IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 25 / 04-1327
Filed May 19, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JESSE LEE SIMMONS,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County, James S.
Heckerman (motion to suppress), Timothy O’Grady (trial), and J.C. Irvin
(sentencing), Judges.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for manufacturing
methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2003).
AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, Richard Davidson, County Attorney, and Paul Walter and
Tony Almquist, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee. 2
WIGGINS, Justice.
The defendant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine
in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2003). In this appeal, the
defendant challenges the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress as
to the items seized from his apartment and the statements he made to
police officers. Additionally, he claims his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the constitutionality of a
sentencing statute, Iowa Code section 901.10(2). Because we find the
defendant’s claims are without merit, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
At approximately 11:37 p.m. on December 3, 2003, police officer
Jesse Hitt responded to a complaint of loud music coming from apartment
eight of Parkview Apartments in Clarinda, Iowa. The access to the
apartments is from the outside, requiring Hitt to go up an outside set of
stairs and then enter a door into a hallway where the apartments are
located. While he was at apartment eight, Hitt smelled what he suspected
to be anhydrous ammonia coming from apartment nine across the hall. Hitt did not perceive an emergency to prompt him to evacuate the
apartment building when he first detected the odor. Hitt went to the police
station and contacted lieutenant Keith Brothers at his home at
approximately 12:08 a.m. Having safety concerns for the tenants of the
apartment building and fearful of a potential fire or explosion, Brothers
advised Hitt to contact sergeant David Rine, a state-certified clandestine
methamphetamine lab expert. Brothers wanted Hitt and Rine to go to the
apartment building so Rine could verify the odor as that of anhydrous
ammonia. Brothers further advised Hitt if Rine believed a working 3
methamphetamine lab was inside the apartment, he should knock,
announce, and make entry without a warrant.
Hitt contacted Rine at his home and they met at the police station.
They and another officer went to the apartment building at 12:43 a.m. Rine
confirmed the odor in the hallway was that of anhydrous ammonia. Rine
was not aware of any legitimate purpose for possessing anhydrous ammonia
in an apartment, but he knew it is used to manufacture methamphetamine.
Rine also knew the risks created by a methamphetamine laboratory include
fires created from the fumes, chemical exposures, inhalation exposures
from the toxic fumes, and waste products left over from the chemical
reactions. Rine further knew these risks not only affect the people making
the methamphetamine, but also affect other residents in a multiple-
occupant dwelling. Hitt knocked on the door and a woman asked who was there. Hitt
announced it was the police. The woman then asked what they wanted.
Hitt responded they were there for a safety check because they could smell
anhydrous ammonia, and said the door needed to be opened immediately.
Receiving no response, Hitt knocked again because the officers could hear something in the apartment, and advised her to open the door or they
would force it open. At this time, Rine became concerned about the strong
odor of anhydrous ammonia. Rine did not know whether there was a
working methamphetamine lab or a container leaking anhydrous ammonia.
He was worried about the safety of the occupants of the apartment as well
as the safety of the other occupants of the building.
Again receiving no response from the occupants of the apartment, the
officers forcibly entered the apartment with guns drawn. The odor of
anhydrous ammonia was strong. The officers observed Cindy Cordell 4
standing in the middle of the room and ordered her to get down on the floor.
The defendant, Jesse Lee Simmons, walked into the room from the back of
the apartment. Rine had his gun pointed at Simmons. The strong smell of
anhydrous ammonia caused Rine’s eyes to water. Rine asked Simmons if
there was an active methamphetamine lab in the apartment. Simmons
responded there was. Rine asked where the lab was located and Simmons
told him it was in the bathroom. Rine then asked what stage it was in to
determine the chemicals and risks involved. Simmons answered by stating
the lab was in the first rinse stage, the lab belonged to him, and Cordell was
not involved with the lab. The officers handcuffed Cordell and Simmons, removed them from the
apartment, and gave them decontamination suits to wear. Due to the risk
of chemical exposure, Rine was unable to conduct a safety sweep of the
apartment at that time. He was not concerned about other individuals
being in the apartment because either Cordell or Simmons told him no one
else was in the apartment. Rine closed the door to the apartment. The
officers also evacuated the occupants of apartment eight.
