BOEHM, Justice.
At a jury trial, Glenda Robinette was found guilty of murder, criminal confinement, and burglary resulting in bodily injury. The trial court entered a verdict of guilty but mentally ill and sentenced Robi-nette to fifty-five, ten, and thirty years, respectively, to be served concurrently. Because the trial court erroneously admitted videotaped statements Robinette made after being Mirandized and asserting her right to remain silent, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Factual and Procedural Background
Robinette and Michael Gougeon had dated for five years when Gougeon ended their relationship and started dating Carrie Sherman. In the wee hours of September 6, 1998, Gougeon and Sherman were asleep at Sherman’s house when Sherman awoke to see Robinette standing beside her bed holding a gun. Sherman told Robinette to hand her the gun and woke up Gougeon, who walked across the room, turned on the light, and also directed Robi-nette to surrender the gun. Robinette then shot Gougeon five times. After locating Gougeon’s car keys, Robinette escorted Sherman at gunpoint to Gougeon’s parked car and ordered Sherman into the car. Sherman complied. Robinette then drove about six blocks to a church parking lot where she ordered Sherman into the trunk. After driving some distance more, Robinette abandoned the automobile. Sherman was discovered nine to eleven hours later by passers-by who heard her knocking and screaming from inside the trunk.
Three days later, Robinette turned herself in to police in Pendleton. She was then transferred to Anderson, where she was twice interviewed by the police after being Mirandized. She refused to sign Miranda waivers and asserted her right to remain silent nearly fifty times during the course of these interviews, stating, “I don’t want to talk about it.” Despite her unmistakable assertion of this right, she was interrogated first for three hours and fifteen minutes and a second time for forty-five minutes. The videotapes of Robi-nette’s interrogations were admitted into evidence over the objections of defense counsel and are the basis of this appeal.
I. Admission of Videotapes
At trial, the State moved for admission of a videotape of Robinette’s first interview with Anderson police officers. Defense counsel objected on the ground that it had not been clarified whether Robinette had formally waived her Miranda rights. The trial court admitted the videotape. The State later moved for admission of a videotape of Robinette’s second interview with police. Defense counsel again objected, arguing that, in view of Robinette’s use of profanity during questioning, the prejudice of having the videotape admitted outweighed its relevance under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403. Defense counsel also pointed out that Robinette had a constitutional right to remain silent that had been exercised and ignored by police. After noting that Robinette had raised the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect,
the State argued that it was significant that Robinette had understood her rights and responded appropriately to questions. The State further asserted that the videotape was probative of her “awareness of her surroundings, awareness of what was going on” close to the time frame of the murders and that the statement, “I’m not talking to you about it,” rebutted her contention that she had no memory of the incident. The trial court agreed with the State, proclaiming that “we have a responsibility to let [the State] put [the videotape] on ... to rebut some of the things that psychiatrists say in their reports.... I haven’t read the cases, but the notes suggest that the insanity issue trumps everything else.”
After the videotapes had been admitted, the trial court, realizing its error, gave a limiting instruction with regard to the first videotape to the effect that the jury should consider it for the “limited purpose of judging Miss Robinette’s physical appearance, carriage and demeanor at the time that first tape was made.” The trial court further instructed the jury to disregard completely the second videotape. Robi-nette argues that the trial court’s attempt to rectify its error was insufficient.
In
Doyle v. Ohio,
the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when the defendant’s post-arrest and post-Miranda silence is used to impeach the defendant’s exculpatory explanation at trial. 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). The Court explained, “[Wjhile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.”
Id.
at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240. In
Wainwright v. Greenfield,
the Supreme Court extended the rule in
Doyle
to apply to the use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence as evidence of sanity. 474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). The Court concluded that there was no viable distinction between the use of the defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes and its use as evidence of the defendant’s sanity. Rather, “[i]n both situations, the State gives warnings to protect constitutional rights and implicitly promises that any exercise of those rights will not be penalized.”
