State of Iowa v. Kevin Dwayne Woods, Jr.

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: 24-0261
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–0261

Submitted February 18, 2025—Filed June 27, 2025 Amended September 4, 2025

State of Iowa,

Appellee,

vs.

Kevin Dwayne Woods, Jr.,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory D. Brandt,

judge.

A criminal defendant challenges his conviction under Iowa Code

section 724.8B (2023), arguing that the conviction violates the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 1A of the

Iowa Constitution. Affirmed.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which

Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., joined. Oxley, J., filed an opinion

concurring in the judgment. McDermott, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which

Waterman and May, JJ., joined. May, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which

Waterman and McDermott, JJ., joined.

Jessica Donels (argued) and Kyle Dawson of Parrish Kruidenier, L.L.P.,

Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee. 2

McDonald, Justice.

During a traffic stop, Kevin Woods was found to be in possession of drugs,

a scale, a loaded semiautomatic pistol, and additional high-capacity firearm

magazines. He was charged with and pleaded guilty to (1) possession of a

controlled substance and (2) carrying a dangerous weapon while in the illegal

possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense.

Woods challenges the latter conviction in this appeal. He argues that he has a

federal and state constitutional right to carry a firearm while simultaneously in

the illegal possession of a controlled substance and while committing an

indictable offense. We disagree. There is no federal or state constitutional right

to carry a firearm while criming.

I.

An officer pulled Kevin Woods over for having inoperable taillights on the

trailer of the commercial vehicle he was driving. During the stop, the officer

detected the odor of marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle, and the officer

saw in plain view a THC vape pen on the center console. Having probable cause

to believe a crime was being committed, the officer conducted a search of the

vehicle, including a backpack on the center console. The officer found marijuana

and a scale inside the backpack. Also in the backpack with the drugs and the

scale was a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol with a loaded magazine in the

magazine well. In addition to the drugs, the scale, and the loaded pistol, the

officer found three additional magazines, two of which were loaded, and two of

which were high-capacity. In total, the officer found sixty-eight rounds of

ammunition.

Woods was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a serious

misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2023), and carrying 3

a dangerous weapon while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or

while committing an indictable offense, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of

Iowa Code section 724.8B. Iowa Code section 724.8B provides as follows:

A person determined to be ineligible to receive a permit to carry weapons under section 724.8, subsection 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, a person who illegally possesses a controlled substance included in chapter 124, subchapter II, or a person who is committing an indictable offense is prohibited from carrying dangerous weapons. Unless otherwise provided by law, a person who violates this section commits a serious misdemeanor.

A pistol is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute. Id. § 702.7.

Woods moved to dismiss the dangerous weapon charge on the ground that

prosecution of the case would violate his federal constitutional right to keep and

bear arms, as protected by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution, and his state constitutional right to keep and bear

arms, as protected by article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. The district

court denied the motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the legislature could place

reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the right to keep and bear

arms. It concluded that the prohibition on carrying firearms while illegally

possessing a controlled substance or committing an indictable offense was a

reasonable time, place, and manner regulation supported by historical

analogues.1

After the district court denied Woods’s motion to dismiss, Woods entered

a conditional guilty plea to both charges, preserving his right to challenge the

1In the district court, Woods also claimed that a conviction under section 724.8B would

deprive him of his fundamental right to keep and bear arms without due process of law, an argument that he also raises on appeal. The district court did not rule on that issue, however, and Woods did not request that the district court make a ruling on the issue. Error is thus not preserved on Woods’s due process claim, see State v. Chawech, 15 N.W.3d 78, 83 (Iowa 2024) (stating that error preservation rules apply in criminal cases and that an issue must be “(1) properly raised in the district court and (2) ruled on by the district court” to preserve error), and we need not address it any further. 4

constitutionality of his conviction for violating section 724.8B. The district court

accepted the guilty plea and sentenced Woods to concurrent sentences of

180 days in jail for the drug offense and 365 days in jail for the dangerous

weapon offense, both sentences suspended. Woods timely filed this appeal. The

adjudication of this appeal is in the interest of justice, and we have jurisdiction

over the appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(3) (2025) (providing for appellate

jurisdiction over conditional guilty pleas when “in the interest of justice”); State v.

McClain, 20 N.W.3d 488, 494–95 (Iowa 2025) (discussing the jurisdictional

statute and the interest of justice standard).

II.

Woods contends that his conviction for carrying a dangerous weapon in

violation of Iowa Code section 724.8B (2023) violates his federal constitutional

right to keep and bear arms.2 The Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security

of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

infringed.” The Supreme Court has made the Second Amendment applicable to

the states via the incorporation doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. See

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).

2Woods appears to assert both a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge to his conviction under section 724.8B. In a facial challenge to a statute, the party contends that there is “no application of the statute [that] could be constitutional under any set of facts.” Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 716 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 764 (Iowa 2019)). In an as-applied challenge, the party “alleges the statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts.” Id. (quoting Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 764). A facial challenge “is the ‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it requires a defendant to ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). To successfully prevail against a facial challenge, the “[g]overnment need only demonstrate that [the challenged law] is constitutional in some of its applications.” Id. We need not dwell on the distinction between these two types of challenges here because section 724.8B “is constitutional as applied to the facts of [Woods’s] own case.” Id. 5

A.

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and in

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Supreme Court instructed

courts to engage in a particular analytical process when evaluating Second

Amendment claims. Under the first step of the Bruen test, courts must make a

threshold determination whether the challenger is part of “the people” included

in the Second Amendment and whether the “Second Amendment’s plain text

covers [the] individual’s conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17; see id. at 31–32 (stating

that it was “undisputed” that the petitioners were “part of ‘the people’ whom the

Second Amendment protects”). If the individual is part of “the people” and his

conduct is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, “the Constitution

presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 17. If the Federal Constitution

protects the conduct at issue, the burden then shifts to the government

“[t]o justify its regulation.” Id. To justify the regulation, “the government may not

simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest.” Id. Instead,

“the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. To determine whether a

firearm regulation is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition, “[a] court

must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our

tradition is understood to permit.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen,

597 U.S. at 29).

B.

Woods’s challenge to section 724.8B fails at the first step of the Bruen test.

See 597 U.S. at 18 (stating that if “the regulated conduct falls beyond the

Amendment’s original scope, ‘then the analysis can stop there; the regulated

activity is categorically unprotected’ ” (quoting United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 6

510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bruen,

597 U.S. 1)); Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518 (stating that “the analysis can stop” once

a court determines that the plain text of the Second Amendment does not protect

the conduct prohibited by the statute at issue (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago,

651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011))). The Second Amendment does not cover or

protect a right to carry a firearm while also illegally possessing a controlled

substance or while committing an indictable offense.

The federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms “is not unlimited.”

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). The federal constitutional

right is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner

whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. Instead, it is a limited right of

responsible, law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms when engaged in lawful

conduct. The Supreme Court has made this crystal clear. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8–9

(“[T]he Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of an ordinary,

law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun . . . .”); id. at 9–10 (“In this case,

petitioners and respondents agree that ordinary, law-abiding citizens have a

similar right to carry handguns publicly for their self-defense. We too

agree . . . .”); id. at 26 (stating that the Second Amendment “ ‘elevates above all

other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms’ for

self-defense” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635)); id. at 31–32 (“It is undisputed

that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are

part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.”); id. at 38

(discussing the lack of historical tradition regarding limitations on public carry

for “law-abiding citizens”); id. at 60 (discussing the lack of historical limitations

on “law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from carrying arms in

public for that purpose”); id. at 70 (noting that “law-abiding, responsible citizens” 7

historically have not had to demonstrate a special need to carry arms for

self-protection); id. at 71 (“New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the

Fourteenth Amendment in that it prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary

self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.”);

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780 (stating that “the Second Amendment protects a

personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes”); Heller, 554 U.S. at

625, 635; see also Snope v. Brown, 145 S. Ct. 1534, 1534 (2025) (mem.)

(Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (stating that District

of Columbia v. Heller “further determined that the Second Amendment protects”

the use of certain weapons by “law-abiding citizens” and using the term “law-

abiding citizens” four times); id. at *5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from

the denial of certiorari because the question presented was “of critical

importance to tens of millions of law-abiding AR-15 owners” (emphasis added)).

Federal courts have thus consistently held that “[t]he Constitution does

not give anyone the right to be armed while committing a [crime].”

