IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 25 / 06-0410
Filed December 28, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
DAWN MARIE NAIL and JOSHUA KUCERA,
Appellees,
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sylvia A.
Lewis, District Associate Judge.
We granted discretionary review of a district court decision which
declared Iowa Code section 907.14(1) void for vagueness. REVERSED AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall and Darrel L.
Mullins, Assistant Attorneys General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney,
and Iris Frost, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
John B. Whiston, Iowa City, and Rachel C.B. Antonuccio and Mary T.
Northrup, Student Legal Interns, for appellees. 2
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, the court is called upon to determine whether Iowa Code
section 907.14(1) (2005), which provides for a civil money penalty as a
result of a deferred judgment, is constitutional. The defendants argue that
the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it does not expressly
contain a limit on the amount of penalty assessed. They further allege that
the provision violates due process of law by imposing punishment prior to
an adjudication of guilt. The district court found the statutory provision
constitutionally infirm and refused to enforce it against the appellees Nail
and Kucera. We granted the State’s discretionary appeal to address these
constitutional issues. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse the
ruling of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
On July 4 and July 16, 2005, respectively, Dawn Nail and Joshua
Kucera were arrested for first offense operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated (OWI). Both defendants originally pled not guilty. As part of a
plea bargain, the defendants entered written guilty pleas. The written guilty
pleas stated that the defendants understood the nature of the charge and
knew “the maximum possible penalty and any mandatory minimum penalty
therefor” and that the court may enter the maximum sentence provided by
law.
Both defendants requested deferred judgments. As part of the plea
bargain, the State and the defendants agreed that the defendants “may
receive a deferred judgment, self-supervised probation, and must complete
the Kirkwood Weekend Program.” The district court accepted the pleas. A
hearing was then set for the entry of judgment and sentencing. 3
Prior to the scheduled hearing, the defendants challenged the
potential imposition of a civil penalty as part of a deferred judgment. Iowa
Code section 907.14(1) provides:
Upon entry of a deferred judgment pursuant to section 907.3, a defendant shall be assessed a civil penalty of an amount not less than the amount of any criminal fine authorized by law for the offense under section 902.9 or section 903.1.
The defendants argued, among other things, that the civil penalty
authorized by section 907.14(1) violated both the United States and the
State of Iowa Constitutions because (1) the statute was void for vagueness as it failed to establish a ceiling for potential civil penalties and lacked
substantive guidelines or criteria for law enforcement and courts to apply,
and (2) the statute imposed a civil penalty prior to an adjudication of guilt,
thereby violating due process.
At the beginning of the hearing, the district court proposed separating
the granting of a deferred judgment from the imposition of a civil money
penalty. The State and the defendants agreed to this approach.
When the court asked for a statement on the issue of granting a
deferred judgment, defense counsel asked the court that “part of the guilty
plea colloquy be conducted by the Court to make sure that [the defendants
are] fully informed about the maximum sentence that would be available if
they do not get a deferred.” In response, the district court stated that upon
conviction of first offense OWI, there is a minimum jail sentence of forty-
eight hours and a maximum jail sentence of one year, a fine of $1000 is
assessed, along with a thirty-two percent surcharge and court costs, but no
civil money penalty is imposed. After the district court’s statement, the
defense counsel advised the court that the defendants wished to maintain
their pleas of guilt, which was confirmed by each defendant on the record. 4
The district court then returned to the issue of whether the
defendants should be granted a deferred judgment. The State did not resist
deferred judgment in light of the defendants’ lack of prior criminal history
and their relatively low levels of intoxication—.093 and .092. Defense
counsel further assured the court that the defendants realized that they
had each made “a horrible error of judgment” and promised that the court
“should not see them again, ever.”
At this point, the district court asked each defendant if they requested
a deferred judgment and each answered affirmatively. The court, without
objection from the defense, granted deferred judgment in each case. As a
condition of the deferred judgment, the court ordered that each defendant
be on self-supervised probation, pay a fee to the Department of Corrections
for the administration of the program, and complete the Kirkwood Weekend
Program. After granting the deferred judgments, the court then proceeded
to entertain arguments related to the lawfulness of the civil penalty.