Id.
at 292, 106 S.Ct. 634.
This Court had occasion to address
Doyle
and
Wainwright
in
Lynch v. State,
632 N.E.2d 341 (Ind.1994), and
Wilson v. State,
514 N.E.2d 282 (Ind.1987). In
Lynch,
at the outset of his interrogation by police, the defendant had asserted his right not to be questioned -without an attorney present. A tape of the interrogation was admitted for the purpose of establishing the defendant’s state of mind shortly after he shot his father. The defendant’s sanity was an issue in the trial. 632 N.E.2d at 341-42. In
Wilson,
as evidence of the defendant’s sanity, the State elicited testimony as to the defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent and his right to consult with an attorney. 514 N.E.2d at 283. Relying on
Doyle
and
Wainwright,
this Court reversed both of these convictions and remanded for new trials. The same result is required here.
The State does not seriously defend the admissibility of the videotapes. Rather, the State argues that any error was harmless because the jury was subsequently instructed that it was to use the first videotape only for purposes of observing Ro-binette’s demeanor and carriage and that they should disregard the second videotape altogether.
The use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory explanation or to prove a defendant’s sanity is subject to harmless error analysis.
Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (“The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”) (citation omitted);
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BOEHM, Justice.
At a jury trial, Glenda Robinette was found guilty of murder, criminal confinement, and burglary resulting in bodily injury. The trial court entered a verdict of guilty but mentally ill and sentenced Robi-nette to fifty-five, ten, and thirty years, respectively, to be served concurrently. Because the trial court erroneously admitted videotaped statements Robinette made after being Mirandized and asserting her right to remain silent, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Factual and Procedural Background
Robinette and Michael Gougeon had dated for five years when Gougeon ended their relationship and started dating Carrie Sherman. In the wee hours of September 6, 1998, Gougeon and Sherman were asleep at Sherman’s house when Sherman awoke to see Robinette standing beside her bed holding a gun. Sherman told Robinette to hand her the gun and woke up Gougeon, who walked across the room, turned on the light, and also directed Robi-nette to surrender the gun. Robinette then shot Gougeon five times. After locating Gougeon’s car keys, Robinette escorted Sherman at gunpoint to Gougeon’s parked car and ordered Sherman into the car. Sherman complied. Robinette then drove about six blocks to a church parking lot where she ordered Sherman into the trunk. After driving some distance more, Robinette abandoned the automobile. Sherman was discovered nine to eleven hours later by passers-by who heard her knocking and screaming from inside the trunk.
Three days later, Robinette turned herself in to police in Pendleton. She was then transferred to Anderson, where she was twice interviewed by the police after being Mirandized. She refused to sign Miranda waivers and asserted her right to remain silent nearly fifty times during the course of these interviews, stating, “I don’t want to talk about it.” Despite her unmistakable assertion of this right, she was interrogated first for three hours and fifteen minutes and a second time for forty-five minutes. The videotapes of Robi-nette’s interrogations were admitted into evidence over the objections of defense counsel and are the basis of this appeal.
I. Admission of Videotapes
At trial, the State moved for admission of a videotape of Robinette’s first interview with Anderson police officers. Defense counsel objected on the ground that it had not been clarified whether Robinette had formally waived her Miranda rights. The trial court admitted the videotape. The State later moved for admission of a videotape of Robinette’s second interview with police. Defense counsel again objected, arguing that, in view of Robinette’s use of profanity during questioning, the prejudice of having the videotape admitted outweighed its relevance under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403. Defense counsel also pointed out that Robinette had a constitutional right to remain silent that had been exercised and ignored by police. After noting that Robinette had raised the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect,
the State argued that it was significant that Robinette had understood her rights and responded appropriately to questions. The State further asserted that the videotape was probative of her “awareness of her surroundings, awareness of what was going on” close to the time frame of the murders and that the statement, “I’m not talking to you about it,” rebutted her contention that she had no memory of the incident. The trial court agreed with the State, proclaiming that “we have a responsibility to let [the State] put [the videotape] on ... to rebut some of the things that psychiatrists say in their reports.... I haven’t read the cases, but the notes suggest that the insanity issue trumps everything else.”