United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). In United States v.

Risner, 129 F.4th 361, 364 (6th Cir. 2025), the Sixth Circuit evaluated a post-

Bruen Second Amendment challenge to a sentencing enhancement for

possession of a firearm while committing certain federal crimes. The court

focused “on whether the Second Amendment’s right ‘protected the possession of

weapons by individuals engaged in criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 367–68 (quoting

Greeno, 679 F.3d at 519). The court reasoned that it did not, and it ended its

analysis there. See id. at 368 (“Because we started and stopped our inquiry at

step one of the prior test in [United States v. ]Greeno, nothing in Bruen dictates

a different approach here.”). 8

In Johnson v. United States, No. 23–CV–61575–RAR, 22–CR–60097–RAR,

2023 WL 6442991, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2023), a postconviction-relief

proceeding, the court dealt with an issue similar to the one presented here.

There, the movant was convicted of a gun crime and sought to vacate the

conviction on the ground that “the Second Amendment allow[ed] him to possess

a ‘legal firearm for self-defense’ ” even though he was in possession of illegal

drugs. Id. Like Woods, the movant argued that the mere presence of illegal drugs

“[did] not encumber this right because he was not being dangerous or violent.”

Id. The court rejected the factual premise of the movant’s argument that the

simultaneous possession of drugs and guns was not dangerous, stating that

“[g]uns and drugs ‘are a dangerous combination’ ” that inherently increase the

potential for violence. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Orrego Goez v. United

States, 656 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2023)). The court then denied the

Second Amendment claim, explaining that “there is a history and tradition of

keeping guns away from those engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. (quoting Orrego

Goez, 656 F. Supp. 3d at 1376). In the court’s view, the movant’s “legal right to

possess a firearm was extinguished the moment [he] chose to carry his firearm”

while committing an illegal act. Id. (emphasis omitted).

Other federal cases, also decided after Bruen, are in accordance with

Risner and Johnson. See, e.g., United States v. Page, No. CR–25–024–RAW,

2025 WL 1489540, at *1 (E.D. Okla. May 23, 2025) (stating that only

“law-abiding citizens have a right to carry a gun outside the home for

self-defense”); Madrid v. United States, No. 1:21cv507, 2024 WL 5466859, at *8

(E.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2024) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to a

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) at “the first step in the [Bruen] analysis”

because the Second Amendment “does not cover an individual’s right to use or 9

carry a firearm” in a federal drug crime); United States v. Barenas-Reynoso,

No. 19–cr–00351–8, 2024 WL 3509757, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2024) (rejecting

a facial challenge to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) at the first step of the

Bruen analysis); United States v. Charles, No. 6:21–CR–00154–01,

2023 WL 6358688, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 28, 2023) (rejecting a Second

Amendment challenge to a conviction because the Second Amendment right “is

tied to firearm possession and use for lawful purposes by law-abiding citizens”);

United States v. Snead, 647 F. Supp. 3d 475, 479–81 (W.D. Va. 2022) (explaining

that Heller, McDonald, and Bruen “make[] clear that the Second Amendment

protects the conduct of law-abiding citizens, and provides no constitutional

sanctuary” for non-law abiding citizens).

State courts have also concluded that there is no federal constitutional

right to carry a firearm while also committing a crime. People v. Gonzalez,

291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127 (Ct. App. 2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by

Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, is materially indistinguishable from this case. In that case, a

police officer found the defendant “asleep in his car with a bag of

methamphetamine and a loaded gun at his feet.” Id. at 128. As relevant here, the

defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance while armed.

Id. Like Woods, the defendant contended his conviction “violate[d] the Second

Amendment by restricting a nonviolent offender’s right to possess firearms.” Id.

The court rejected the challenge. Id. It explained that the first step in determining

a challenged statute’s constitutionality under the Second Amendment is to

determine “ ‘whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the

scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee’ of protecting the right of

responsible, law-abiding citizens to possess firearms.” Id. at 130 (quoting

Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668–69 (1st Cir. 2018), abrogated in part on other 10

grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1). It stated that it was “aware of no court decision

holding that the United States Constitution protects a right to carry a gun while

simultaneously engaging in criminal conduct,” id. at 130, and held that “[t]here

is no constitutional right to carry a gun while committing a crime,” id. at 132.

Although People v. Gonzalez was issued before Bruen, its threshold

analysis was later affirmed post-Bruen. See People v. Allen, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d

474, 476 (Ct. App. 2023) (“We reject the constitutional challenges, and we

publish our analysis concerning possession of a controlled substance while

armed with a firearm to confirm that [Gonzalez] remains good law.”); see also

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19 (stating that the first step of the predominant Second

Amendment framework pre-Bruen was “broadly consistent” with the first step of

the Bruen test). In People v. Allen, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 475, the defendant was

convicted of “possessing a controlled substance while armed with a firearm.” The

defendant challenged the conviction on Second Amendment grounds. Id. at 476.

The court rejected the challenge at the first step of the Bruen analysis. Id. at 479.

The court concluded that the Second Amendment protects “ ‘law-abiding citizens

only’ and does not ‘protect[] a right to carry a gun while simultaneously engaging

in criminal conduct.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzalez, 291 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 130). Consistent with Gonzalez, the court did not even proceed with

the second step of the Bruen analysis:

Allen focuses exclusively on the second step of the Bruen analysis, arguing that there were “no regulation[s] in or around 1791 that prohibited individuals in possession of any drug from also being armed” and that there are no other relevant, analogous prohibitions. . . . [U]nder Bruen we need not analyze whether a regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” if the individual’s regulated conduct is not covered by the Second Amendment.

Id. at 479–80 (first alteration in original) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24). 11

Similarly, in Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, No. 0261–24–3, 2025 WL

1559568, at *1–2 (Va. Ct. App. June 3, 2025), the defendant was convicted of

violating a Virginia statute that criminalized the possession of a firearm while

possessing a schedule I or II controlled substance after law enforcement found a

shotgun and cocaine inside the defendant’s bedroom. The defendant brought an

as-applied Second Amendment challenge to the statute, which the court rejected.

Id. at *5. The court noted that, like Iowa Code section 724.8B, the Virginia

statute only “proscribes a temporary loss of gun rights when and where a person

possesses such a substance while simultaneously knowingly and intentionally

possessing the firearm in question.” Id. at *8. The court added that there was an

“underlying dangerousness stemming from concurrent drug and firearm

possession” even if the defendant was merely in constructive possession of those

items. Id. at *11. The court thus concluded that based on Heller, Rahimi, and

relevant Virginia precedent, “the right to keep and bear arms in the home for

self-defense does not include the right to concurrent drug and firearm

possession, even where the arms in question are found in the home not on the

defendant’s person.” Id. at *8.

In State v. Jones, 249 N.E.3d 782, 792–94 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024), the court

rejected a federal and state constitutional challenge to a law that enhanced the

defendant’s criminal sentence for possession of a firearm while possessing drugs.

The court explained that the Second Amendment right applies to “ ‘law-abiding,’

responsible citizens, not those who would violate the nation’s laws.” Id. at 794

(quoting State v. Windland, No. 2023 CA 00068, 2024 WL 2037674, at *6 (Ohio

Ct. App. May 6, 2024)). Like Woods, the defendant argued that the Second

Amendment should apply because the handgun was not used during the

commission of or in the furtherance of any crime. Id. The court rejected the 12

argument, reasoning that the “close proximity” between the firearm and the

drugs was sufficient. Id. “Consequently, since the Second Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution apply

‘only to those who are [not] actively violating the nation’s drug laws,’ [the law

was] not unconstitutional as applied to Jones.” Id. (first alteration in original)

(quoting Windland, 2024 WL 2037674, at *6). The same rationale applies here.

Indeed, in two cases decided prior to Bruen (and Heller, actually), this court

had already reached the common-sense conclusion that the federal

constitutional right to keep and bear arms does not include the right to carry

while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an

indictable offense. In State v. Mehner, 480 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Iowa 1992), the

defendant challenged the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 204.401(1)(e)

(Supp. 1989), which enhanced the sentence for certain drug offenses for those “in

the immediate possession or control of a firearm” while committing the drug

offense. We rejected the Second Amendment challenge with little difficulty:

“Although Mehner argues the constitution gives him the right to possess

firearms, the statute involved prohibits only the possession of firearms while

participating in a drug offense; a criminal activity. The statute does not forbid

conduct which is constitutionally protected.” Id. at 879.