Rine then contacted dispatch, performed a perimeter sweep of the building for other risks, and discussed a possible evacuation of the
remainder of the building with the fire chief. He reentered the apartment in
protective gear with a second lab tech to conduct a safety sweep and remove
the containers and chemicals from the apartment. Upon reentry, Rine
tested the anhydrous ammonia levels in the apartment. The levels were
almost three times the acceptable OSHA levels for short-term exposure.
The officers found, among other items, a glass one-gallon container in the
bathtub containing a bluish tinted liquid, a funnel, and a blue shop towel.
There was also some off-white sludge residue in the bathtub. The officers 5
removed these items and preserved them as evidence. After neutralizing the
problem in the apartment by removing the hazardous items and ventilating
the apartment, the officers left the apartment and waited for Brothers’
instructions.
Brothers arrived at the apartment building twenty to thirty minutes
after the initial entry into the apartment. Simmons was in handcuffs and
accompanied by an officer. Upon seeing Simmons, Brothers said, “[H]ello,
Jesse, what’s going on.” Simmons responded by repeating what he told
Rine, that the lab was all his and Cordell had nothing to do with it. Later,
Brothers talked to Simmons again. This conversation took place in a police
car. After Brothers advised Simmons of his Miranda rights, Simmons again
stated the lab was his and Cordell had nothing to do with it. Brothers talked to Cordell when she was in a police car. Brothers
asked her to consent to a search of the apartment. She eventually did so
after some discussion between her and Brothers. After receiving Cordell’s
consent, Rine entered the apartment for a third time and collected non-
hazardous items used in the methamphetamine-making process.
Simmons was charged with two counts: (1) conspiring or acting with others to manufacture, deliver, or possess more than five grams of a
schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to
manufacture or deliver in the presence of a minor and within one thousand
feet of certain real property, in violation of Iowa Code sections
124.401(1)(b)(7), 124.401A, and 124.401C(1), (2)(b)-(c), 2(e); and (2)
unlawful possession of a precursor substance in violation of Iowa Code
section 124.401(4)(b). The State filed an amendment to the trial information
alleging Simmons was a habitual offender in count two in violation of Iowa
Code sections 902.8 and 902.9(3). 6
Simmons pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress evidence and
a waiver of jury trial. He subsequently filed an amended motion to
suppress. The district court overruled the motion to suppress.
The parties submitted the case to the court based on the minutes of
testimony in order to preserve Simmons’ right to appeal the suppression
ruling. The State agreed to amend count one by deleting all enhancing
charges and dismiss count two. The court found Simmons guilty of
manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section
124.401(1)(b)(7), a class “B” felony. The court sentenced Simmons to a term
of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years. Simmons appeals. II. Issues.
There are two issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in
overruling Simmons’ motion to suppress evidence as to the search of the
apartment and the statements made to officers; and (2) whether Simmons’
trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel in regards to the failure
to challenge the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 901.10(2).
III. Scope of Review.
The first issue presented in this case is whether the district court erred in not suppressing certain physical evidence and statements.
Simmons claims the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress based on the federal and state constitutions; therefore, our review
is de novo. State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa 2005). This review
requires us to “ ‘make an independent evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances as shown by the entire record.’ ” State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d
601, 606 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). We give deference to the factual
findings of the district court due to its opportunity to evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses, but we are not bound by such findings. Id. 7
The second issue presented in this case is whether Simmons’ trial
counsel provided effective assistance of counsel in regards to the failure to
challenge the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 901.10(2). Simmons
asserts his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the federal and
state constitutions. Although these claims are typically preserved for
postconviction relief actions, “we will address such claims on direct appeal
when the record is sufficient to permit a ruling.” State v. Wills, 696 N.W.2d
20, 22 (Iowa 2005). IV. Analysis.
A. The initial search of the apartment. Simmons asserts the initial
search of the apartment was in contravention of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment assures “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
Fourth Amendment is binding on the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal constitution. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 297.
Simmons also asserts the search violated article I, section 8 of the
Iowa Constitution. That section guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
seizures and searches shall not be violated.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 8.
