IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 94 /05-0581
Filed December 15, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
ROBERT EDWIN DOHLMAN,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, Bryan H.
McKinley, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a district court finding that he failed to
establish he was a wrongfully imprisoned person. AFFIRMED.
Judith M. O’Donohoe of Elwood, O’Donohoe, Stochl, Braun &
Churbuck, Charles City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, and Mark L. Walk, County Attorney, for appellee. 2
WIGGINS, Justice.
In this case, we must decide whether Robert Dohlman proved he
was a wrongfully imprisoned person under chapter 663A of the Iowa
Code (Supp. 1997). 1 The district court found Dohlman was not a
wrongfully imprisoned person because he did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he did not commit the offenses for which he
was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned or that any person, including
himself, did not commit these offenses. In our review of the record, we
find substantial evidence supports this finding and affirm the judgment
of the district court. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In the early morning hours of December 6, 1998, Dohlman’s
vehicle collided with a van driven by Jessica Sweeney. The collision
caused the death of her husband and passenger, James Sweeney. The
collision also caused Jessica to suffer a broken vertebra and multiple
fractures in her arm.
The State charged Dohlman with homicide by vehicle, in violation
of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1); homicide by vehicle, in violation of Iowa
Code section 707.6A(2)(a); and two counts of serious injury by vehicle, in
violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(4). A jury convicted Dohlman of all
four charges and the court sentenced Dohlman to a term of
imprisonment. Although Dohlman appealed his conviction, he began
serving his sentence immediately because under Iowa law he was
ineligible for bail. See Iowa Code § 811.1(2) (providing a defendant
Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to Code sections are to the 1997 Iowa 1
Code Supplement. 3
appealing a conviction for a class “B” felony under section 707.6A shall
not be admitted to bail during the pendency of the appeal).
We transferred Dohlman’s appeal to our court of appeals. It
reversed his convictions finding there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Dohlman was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Dohlman, No. 01-1873, 2002 WL 31882998, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 2002). The State filed a request for further review, which we
denied. After serving approximately one year and five months of his
sentence, the State released Dohlman from custody. Dohlman then filed an application for entry of order re wrongful
imprisonment under chapter 663A. The district court found Dohlman
did not prove under section 663A.1(2) that he did not commit the
offenses for which he was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned or that
any person, including himself, did not commit these offenses. Dohlman
now appeals the district court judgment holding he was not a wrongfully
imprisoned person under chapter 663A.
II. Issue.
We must decide whether substantial evidence supports the district
court’s determination that Dohlman did not prove the requirements of
section 663A.1(2) by clear and convincing evidence.
III. Scope of Review.
This court’s function is not to invalidate the district court’s factual
findings if substantial evidence supports its findings. Fischer v. City of
Sioux City, 695 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2005). We consider evidence as
substantial if a reasonable person would accept the evidence as adequate
to reach the district court’s conclusion. Nash Finch Co. v. City of Cedar
Rapids, 672 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 2003). “Evidence is not 4
insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from
[the evidence]; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding
actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different
finding.” Fischer, 695 N.W.2d at 34 (citations omitted).
Therefore, “[w]hen the challenge to the district court’s ruling is lack
of substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment” and “we liberally construe the district court’s findings to
uphold, rather than defeat, the result reached.” Tim O’Neill Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1996) (citation omitted).
“However, neither the district court’s conclusions of law nor its
application of its legal conclusions is binding on appeal.” Fischer, 695
N.W.2d at 34 (citations omitted). Our review is for correction of errors at
law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. IV. Statutory Framework.
