IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 101 / 06-0478
Filed February 8, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
ERROL EDWARD DECKER,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Douglas S.
Russell (suppression) and Marsha M. Beckelman (trial and sentencing),
Judges.
Criminal defendant appeals conviction based upon the introduction of
a police interrogation video during rebuttal, which had been suppressed
during the case-in-chief for due process and Miranda violations.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson
and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant
Attorney General, and Harold Denton, County Attorney, for appellee. 2
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we must decide whether a videotaped interrogation,
suppressed during the State’s case-in-chief for constitutional violations, can
be admitted as rebuttal evidence to combat an insanity defense. The trial
court admitted the videotape, on the State’s motion, as evidence of the
defendant’s demeanor less than twenty-four hours after commission of the
assault. The defendant claims that the admission of the videotape violated
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by impermissibly using
invocations of his right to remain silent as evidence of sanity. At the
conclusion of a bench trial, the court convicted the defendant of attempted
murder, burglary in the first degree, and willful injury. For the reasons set
forth below we affirm.
I. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings.
The evidence at trial showed that Amy McNeal, a young mother and
Cedar Rapids native, began dating Errol Edward Decker, the defendant, in
August 2003. The couple’s year-long relationship was a tumultuous one,
punctuated by a series of breakups and reconciliations. Finally, McNeal
permanently ended the relationship in July 2004. Thereafter a series of
increasingly bizarre and violent events occurred. McNeal’s dog disappeared.
After several days, she recovered the animal. Although Decker claimed not
to have been involved, McNeal thought otherwise. Fearing for the safety of
herself and her thirteen-year-old son Jacob, McNeal unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain a no-contact order. On the advice of local police,
however, McNeal sent Decker a letter detailing her wish to have no further
contact with him.
On August 24, 2004, just days after the Linn County Sheriff’s
Department delivered the letter, McNeal returned home around noon to care 3
for her dog. Although it was her routine to return home each day, she
usually did not take her lunch hour until one o’clock. After taking the dog
outside, McNeal immediately noticed that her attic door was ajar and the
rug normally pushed against it had been moved. As she went to investigate,
Decker emerged from the hallway and attacked her. Decker repeatedly hit
McNeal with a hammer on her head and neck and stabbed her with a knife
in her chest, stomach, and back. McNeal testified that she had never seen
the knife used in the attack before, but believed that the hammer could
have come from a tool kit in her home.
According to the State’s evidence, McNeal attempted to fight Decker
off and begged for her life. Decker responded that McNeal “was dead,” “that
she had ruined his life,” and that he had already killed her son Jacob. The
attack eventually progressed to Jacob’s bedroom. At some point, Decker
headed to the basement and called for “boy,” and then for “Ted.” No one
responded. McNeal used Decker’s momentary absence to call 911. Before
the call connected, however, Decker returned, hitting her on the head with
the hammer and choking her around the neck. Decker finally left the home
after McNeal promised not to call the police.
Investigating police did not find anyone in the home, nor did they
immediately locate an acquaintance of Decker’s named Ted. McNeal
testified that she did not see anyone besides Decker at any point before,
during, or after the attack. Exhibits introduced by the State showed
Decker’s point of entry as a basement window. Jacob was later located,
unharmed, at his school.
On the urging of his family, Decker turned himself in to the Iowa City
Police Department and was transported to the Linn County jail. Upon
arrival at the jail, Decker was arrested for attempted murder. The following 4
morning, Detective Anne Deutmeyer initiated Decker’s interrogation. At the
outset, Deutmeyer verbally informed Decker of his Miranda rights. She also
presented Decker with a written statement of his Miranda rights for
signature. When Decker did not sign the document, Deutmeyer asked him
if he understood the information on the sheet. Decker responded, “I can
read.” About a minute later, Deutmeyer asked Decker whether he wanted
to talk to her, and Decker responded “not really.” When Deutmeyer
continued her questioning, Decker was lethargic, routinely gazed at the
floor, and was only minimally responsive to questioning. During the next
twenty minutes, Deutmeyer repeatedly asked the defendant if he wanted to
talk to her. In response, Decker either did not reply or stated that “I don’t
want to talk about it” or “I don’t have nothing to say about it.”