“Because [Simmons] has not asserted and we have not found a basis to
distinguish the protection afforded by the Iowa Constitution from those
afforded by the federal constitution under the facts of this case, our
analysis applies equally to both the state and federal grounds.” State v.
Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 37 (Iowa 2005).
Unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists,
searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se 8
unreasonable. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 297. These exceptions include
“ ‘searches based on consent, plain view, probable cause coupled with
exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and those based on the
emergency aid exception.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
The State is required to prove a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. A court cannot admit
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. In
determining if one of the recognized exceptions is applicable, the court must
assess a police officer’s conduct based on an objective standard. Id. A
search’s legality does not depend on the actual motivations of the police
officers involved in the search. Id. We must first determine whether Simmons had a legitimate
expectation of privacy, both subjectively and objectively, in the premises
searched. State v. Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 562-63 (Iowa 2004). We make
this determination based on the unique facts of each case. Id. at 563. We
have said the Fourth Amendment clearly protects physical entry into one’s
home. Id. We have acknowledged a legitimate expectation of privacy may
extend to protect an overnight guest in the host’s home, but we have also recognized there is no legitimate expectation of privacy if a guest is there
simply to conduct a business transaction. Id.
Neither the State nor Simmons challenge Simmons’ legitimate
expectation of privacy in the apartment. At the time of the search,
Simmons claimed to be living with Cordell in the apartment for
approximately six weeks. Although he listed a friend’s address in his
application for court-appointed counsel, Simmons kept clothing and
personal belongings at the apartment. He testified he used his friend’s
address as a mailing address because he works on the road. Cordell 9
confirmed Simmons had lived in the apartment for six weeks and he kept
clothes and personal belongings there. Considering the circumstances of
this case in view of the values of the Fourth Amendment, Simmons did have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment.
Next, we must determine whether the State proved an exception to
the warrant requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. The State
contends probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances relieved the officers from the obligation to obtain a warrant. Probable cause to search
exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, “a person of reasonable
prudence would believe that evidence of a crime might be located on the
premises to be searched.” State v. Davis, 679 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Iowa 2004).
While it does not appear we have previously addressed the effect an
odor may have on probable cause to search under circumstances such as
those presented here, we have found probable cause in a somewhat similar
situation. See State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1984) (finding an
officer had sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle and its contents
based on the odor of marijuana drifting from the vehicle). The Supreme Court has discussed when the detection of an odor establishes sufficient probable cause for a magistrate to issue a search warrant. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440
(1948). There the Court stated:
If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive character.
Id. 10
In this case, Hitt smelled what he suspected to be anhydrous
ammonia. Not being an expert in the area of methamphetamine labs, Hitt
contacted his superior, Brothers, for instructions on how to proceed.
Brothers advised Hitt to meet with Rine, a state-certified clandestine
methamphetamine lab expert, to assess the situation. Rine, who had
experience in handling clandestine methamphetamine labs, determined the
distinctive odor in the hallway was in fact that of anhydrous ammonia.
Rine knew there was no legitimate purpose for possessing anhydrous
ammonia in an apartment and he knew it is used to manufacture
methamphetamine. Based on Rine’s training and experience, coupled with
the distinct odor of anhydrous ammonia and the lack of household uses for
it, we find the officers had probable cause to believe the occupants of the
apartment were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Clayton,
210 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding an officer’s perception of an odor
associated with methamphetamine production constituted probable cause
for a search); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding a chemical odor associated with the manufacturing of amphetamines, detected by an officer familiar with such odors through experience and training, may alone
establish probable cause); United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1137
(7th Cir. 1982) (finding an officer who is qualified to identify an odor, which
is sufficiently distinctive to identify the manufacture of methamphetamine,
may establish probable cause for a search warrant).
Finally, we must determine whether exigent circumstances existed to
allow the warrantless search. We have found exigent circumstances to exist
where a danger of violence and injury to officers or others is present. State
v. Holtz, 300 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Iowa 1981). When an exigency poses a 11
threat of danger to others, officers can perform a limited search to remove
the immediate risk. United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002).