In State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Iowa 1997), the defendant was

charged with interference with official acts while armed, in violation of Iowa Code

section 719.1 (1993). He moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that, as

relevant here, enforcement of the law violated his rights under the Second

Amendment. Id. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, and a jury found

him guilty as charged. Id. This court rejected the Second Amendment challenge

on appeal. Id. at 370. This court explained that the law was “unsettled as to the 13

precise scope of what rights the Second Amendment protects” but that the court

was “certain . . . in what it does not protect.” Id. This court held that the

defendant “ha[d] no constitutional right to be armed” while committing a crime.

Id. Accordingly, “[h]is Second Amendment constitutional challenge must fail, and

the judgment entered upon his conviction must be affirmed.” Id.

While we acknowledge that Mehner and Brecunier are not controlling

because they pre-date Heller and Bruen and thus do not feature an adequate

historical analysis, see Risner, 129 F.4th at 366–67 (noting that the first step of

the historical analysis post-Heller was “embrace[d]” by the Supreme Court in

Bruen, but pre-Heller cases may have used a different mode of analysis), nothing

in Bruen undermines their holdings. The holding in each case—that there is no

Second Amendment right to carry a firearm while in the illegal possession of a

controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense—is widely

supported by post-Heller and post-Bruen caselaw. See, e.g., id. at 368 (“[W]e have

no reason to depart from Greeno’s holding that the historical understanding of

the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to the use of a firearm for an

unlawful purpose.”); United States v. Cole, No. 24–10877, 2025 WL 339894, at

*4 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025) (per curiam) (affirming a post-Bruen and post-Rahimi

felon-in-possession conviction based on a pre-Bruen decision because neither

Bruen nor Rahimi came close to “demolish[ing]” or “evisercat[ing]” the pre-Bruen

case’s “fundamental props” (alterations in original) (quoting Del Castillo v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Health, 26 F.4th 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2022))); Allen, 314 Cal Rptr.

3d at 479 (concluding that Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, “remain[ed] good

law after Bruen”). 14

We thus conclude that Woods’s conviction for carrying a dangerous

weapon while illegally possessing a controlled substance and while committing

an indictable offense does not violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

C.

Even if the conduct at issue here—the possession of a firearm while

illegally possessing a controlled substance or while committing an indictable

offense—was covered by the Second Amendment, Woods’s federal challenge to

his conviction would nonetheless fail. To justify the regulation, “the government

must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. The challenged law must

be “ ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit.”

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). “Why and how the

regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.” Id. The “why” analysis

instructs that “if laws at the Founding regulated firearm use to address

particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws

imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible

category” of firearms regulation. United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269, 274

(5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692). The “how” analysis warns that

“a law . . . may not be compatible with the right if it [is regulated] to an extent

beyond what was done at the Founding.” Id. (alteration and omission in original)

(quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692).

We start with the “why” behind the challenged law. “The state possesses a

strong compelling interest in maintaining public safety and preventing gun

violence.” State v. Weber, 132 N.E.3d 1140, 1148 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). Carrying

a firearm during the commission of an indictable offense increases the risk of

danger and violence to the perpetrator, the victim, if any, and those investigating 15

or responding to the crime, including members of the public, private security

officers, and public peace officers. There is no category of crime where the

perpetrator’s possession of a pistol during the commission of the crime makes

the situation safer. The government thus has “a compelling interest in public

safety and preventing crime through the uniform enforcement of gun control

laws.” United States v. Harper, 634 F. Supp. 3d 594, 603 (N.D. Iowa 2022).

The government’s interest in public safety, generally, and peace officer

safety, particularly, extends to drug offenses. “[D]rugs and guns are a dangerous

combination.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993). Contrary to

Woods’s (and the dissent’s) assertion, mixing drugs and guns together is

inherently dangerous, even in the case of personal use. “Even one who simply

possesses a controlled substance . . . must generally obtain it from someone

else, and firearms are often involved in drug transactions. This dangerous

connection between illegal drugs and firearms is well-known and has been

recognized by Congress.” United States v. Levasseur, No. 1:22–cr–00155–LEW,

2023 WL 6623165, at *9 (D. Me. Oct. 11, 2023). Further,

[I]t is reasonable to assume a person armed with a loaded, operable firearm during the commission of any crime may be willing to resort to use of that weapon to avoid arrest and—in the case of section 11370.1 [drug possession statute], specifically—to maintain possession of their illicit stash. It is also reasonable to assume that some people who have controlled substances . . . also abuse those drugs, making their immediate access to a loaded, operable firearm more of a threat to public safety than someone . . . who isn’t in the process of committing a crime. Indeed, the potentially “deadly combination” of illegal drugs and firearms is precisely what the Legislature intended to address by enacting section 11370.1.

Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130–32 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Pena,

88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 659 (Ct. App. 1999)). 16

Woods suggests that personal-use marijuana offenses may not raise the

same concerns, but his claim is incorrect. Contrary to popular belief, and the

dissent’s assertion, the possession of marijuana is still illegal in every state

because marijuana remains a controlled substance under federal law. 21 U.S.C.

§ 812, sched. I (c)(10). It is just doubly illegal in Iowa. State v. Middlekauff,

974 N.W.2d 781, 791 (Iowa 2022) (stating that marijuana is listed as a schedule I

controlled substance “[u]nder both Iowa and federal law”). So the same concerns

for peace officer safety arising out of the investigation of drug offenses and the

apprehension of drug offenders apply equally to marijuana offenses, including

personal-use marijuana offenses.

The facts of this case bear out that concern. Woods was pulled over

because of an inoperable light on the trailer of his commercial vehicle. During

the traffic stop, the officer observed a THC vape pen on the center console of the

vehicle and smelled marijuana wafting from the cabin, indicating that Woods

may have been using while driving and while in possession of a loaded pistol.

The loaded pistol was contained in a backpack on the center console, readily

accessible to Woods. Although Woods did not use the loaded pistol to avoid

apprehension in this case, that does not make the potential for death or physical

injury to the officer and Woods any less real. Traffic stops, especially stops where

the motorist is in possession of drugs and guns, are inherently dangerous:

Even for routine traffic violations, traffic stops are “fraught with danger to police officers.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). An “inordinate risk confront[s] an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (per curiam). That is in part because officers operate at a “tactical disadvantage” when “approaching an unknown vehicle, with limited visibility and unpredictable threats.” Brief for National Fraternal Order of Police as Amicus Curiae 4. As this Court noted nearly 50 years ago, “a significant percentage of 17

murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.” Mimms, 434 U.S., at 110, 98 S. Ct. 330 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234, n. 5, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973)). Traffic stops remain highly dangerous today. . . .

Officers cannot let their guard down and assume that any particular traffic stop will be safe—even if a driver is pulled over for nothing more than a speeding violation, a broken taillight, or the like. The driver may be drunk, on drugs, armed, or some combination thereof. Or the driver may have committed (or may be about to commit) a serious crime. “People detained for minor offenses” such as ordinary traffic violations “can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.” Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 334, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2012). . . .

So even though most traffic stops end without incident, traffic stops are nonetheless inherently risky for police officers.

Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1360–61 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., with whom

Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., join, concurring) (alteration in original)

(emphases added).

Having looked at the “why” underlying the current law, we now turn to

“how” the law is implemented. Iowa Code section 724.8B (2023) is a narrow law.

Section 724.8B does not involve a licensing scheme, a permanent or lengthy

dispossession law, or a limitation on the right to keep and bear arms while

engaged in lawful activity. Section 724.8B does not prohibit any individual from

owning a firearm, possessing a firearm, or carrying a firearm. Instead, as relevant

here, the statute makes it a criminal offense for an individual to carry a firearm

only during the limited time in which the individual is also simultaneously in the

illegal possession of a controlled substance or while the person is committing an

indictable offense.