The State charged Decker with attempted murder, burglary in the
first degree, and willful injury. He entered a plea of not guilty, and later
asserted the affirmative defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. After
several requests to represent himself, the court appointed Decker a new
attorney. Decker then moved to suppress videotaped statements he made
during his interrogation.
The motion to suppress was heard by Judge Douglas Russell. Judge
Russell granted defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the detective
failed to honor Decker’s repeated invocations of his right to remain silent.
Further, Judge Russell held that Deutmeyer made a promise of leniency in
violation of Decker’s right against self-incrimination. As a result, Judge
Russell ruled that any statements made by Decker during the interrogation
be suppressed.
The matter came to a bench trial on August 15 before Judge Marsha
Beckelman. At trial, the State presented detailed testimony about the 5
assault from the victim, Amy McNeal. The State further offered testimony
from two Cedar Rapids police officers. The officers testified that Decker
refused to say anything about the crime during transport to the Linn
County jail. His demeanor was described as “very quiet, sweaty, just sat
quietly in the back of our squad car.”
In response, Decker put forth an insanity defense. His first witness
was Susan Blome, a long-time registered nurse with experience in providing
assessments of and medical monitoring for Linn County jail inmates. She
testified that Decker was on suicide precaution while being held prior to
trial. In records, she noted that Decker had difficulty tracking and
answering questions. Blome characterized his mood as “vacant,” affect as
“restricted,” and facial expressions “flat.” She also described Decker as alert
and oriented, knew the date and where he was, and that his speech rate
and rhythm were normal. Blome noted that Decker reported “psychotic
symptoms” including hallucinations, auditory [sensations], and paranoia.
During his stay in the Linn County jail, Decker reported that he heard
voices and requested an increase in medication. Ultimately, Dr. Ali Safdar
diagnosed Decker as “probable bi-polar with psychotic symptoms.” At the
time of his diagnosis, Dr. Safdar noted that Decker was not hearing voices.
Additionally, Decker offered expert testimony from Dr. Scott Stuart.
Stuart conducted a one-and-a-half hour interview with Decker, examined
his medical records, and reviewed police reports about the events of
August 24. The doctor concluded that at the time of the attack, Decker was
suffering from untreated schizophrenia. As a result, the defendant was
unaware of the nature and consequences of his actions, and unable to
distinguish between right and wrong. In support of his opinion, Stuart
noted that Decker called out to people that were not there. In particular, 6
Stuart noted that Decker called out to “Ted,” who was not at the scene of
the crime, and had various conflicting versions about Ted’s involvement.
Stuart concluded that Ted was part of Decker’s delusional system. Relying
on police reports that Decker was “not [all] there,” Stuart concluded that at
the time of the crime he was in the midst of an untreated psychotic episode,
consistent with untreated schizophrenia.
In addition to the direct testimony of Blome and Stuart, Decker
offered into evidence medical records regarding his mental health. The
records generally reveal a long history of treatment for psychological and
behavioral matters. The diagnoses fluctuated from childhood behavior
disorder, childhood schizophrenia, mild mental retardation, unsocialized
aggressive reaction disorder, and attention deficit disorder.
On rebuttal, the State called Detective Deutmeyer to the stand.
Deutmeyer was asked about her observations of Decker’s demeanor at the
time of his interrogation. Deutmeyer testified that “he didn’t want to make
eye contact with me, he was very evasive.” Decker’s counsel objected to the
characterization that Decker did not want to make eye contact, asking the
court to direct the witness to recast the testimony to simply state that
Decker did not make eye contact with her. The district court overruled the
objection. Deutmeyer further testified, without defense objection, “As I was
speaking with him, he continually looked at the floor. He was kind of
fidgety. That was about it.”