The volatile nature of and the dangers created by methamphetamine
labs can be exigent circumstances justifying an immediate limited search of
premises harboring such a lab. Kleinholz v. United States, 339 F.3d 674,
677 (8th Cir. 2003). In this case, Rine’s confirmation of the odor as
anhydrous ammonia, its use in manufacturing methamphetamine, and the
risks created by a methamphetamine lab in a multiple-occupant dwelling support a finding of exigency. Numerous cases have upheld limited
searches conducted by officers without a warrant to eliminate the potential
hazards of a methamphetamine lab when the officers had probable cause to
believe they had discovered an ongoing methamphetamine lab. United
States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Walsh, 299 F.3d
at 734 (collecting precedent from other federal circuit courts of appeals).
Here, the testimony of the officers establishes the dangers of
methamphetamine manufacturing. Besides the risk of fire or explosion, the exposure to the fumes of anhydrous ammonia posed a serious threat to the persons manufacturing the drug, the officers who entered the apartment,
and the neighbors who were evacuated from their apartment across the
hall. During the initial search of the apartment, the officers conducted a
limited search, only removing the hazardous items that posed an immediate
threat. After determining the levels of anhydrous ammonia in the
apartment exceeded the acceptable OSHA levels for short-term exposure by
almost three times, the officers ventilated the apartment, left the apartment,
and waited for further instructions before entry was made for the third time. 12
Simmons argues the officers’ conduct in this case, such as the time
delay between Hitt’s detection and Rine’s confirmation of the odor, and the
lack of consideration to evacuate the other tenants before Rine’s
confirmation of the odor, was inconsistent with the claimed exigency. It is
possible that an officer’s conduct “which is in any way inconsistent with the
purported reason for the entry is a just cause for healthy skepticism by the
courts.” See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 6.6(a) (4th ed. 2004). However, Simmons’ argument
misses the mark here because an officer is required to have specific,
articulable grounds justifying a finding of exigency, and a warrantless
search’s legality is not determined by the subjective beliefs of the officer
involved. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 109 (Iowa 2001). Thus, the
alleged inconsistency of the officers’ actions in the instant case, which
supposedly evidences their subjective beliefs as to the lack of exigency of
the situation, is irrelevant to the objective assessment of whether the search
was reasonable based on exigent circumstances.
When Hitt first detected the odor of what he suspected was anhydrous ammonia, his lack of experience did not allow him to fully
comprehend the gravity of the situation. When he returned to the apartment building with Rine, the dangers of a working methamphetamine
lab continued to exist and nothing in this record suggests the exigency had
disappeared by the time Hitt and Rine arrived at the building. Moreover,
the conclusion that a bona fide exigency existed is supported by the officers’
conduct, which included removing Cordell and Simmons from the
apartment, giving them decontamination suits, evacuating the occupants of
apartment eight, discussing a possible evacuation of the remainder of the 13
building with the fire chief, and reentering the apartment in protective gear
to remove the hazardous items from the apartment.
Accordingly, there were exigent circumstances present in this case.
Therefore, the presence of probable cause coupled with exigent
circumstances makes the initial search of the apartment an exception to the
warrant requirement.
B. The first statements made by Simmons when the officers entered the
apartment. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The right against self-
incrimination applies to the states because it is incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606.
Before a person in custody may be interrogated, the person must be advised
as to the right to remain silent and the right to have appointed counsel
present. Id. at 607. These Miranda requirements do not come into play
unless both custody and interrogation are present. Id. Custodial
interrogation is defined as “ ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). In regards to custody, we use an objective test where the inquiry is
how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood
the situation. Id. In making this determination, we may consider “ ‘the
language used to summon the individual, the purpose, place and manner of
the interrogation, the extent to which the defendant is confronted with
evidence of his guilt, and whether the defendant is free to leave the place of
questioning.’ ” State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Iowa 1996) (citations 14
omitted). For purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding
Simmons was in custody at this time. We have recognized a public safety exception to the Miranda
requirements. State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 790-91 (Iowa 1994). Such
an exception exists where “the need for answers to questions in a situation
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic
rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632, 81 L. Ed.
2d 550, 558 (1984). The exception applies if the officer’s question is not
“designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.” Id. at 658-
59, 104 S. Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559.