Dohlman sought a finding that he was a wrongfully imprisoned
person under chapter 663A of the Iowa Code. The first step in qualifying
as a wrongfully imprisoned person requires an individual to meet the
following criteria:
1. As used in this section, a “wrongfully imprisoned person” means an individual who meets all of the following criteria:
a. The individual was charged, by indictment or information, with the commission of a public offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.
b. The individual did not plead guilty to the public offense charged, or to any lesser included offense, but was convicted by the court or by a jury of an offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.
c. The individual was sentenced to incarceration for a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years if the offense 5
was an aggravated misdemeanor or to an indeterminate term of years under chapter 902 if the offense was a felony, as a result of the conviction.
d. The individual’s conviction was vacated or dismissed, or was reversed, and no further proceedings can be or will be held against the individual on any facts and circumstances alleged in the proceedings which had resulted in the conviction.
e. The individual was imprisoned solely on the basis of the conviction that was vacated, dismissed, or reversed and on which no further proceedings can be or will be had.
Iowa Code § 663A.1(1).
If these criteria are met, the court then proceeds to the second
inquiry: whether that person meets the requirements of section
663A.1(2). Section 663A.1(2) provides:
2. Upon receipt of an order vacating, dismissing, or reversing the conviction and sentence in a case for which no further proceedings can be or will be held against an individual on any facts and circumstances alleged in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction, the district court shall make a determination whether there is clear and convincing evidence to establish either of the following findings:
a. That the offense for which the individual was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned, including any lesser included offenses, was not committed by the individual.
b. That the offense for which the individual was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned was not committed by any person, including the individual.
Id. § 663A.1(2). If the criteria of both section 663A.1(1) and section
663A.1(2) are met, the individual qualifies as a wrongfully imprisoned
person. Id. § 663A.1(3)(a).
The parties agree Dohlman met the criteria of section 663A.1(1).
The parties disagree as to whether Dohlman met his burden of proof 6
under section 663A.1(2). Therefore, the resolution of this appeal
depends on our construction of Iowa Code section 663A.1(2).
When confronted with the task of statutory interpretation, we have
stated:
The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said. Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used. Under the guise of construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute.
Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004)
(citations omitted). Additionally, legislative intent is derived not only
from the language used but also from “the statute’s ‘subject matter, the
object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying
policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various
interpretations.’ ” Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004)
(citations omitted). When ascertaining legislative intent, the legislative
history of a statute is also instructive. State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60,
62 (Iowa 1999); Richards v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 362 N.W.2d 486, 488
(Iowa 1985); see also Iowa Code § 4.6(3) (1997) (stating the court may
consider the legislative history of an ambiguous statute in determining
legislative intent).
The plain language of section 663A.1(2) requires a person to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the person did not commit the
originally charged offenses or the offenses were not committed by any
person, including himself. “Commit” means to do or to perform an act.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 457 (unabr. ed. 2002). 7
Thus, the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature indicates
section 663A.1(2) requires proof the person did not do the offense or the
facts establish an offense was not done by anyone.
The legislative history supports this plain meaning interpretation
of section 663A.1(2). First, in the explanation of the bill, the committee
on the judiciary stated the purpose of the bill is to provide damages to
a person who was charged with, convicted of, and sentenced to serve a term of incarceration[,] . . . and whose conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed either because the offense was committed by another person or the offense was a fabrication. H.F. 674 Explanation, 77th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1997)
(emphasis added).
Second, the proposed legislation had a fiscal impact, requiring a
statement on the fiscal impact of the bill prior to conducting any debate
on the bill. Joint Rules of the Senate and House, H.R.J. Res. 3, 77th
Gen. Assemb., R. 17 (Iowa 1997). The fiscal impact statement for the bill
contained the assumption that “[a]pproximately one case per year is
reversed because of insufficient evidence. It is assumed that cases
meeting the requirements of this Bill would occur less frequently.” H.F.
674 Fiscal Note, 77th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1997) (emphasis
added). After receiving the fiscal impact statement, the house and senate
passed the bill. We assume one of the reasons the legislature passed the
bill is because of the fiscal statement and its assumption. State v. Allen,
708 N.W.2d 361, 367 (Iowa 2006).
Therefore, considering the plain meaning of the statute and its
legislative history, in order for a person to qualify for the benefits
afforded by section 663A.1(2), the person must prove by clear and 8
convincing evidence: (1) the person did not do the offense for which the
person was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned; or (2) the offense for
which the person was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned was not
done by anyone.
