IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1580 Filed May 21, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RUSLAN NEGRUTA, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, John R. Flynn,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for ongoing criminal
conduct. AFFIRMED.
Raya Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and
Langholz, JJ. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
Ruslan Negruta pleaded guilty to ongoing criminal conduct, specified
unlawful activity—a class “B” felony—for his role in a sophisticated scheme to steal
credit- and debit-card information with skimming devices and hidden cameras on
ATMs and use the information for financial gain. See Iowa Code §§ 706A.1(5),
706A.2(4), 706A.4 (2023). The district court imposed an indeterminate twenty-
five-year prison sentence. And Negruta now appeals, arguing that his guilty plea
was not knowing and voluntary and that the court abused its discretion in selecting
a prison sentence rather than probation. But Negruta’s guilty-plea challenge is not
preserved for our review because he failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment
after being properly advised that he would need to do so in order to challenge his
plea on appeal. And the district court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the
sentence. We thus affirm Negruta’s conviction and sentence.
I. Guilty Plea
“A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding
by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s right to assert such
challenge on appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a)(2). But this rule only applies if
the district court adequately advised the defendant during the guilty plea
proceeding that plea challenges must be made in such a motion and that the failure
to timely do so before sentencing precludes challenging the plea on appeal. See
State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 535 (Iowa 2024). Here, Negruta failed to file a
motion in arrest of judgment. And during his guilty plea proceeding, the district
court gave Negruta the proper advisory of the need to file the motion and the
consequences on appeal of failing to do so. 3
Negruta does not dispute the adequacy of the content of that advisory. But
he contends that it was still “insufficient under the circumstance” because English
is not Negruta’s first language and even with an interpreter, Negruta “was still
confused and uncertain regarding aspects of the hearing.” But the record lacks
any support for Negruta’s suggestion that he did not understand the advisory. For
starters, he had a remote Romanian-language interpreter throughout the guilty
plea proceeding. True, the interpreter had difficulty hearing Negruta when he was
speaking because of technical difficulties with the connection. But the interpreter
had no trouble hearing the district judge and Negruta had no trouble hearing the
interpreter. What’s more, Negruta explained that he could understand most
English even without an interpreter—he only needed some help when speaking.
And when he did not understand or hear something said, he had no issue saying
so. Yet he expressed no concern when questioned throughout the proceeding or
after the court advised him of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment. And
so, because Negruta failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment after being
adequately advised of the consequences of not doing so, we are precluded from
considering Negruta’s guilty-plea challenge. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a)(2).
II. Sentence
Negruta next challenges his sentence, arguing that the court abused its
discretion by considering only the nature of the offense and overlooking mitigating
circumstances. According to Negruta, properly factoring in the ten months he
spent in custody while his case was pending and his need to financially support
his children, the court should have sentenced him to probation rather than an
indeterminate twenty-five-year prison term. 4
We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This
deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption
in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And “our task
on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to
determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.
When selecting an appropriate sentence, the court must decide what “will
provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the
protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others.”
Iowa Code § 901.5. To do so, “the court must consider the nature of the offense,
the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender,
and the chances of reform.” Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 862 (cleaned up). A court
cannot rely on only a single factor. See State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67
(Iowa 1982) (reversing manslaughter sentence when court gave only one
reason—that the defendant caused “the loss of life”). But placing “considerable
emphasis” on a particular factor at sentencing is not an abuse of discretion so long
as the court also “considered other factors pertinent to sentencing.” State v.
Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216–17 (Iowa 2006).
Here, the district court did not rely on only the nature of the offense as
Negruta claims. The court explained:
In considering your sentence here today, I’ve considered specifically your age. You’re 39 years old. I’ve considered your prior criminal history, your family circumstances as set forth in the PSI, the nature of the offense committed, and the harm to the victims here out of this Boone County case. I’ve considered the elaborate and sophisticated 5
nature of this financial crime. I’ve considered the need to protect the community and the need to deter you and others similarly situated from committing offenses like this in the future. I’ve considered your statement that you made to the court earlier here today; and I’ve considered the recommendations from the prosecutor, your attorney, and from the PSI.
Negruta’s attorney’s recommendation—which the court expressly considered—
relied on Negruta’s ten months of custody that he now urges the court did not factor
in. And the PSI and “family circumstances” included his child-support obligations
for his children in another country that he also urges should have been considered.
The court noted too that “everyone agrees that the Immigration and
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1580 Filed May 21, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RUSLAN NEGRUTA, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, John R. Flynn,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for ongoing criminal
conduct. AFFIRMED.