After the videotapes had been admitted, the trial court, realizing its error, gave a limiting instruction with regard to the first videotape to the effect that the jury should consider it for the “limited purpose of judging Miss Robinette’s physical appearance, carriage and demeanor at the time that first tape was made.” The trial court further instructed the jury to disregard completely the second videotape. Robi-nette argues that the trial court’s attempt to rectify its error was insufficient.
In
Doyle v. Ohio,
the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when the defendant’s post-arrest and post-Miranda silence is used to impeach the defendant’s exculpatory explanation at trial. 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). The Court explained, “[Wjhile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.”
Id.
at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240. In
Wainwright v. Greenfield,
the Supreme Court extended the rule in
Doyle
to apply to the use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence as evidence of sanity. 474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). The Court concluded that there was no viable distinction between the use of the defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes and its use as evidence of the defendant’s sanity. Rather, “[i]n both situations, the State gives warnings to protect constitutional rights and implicitly promises that any exercise of those rights will not be penalized.”
Id.
at 292, 106 S.Ct. 634.
This Court had occasion to address
Doyle
and
Wainwright
in
Lynch v. State,
632 N.E.2d 341 (Ind.1994), and
Wilson v. State,
514 N.E.2d 282 (Ind.1987). In
Lynch,
at the outset of his interrogation by police, the defendant had asserted his right not to be questioned -without an attorney present. A tape of the interrogation was admitted for the purpose of establishing the defendant’s state of mind shortly after he shot his father. The defendant’s sanity was an issue in the trial. 632 N.E.2d at 341-42. In
Wilson,
as evidence of the defendant’s sanity, the State elicited testimony as to the defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent and his right to consult with an attorney. 514 N.E.2d at 283. Relying on
Doyle
and
Wainwright,
this Court reversed both of these convictions and remanded for new trials. The same result is required here.
The State does not seriously defend the admissibility of the videotapes. Rather, the State argues that any error was harmless because the jury was subsequently instructed that it was to use the first videotape only for purposes of observing Ro-binette’s demeanor and carriage and that they should disregard the second videotape altogether.
The use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory explanation or to prove a defendant’s sanity is subject to harmless error analysis.
Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (“The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”) (citation omitted);
Thomas v. State,
910 F.2d 1413, 1414-15 (7th Cir.1990) (“All the psychiatric evidence in
dicated insanity, though how strongly was a question for the jury. So we cannot dismiss as harmless the error in admitting the evidence of his silence.”). Under the harmless error analysis, the State bears the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (citing
Chapman,
386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824);
Rawley v. State,
724 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Ind.2000). In analyzing whether a
Doyle
violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court examines five factors: (1) the use to which the prosecution puts the post-arrest silence; (2) who elected to pursue the line of questioning; (3) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt; (4) the intensity and frequency of the reference; and (5) the availability to the trial judge of an opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or give curative instructions.
Bieghler v. State,
481 N.E.2d 78, 91-92 (Ind.1985) (quoting
United States v. Massey,
687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir.1982)).
We cannot conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Robinette’s post-Miranda silence as evidence of her sanity was harmless. Robinette offered substantial testimony to the effect that she suffered from a condition rendering her unable to recall or appreciate the crimes she committed.
Her two videotaped statements, in which she repeats, “I don’t want to talk about it,” dozens of times could have easily left jurors with the impression that Robinette had enough of her wits about her to recognize that it was not to her benefit to speak with police. On these tapes she provided the police with general information such as her name, age, and address, yet declined to speak about the crimes with which she was charged. Jurors listened to her repeated refusals to answer for four hours, during which time she was badgered and chastised by police for being uncooperative and occasionally responded belligerently.