V. Analysis.
Dohlman asserts the reversal of his convictions by the court of
appeals in and of itself proves the requirements of section 663A.1(2) by
clear and convincing evidence. He argues this assertion in two different
ways. First, he argues because the court of appeals reviewed his
conviction in the light most favorable to the State, that review is more
closely aligned with his clear and convincing burden rather than the
burden used at his criminal trial, requiring the State to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he argues the court of appeals’
finding of insufficient evidence to support his convictions is controlling
law for purposes of section 663A.1(2) under the law-of-the-case doctrine.
These two arguments are essentially the same argument made in
two different ways. The only law of the case found by the court of
appeals is its legal finding that when it viewed the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding that Dohlman was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We
disagree the reversal of Dohlman’s convictions by the court of appeals
proves his claim under section 663A.1(2).
Section 663A.1(2) requires a person to prove by clear and
convincing evidence: (1) the person did not commit the offense for which
the person was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned; or (2) the offense
for which the person was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned was not 9
committed by anyone. An appellate court finding that there is not
substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction does not meet the
requirements of section 663A.1(2). See Vasquez v. New York, 693
N.Y.S.2d 220, 220 (N.Y. 1999) (holding a reversal of the underlying
criminal conviction does not establish innocence by clear and convincing
evidence); Reed v. State, 574 N.E.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. 1991) (finding a
reversal of the underlying criminal conviction is not equivalent to a
finding of innocence in a subsequent civil proceeding for wrongful
imprisonment involving a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt); Walden v. Ohio, 547 N.E.2d 962, 966 (Ohio 1989) (stating “[a]s a
general rule, a verdict or judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial is a
determination that the state has not met its burden of proof on the
essential elements of the crime[, i]t is not necessarily a finding that the
accused is innocent” for purposes of a wrongful imprisonment claim); Le
Fevre v. Goodland, 19 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Wis. 1945) (finding a
determination that the state’s evidence was insufficient to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is not equal to finding the
defendant is innocent beyond a reasonable doubt). Such a finding by an
appellate court only means when the court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact cannot find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Nitcher, 720
N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006).
Therefore, under either of Dohlman’s arguments, a finding by our
court of appeals that the evidence was insufficient to support Dohlman’s
conviction does not in and of itself preclude a court from determining
whether Dohlman proved the requirements of section 663A.1(2) by clear
and convincing evidence. 10
Next, Dohlman asserts even if the court of appeals reversal does
not in and of itself meet his burden of proof, there is insufficient evidence
in the record to support the district court’s finding that he did not prove
the requirements of section 663A.1(2). To address this assertion, it is
necessary to discuss the offenses for which Dohlman was convicted,
sentenced, and imprisoned.
Dohlman was convicted of homicide by vehicle, in violation of Iowa
Code section 707.6A(1); homicide by vehicle, in violation of Iowa Code
section 707.6A(2)(a); and two counts of serious injury by vehicle, in
violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(4). A person commits the crime of
homicide by vehicle, in violation of section 707.6A(1) when “the person
unintentionally causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, as prohibited by section 321J.2.” Iowa Code
§ 707.6A(1). Section 321J.2 provides in relevant part:
1. A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions:
a. While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug or a combination of such substances.
b. While having an alcohol concentration as defined in section 321J.1 of .10 or more.
Id. § 321J.2.
The crime of homicide by vehicle in violation of section 707.6A(2)(a)
is committed “when the person unintentionally causes the death of
another by . . . [d]riving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful
or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, in violation of
section 321.277.” Id. § 707.6A(2)(a). Section 321.277 provides that
“[a]ny person who drives any vehicle in such manner as to indicate either 11
a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is
guilty of reckless driving.” Id. § 321.277 (1997).