After the hearing, the district court entered an order holding that
Iowa Code section 907.14(1) as applied to Nail and Kucera violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The district court found that the statute does not set an
upper limit on the civil penalty and that the minimum amount is either
$1000 as established by Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a)(2) or $250 pursuant
to Iowa Code section 903.1. Further, the district court stated that the
statute does not indicate whether the amount assessed may be suspended,
paid through community service work, or reduced under conditions set
forth in chapter 321J. The court rejected the State’s claim that the statute
was remedial in nature and designed to recoup the costs of investigating,
prosecuting, and administering to defendants who receive deferred 5
judgments. The court further found that the imposition of the civil penalty
had the characteristics of a criminal punishment. For these reasons, the
court held that Iowa Code section 907.14(1) violated the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution. We granted the State’s application for
discretionary review.
II. Standard of Review.
Review of constitutional claims is de novo. State v. Shanahan, 712
N.W.2d 121, 131 (Iowa 2006).
III. Due Process: Void for Vagueness.
A. Overview of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that “[n]o
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Iowa
Constitution, Article I, section 9 provides that “no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Iowa Const. art. I,
§ 9. This court has generally deemed the federal and state due process
clauses to be “ ‘identical in scope, import, and purpose.’ ” In re
Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 575 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Bruns v.
State, 503 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1993)). Neither party has suggested that
a due process analysis under the Iowa Constitution should be approached
differently than under the parallel provision in the United States
Constitution. Therefore, for the purposes of this opinion, we will treat the
provisions as identical. Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 819 (Iowa 2005);
Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2004) (“[I]t is
prudent to delay any consideration of whether a different analysis is
appropriate to a case in which this issue was thoroughly briefed and 6
explored.” (citing In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n.1 (Iowa
2000))).
Due process is designed to ensure fundamental fairness in
interactions between individuals and the state. Among other things, the
Due Process Clause prohibits enforcement of vague statutes under the void-
for-vagueness doctrine. There are three generally cited underpinnings of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. First, a statute cannot be so vague that it
does not give persons of ordinary understanding fair notice that certain
conduct is prohibited. Second, due process requires that statutes provide
those clothed with authority sufficient guidance to prevent the exercise of
power in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion. Third, a statute cannot
sweep so broadly as to prohibit substantial amounts of constitutionally-
protected activities, such as speech protected under the First Amendment.
State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996) (citing Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298–99, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222,
227–28 (1972)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d
306, 312 (Iowa 2000).
The United States Supreme Court has employed vagueness analysis
both in the context of proscribing criminal conduct and in imposing
criminal penalties. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 68 S. Ct. 634, 92
L. Ed. 823 (1948). The majority of cases in other jurisdictions agree. See
State v. Thompson, 495 A.2d 1054, 1061 (Conn. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Gagnon, 441 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Mass. 1982); Duquette v. Warden, New
Hampshire State Prison, 919 A.2d 767, 773 (N.H. 2007); State v. Manzie, 773
A.2d 659, 661 (N.J. 2001); State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987);
Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1989). But see State v. Booth, 347
So. 2d 241, 243 (La. 1977). We hold, therefore, that the void-for-vagueness 7
doctrine applies to legislation establishing civil or criminal sanctions. State
v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Iowa 1979).
In order to provide due deference to our legislature, this court has
applied what has been called avoidance theory in the context of due process
challenges to legislative acts. Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts,
Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional
Challenges to Uninterpreted Statutes, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 381, 391–92 (2002);
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1948–49 (1997).
For example, in determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague,
this court presumes the statute is constitutional and gives “ ‘any reasonable
construction’ ” to uphold it. State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Iowa
2005) (quoting Hunter, 550 N.W.2d at 462) (emphasis added).
Conversely stated, challengers to a statute must refute “ ‘every
reasonable basis’ ” upon which a statute might be upheld. State v. Seering,
701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639
N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 2002)) (emphasis added). Where a state “statute
‘can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction, . . . this
Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction.’ ” State v.
Williams, 238 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Iowa 1976) (quoting United States. v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S. Ct. 808, 812, 98 L. Ed. 989, 996–97
(1954)). Avoidance theory, moreover, applies to the interpretation as well as
the construction of statutes. Norman Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 45:04 (6th ed. 2000) (noting that the distinction between
interpretation and construction is not meaningful).
The underpinning of avoidance theory is that a definitive judicial gloss
can save a statute from void-for-vagueness infirmity. The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that vagueness challenges are 8
determined on the basis of statutes and pertinent case law rather than the
subjective expectations of particular defendants based on incomplete legal
knowledge. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370, 103 S. Ct.