Woods fails to appreciate the limited nature of the regulation at issue in

this case and thus makes a categorical error when looking at historical

analogues. Rather than comparing section 724.8B to limited 18

criminal-conduct-based regulations that prohibit a person from carrying a

firearm only at certain times—in particular, when the person is in the illegal

possession of a controlled substance or committing an indictable offense—Woods

compares section 724.8B to status-based dispossession statutes. But the

distinction between limited conduct-based regulations and status-based

dispossession statutes matters. A status-based dispossession statute has the

potential to infringe on protected Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights

because the individual is unable to own or possess a firearm at all, whereas a

limited criminal-conduct-based regulation has no such potential:

[D]ispossession laws prohibit individuals from possessing firearms in the future based on their past criminal conduct [or status]. Section 11370.1 [a conduct-based law], in contrast, prohibits individuals from possessing firearms while simultaneously committing criminal activity. [A] convicted nonviolent felon, could at least argue that if he were allowed to possess firearms, he would use them for a lawful purpose (e.g., defense of the home or certain military purposes). [The defendant] cannot make that argument. Instead he seeks to validate his possession of a gun for an unlawful purpose, something on which Second Amendment jurisprudence, for all its murkiness, is quite clear. There is no constitutional right to carry a gun while committing a crime.

Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130–32.

Indeed, the primary case on which Woods relies, United States v. Daniels,

124 F.4th 967, 970 (5th Cir. 2025), undercuts his argument because it makes

the distinction between historical conduct-based laws that regulated when a

person could carry a firearm and historical status-based laws that prohibited a

person from even possessing a firearm. In that case, the defendant was convicted

of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which wholly bars a person who is an “unlawful

user of or addicted to any controlled substance” of shipping, transporting,

possessing, or receiving a firearm. Id. The Fifth Circuit, relying on its controlling

decision United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269, reversed and remanded the 19

conviction. Daniels, 124 F.4th at 978–79. Part of the court’s rationale was that

historically, there were laws that “banned carrying weapons while under the

influence” under certain conditions but “none [that] barred gun possession by

regular drinkers.” Id. at 974 (quoting Connelly, 117 F.4th at 280). That

distinction—between limits on the right to carry a firearm based on conduct and

prohibitions on the right to possess a firearm based on status—meant the

dispossession statute at issue did “not impose a comparable burden on the right

holder” and thus had no historical analogue. Id. Further, there was only a vague

“temporal nexus” between the disqualifying conduct and the limitation of the

right. See id. (quoting Connelly, 117 F.4th at 282).

Unlike the dispossession law at issue in Daniels and Connelly, carry laws

like section 724.8B that criminalize or further penalize the carrying of a firearm

while simultaneously in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while

simultaneously committing an indictable offense are “analogous enough [to

historical precursors] to pass constitutional muster” at the justification stage of

the Bruen analysis. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30).

“Crimes historically have been subject to enhanced sentences because they were

committed with firearms—true both just before and contemporaneous to the

Second Amendment’s ratification in 1791.” United States v. Wigfall,

677 F. Supp. 3d 791, 796 (N.D. Ind. 2023).

In 1788, the Northwest Territory—a federal jurisdiction with laws enacted by a governor and three judges, all subject then to congressional approval, see An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprinted in Documents Illustrative of the Union of the American States, House Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927) (Northwest Ordinance)—punished breaking and entering more severely when a person was “armed with any dangerous weapon or weapons” by causing offenders to forfeit their estate and to face 40 years in gaol (jail), see Laws Passed in the Territory of the United 20

States, North-West of the River Ohio, from the Commencement of the Government to the 31st of December, 1791, 20 (1792). Federal legislation establishing the Mississippi Territory (later Alabama and Mississippi) based its governance on the Northwest Territory’s model, and its earliest laws in 1799 and 1800—later known as the Sargent’s Code based on the Federalist Governor Winthrop Sargent—increased punishment for both burglary and robbery when the culprit was armed with a dangerous weapon. See A Law Respecting Crimes and Punishments (Feb. 28, 1799), reprinted in Sargent’s Code: A Collection of the Original Laws of the Mississippi Territory Enacted 1799–1800: By Governor Winthrop Sargent and the Territorial Judges 12–13 (1939) (e.g., enhancing sentence for burglary with a dangerous weapon from three to four years); see also Michael H. Hoffheimer, Murder and Manslaughter in Mississippi: Unintentional Killings, 71 Miss. L. J. 35, 55 n. 47–48 (2001).

Id. at 797 (footnote omitted). Similar laws were in place at the time the

Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. See id. at 798–99 (discussing laws

in the 1800s). Take Iowa, for example. The Revision of 1860 of the Code of Iowa

punished robbery and burglary more severely if the offender was “armed with a

dangerous weapon.” Iowa Code § 4202 (1860); id. § 4233. These more severe

sanctions were also included in the 1873 Code of Iowa. Iowa Code § 3859 (1873);

id. § 3892.

In the interest of brevity, we need not recite all the relevant historical

analogues that demonstrate Iowa Code section 724.8B (2023), as applied here,

is consistent with “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen,

597 U.S. at 17. Other courts have done so, and they have definitively established

that the type of limited conduct-based regulation at issue in this case is

relevantly similar to this nation’s history of firearms regulations. See Rahimi,

602 U.S. at 699 (holding that the challenged law was consistent with historical

analogues because, among other aspects, the “restriction was temporary”);

United States v. Underwood, 129 F.4th 912, 930 (6th Cir. 2025) (“In the period

surrounding the founding, many states . . . began to provide for enhanced 21

punishment for crimes committed while the perpetrator was armed with a deadly

weapon.”); Greeno, 679 F.3d at 519–20 (reviewing the historical analogues and

concluding that there is no right to possess a firearm while engaged in criminal

activity); Wigfall, 677 F. Supp. 3d at 796–800 (reviewing the relevantly similar

laws at the time of the founding and at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth

Amendment and rejecting the defendant’s challenge); Commonwealth v. Jenkins,

328 A.3d 1076, 1089–91, 1093–94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) (conducting a thorough

survey of the historical materials and concluding that conduct-based firearm

prohibitions are historically justified); Fitzgerald, 2025 WL 1559568, at *12

(“[T]here is a sufficient historical analogue for Code § 18.2-308.4 [prohibiting

firearms possession while in the possession of controlled substances] in the

historical prohibition against possessing firearms while smuggling

contraband.”); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 911 S.E.2d 181, 184 (Va. Ct. App.

2025) (rejecting a defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to his conviction for

“possessing a firearm while also possessing a controlled substance” and

concluding that the law was “constitutional as applied to [the defendant] under

the test set out in Bruen and Rahimi”); Commonwealth v. Webb, No. 1805–24–3,

2025 WL 898249, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2025) (“We find that the regulation

here is passed for a similar purpose to the historical analogues set out in

Watkins, and it imposes a similar burden.”).

In United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th 1124, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2023), the

court rejected a challenge to a federal sentencing enhancement triggered by the

possession of a firearm. The court reasoned that there was a “well-established”

“historical tradition” of criminalizing the possession of a firearm while

committing a crime or increasing “the severity of punishment for certain felonies

when weapons were possessed, but not necessarily used, during the commission 22

of the crime.” Id. at 1129. The court rejected the defendant’s contrary arguments

as “divorced from both reality and the law.” Id. “The analogues show a

longstanding tradition of enhancing a defendant’s sentence for the increased risk

of violence created by mere possession of a firearm during the commission of

certain crimes.” Id. at 1130.

In Commonwealth v. Webb, 2025 WL 898249, at *1, the court rejected a

defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute criminalizing the

possession of a firearm while in the possession of a controlled substance. Like

Woods, the defendant argued that the criminal statute was unconstitutional as

applied to him following Bruen and Rahimi because “disarming an individual

based solely on the possession of a controlled substance lacked a historical

precedent.” Id. Like Woods, the defendant argued that a showing of

dangerousness was required and there was no showing of dangerousness. See

id. at *4. The court disagreed. Id. at *4–5. “[A] person possessing both a controlled

substance and a firearm together is dangerous” and “the United States has a

historical tradition of disarming the dangerous.” Id. at *4. Further, like

section 724.8B, the challenged law only “place[d] a temporary restriction on the

possession of a firearm, and it [was] limited to when an individual [was]

possessing a controlled substance.” Id. at *5. The court reasoned that an

“individual can reclaim or retain his or her right to possess a firearm by not

possessing the controlled substance.” Id.