Raya Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and
Langholz, JJ. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
Ruslan Negruta pleaded guilty to ongoing criminal conduct, specified
unlawful activity—a class “B” felony—for his role in a sophisticated scheme to steal
credit- and debit-card information with skimming devices and hidden cameras on
ATMs and use the information for financial gain. See Iowa Code §§ 706A.1(5),
706A.2(4), 706A.4 (2023). The district court imposed an indeterminate twenty-
five-year prison sentence. And Negruta now appeals, arguing that his guilty plea
was not knowing and voluntary and that the court abused its discretion in selecting
a prison sentence rather than probation. But Negruta’s guilty-plea challenge is not
preserved for our review because he failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment
after being properly advised that he would need to do so in order to challenge his
plea on appeal. And the district court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the
sentence. We thus affirm Negruta’s conviction and sentence.
I. Guilty Plea
“A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding
by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s right to assert such
challenge on appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a)(2). But this rule only applies if
the district court adequately advised the defendant during the guilty plea
proceeding that plea challenges must be made in such a motion and that the failure
to timely do so before sentencing precludes challenging the plea on appeal. See
State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 535 (Iowa 2024). Here, Negruta failed to file a
motion in arrest of judgment. And during his guilty plea proceeding, the district
court gave Negruta the proper advisory of the need to file the motion and the
consequences on appeal of failing to do so. 3
Negruta does not dispute the adequacy of the content of that advisory. But
he contends that it was still “insufficient under the circumstance” because English
is not Negruta’s first language and even with an interpreter, Negruta “was still
confused and uncertain regarding aspects of the hearing.” But the record lacks
any support for Negruta’s suggestion that he did not understand the advisory. For
starters, he had a remote Romanian-language interpreter throughout the guilty
plea proceeding. True, the interpreter had difficulty hearing Negruta when he was
speaking because of technical difficulties with the connection. But the interpreter
had no trouble hearing the district judge and Negruta had no trouble hearing the
interpreter. What’s more, Negruta explained that he could understand most
English even without an interpreter—he only needed some help when speaking.
And when he did not understand or hear something said, he had no issue saying
so. Yet he expressed no concern when questioned throughout the proceeding or
after the court advised him of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment. And
so, because Negruta failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment after being
adequately advised of the consequences of not doing so, we are precluded from
considering Negruta’s guilty-plea challenge. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a)(2).
II. Sentence
Negruta next challenges his sentence, arguing that the court abused its
discretion by considering only the nature of the offense and overlooking mitigating
circumstances. According to Negruta, properly factoring in the ten months he
spent in custody while his case was pending and his need to financially support
his children, the court should have sentenced him to probation rather than an
indeterminate twenty-five-year prison term. 4
We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This
deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption
in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And “our task
on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to
determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.
When selecting an appropriate sentence, the court must decide what “will
provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the
protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others.”
Iowa Code § 901.5. To do so, “the court must consider the nature of the offense,
the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender,
and the chances of reform.” Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 862 (cleaned up). A court
cannot rely on only a single factor. See State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67
(Iowa 1982) (reversing manslaughter sentence when court gave only one
reason—that the defendant caused “the loss of life”). But placing “considerable
emphasis” on a particular factor at sentencing is not an abuse of discretion so long
as the court also “considered other factors pertinent to sentencing.” State v.
Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216–17 (Iowa 2006).
Here, the district court did not rely on only the nature of the offense as
Negruta claims. The court explained:
In considering your sentence here today, I’ve considered specifically your age. You’re 39 years old. I’ve considered your prior criminal history, your family circumstances as set forth in the PSI, the nature of the offense committed, and the harm to the victims here out of this Boone County case. I’ve considered the elaborate and sophisticated 5
nature of this financial crime. I’ve considered the need to protect the community and the need to deter you and others similarly situated from committing offenses like this in the future. I’ve considered your statement that you made to the court earlier here today; and I’ve considered the recommendations from the prosecutor, your attorney, and from the PSI.
Negruta’s attorney’s recommendation—which the court expressly considered—
relied on Negruta’s ten months of custody that he now urges the court did not factor
in. And the PSI and “family circumstances” included his child-support obligations
for his children in another country that he also urges should have been considered.
The court noted too that “everyone agrees that the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agency otherwise known as ICE has a hold on you in this
case,” and Negruta had not shown “that probation would be workable and proper
for a foreign national being deported to his home country” of Moldova. And so, the
court reasoned that “it’s very difficult to see how probation can be effectively
implemented in your case when it’s likely that you will be deported.” See State v.
Avalos Valdez, 934 N.W.2d 585, 594–95 (Iowa 2019) (affirming district court’s
consideration of future deportation in assessing the workability of probation).
Because the court expressly weighed all these considerations before
finding “that prison is appropriate in this case,” Negruta’s argument that it solely
relied on a single factor is without merit. We understand that Negruta disagrees
with the court’s weighing of the sentencing factors and the particular sentence
selected—but that is not enough to show an abuse of discretion on appeal. See
Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 863 (“The test for whether a sentencing court abused its
discretion is not whether we might have weighed the various factors differently.”).
And we see nothing unreasonable or untenable in the district court’s reasoning. 6
Bottom line, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Negruta to an indeterminate twenty-five-year prison sentence. We thus affirm.
AFFIRMED.