1855, 1865, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 918 (1983); Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5, 102 S. Ct. 1186,
1191 n.5, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369 n.5 (1982); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347, 355 n.5, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 1703 n.5, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894, 901 n.5
(1964).
Although the incorporation of code books and case law in the
evaluation of fair notice has been criticized on the ground that ordinary
citizens lack access to them, see John Calvin Jefferies Jr., Legality,
Vagueness, and Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 207–08
(1985), United States Supreme Court holdings that vagueness may be cured
through judicial narrowing have been widely accepted and characterized as
settled law. See id. at 207; Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 279, 295 (2003)
(noting judicial narrowing of statute as cure to vagueness problems); Robert
Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes—Balancing Acts,
5 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 1, 5 (1997) (stating that it is settled law that judicial
glosses on criminal statute can “cure” vagueness); Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 73 (1960)
(observing that the Supreme Court “invariably” allows clarifying gloss of
state courts to penal statutes in vagueness context).
A statute may be saved from constitutional deficiency, moreover, if its
meaning is fairly ascertainable by reference to other similar statutes or
other statutes related to the same subject matter. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S.
254, 281, 123 S. Ct. 1429, 1445, 155 L. Ed. 2d 407, 432–33 (2003); State v. 9
Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 581 (Iowa 2000) [hereinafter State]; Powers,
278 N.W.2d at 29. This reference to other related statutes is commonly
referred to as the interpretation or construction of a statute in pari materia.
The in pari materia approach is especially appropriate in the area of
criminal law, where our legislature has established a number of code
chapters with highly detailed, interconnecting provisions. When
considering an incremental modification, the legislature sometimes adopts
relatively cryptic measures that can be fully understood only in the context
of the web of preexisting statutes. While such statutes may occasionally be
imperfectly drawn, a statute which is not a paradigm of legislative drafting
does not necessarily pose a constitutional problem if any inherent
difficulties are resolved through judicial interpretation. Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584, 590 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (Pa. 1976).
In light of our recognition of the nature and realities of the legislative
process, we have repeatedly emphasized that sentencing provisions in
Iowa’s criminal code must be read in pari materia with other sentencing
provisions found elsewhere in the code. State, 616 N.W.2d at 581; State v.
Carstens, 594 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Iowa 1999); State v. Kostman, 585 N.W.2d
209, 212 (Iowa 1998); State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998);
State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990); State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d
738 (Iowa 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Jenney v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,
456 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1990); State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 397
(Iowa 1979). Through such interpretation, we necessarily operate on the
objective assumption that the legislature strives to create a symmetrical and
harmonious system of laws. State, 616 N.W.2d at 581; Fitzgerald v. State,
220 Iowa 547, 552, 260 N.W. 681, 683–84 (1935). 10
B. Application of Void-for-Vagueness Principles: Is there a
Ceiling for Civil Penalties Imposed Pursuant to Iowa Code Section
907.14(1)? In examining the language of section 907.14(1), the legislature
plainly established a floor for civil penalties in deferred judgment
proceedings, but did not expressly create a ceiling. As a result, Nail and
Kucera claim that the statute provides no guidance of any kind for a district
court judge, who would be empowered to impose a potentially limitless civil
money penalty for even minor crimes.
The State does not directly contest the proposition that a statute that
creates an unlimited civil penalty provision would violate due process.
Instead, the State asserts that a cardinal rule of statutory construction is
that a statute should not be interpreted or construed to create absurd
results. State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2003). It would be
absurd, according to the State, to read section 907.14(1) as authorizing the
court to impose a civil penalty of literally any amount. In order to avoid this
potentially absurd result, the State argues that the reference in section
907.14(1) to fines “authorized by law for the offense under sections 902.9 or
section 903.1” establishes an upper limit by implication.
We do not agree that the express language found in the narrow
confines of section 907.14(1) establishes a ceiling for civil penalties. The
statutory language itself—“a defendant shall be assessed a civil penalty of
an amount not less than the amount of any criminal fine authorized by law
for the offense under section 902.9 or section 903.1”—simply establishes a
floor for civil penalties, not a ceiling.
But the analysis does not end at this point. While the language of
section 907.14(1) considered in isolation does not expressly establish a
ceiling, our cases dictate that this code provision must be read in pari 11
materia with the system of laws that make up our criminal law to produce a
coherent whole. See, e.g., Byers, 456 N.W.2d at 919; Hildebrand, 280
N.W.2d at 397. While the penalties imposed under our deferred judgment
statute may be only quasi-criminal rather than criminal in nature, the
statute itself is part of the system of laws that govern criminal conduct
generally and must be considered in this larger context. State v. McSorley,
549 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Iowa 1996) (noting that statutes related to same
subject matter or to closely allied subject matter must be considered together
in light of common purposes and intent); Wonder Life Co. v. Liddy, 207
N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 1973) (same).