We agree with these conclusions, and we note that the Virginia Court of

Appeals expanded this analysis recently in Fitzgerald. There, the court stated

that “there is no historic evidence suggesting that persons had a right to possess

firearms during an offense” and that founding-era English smuggling laws served 23

as a historical analogue justifying the prohibition of concurrent possession of a

firearm and contraband:

[T]he actus reus of both [laws] required the intentional and knowing possession of a firearm and the possession of contraband, which in the case of Code § 18.2-308.4 is a Schedule I/II controlled substance. See Blackstone, supra, *155. Both statutes regulated “firearm use to address particular problems,” with this problem being the possession of the firearm to protect the contraband from discovery. Connelly, 117 F.4th at 274. And Code § 18.2-308.4 regulates firearms to a much more limited extent than this smuggling felony as Blackstone noted that courts “cannot surely be too cautious in inflicting the penalty of death” for that felony due to its effect on the English economy by facilitating illicit trade. See Blackstone, supra, *155. Under Code § 18.2-308.4, the offender is only disarmed where he possesses both the substance and the weapon, which are both indicative of involving in the illicit drug trade of which the smuggling offense is but an older and broader relative. It may not be a “dead ringer,” but it is clearly a “historical analogue” for purposes of the Bruen analysis. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 708–09 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30).

Fitzgerald, 2025 WL 1559568, at *13 (footnote omitted). We agree with this

analysis.

D.

Woods is asking this court to do what no other court in the country has

done and hold that there is a federal constitutional right to carry a firearm while

simultaneously in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while

simultaneously engaged in indictable criminal activity. See Wigfall,

677 F. Supp. 3d at 800 (rejecting the defendant’s challenge to a federal

sentencing enhancement and stating, “Mr. Wigfall cites no cases that have ruled

his way, and tellingly the court finds none”); Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130

(rejecting the defendant’s challenge to his conviction for possession of a

controlled substance while armed and stating that the court was “aware of no

court decision holding that the United States Constitution protects a right to 24

carry a gun while simultaneously engaging in criminal conduct”). While Iowa is

sometimes “first in the nation,” we decline to be first in the nation here. The

Second Amendment does not cover the conduct at issue in this case, and even if

it did, a statute making it a criminal offense to carry a firearm while also in the

illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable

offense is consistent with this “Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.

III.

Woods also contends that his conviction for carrying a firearm while in the

illegal possession of a controlled substance and while committing an indictable

offense violates article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. For the reasons

expressed below, we disagree.

In 2022, Iowa voters ratified an amendment to the Iowa Constitution.

In re N.S., 13 N.W.3d 811, 826 (Iowa 2024). The amendment, codified as article I,

section 1A, recognizes a fundamental right to keep and bear arms:

The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. The sovereign state of Iowa affirms and recognizes this right to be a fundamental individual right. Any and all restrictions of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny.

Iowa Const. art. I, § 1A. “By its terms, Amendment 1A recognizes a fundamental

individual right to keep and bear arms—not an absolute right.” N.S., 13 N.W.3d

at 826. The right is thus subject to regulation.

In assessing a constitutional challenge to a statute or regulation under

article I, section 1A, we must first address the threshold question of whether the

constitutional provision is even implicated. See Todd E. Pettys, The N.R.A.’s

Strict-Scrutiny Amendments, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 1455, 1481 (2019) (stating that

courts should “consider, as a threshold matter, whether the facts in a given 25

claimant’s case bring the fundamental right to keep and bear arms into play”).

Under the plain language of the text, article I, section 1A is implicated only where

the challenged law “infringe[s]” or “restrict[s]” “[t]he right of the people to keep

and bear arms.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 1A. In determining whether a law infringes

or restricts the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms, we tread

carefully. We presume that the general assembly, in twice approving the

amendment before submitting it to the people for a referendum, did not intend

the amendment to overturn the numerous laws on the books imposing more

serious sanctions for crimes committed with the use of firearms and other

dangerous weapons. Cf. N.S., 13 N.W.3d at 826 (detailing the process of enacting

amendment 1A). Further, while the legal standard of strict scrutiny is

well-established, “there is no settled analysis as to how strict scrutiny applies to

laws affecting the fundamental right to bear arms, which has historically been

interpreted to have accepted limitations.” Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197

(Mo. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam).

With those considerations in mind, we conclude that Woods’s state

constitutional challenge fails at this threshold step. Like the federal

constitutional right to keep and bear arms, the state constitutional right does

not include the right to carry a firearm while in the illegal possession of a

controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense. See Brecunier,

564 N.W.2d at 370 (holding that there is “no constitutional right to be armed”

while committing a crime); Mehner, 480 N.W.2d at 879 (“Although Mehner argues

the constitution gives him the right to possess firearms, the statute involved

prohibits only the possession of firearms while participating in a drug offense; a

criminal activity. The statute does not forbid conduct which is constitutionally

protected.”); see also Risner, 129 F.4th at 368 (reaffirming Greeno’s holding that 26

a sentencing enhancement that “applied to individuals who possessed a firearm”

while committing a federal drug offense “regulated conduct [that] was not within

the Second Amendment’s scope”); United States v. Jenkins, 697 F. Supp. 3d 380,

394 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (“Neither Heller nor McDonald expressly extended the right

to bear arms beyond lawful activities.”); Johnson, 2023 WL 6442991, at *6

(“[T]here is a history and tradition of keeping guns away from those engaged in

criminal conduct . . . .” (quoting Orrego Goez, 656 F. Supp. 3d at 1376)); Charles,

2023 WL 6358688, at *3 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that

the Second Amendment right is tied to firearm possession . . . by law-abiding

citizens.”); Snead, 647 F. Supp. 3d at 481 (stating that Bruen, Heller, and

McDonald make “clear that the Second Amendment protects the conduct of

law-abiding citizens”); Allen, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 479 (“[T]he Second

Amendment . . . does not ‘protect[] a right to carry a gun while simultaneously

engaging in criminal conduct.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting Gonzalez,

291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130)); Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130 (“While the

Supreme Court has not yet delineated the precise scope of the Second

Amendment, it has made abundantly clear that its protections inure to the

benefit of law-abiding citizens only.”); Jones, 249 N.E.3d at 794 (“[T]he Second

Amendment . . . appl[ies] ‘only to those who are [not] actively violating the

nation’s drug laws . . . .’ ” (third alteration in original) (quoting Windland,

2024 WL 2037674, at *6)).

Even if there were such a right, and even if section 724.8B could be

considered an infringement or restriction of such a right, the statute, as applied

here, still survives strict scrutiny review. “Under strict scrutiny, ‘the statute will

survive a constitutional challenge only if it is shown that the statute is narrowly

drawn to serve a compelling state interest.’ ” AFSCME Iowa Council 61 v. State, 27

928 N.W.2d 21, 41 (Iowa 2019) (quoting City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d

179, 184 (Iowa 1992) (en banc)). “The first step in [the] strict-scrutiny analysis

is to identify the ‘compelling’ government interest served by the challenged law.”

N.S., 13 N.W.3d at 830. If the government identifies a compelling interest, it must

show that the challenged law is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id. at

831. “Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every

conceivable . . . alternative.” Id. (omission in original) (quoting Grutter v.

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).

As discussed above, the state has a compelling interest in public safety,

including preventing death and physical injury caused by firearms. See State v.

Kellogg, 534 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 1995) (stating that the government has a

“compelling interest in the public safety”); see also Harper, 634 F. Supp. 3d at

603; Weber, 132 N.E.3d at 1148 (“The state possesses a strong compelling

interest in maintaining public safety and preventing gun violence.”). In

particular, the state has a compelling interest in curbing the increased risk of

death and physical injury associated with an individual’s possession of a firearm

while simultaneously in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while

simultaneously committing an indictable offense. The government also has a

compelling interest in protecting the safety of peace officers, see Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977) (per curiam), who are placed at increased

risk of death and physical injury when investigating and responding to crimes

committed when the suspect is in possession of a firearm. Woods concedes that

these are compelling state interests.

Section 724.8B is narrowly tailored to achieve these interests. As relevant

here, section 724.8B only limits an individual from carrying a firearm when the

individual is also in illegal possession of a controlled substance or while 28

committing an indictable offense. Iowa Code § 724.8B. Unlike the law at issue in

Daniels and Connelly, upon which Woods and the dissent rely, there is a precise

temporal and spatial nexus between the statutory regulation of the right to carry a

firearm and the conduct that justifies the limitation of that right. Further, the

statute excludes from its operation low-level offenses and instead applies only when

the person is carrying a firearm while committing a crime of sufficient gravity—an

indictable offense. Id. In effect, under section 724.8B, Woods “himself controls his

right to [carry] a gun.” United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam). He can carry a gun when he so chooses, but the state constitution

affords him no additional constitutional right to also simultaneously illegally

possess a controlled substance or commit an indictable offense while doing so.