Given that Robinette produced experts willing to testify to her lack of mental capacity at the time of the crimes and that the only other evidence of Robinette’s sanity around the time of the crime was the testimony of Sherman, the admission of the videotapes could have easily contributed to her conviction.
Cf. Thomas,
910 F.2d at 1414-15 (reversing where psychiatric testimony indicated insanity and only evidence of sanity was defendant’s silence after being Mirandized, his request for counsel, and his “outwardly calm appearance”). Instructions to consider the first videotape only for the purpose of observing Robinette’s demeanor and to disregard the second videotape fell well short of curing the harm.
The State argued that observations of her demeanor were relevant to rebut the defense’s psychiatric testimony that Robinette’s catatonia was a natural continuation of a state that began at the time of the crime. Relevancy is beside the point. Even confessions are suppressed if obtained in violation of Miranda rules. Obviously they are highly relevant, but the Constitution prohibits use of post-Miranda statements, relevant or not. The only real issue presented by the State is the possibility of harmless error. But the principal issue in the case was Robinette’s sanity at the time of the shooting. As discussed above, because the tape contained Robi-nette’s repeated seemingly sane attempts to assert her rights, we cannot conclude that it had no effect on the resolution of that issue.
The State alternatively argues that evidence of Robinette’s sanity is proper because Robinette has opened the door by raising the insanity defense. Although it is correct that “[a] plea of insanity opens the door for the admission of testimony about the defendant’s entire life,”
Shepherd v. State, 547
N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ind.1989), raising the insanity defense does not allow the admission into evidence of testimony obtained in violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights. Indeed,
Wainwright
would be meaningless if the State were correct. The State’s argument that the error is harmless because Robinette said nothing incriminating about the charges against her is specious. Robinette did not deny she committed the acts. Rather, Ro-binette argued that she had done these things, but was insane at the time. Her invocation of her right to remain silent bore directly on that issue.
The admission of these videotapes was reversible error.
Robinette is therefore entitled to a new trial.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Robinette argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of guilty but mentally ill. If so, double jeopardy would preclude a retrial.
Thompson v. State,
690 N.E.2d 224, 237 (Ind.1997). Because Robinette does not dispute that she committed these crimes, Robinette’s contention in effect amounts to the claim that she should have been found not responsible by reason of insanity. Ind.Code § 35-86-2-3 (1998). In order to succeed on an insanity defense, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence,
id.
§ 35-41-4-l(b), that she was, “as a result of mental disease or defect, ... unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.”
Id.
§ 35-41-3-6.
A defendant appealing the rejection of an insanity defense must demonstrate that the evidence was without conflict and led only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.
Weeks v. State,
697 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Ind.1998). A determination of insanity is a question for the trier of fact and the jury is free to disregard the testimony of experts and rely upon that of lay witnesses.
Gambill v. State,
675 N.E.2d 668, 672 (Ind.1996) (quoting
Barany v. State,
658 N.E.2d 60, 63-64 (Ind.1995)).
Here, the jury found Robinette guilty of murder, criminal confinement, and burglary as a Class A felony, but the trial court entered a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.
The evidence did not lead only to the conclusion that Robinette was insane when the crimes were committed. Although several medical professionals testified on Robinette’s behalf and agreed that Robinette suffered from mental illness, not all of them were willing to state with absolute certainty that Robinette was unaware of her actions at the time of the crime. More importantly, Sherman testified at trial that she had not observed anything indicating that Robinette did not know what she was doing. She testified that Robinette remained “calm” throughout the entire episode. The erroneously admitted tapes supported this. Sherman also testified that Robinette directed Sherman out the back door instead of the front, asked for a drink, and reloaded the gun before driving away. According to Sherman, after Sherman spoke to Robinette
about Sherman’s son, Robinette told her that was why she had not shot her yet. The jury was free to conclude that the evidence before it did not indicate that Robinette was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct at the time of the offense. Because there is sufficient evidence to support Robinette’s convictions, there is no double jeopardy bar to retrial.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.