The concept of reading a penalty statute in para materia with other
criminal statutes has been utilized by this court to provide a statutory floor
where the provision expressly created only a ceiling. For example, in Link,
341 N.W.2d at 738, we considered the meaning of Iowa Code section
908.11. This provision stated that upon the revocation of probation, the
district court was empowered to sentence the defendant to “the sentence
[previously] imposed or any lesser sentence.” Id. at 739. This provision
created a ceiling, namely, the sentence previously imposed, but no floor.
Read literally, the phrase “any lesser sentence” could be construed as
authorizing the district court to impose a sentence less than the relevant
statutory minimum or even no sentence at all. Id. at 740.
This court in Link rejected the literalist approach, holding that upon
revocation of probation, the sentence must be within the range of sentences
that could have been imposed in the underlying criminal proceeding. Id.
Link stands for the proposition, therefore, that where the words of a
particular sentencing statute establish a ceiling but no floor, the statute 12
should not be read in isolation, but should be read in context with other
related sentencing provisions of the criminal code. Id.
While the legislature in Link enacted a provision with a ceiling but no
expressly stated floor, in this case the legislature enacted a statute with a
floor but no expressly stated ceiling. For purposes of in pari materia
analysis, this is a distinction without a difference. We note that other
courts have used in pari materia analysis to establish ceilings for criminal
sanctions where specific statutes established only penalty floors. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Bell, 645 A.2d 211, 216–17 (Pa. 1994), the
court held that a statute establishing a three-year minimum sentence, but
no maximum sentence, was to be read together with a general criminal
statute establishing a maximum penalty of five years. Similarly, in United
States v. Bruney, 866 F. Supp. 874, 878 (D.V.I. 1994), the court held that a
catch-all sentencing provision provided a maximum sentence for a specific
statute that failed to provide any limitation on the maximum penalty.
In this case, the issue is made awkward by the fact that the
legislature expressly incorporated Iowa Code sections 902.9 and 903.1 in
establishing a floor but did not make a parallel reference to the statutes to
establish a ceiling. Where the legislature has expressly cited sections 902.9
and 903.1 to establish a floor, but has declined to reference the cited
statutes to create a ceiling, it can be argued that a court has no business
rewriting the statute. According to the defense, the legislature considered
the provisions of sections 902.9 and 903.1 and expressly chose to
incorporate them for purposes of creating a floor and purposefully failed to
reference them to create a ceiling. Arguably, this court should have no role
in upsetting this legislative choice. Zomer v. West River Farms, Inc., 666 13
N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 2003); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656–57
(Iowa 1973).
On the other hand, if we fail to adopt an in pari materia analysis to
impose a ceiling on civil penalties under section 907.14(1), we violate the
rule of statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted in a
fashion that avoids unreasonable or absurd results inconsistent with
legislative intent. See Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (noting that the legislature is
presumed to intend “a just and reasonable result”); Pickett, 671 N.W.2d at
870; State, 616 N.W.2d at 589. It would be absurd to suggest that the
legislature intended to vest unlimited discretion in a district court to
establish a civil money penalty. Indeed, even the notion that the legislature
intended to allow a district court to impose a civil penalty in excess of the
potential criminal penalty is wholly illogical and would introduce
unintentional distortions into the criminal justice system. State, 616
N.W.2d at 581 (rejecting statutory interpretation that would have treated
younger offenders more harshly than older offenders for same crime).
Deferred judgments are reserved for those defendants deserving a second
chance.