The Louisiana Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in a materially

indistinguishable case. Louisiana, like Iowa, is one of the few states that has a strict

scrutiny provision in its state constitution protecting the right to keep and bear

arms. See La. Const. art. I, § 11. In State v. Webb, 144 So. 3d 971, 974 (La. 2014),

the defendant was found with a personal-use amount of marijuana in his backpack

and a legally purchased firearm on the floorboard of the car his girlfriend was

driving. He was only charged with “carrying a firearm while in possession of illegal

drugs.” Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the conviction survived the strict

scrutiny challenge because “it is constitutionally permissible for the state to treat

the entirety of possessing illegal drugs and a firearm as a more serious crime than

possessing illegal drugs alone.” Id. at 982. That is because “on its face, the

challenged statute does not restrict the legitimate exercise of the fundamental right

to bear arms.” Id. at 974. “Instead, the statute enhances the penalty for possessing

illegal drugs while [] carrying a firearm.” Id. The court rejected the defendant’s

argument that the conviction was unconstitutional because he was not dangerous: 29

According to the defendant, the simultaneous possession of an illegal drug and a firearm is an innocuous coincidence. The defendant also argues that in no way does possessing a firearm by an alleged consumer of illegal drugs, such as himself, promote drug trafficking. Apparently, the defendant would have this court overlook the obvious fact that because possessing marijuana is unlawful, the defendant must have employed some unlawful means to obtain the drug. The defendant would also have this court hold that the firearm must actually be used in some manner in order for La. R.S. 14:95(E) to promote a compelling governmental interest. These arguments are unavailing . . . .

Id. at 979. We agree with the reasoning, and we conclude that the application of

section 724.8B in this case does not violate article I, section 1A of the Iowa

Constitution. See id. at 982 (“Because the element of firearm possession in La. R.S.

14:95(E) is more in the nature of an ‘enhancement’ than a restriction upon the

legitimate possession of firearms and the act of possessing illegal drugs ‘qualif[ies]’

a person’s ability to enjoy a fundamental right, we hold the statute ‘is precisely

drawn or narrowly tailored to serve’ the compelling interest of protecting the public

from the dangers inherent in the combination of illegal drugs and firearms.”

(alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).

IV.

We end where we began: there is no federal or state constitutional right to

carry a pistol in the same backpack with one’s illegal drugs. We affirm the

defendant’s conviction for violating Iowa Code section 724.8B.

Affirmed.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J.,

and Mansfield, J., joined. Oxley, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

McDermott, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman and May, JJ., joined.

May, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman and McDermott, JJ., joined. 30

#24–0261, State v. Woods

Oxley, Justice (concurring in the judgment).

The plurality takes the unnecessary—and unsupported—route of broadly

declaring that carrying a firearm while engaging in any indictable offense is

conduct that is never protected by the Second Amendment or article I,

section 1A.

First, the plurality’s overly broad analysis is unnecessary. This case

involves an as-applied challenge to a conviction for violating Iowa Code

section 724.8B (2023), which prohibits carrying a firearm in three different

circumstances: if the person (1) is “ineligible to receive a permit to carry weapons

under section 724.8, subsection 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6”; (2) “illegally possesses a

controlled substance included in chapter 124, subchapter II”; or

(3) “is committing an indictable offense.” As the plurality notes, Woods was

convicted of violating section 724.8B because he was carrying a firearm while in

possession of marijuana. Under Iowa law, marijuana is a controlled substance,

and possession of marijuana is a serious misdemeanor (i.e., an indictable

offense). So his conduct fits both the second and third prohibitions.

Because we can decide this case based on Woods’s illegal possession of a

controlled substance (which more closely corresponds to the cases relied upon

by the plurality), we need not—and should not—address whether the act of

carrying a firearm while committing any other indictable offense is separately

protected by the Second Amendment. See Kluender v. Plum Grove Invs., Inc.,

985 N.W.2d 466, 470 (Iowa 2023) (recognizing that there is a “fundamental

principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither ‘anticipate a question of

constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it’ nor ‘formulate a rule

of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is 31

to be applied’ ” (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,

552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008))). Heeding the Fifth Circuit’s caution expressed in

United States v. Daniels:

[I] sympathize with the desire to articulate a bright-line rule that district courts could apply going forward. But, with due respect, the [all indictable offenses] rule advanced by the [plurality] relies on . . . an understandable but unwarranted aversion to letting Second Amendment doctrine develop more fully as more cases involving different fact patterns arise. A piecemeal approach to laws such as [section 724.8B], determining the contours of acceptable prosecutions through the resolution of continual as-applied challenges, is what Bruen and Rahimi require. We [should] decline to short-circuit that process now.

124 F.4th 967, 978 (5th Cir. 2025) (footnote omitted). Whether carrying a firearm

while committing other indictable offenses in violation of section 724.8B is

protected by the Second Amendment is better left for further development in

future cases.

Second, the plurality’s overbroad analysis is unsupported. Its reasoning

greatly extends, rather than merely follows, the cases it relies upon, blurring

critical distinctions. The consensus identified by the plurality is not as

broad-reaching as the plurality declares. At most, there is a consensus among

courts that the Second Amendment provides no protection when a firearm is

possessed for an unlawful purpose. That limiting principle is important to avoid

obliterating the “fundamental” right to “keep and bear arms” contained in the

Second Amendment and article I, section 1A. McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010) (identifying “the right to keep and bear arms” in the

Second Amendment as a “fundamental right[]”); see also Iowa Const. art. I, § 1A

(“The sovereign state of Iowa affirms and recognizes this right [to keep and bear

arms] to be a fundamental individual right.”). I am unaware of any federal or

state case that holds, as the plurality would, that an individual has no 32

constitutional right to possess or carry a firearm while that person is committing

any indictable offense, no matter the underlying offense or the connection

(or lack thereof) between the firearm and the offense. And the plurality cites

none. Instead, it extrapolates well beyond the cases on which it relies to

effectively announce a categorical rule.

Nonetheless, I agree with the plurality that there is no constitutional right

to carry (or possess or use) a firearm for an unlawful purpose. With that

qualification, I concur in the judgment.

“[I]ndividual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second

Amendment right” to keep and bear arms, McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)), and is “among those

fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty,” id. at 778. In

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Supreme Court made clear that

“the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry

a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” 597 U.S. 1, 10 (2022). The

Supreme Court confirmed what it had said in District of Columbia v. Heller:

“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17

(emphasis added) (discussing its holding in Heller). The plurality focuses on this

conduct language to conclude that “there is no federal constitutional right to

carry a firearm while also committing a crime.” While claiming widespread

support for this conclusion, the plurality overstates the cases upon which it

relies. None of the cases cited by the plurality involve the misdemeanor

possession of a controlled substance while carrying a firearm. 33

The plurality relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s description of the

Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as applying to “law-abiding

citizens” to conclude that the Second Amendment does not apply to Woods’s

conduct of carrying a firearm while engaging in an indictable offense. But the

scope of the Second Amendment right must come from the amendment’s text

and history, not the Supreme Court’s description of it. “At step one [of the Bruen

analysis], the [challenger] is tasked with establishing that the Second

Amendment’s explicit text, ‘as informed by history,’ encompasses the conduct

they seek to engage in.” Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96, 113

(10th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, 19); see also

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 737 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring)

(explaining that the Second Amendment “codified a pre-existing right, and

pre-existing limits on that right are part and parcel of it”). To identify those

pre-existing limits—including whether the right extends to the specific conduct

of contemporaneously engaging in criminal activity—we “must examine [the]

‘historical tradition of firearm regulation.’ ” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 737 (quoting

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, 19). Likewise, under article I, section 1A of the Iowa

Constitution, we should “consider, as a threshold matter, whether the facts in a

given claimant’s case [even] bring the fundamental right to keep and bear arms

into play.” Todd E. Pettys, The N.R.A.’s Strict-Scrutiny Amendments, 104 Iowa L.

Rev. 1455, 1481 (2019) (emphasis added).