The crime of serious injury by vehicle, in violation of section
707.6A(4), is committed “when the person unintentionally causes a
serious injury, as defined in section 321J.1, subsection 8 by any of the
means described in [section 707.6A(1) or (2)(a)].” Id. § 707.6A(4). Section
321J.1(8) defines serious injury as
a bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ or major bodily member, or which causes the loss of any bodily member.
Id. § 321J.1(8) (1997).
Because the undisputed record establishes Dohlman
unintentionally caused the death of James Sweeney and serious injury to
Jessica Sweeney at the time of the collision, he must prove by clear and
convincing evidence he was neither driving while intoxicated nor driving
his motor vehicle in a reckless manner to establish he was a wrongfully
imprisoned person.
The record establishes after a day of deer hunting, Dohlman
consumed numerous alcoholic beverages at various locations. The fatal
accident occurred at approximately 1:30 a.m. After the accident, the
authorities transported Dohlman to the local hospital for a blood test. At
5:04 a.m., a nurse drew a sample of his blood. The authorities sent the
sample to the department of criminal investigation (DCI). The DCI tested
the blood sample and determined Dohlman’s blood alcohol level to be
.036 at the time it was drawn. 12
At trial, a criminologist from the DCI applied the science of
retrograde extrapolation to determine Dohlman’s blood alcohol at the
time of the accident. Retrograde extrapolation determines how much
alcohol a person’s body metabolizes between the time a blood sample is
drawn and some prior time, such as the time of an accident. An
averaged metabolized amount is then added to the blood alcohol level
established by the initial test to approximate a person’s blood alcohol at
a prior time. After applying the science of retrograde extrapolation, the
criminologist opined at the time of the accident Dohlman’s blood alcohol
level was between .081 and .096. The criminologist also opined a driver’s
judgment, control, and reaction time begins to be impaired when a blood
alcohol level reaches .05. Finally, the criminologist testified once a blood
alcohol level reaches .08 most drivers’ driving skills are measurably
impaired.
In its review, the court of appeals concluded when it considered
both the expert and lay testimony as to Dohlman’s intoxication the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ conclusion, the evidence of
intoxication still supports the district court finding that Dohlman failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence he did not commit the offenses
for which he was charged.
At the time of the accident, a person operated a vehicle while
intoxicated by driving the vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage or when the driver operated the vehicle with an alcohol
concentration of .10 or more. Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(a), (b). Although
the record does not establish Dohlman’s blood alcohol level to be .10 or 13
more, the testimony of the criminologist is substantial evidence
indicating a person driving a vehicle with a blood alcohol level above .05
is under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. The criminologist
testified Dohlman’s blood alcohol level was between .081 and .096 at the
time of the accident.
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to uphold the
district court’s judgment, this evidence supports the district court’s
conclusion that Dohlman had not proved by clear and convincing
evidence that he was not driving while intoxicated at the time of the
accident. Accordingly, Dohlman failed to prove he did not commit the
offenses of homicide by vehicle under section 706A.1 and serious injury
by vehicle under section 706A.4. Therefore, we are required to affirm the
district court’s finding that Dohlman did not meet the requirements of
section 663A.1(2) by clear and convincing evidence. Under section 663A.1(2), wrongfully imprisoned person status only
applies if a person can prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) he did
not commit the offenses for which he was convicted, sentenced, and
imprisoned; or (2) the offenses for which he was convicted, sentenced,
and imprisoned were not committed by anyone. In most cases, this
status will apply to a person who is completely exonerated of the crime
for which he was imprisoned, or if it is determined the victim fabricated
that crime. Dohlman’s failure to meet this heavy burden prevents the
district court from entering an order classifying him as a wrongfully
imprisoned person. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. 14
VI. Conclusion and Disposition.
Because substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding
that Dohlman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence he did not
commit the offenses for which he was convicted, sentenced, and
imprisoned or that any person, including himself, did not commit these
offenses, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Hecht and Appel, JJ., who take no part.