We are convinced that the legislature, despite its clumsy wording, did
not intend the absurd result of allowing district courts to impose unlimited
civil penalties in section 907.14(1).1 Instead, objectively viewed, we believe
1In brief, Nail and Kucera allege that the legislature deliberately chose not to cap the amount of the civil penalty. We disagree. Prior to the passage of Iowa Code section 907.14(1), an amendment was introduced which set the civil penalty floor at one hundred dollars and ceiling at one thousand dollars for all crimes regardless of the permissible fines available for criminal convictions. Additionally, this proposed across-the-board limitation made the imposition of the civil penalty permissive rather than mandatory in the deferred judgment setting. S. Amend. 3103A, 81st G.A., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2005) (proposed amendment to House File 682). Thus, the proposed amendment stood for much different propositions than that advanced by the defendants in this case. In any event, these portions of the amendment were withdrawn prior to a vote. Id. Due to the nature of the proposed amendment as well as the failure of the legislature to vote upon it, it is not 14
that the enactment of section 907.14(1) was an incremental legislative act
which must be read in context of the ceiling established by Iowa Code
sections 902.9 and 903.1 even though the legislature did not expressly
incorporate the ceiling into the statute.
With this interpretation, we give the statute a reasonable, contextual
interpretation that is workable, promotes symmetry, and which therefore
best manifests legislative intent. State, 616 N.W.2d at 581. Further, our
approach gives life to the notion that a declaration of unconstitutionality
should be avoided where possible through any reasonable statutory
interpretation. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 233.
Under our interpretation, the provisions of Iowa Code sections 902.9
and 903.1 apply to create a ceiling for civil penalties that may be imposed
when judgments are deferred. For serious misdemeanors like first offense
drunk driving, the range of permissible criminal fines at the time of the
convictions of Nail and Kucera was between $250 and $1500. This range,
however, applies only “if a specific penalty is not provided for.” Iowa Code
§ 903.1. The Iowa legislature has enacted a specific penalty for first time
OWI, namely, a $1000 fine. Id. § 321J.2(2)(a)(2). As a result, the range of
potential fines for serious misdemeanors under section 903.1 has no
application. Instead, the penalty authorized by law under Iowa Code
section 907.14(1) for first offense OWI is the “specific penalty . . . provided
for” in Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a)(2)—$1000.
______________________________ dispositive, or even illustrative, of the legislature’s intent regarding a civil penalty ceiling. See Puerto Rico Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501, 108 S. Ct. 1350, 1354, 99 L. Ed. 2d 582, 589 (1988) (“But unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws.”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616, 671–72, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1473, 94 L. Ed. 2d 615, 656 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning that courts risk “ignor[ing] rudimentary principles of political science [when they] draw any conclusions regarding [legislative] intent from the failure to enact legislation.”). 15
We also hold that because Iowa Code section 907.14(1) must be read
in the context of our body of criminal law, the general sentencing provisions
of criminal law in Iowa Code section 901.5 apply. That provision vests the
district court with wide discretion in and general criteria for imposing
sentences. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d at 396. The range of sentencing
discretion under section 901.5 includes suspension of half the $1000 fine
as provided in Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a)(2), requiring a defendant to
perform community service in lieu of the fine under Iowa Code section
909.3A, and allowing payments to be made in installments under Iowa Code
section 909.3. In other words, the discretionary tools available to the
district court in the imposition of a civil penalty pursuant to a deferred
judgment under section 907.14 are coextensive with those of the court in
imposing a criminal fine under section 901.5 because the civil money
penalty under section 907.14(1) is imposed “pursuant to Iowa Code section
901.5.” Carstens, 594 N.W.2d at 437 (holding that section 902.9 sets forth
general sentencing parameters, but must be read in pari materia with
specific sentencing provisions found elsewhere in the Code). Any civil
penalty that is imposed under section 907.14 is thus subject to other
provisions of the criminal code related to the imposition of fines. State, 616
N.W.2d at 581 (holding that statute must be interpreted consistently with
other statutes concerning the same or related subjects).
Given our approach to the statute, we next determine whether the
statute is vague as applied to Nail and Kucera. We conclude the statute, as
we have construed it, satisfies due process. Because the criminal law
sanction for first offense OWI includes a $1000 fine, subject to discretionary
reduction by the district court, our construction of the deferred judgment
statute, as incorporating an identical monetary sanction, eliminates any 16
potential problem of fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence. Further,
by restricting the range of sentencing options, the second prong of due
process attack related to the potential of arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement has also been eliminated. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 481, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2358, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 449 (2000); see, e.g.,
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1082, 93 L. Ed.
1337, 1341 (1949) (“[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a
nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under
which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources
and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent
of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” (Emphasis added.)).