I agree with the plurality that “the ‘historical understanding’ of the Second

Amendment right ‘did not extend to possession of weapons for unlawful

purposes.’ ” United States v. Risner, 129 F.4th 361, 367 (6th Cir. 2025) (emphasis

added) (quoting United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2012),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1). But this historical 34

understanding follows from “going armed” restrictions, not from the Supreme

Court’s generalized description of the Second Amendment as applying only to

“law-abiding” citizens. See, e.g., Bruen, 597 U.S. at 43–46, 50 (discussing that

the common law, as developed from English law leading to the founding and

early colonial law, prohibited “going armed” only when doing so “to terrify the

people”). Thus, “during the colonial and founding periods, the common-law

offenses of ‘affray’ or going armed ‘to the terror of the people’ continued to impose

some limits on firearm carry in the antebellum period.” Id. at 50. As the

Fifth Circuit recently explained in rejecting an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(q)(2)(A)’s prohibition on possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school,

“[B]y the time of American independence[,] . . . the old Statute of

Northampton . . . was only applicable to carrying for the purpose of terrorizing

other people, and not to carrying for legitimate self-defense.” United States v.

Allam, 140 F.4th 289, 297, (5th Cir. June 2025) (alterations and omissions in

original) (quoting David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places”

Doctrine: Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 203,

227 (2018)) (rejecting defendant’s as-applied challenge to § 922(q)(2)(A)).

This is a critical qualifier: carrying a firearm is beyond the protection of

the Second Amendment when it is done for an unlawful purpose. See Bruen,

597 U.S. at 56 (“As William Rawle explained in an influential treatise, an

individual’s carrying of arms was ‘sufficient cause to require him to give surety

of the peace’ only when ‘attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear

that he purposes to make an unlawful use of them.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting

William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 126

(2d ed. 1829) [hereinafter Rawle])); see also Snope v. Brown, 145 S. Ct. 1534,

1534 (2025) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) 35

(contrasting law-abiding citizens’ use of AR-15s and handguns for lawful

purposes with “criminals [who] use both AR-15s and handguns . . . in unlawful

ways that threaten public safety” (emphasis added)); United States v. Bryant,

711 F.3d 364, 369–70 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“[W]e hold that the Second

Amendment does not protect the unlawful purpose of possessing a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as applied in

this case does not violate the Second Amendment.”); United States v. King,

333 F. App’x 92, 96 (7th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (“[B]ecause ‘there is no

constitutional problem with separating guns from drugs,’ the district court’s

enhancement of Underwood’s Guidelines range for possession of a dangerous

weapon was not erroneous as long as there was some link between the conspiracy

and the weapon.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d

635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009))).

The vast majority of cases cited by the plurality fall into this category:

where the firearm is possessed for an unlawful purpose, most often to facilitate

drug trafficking. See, e.g., Risner, 129 F.4th at 369 (“Because § 924(c)(1)(A)

expressly prohibits the use of a firearm during the commission of a drug

trafficking crime—an objectively unlawful purpose—and Risner admits to

possessing a firearm in connection with drug trafficking, § 924(c)(1)(A) lawfully

applies to Risner.” (emphasis added)); Madrid v. United States, No. 1:21cv507,

2024 WL 5466859, at *1, *8. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2024) (rejecting Second

Amendment challenge where defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm,

during and in relation to, a drug trafficking crime); United States v.

Barenas-Reynoso, No. 19–cr–00351–8, 2024 WL 3509757, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 23,

2024) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge where defendant was convicted of

possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime); United States v. 36

Jenkins, 697 F. Supp. 3d 380, 383, 400–01 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (rejecting Second

Amendment challenge to conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm

where the defendant was arrested on an outstanding burglary warrant and found

with a firearm and over a dozen containers of suspected methamphetamine in

his possession); Johnson v. United States, No. 23–CV–61575–RAR,

22–CR–60097–RAR, 2023 WL 6442991, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2023) (“As this

Court recently explained, ‘there is a history and tradition of keeping guns away

from those engaged in criminal conduct[,]’ so ‘the Second Amendment doesn’t

protect a person’s right to possess a firearm in furtherance of a felony offense

(like drug trafficking).’ . . . [Thus,] even if Movant had a valid concealed carry

permit, his legal right to possess a firearm was extinguished the moment Movant

chose to carry his firearm to facilitate an illegal act.” (second emphasis added)

(quoting Orrego Goez v. United States, 656 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1376 (S.D. Fla.

2023))); United States v. Charles, No. 6:21–CR–00154–01, 2023 WL 6358688, at

*1, *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 28, 2023) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge where

defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime); United States v. Snead, 647 F. Supp. 3d 475, 476–77

(W.D. Va. 2022) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge where defendant was

convicted of knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking

crime). The plurality blurs this critical portion of these cases through the

strategic use of ellipses and paraphrasing.

The plurality also relies on cases holding that the Second Amendment does

not protect possession of a firearm while committing a felony without addressing,

or even acknowledging, the significant differences between felonies and lesser

indictable offenses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Webb, No. 1805–24–3,

2025 WL 898249, at *4–5, *4 n.6 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2025) (recognizing that 37

“the United States has a historical tradition of disarming the dangerous” and

explaining that the dangerousness finding stemmed from the facts that

“possession of a controlled substance, regardless of purpose, is a felony” and

that “[w]hile the Second Amendment protects the right to self-defense, it ‘does

not give anyone the right to be armed while committing a felony.’ ” (emphasis

added) (quoting Jackson, 555 F.3d at 636)). Courts have long recognized a critical

distinction between misdemeanors and felonies. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry,

417 U.S. 21, 28 n.6 (1974) (observing that “conviction of a ‘felony’ often entails

more serious collateral consequences than those incurred through a

misdemeanor conviction”); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“As in

most States, . . . in New York . . . [,] the collateral consequences attaching to a

felony conviction are more severe than those attaching to a conviction for a

misdemeanor.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(“Whether a certain crime removes one from the category of ‘law-abiding and

responsible,’ in some cases, may be a close question. For example, . . . a

misdemeanor arising from a fistfight—may be open to debate. Those who commit

felonies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such borderline cases.”);

People v. Vigil, 328 P.3d 1066, 1070–71 (Colo. App. 2013) (noting that “there are

significant differences between felonies and misdemeanors beyond the mere

length of the term of incarceration faced by the defendant,” including “the place

of incarceration, the procedural protections enjoyed by the defendant . . . , and

collateral consequences faced by a defendant who has been convicted of a

felony”).

Properly considered, the cases relied upon by the plurality stand for the

more limited principle that the constitutional right to carry a firearm in public

does not extend to using (or carrying) a firearm for an unlawful purpose. Those 38

cases focus on the nexus between possessing or carrying the firearm and the

unlawful activity. One federal district court relied on by the plurality explained

it this way: “This has nothing to do with the person’s status for constitutional

analysis but the means by which he perpetrated the crime.” United States v.

Wigfall, 677 F. Supp. 3d 791, 796 (N.D. Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (rejecting a

Second Amendment challenge to a sentencing enhancement for possessing a

firearm during a drug trafficking offense). That court made clear that the

challenged enhancement applies only if the firearm helped perpetrate or facilitate

the crime. Id.; see also State v. Jones, 249 N.E.3d 782, 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024)

(“Jones was not merely using the firearm for self-defense. Rather, the record

reflects that Jones was using the firearm to facilitate drug offenses.”). The

narrower question these cases permit us to ask is whether Woods was engaged

in the conduct of carrying a firearm for an illegal purpose.

The plurality’s unnecessary categorical approach could lead to improper

results. The plurality broadly concludes that the Second Amendment applies

only to lawful conduct and that the United States has a history of disarming

persons while violating the law. But which laws?

Iowa Code section 724.8B prohibits carrying a firearm while committing

any indictable offense. But carrying a firearm does not necessarily facilitate all

indictable offenses. Take, for example, driving while barred. Our court of appeals

recently addressed an appeal from a defendant who was convicted of driving

while barred, possession of marijuana, and being a person ineligible to carry

dangerous weapons under Iowa Code section 724.8B. See State v. Richter,

No. 22–1298, 2024 WL 960963, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App Mar. 6, 2024). Neighbors

called the police after observing a car back out of a driveway across the street, 39

hitting the neighboring house’s downspout. Id. While an officer was investigating,

the driver returned. Id. In a cordial exchange, the officer ran the driver’s license

and learned his license was barred. Id. He told the driver that he would need to

arrest him, and the driver told the officer that he had a lawfully permitted gun

on his person. Id. The officer took the gun and attempted to leave it with someone

else inside the house to avoid needing to take it to the station, but no one

answered the door. Id. at *1–2. The marijuana and section 724.8B charges came

about when the officer then got into the defendant’s car to move it since it was

straddling the sidewalk in the driveway. Id. at *2. When he parked on the street,

the dome light came on, and the officer saw marijuana near the gear shift. Id. It

was only at this point that the officer told the driver he could not carry the

firearm. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence

obtained following the officer’s entry into his car, and the defendant was

convicted on all three charges. Id. at *3.