At this point, the State offered into evidence the entire videotape of
Decker’s police interrogation. The State recognized that the tape been had
suppressed during its case-in-chief, but contended that the defense had
opened the door by asserting an insanity defense. Specifically, the State
alleged that the tape would show the defendant’s “capacity” or demeanor 7
shortly after the incident. The State further argued that the tape provided
better evidence of Decker’s capacity than Detective Deutmeyer’s testimony.
Finally, the State argued that the tape did not contain any statements that
would be regarded as incriminating in any event.
Decker’s attorney objected to the offer of the videotape. The defense
argued that the tape should not be admitted in light of the suppression
ruling. Defense counsel conceded that the statements were made close in
time and proximity, but questioned whether any arguably relevant aspects
of the tape could be separated from unlawfully obtained evidence.
According to defense counsel, “I don’t believe there is any way that . . . the
court could be able to look at the tape and observe for demeanor and so
forth and not listen to what is said on the tape.” The district court
overruled Decker’s objection and admitted the interrogation videotape.
After the videotape was admitted, Deutmeyer continued her
testimony. She testified that she did not know whether Decker understood
her questions, but that she had to ask him questions several times before
she got an answer. In terms of speech and demeanor, she testified, “He just
seemed like he had a lot on his mind and wasn’t really there.”
The State also called Candice Martin, a friend of McNeal, as a rebuttal
witness. She testified that she observed Decker a couple of times a week
prior to the incident leading to his arrest. She testified that she had not
observed Decker engage in any unusual or bizarre behavior.
The State’s final witness on rebuttal was Ted Dunkel, who was
located by McNeal’s family on the third day of trial. Dunkel testified that he
gave Decker a ride in his van to the area surrounding McNeal’s home on the
date of the incident and that Decker instructed him to wait in the van.
After waiting for more than half an hour, Dunkel left the keys in the van 8
and walked to work. According to Dunkel, Decker appeared “fine,”
“normal,” “not angry,” and “quiet.”
In response, the defense recalled Dr. Stuart. Dr. Stuart reconfirmed
his prior diagnosis, despite “Ted’s” discovery.
In her ruling, Judge Beckelman rejected Decker’s insanity defense
and found Decker guilty as charged. With respect to insanity, Judge
Beckelman noted that while Dr. Stuart supported his opinion by pointing to
auditory hallucinations with a nonexistent “Ted,” when the crime was
committed the evidence showed that Ted, in fact, was quite real and in the
immediate vicinity.
Contrary to Dr. Stuart, Judge Beckelman noted that the medical
records, at least from 1976 to the present, tended to support the absence of
ongoing auditory or visual hallucinations, psychotic symptoms, and
delusional thinking. As a result, she disagreed with the opinion of
Dr. Stuart that Decker had a long and clearly documented history of
paranoid delusions. Instead, she found that claims of Decker’s
hallucinations were self-reported only after his arrest. Further, review of
the medical records drove Judge Beckelman to the opposite conclusion,
namely, that Decker was of sufficient intelligence and mental capacity to
form specific intent.
Aside from the medical evidence, Judge Beckelman also relied upon
the testimony of lay witnesses. She observed that McNeal and Martin, both
of whom had ample opportunity to observe Decker prior to the crime,
testified that he behaved in a normal fashion.
Finally, Judge Beckelman cited the facts surrounding the attack. She
concluded that the evidence showed that Decker purposefully planned and
carried out the attack in revenge for the breakup of his relationship. Judge 9
Beckelman found that Decker perpetrated the crime through deliberate,
logical, and methodical steps.
Subsequent to his conviction, Judge Beckelman sentenced Decker to
twenty-five years on both the attempted murder and burglary counts and to
ten years on the willful injury count. Additionally, the court ordered that
each of these sentences run consecutively, for a total of sixty years. Decker
filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
Decker alleges that the admission of the interrogation video violated
his right to due process by compelling him to be a witness against himself
in violation of Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We review
constitutional claims de novo. State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Iowa
2003).
