter eventually returned to the Convention Center parking lot, he testified
that he only did so because he thought something was wrong and not to
identify himself as the person who struck Lampley.
Carter maintains that he was unaware he ever hit a person but was
under the impression he hit a ditch. However, at trial, Carter stated that at
the time of the accident, he was aware there was a party with a significant
number of people in attendance in a poorly lit environment with cars parked
on either side of the road. Given this, we find there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to conclude that Carter knew or should have known that he struck
Lampley with his vehicle. It is uncontroverted that Carter failed to exit his
vehicle, identify himself, or render aid; moreover, there was no justification
for Carter in failing to check his surroundings under these circumstances.
After a review of the evidence and testimony presented, we find that
the jury did not err in rejecting Carter’s claim, as there was more than
sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to conclude that all of the
essential elements for Carter’s convictions were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
Excessive Sentence
By his second assignment of error, Carter argues that his sentences are
excessive and in violation of the 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Carter alleges that his concurrent sentences were
not particularized to him as an offender with a criminal record that consists
only of a “few misdemeanor charges, and a misdemeanor conviction for
disturbing the peace.” He further argues that his sentences were not “within 14 the limits of appropriate sentences for similar crimes,” i.e., that maximum
sentences for these offenses have typically been imposed in cases where the
defendant had a significant history of a similar prior offense.
Appellate review to determine whether a sentence is constitutionally
excessive is a two-pronged inquiry whereby the first considers whether the
trial court took cognizance of the guidelines set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art.
894.1, and the second considers constitutional excessiveness. State v. Wing,
51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711. However, in this case,
no motion to reconsider sentence was filed; therefore, this Court’s review is
limited to the constitutional excessiveness of the sentence alone. La. C. Cr.
P. art. 881.1; State v. Williams, 51,667 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 245 So. 3d
131, writ not cons., 18-0017 (La. 8/3/18), 248 So. 3d 322; State v. Turner,
50,221 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/20/16), 186 So. 3d 720, writ denied, 16-0283 (La.
2/10/17), 215 So. 3d 700.
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 01-
2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1; State v. Mandigo, 48,801 (La. App. 2 Cir.
2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 292, writ denied, 14-0630 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d
600. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime
and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the
sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.
State v. Wing, supra. The trial court maintains wide discretion in the
imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and absent a showing of
manifest abuse, an imposed sentence will not be set aside as excessive. State
v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081. 15 Therefore, appellate review does not consider whether another
sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused
its discretion. State v. Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d
1031; State v. Davis, 50,149 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 200.
Regarding Carter’s conviction for first degree negligent injuring, La.
R.S. 14:39.2(D) provides:
Whoever commits the crime of first degree vehicular negligent injuring shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years, or both.
Further, with respect to his conviction for hit-and-run driving resulting in
death or serious bodily injury, La. R.S. 14:100(C)(2) provides:
Whoever commits the crime of hit-and-run driving, when death or serious bodily injury is a direct result of the accident and when the driver knew or should have known that death or serious bodily injury has occurred, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than ten years, or both.
After a review of the record and consideration of the facts of the instant case,
we are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Carter.
The record in this case reflects that the trial court appropriately
sentenced Carter; namely, the trial court fully complied with the factors
enumerated in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, finding that there were no mitigating
factors present, and noting a number of aggravating factors, including
Carter’s “extreme impairment” as evidenced by his BAC of .256 grams
percent, three times the legal limit. The trial court also noted that Carter’s
“complete disregard [for] the safety or well-being of others” ultimately
resulted in the “extremely serious life-threatening injuries” and “serious
permanent disfigurement” Lampley suffered. 16 Further, the trial court reviewed Carter’s social history, PSI, and
several letters written on Carter’s behalf. The trial court acknowledged that
Carter’s criminal history consisted of misdemeanor charges and a
misdemeanor conviction; however, the trial court determined that because of
Carter’s actions during and after the incident, a lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of his actions. Given that Carter expressed no true
remorse for his actions, as evidenced in his letter to the court which
primarily focused on the detriment he and his family would suffer without
ever expressing concern for the burden Lampley and her family would have
to endure, we agree with the trial court’s ruling.
Moreover, we note that when Carter did contact Lampley, it was to
convince her to drop the charges filed against him and to offer Lampley
money for her medical expenses, which she never received. In reviewing
the totality of the facts of this case, this court finds that in light of Carter’s
excessive BAC, lack of remorse for his careless behavior, the extent and
measure of Lampley’s injuries, and that Carter’s sentences fall within the
statutory range for both offenses, Carter’s sentences are neither grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the offenses, nor do they shock the sense of
justice.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing these sentences, and this assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Carter’s convictions and sentences
are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.