In sum, Iowa Code section 907.14(1), as construed in this opinion
and applied in this case, does not give rise to a due process claim under
either the Iowa or United States Constitutions.2
IV. Due Process: Punishment Prior to Adjudication of Guilt.
Nail and Kucera launch a second due process attack, asserting that a
civil penalty under section 907.14(1) cannot be imposed prior to an
adjudication of guilt. In briefing, the parties engage in a battle at close
quarters regarding whether the civil penalty in section 907.14(1) is criminal
or civil in nature. Specifically, the State contends that the purpose of the
2Nail and Kucera further allege that plea bargains, where there is a potential for deferred judgment, cannot be knowingly and voluntarily entered as the potential amount of civil penalty under section 907.14(1) is uncertain. While our construction of the statute eliminates any vagueness problem in future cases, State v. Speck, 242 N.W.2d 287, 293 (Iowa 1976), there might be an issue as to whether our decision should be retroactively applied to defeat a challenge to the validity of Nail’s and Kucera’s guilty pleas. Nail and Kucera, however, requested the deferred judgment and then agreed at the district court hearing to separate the issue of granting a deferred judgment from their challenge to the civil penalty provision of Iowa Code section 907.14(1). Further, in the colloquy before the district court, they were clearly informed that the criminal penalty for first offense driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated included a $1000 fine. Under these circumstances, the suggestion that the guilty pleas were involuntary has a hollow ring. 17
“civil penalty” is to recover costs of investigating, prosecuting, and
administering deferred judgments. Nail and Kucera contend that the “civil
penalty” is primarily punitive in nature. See Clinton Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Anderson, 322 N.W.2d 73, 75–76 (Iowa 1982) (discussing whether a “civil
penalty” is civil or criminal in nature).
We believe that the parties have focused on the wrong issue. We
recognize that generally speaking, due process requires that criminal
penalties be imposed only after an adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 n.16, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1872 n.16, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 466 n.16
(1979); Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 237 n.5. The foundation of this
requirement is the presumption of innocence. It would be fundamentally
unfair to impose criminal penalties in a contested matter until the matter of
guilt or innocence is determined. These are bedrock principles of
constitutional law. We further recognize that a plea bargain and the grant
of a deferred judgment are not ordinarily considered adjudications of guilt—
the prosecution not being complete until a final judgment has been entered.
State v. Anderson, 246 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Iowa 1976); State v. Farmer, 234
N.W.2d 89, 92 (Iowa 1975).
In this case, however, while there may be no adjudication of guilt,
there has been an admission of guilt. Nail and Kucera have filed written
guilty pleas and personally affirmed their guilt in open court. There is no
question of guilt or innocence to be adjudicated. Any due process claim
rooted in the presumption of innocence evaporates in light of their guilty
pleas.
Further, the State is not seeking to force a deferred judgment on
these defendants. In this case, deferred judgment offers the defendants the
significant benefit of avoiding inevitable criminal conviction. The 18
defendants, moreover, specifically requested that the court grant them this
benefit.
It is well-settled that a defendant who pleads guilty surrenders basic
constitutional rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 1712 n.5, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279–80 n.5 (1969). Where the
defendants have admitted guilt and themselves requested a deferred
judgment in order to avoid an adjudication of guilt, it cannot be maintained
that an adjudication of the underlying criminal offense is a prerequisite to
the imposition of a penalty, regardless of whether the penalty is considered
civil or criminal.
A defendant who voluntarily seeks a deferred judgment to avoid a
final criminal adjudication cannot object to the lack of one when statutory
sanctions under a deferred judgment are imposed. As a result, we hold that
the imposition of a civil penalty for deferred judgments does not affront
fundamental fairness notions inherent in the due process guarantees of the
Iowa and United States Constitutions.3
V. Conclusion.
The opinion of the district court holding Iowa Code section 907.14(1)
unconstitutional is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
3We note that below, Nail and Kucera alleged that a double jeopardy-excessive fines issue potentially lurked in the shadows of this case. They claim that if a deferred judgment is subsequently revoked after the payment of a civil money penalty, the State could seek to impose the maximum fine authorized by law in addition to the civil penalty already collected. As a result, Nail and Kucera argue, the cumulative payments made by a defendant could exceed the maximum penalty established by the legislature for the offense. Nail and Kucera, however, have not had their deferred judgments revoked and, as a result, the issue is not ripe for review. Moreover, the Iowa legislature has amended Iowa Code section 908.11(5), which now reduces the fine in a revoked deferred judgment by the amount of the civil penalty previously assessed. 2007 Iowa Acts ch. 180, § 12. As a result, the issue is moot without the likelihood of repetition and is not addressed in this opinion.