III. Preservation of Error.
The State argues that Decker has failed to preserve error on his
constitutional claim, citing: (1) Decker’s failure to object to either the calling
of Detective Deutmeyer as a rebuttal witness or to her testimony regarding
Decker’s interrogation demeanor; and (2) Decker’s failure to articulate the
constitutional basis for his objection at trial.
Although the State is certainly correct that the detective introduced
demeanor evidence without objection prior to the videotape’s introduction,
we do not find this omission fatal. As will be discussed below, the
demeanor evidence elicited before the tape’s introduction was permissible,
physical demeanor evidence. The videotape, however, contains
impermissible evidence—namely Decker’s repeated invocations of his right
to remain silent and testimonial demeanor evidence. Decker did interpose a 10
timely objection to the offer of the videotape and, as a result, the objection
was timely with respect to this evidence.
Secondarily, the State argues that Decker’s objection to the admission
of the videotape was too general to preserve error. The general rule with
respect to error preservation is that unless the reasons for an objection are
obvious a party attempting to exclude evidence has the duty to indicate the
specific grounds to the court so as to alert the judge to the question raised
and enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures to remedy
the defect, if possible. State v. Clay, 213 N.W.2d 473, 476–77 (Iowa 1973).
Although Decker’s counsel failed to state his objection with particularity,
counsel repeatedly referenced the prior suppression ruling which held that
the interrogation was inadmissible for Miranda violations and promises of
leniency. Under this record, both the State and the court were informed of
the underlying nature of the objection through incorporation of the grounds
previously raised by the defense. As a result, error is preserved.
IV. Discussion.
A. Issues Presented on Appeal. Decker asserts that the trial court
erred in admitting the videotaped interrogation in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights as incorporated against the State through the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution and through the parallel
provision in the Iowa Constitution.1 The State does not appeal the original suppression order, but asserts that the video was proper rebuttal evidence
to show Decker’s demeanor less then twenty-four hours after his attack on
1While Decker argues that the admission of the interrogation tape violated both state and federal constitutional provisions, he has failed to articulate any ground on which to treat or interpret the clauses differently. As such, the state constitutional ground will not be analyzed separately. See Pfister v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 688 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Iowa 2004) (“Because the parties have articulated no basis for distinguishing these clauses for purposes of determining a parolee’s right to counsel, our discussion of the federal due process claim applies equally to the claim made under the Iowa Constitution.”). 11
McNeal. According to the State, this evidence of Decker’s demeanor tends
to show that Decker was not delusional at the time the crime was
committed.
The entire videotape of Decker’s interrogation was admitted into
evidence for the purpose of showing Decker’s “demeanor.” The admission of
the videotape in its entirety gives rise to several constitutional issues.
First, by offering the entire tape into evidence, the State included
portions of the videotape where Decker asserted his Miranda rights. The
question arises whether these portions of the videotape, which arguably
demonstrate that the defendant is capable of rational and calculated
behavior, were admissible and, if not, whether their admission requires
reversal. Second, the videotape contains testimonial demeanor evidence
elicited after Deutmeyer refused to honor Decker’s Miranda rights and after
she made, according to the suppression ruling, an unlawful promise of
leniency. The question arises whether the admission into evidence of
testimonial demeanor evidence after these infractions was permissible and,
if not, whether the admission requires reversal.
B. Admissibility of Testimony Showing Invocation of and
Exercise of Miranda Rights. Over twenty years ago, the United States
Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634,
88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), held that due process prohibited the use of a
defendant’s invocation of Miranda rights as evidence of his sanity.
Expanding upon its decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240,
49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the Court noted that it would be fundamentally
unfair to assure a suspect that his silence would not be used against him
and then later renege on that promise to attack his proffered defense.
Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 292, 106 S. Ct. at 639, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 630–31. In 12
so ruling, the Court emphasized that “silence does not mean only muteness;
it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as a desire to
remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.” Id. at 295 n.13, 106
S. Ct. at 640 n.13, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 63 n.13. In the videotape offered in this
case, Decker asserted his right to remain silent at least five times and did
indeed remain silent for a considerable period of time. Under Greenfield,
this evidence is not admissible to show lack of sanity.
C. Admissibility of Demeanor Evidence Obtained After Miranda
Violations and Unlawful Offer of Leniency. It is axiomatic that only
evidence that is testimonial in nature is protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Nontestimonial evidence thus is unprotected and unaffected by Miranda
and Fifth Amendment violations. “[I]n order to be considered testimonial,
an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate to a
factual assertion or disclose information.” Doe v. United States, 487 U.S.
201, 210, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2347, 101 L. Ed. 2d 184, 197 (1988).
Some evidence obtained through a defendant’s arrest is clearly
nontestimonial. For example, compelling an arrested suspect to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, or other physical measurements, to write or
speak for identification, to stand, walk, or make a particular gesture, or to
submit to a blood test does not result in the gathering of testimonial
evidence. Schmerber v. State, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1832, 16
L. Ed. 2d 908, 916 (1966).
The line between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence is more
difficult to draw, however, when the evidence is obtained in response to a
police interrogation. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct.
2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that
“any slurring of speech and other evidence of lack of muscular coordination” 13
in response to direct questioning “constitute nontestimonial components of
those responses.” Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592, 110 S. Ct. at 2645, 110 L. Ed. 2d
at 546. Slurring and lack of muscular coordination relate, of course, to
physical rather than communicative acts or responses.
At the same time, the Supreme Court in Muniz rejected the argument
that inferring the physiological function of an accused’s brain from his
statements was nontestimonial. Id. at 593, 110 S. Ct. at 2646, 110
L. Ed. 2d at 546. According to the court, the question is “whether the
incriminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act
or from physical evidence.” Id. Because the inference of confusion arose
from the content of the accused’s statements and not from a purely physical
response, the inference was impermissible as arising from a testimonial act.
See Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1542 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The
psychiatrist based his diagnosis not just on Cape’s demeanor and the
sound of Cape’s voice, but on the contents and substance of Cape’s answers
to his questions, ‘thus making Cape’s communications to him testimonial in
nature.’ ” (quoting Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 911, 106 S. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1985))).
Drawing on Muniz, it appears that Decker’s fidgeting and slow speech
pattern amount to nontestimonial evidence. On the other hand, any
evidence related to the quality or content of his communication is
testimonial and protected by Fifth Amendment privileges. To the extent the
videotape contains communicative responses after Decker asserted his
Miranda rights or the promise of leniency was made, including his ability to
“track” or understand the conversation, it is inadmissible.
D. Application of Principles. Under the applicable case law, the
nontestimonial evidence contained on the videotape, such as fidgeting, 14
staring at the ground, the physical quality of his speech, and the lack of any
involuntary hallucinations, would be admissible demeanor evidence
notwithstanding the constitutional violations. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592, 110
S. Ct. at 2645, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 546. Portions of the videotape, therefore,
were properly admitted into evidence.
The problem, as stated by the defense, however, is that to the extent
the tape contains any nontestimonial demeanor evidence, it is intertwined
with impermissible evidence. In viewing the tape, the district court would
be required to ignore Decker’s repeated attempts to exercise his Miranda
rights, ignore the communicative content of Decker’s testimonial
statements, and focus solely on the physical aspects of Decker’s demeanor.
Decker argues that it would be extremely difficult for the finder of fact
to separate out the permissible from the impermissible evidence, requiring
reversal of his convictions. If this case were tried to a jury, Decker would
have a strong argument. Before a jury, the limited probative value of the
admissible features of the videotape would in all likelihood be outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. Even with limiting instructions, it would be difficult
for an untrained jury to consider only the physical demeanor evidence and
not consider the fact that the videotape showed Decker invoking his
Miranda rights and not consider the communicative content of his
statements. See Robinette v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1162 (Ind. 2001) (holding
that a trial court’s limiting instruction could not cure the wrongful
admission of Miranda invocations in a jury trial).