When Rine entered the apartment, the strong odor of anhydrous
ammonia was present. This odor posed a safety risk to him, his fellow
officers, the occupants of the apartment, and the neighbors. At that point,
Rine did not know if an ignition source was available or if a fire or explosion
could occur. We conclude Rine’s inquiries as to the presence and status of
a methamphetamine lab were for the purpose of obtaining information that
would help him safely address the potentially volatile and dangerous situation confronting the officers at the scene, and not solely to obtain
incriminating information from Simmons. Therefore, Simmons’ admissions
in response to Rine’s inquiries are admissible in spite of the fact Rine did
not advise him of his Miranda rights.
C. The other statements made by Simmons to Brothers. Simmons
asserts the statements he made to Brothers while he was handcuffed and
accompanied by an officer are inadmissible due to Brothers’ failure to
advise him of his Miranda rights prior to Brothers stating to him, “[H]ello,
Jesse, what’s going on.” Simmons also asserts the statements he made to 15
Brothers in the police car after receiving his Miranda rights are also
inadmissible because there was no break in the causal connection between
the alleged illegal police actions and the statements obtained after Simmons
received his Miranda rights. Even if we assume without deciding these
statements were inadmissible, we find their admission was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. “In order for a constitutional error to be harmless, the court must be
able to declare it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Deases, 518
N.W.2d at 791. In assessing whether a constitutional error was harmless,
we have stated:
There are two steps in the harmless error analysis. We first consider all of the evidence the jury actually considered, and then we weigh the probative force of that evidence against the erroneously admitted evidence. The inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.
State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 493-94 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n.2.
Here, the statements Simmons gave to Brothers in each of the above
instances were substantially the same statements Simmons gave to Rine in
the apartment. We have already concluded Simmons’ statements to Rine
were admissible under the public safety exception to the Miranda
requirements. “If substantially the same evidence is in the record,
erroneously admitted evidence is not considered prejudicial.” Deases, 518
N.W.2d at 791. Consequently, the district court’s finding of guilt could not
be attributable to the second or third statements made to Brothers.
Therefore, any alleged error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 16
D. Evidence seized after Brothers obtained Cordell’s consent to search
the apartment. Simmons asserts the consent Cordell gave Brothers to enter
the apartment for a third time was not given voluntarily and the items
seized based on such consent should have been suppressed. Again, even if
we assume without deciding these items were inadmissible, their admission
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We have already determined the
containers and chemicals seized during the initial limited search were
admissible. The DCI Criminalistics Laboratory tested these items and
determined they contained methamphetamine or precursors of
methamphetamine. The items seized after receiving Cordell’s consent were
the non-hazardous items used to manufacture methamphetamine.
In applying the constitutional harmless error test, we are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s finding of guilt could not be
attributable to the evidence of the non-hazardous items. The properly
seized evidence coupled with the admission of Simmons that it was his lab
overwhelmingly establishes Simmons was guilty of manufacturing
methamphetamine. Accordingly, any alleged error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. E. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. “In order for a defendant to
succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice
resulted.” Wills, 696 N.W.2d at 22. In order to satisfy the first element,
“ ‘counsel’s performance is measured against the standard of a reasonably
competent practitioner with the presumption that the attorney performed
his duties in a competent manner.’ ” State v. Doggett, 687 N.W.2d 97, 100
(Iowa 2004) (citations omitted). Prejudice exists where “ ‘there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 17
result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Wills, 696 N.W.2d at
22 (citations omitted). Simmons argues his trial counsel had a duty to challenge the
constitutionality of Iowa Code section 901.10(2) under equal protection
principles as it effectively penalizes defendants for exercising their right
against self-incrimination and their right to a jury trial. Section 901.10(1)
allows a sentencing court to sentence a person for a first conviction “to a term less than provided by the statute if mitigating circumstances exist and
those circumstances are stated specifically in the record.” Iowa Code
§ 901.10(1). However, the sentencing court is not allowed to reduce the
sentence for a first conviction “if the sentence under section 124.413
involves an amphetamine or methamphetamine offense under section
124.401, subsection 1, paragraph ‘a’ or ‘b’ ” unless the defendant pleads
guilty. Id. § 901.10(2). Simmons claims a strict scrutiny review should
apply here because fundamental rights are implicated. He asserts the
statute fails such review because there is no compelling state interest in
treating methamphetamine offenses constituting a class “B” felony different than other class “B” felony drug offenses or class “C” felony methamphetamine offenses based on whether the defendant pleads guilty or
goes to trial.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution disallows states from “deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Iowa Constitution states “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same
terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. We 18
acknowledge we have the obligation to determine whether a challenged law
violates Iowa’s constitutional equality provision. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2004). While the judgment of the
Supreme Court under the federal Equal Protection Clause is persuasive, it
does not bind this court’s evaluation of the law under the Iowa Constitution.