Here, however, trial was to the court. Judges routinely are called
upon to consider the admissibility of evidence that may be later excluded at
trial. Judicial knowledge of evidence which is subsequently not admissible
does not ordinarily undermine later judicial determinations in the case. See 15
State v. Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa 2004) (noting that “legal
training helps equip those in the profession to remain unaffected by matters
that should not influence the determination”).
The impermissible portions of the videotape, moreover, were not
admitted into evidence. The record in this case demonstrates that the State
was not offering the videotape to establish the truth of any assertions made
by Decker or to show that Decker was rational enough to invoke his Fifth
Amendment rights. Instead, the State asserted that the videotape was
admissible for the limited purpose of allowing the court to “see the
defendant and observe his demeanor.” While the district court simply
admitted the videotape without further comment, in context, it is clear that
the evidence was offered and admitted for the limited purpose of showing
Decker’s demeanor.
Our rules of evidence allow evidence to be admitted for a limited
purpose even though that same evidence is inadmissible for another
purpose. Iowa R. Evid. 5.105. When admissibility is limited, the court
“restrict[s] the evidence to its proper scope and instruct[s] the jury
accordingly.” Id. When the case is tried to the court, however, we assume
that the court considered the tape solely for the limited purpose for which it
was offered. Here, the videotape was admitted for the limited purpose of
demonstrating Decker’s demeanor. The mere fact that the tape also
collaterally contained his Miranda invocations and testimonial demeanor
evidence, thus did not make the tape wholly inadmissible.
There is no indication in the court’s decision, moreover, that it
considered the impermissible evidence—either the Miranda invocations or
the testimonial demeanor evidence—in reaching its decision. Although
Judge Beckelman referred to the professional and lay demeanor evidence 16
elicited at trial, she made no mention of the videotape or any of the evidence
contained therein. See State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756 (Iowa 1998) (holding
that the reviewing court places “great confidence” in judges to follow the law
and will not assume that evidence in a sentencing hearing was considered
for an improper purpose without a clear showing); In re O’Hara’s Estate, 204
Iowa 1331, 217 N.W. 245 (1928) (holding that in a bench trial the appellate
court presumes that the final judgment was based solely upon competent
evidence and that impermissible evidence was disregarded).
Nothing in Matheson is to the contrary. In Matheson, the district
court in a sentencing proceeding admitted into evidence a victim impact
statement related to an out-of-state crime. 684 N.W.2d at 244. The
evidence offered and admitted in Matheson’s sentencing proceeding was not
admissible for any purpose. Id. Further, the improperly admitted evidence
in Matheson contained substantial information not available from any other
source. Id. at 245. Because the district court in Matheson did not
affirmatively indicate that the harmful evidence was not considered, we
vacated the resulting sentence and remanded the case for resentencing
before a different judge. Id.
Here, as in Matheson, the district court order did not mention the
challenged evidence in reaching its decision and instead relied upon other
evidence in concluding that Decker was sane at the time of the crime.
Unlike Matheson, however, the challenged evidence was offered and
admitted for a valid limited purpose—physical demeanor evidence. Decker
did not below and does not now question that demeanor evidence would be
at least of some relevance on the issue of sanity. Because the tape had a
permissive evidentiary purpose, its admission was not per se in error.
Moreover, without at least some indication that the district court considered 17
the tape’s impermissible evidence, Decker has not demonstrated that his
right to due process has been violated.
V. Conclusion.
Although it is clear that the police interrogation video contained
permissible and impermissible evidence, its admission did not amount to
constitutional error as (1) the district court properly restricted the tape’s
admission for demeanor evidence only; and (2) there is no indication that
the court thereafter considered the videotape for an improper purpose. For
the above reasons, the decision of the district court in this case is affirmed.