Id. at 5. Nevertheless, “[b]ecause neither party in this case has argued that
our equal protection analysis under the Iowa Constitution should differ in any way from our analysis under the Federal Constitution, we decline to
apply divergent analyses in this case.” Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812,
817 (Iowa 2005).
We subject laws to different levels of review based on their
classifications and the rights they affect. Id.
If a statute affects a fundamental right or classifies individuals on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin, it is subjected to strict scrutiny review. The State must prove it is narrowly tailored to the achievement of a compelling state interest. If a statute classifies individuals on the basis of gender or legitimacy, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny and will only be upheld if it is substantially related to an important state interest.
Id. (citations omitted). However,
“[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.”
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Rational basis review requires
only that the law “be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at
817-18. Such review allows a State to act on the basis of certain differences
where a rational relationship exists between the disparity in treatment and
some legitimate government purpose. Id. at 818. 19
In State v. Biddle, we applied the rational basis test and determined
section 901.10(2) is “rationally related to the government’s interest in
curbing the increasing and widespread use of methamphetamine, a highly
addictive drug.” 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002). In Biddle, we did not
examine the statute under a strict scrutiny analysis because the defendant
failed to preserve error on the application of this test. Id. However, the
Supreme Court has addressed an equal protection challenge alleging a
similar statutory scheme penalized a defendant for exercising a
fundamental right. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 225, 99 S. Ct. 492,
500, 58 L. Ed. 2d 466, 478 (1978).
There a New Jersey statutory scheme provided for mandatory
punishment of life imprisonment for a defendant convicted by a jury of first-
degree murder, but allowed the possibility of a sentence of less than life
imprisonment for a defendant who entered a plea of no contest. Id. at 214-
16, 99 S. Ct. at 495-96, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 471-72. In rejecting the defendant’s
argument “that the sentencing scheme infringes [on a defendant’s] right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because it penalizes the
exercise of a ‘fundamental right,’ ” the Court stated:
We rejected a similar argument . . . noting that “[t]o fit the problem . . . into an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished.” All New Jersey defendants are given the same choice. Those electing to contest their guilt face a certainty of life imprisonment if convicted of first-degree murder; but they may be acquitted instead or, in a proper case, may be convicted of a lesser degree of homicide and receive a sentence of less than life. Furthermore, a plea of [no contest] may itself result in a life sentence. The result, therefore, “may depend upon a particular combination of infinite variables peculiar to each individual trial. It simply cannot be said that a state has invidiously ‘classified’ . . . .” It cannot be said that defendants found guilty by a jury are “penalized” for exercising the right to a jury trial any more than defendants who plead guilty are penalized because they give up the chance of acquittal at trial. In each 20 instance, the defendant faces a multitude of possible outcomes and freely makes his choice. Equal protection does not free those who made a bad assessment of risks or a bad choice from the consequences of their decision.
Id. at 225-26, 99 S. Ct. at 500-01, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 478 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, if Simmons’ trial counsel had raised this issue, the trial court
should have found the statutory scheme did not violate the state or federal
Equal Protection Clauses. Therefore, Simmons’ claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must fail. See Wills, 696 N.W.2d at 24 (finding trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an issue with no merit). V. Summary and Disposition.
We find no error in the district court’s ruling on the motion to
suppress regarding the initial search of the apartment and the first
statements made by Simmons when the officers entered the apartment. We
do not reach the other issues raised by Simmons regarding the motion to
suppress because any constitutional error alleged was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, we find Simmons’ trial counsel was not
ineffective in failing to challenge the constitutionality of Iowa Code section
901.10(2). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.