The court of appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s

motion to suppress on the basis that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment

when he got into the defendant’s car. Id. at *5. But, as the court of appeals noted,

the suppressed evidence of the marijuana only affected the marijuana possession

charge. Id. at *6. It did not affect the driving while barred charge or the

section 724.8B charge. Id. The defendant’s appeal of the section 724.8B charge

relied only on the suppression motion because possessing an illegal controlled

substance was the original basis for that charge and was the focus of the district

court’s analysis of the firearm charge. But, as the court of appeals noted in a

footnote, driving while barred as a habitual offender—an aggravated

misdemeanor and therefore an indictable offense—also supported the 40

section 724.8B conviction, id. at *2 n.2, and the defendant had not challenged

that separate basis for his conviction, id. at *6.3

Does an individual who is barred from driving lose his constitutional right

to carry a firearm when he then illegally drives to the corner convenience store,

as Richter did? In my view, that depends on whether it could be said that

carrying his firearm had the potential to facilitate the underlying crime of driving

while barred, i.e., whether he carried it for an unlawful purpose. That case is not

before us, and the resolution of that issue must await a constitutional challenge

in a case that presents that issue. But the plurality’s reasoning would foreclose

us from even considering those very different circumstances.

Further, if the historical tradition applies only to law-abiding citizens, as

the plurality suggests, there is no reasoned basis to stop at indictable offenses.

The plurality’s reasoning would extend as well to simple misdemeanors, such as

speeding. Or jaywalking. If a defendant loses his constitutional right to carry a

firearm for self-protection in public simply because he gets pulled over while

keeping up with the speeding traffic flow or crosses the street mid-block, there

is, as Justice McDermott’s dissent aptly points out, little to the Second

Amendment right.

There must be a nexus between the firearm and the criminal conduct

before the plurality’s underlying premise—that the fundamental constitutional

right to carry a firearm for self-protection does not extend to carrying the firearm

for an illegal purpose—kicks in.

3The defendant brought a Second Amendment challenge, but it was limited to the firearm

prohibition that was included in the sentencing order related to the marijuana possession conviction. Richter, 2024 WL 960963, at *1, *6. The court of appeals’ reversal of the possession conviction mooted the Second Amendment challenge. Id. at *6. 41

With this limitation in proper focus, I agree with the plurality that Woods’s

as-applied challenge to his conviction for carrying a firearm while possessing

marijuana under Iowa Code section 724.8B fails because neither the Second

Amendment nor article I, section 1A protects that conduct.

As the plurality rightly recognizes, section 724.8B is a conduct-based

restriction, not a status-based one. It only prohibits carrying a firearm while

engaging in specific conduct—here, while illegally possessing a controlled

substance. This makes a difference when framing Woods’s as-applied challenge.

The burden rests with Woods to show that the Second Amendment or article I,

section 1A protects his conduct of carrying a firearm while illegally possessing

marijuana as prohibited by Iowa Code section 724.8B. See United States v.

Jackson, 138 F.4th 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “[t]he inquiry at

the first step of the Bruen test” includes determining “whether the proposed

course of conduct falls within the Second Amendment” (quoting Rocky Mountain

Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 114)); Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 113

(“[T]he [challenger] is tasked with establishing that the Second

Amendment . . . encompasses the conduct they seek to engage in.”);

United States v. Lehman, 8 F.4th 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2021) (“[T]o succeed on [his]

as-applied challenge, [the defendant] must establish . . . that the Second

Amendment protects his particular conduct . . . .” (quoting United States v.

Adams, 914 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2019))); see also United States v. Williams,

113 F.4th 637, 662 (6th Cir. 2024) (rejecting defendant’s Second Amendment

challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because “in an as-applied challenge to

§ 922(g)(1), the burden rests on [the defendant] to show he’s not dangerous. And

he can’t make that showing”). 42

In considering Woods’s as-applied challenge, we consider the particular

facts of his conviction. See Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 716 (Iowa 2021)

(“ ‘[A]n as-applied challenge alleges the statute is unconstitutional as applied to

a particular set of facts’ . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Bonilla v. Iowa Bd.

of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 764 (Iowa 2019))); see also State v. Kieffer, 17 N.W.3d

651, 665 (Iowa 2025) (describing the specific facts surrounding defendant’s

conviction for “domestic abuse assault impeding the flow of air or blood and

domestic abuse assault causing injury after he hit and choked [the victim],

leaving scratches on her neck and face, marks on her back and legs, a broken

blood vessel in her eye, and a bloody lip” in assessing his as-applied Second

Amendment challenge). Here, while driving to work in his company commercial

truck, Woods carried a loaded firearm in a backpack that also contained his

illegal (though presumably personal-use-quantity of) marijuana, a scale, and

sixty-eight rounds of ammunition. The backpack was within his immediate reach

on the center console of his company vehicle, alongside a THC vape pen. With

this understanding of the facts, a review of cases addressing the interplay

between firearms and illegal drugs helps address Woods’s challenge.

“The analogues show a longstanding tradition of enhancing a defendant’s

sentence for the increased risk of violence created by mere possession of a

firearm during the commission of certain crimes,” and “[d]rug trafficking fits

squarely within that category.” United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th 1124, 1130

(9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to

sentencing enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm in connection with drug trafficking). I

don’t think the dissent would quarrel with this proposition. It is (or should be)

beyond reproach that using a firearm to protect a drug dealer’s illegal stash, or 43

his illegal drug operation generally, is not conduct that is protected by either the

Second Amendment or article I, section 1A. See United States v. Potter, 630 F.3d

1260, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[I]t cannot seriously be contended that

the Second Amendment guarantees a right to use a firearm in furtherance of

drug trafficking.” (emphasis omitted)); Jackson, 555 F.3d at 636 (recognizing

Heller’s qualification of the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms for

the purpose of lawful self-protection” and holding that the right does not extend

to a drug dealer’s “decision to operate an illegal home business,” even if he did

live in a dangerous neighborhood).

But the fact that this is a drug possession case, not a drug trafficking case,

makes it a closer call than the plurality suggests. See, e.g., United States v.

Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing differences between drug

trafficking and drug possession for personal use in addressing a firearm

sentencing enhancement). As discussed, the core question in this case boils

down to whether Woods has shown that his particular conduct falls within the

protections of the Second Amendment or article I, section 1A, i.e., that he did

not carry his firearm for an unlawful purpose.

On this point, the drug-possession-for-personal-use versus

drug-possession-for-dealing distinction is not necessarily decisive on the

question of a nexus (or lack of one) between carrying firearms and possessing

illegal drugs. Even in the context of drug trafficking, for a firearm to be used

“during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1),

“the gun at least must ‘facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating,’ the

[other] offense;” “its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or

coincidence.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 226, 238 (1993) (holding that

exchanging a firearm for drugs could support a conviction for “using” a firearm 44

“during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime” (first and second alterations

in original) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985),

overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253,

1257 (9th Cir. 1996))).

Courts have focused on this same distinction between facilitation and

coincidence or happenstance when considering whether a firearm was used

“in connection with” a felony drug possession conviction for purposes of a federal

sentencing enhancement. Two Eighth Circuit cases illustrate the distinction. In

United States v. Regans, officers conducted a pat-down search of the passenger

of a car stopped for a traffic violation who appeared to be concealing a weapon,

and he was ultimately convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession of

a firearm. 125 F.3d at 685. A search of his person at the police station uncovered

.29 grams of heroin, which the defendant claimed was for personal use. Id. On

appeal, the defendant challenged the four-level sentencing enhancement under

United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(5), which was based on his plea

in state court to a felony drug possession charge stemming from the heroin

possession. Id.

The Eighth Circuit noted the nexus between firearms and drug

trafficking—where courts have repeatedly referred to “a firearm [a]s a ‘tool of the

trade’ for drug dealers.” Id. at 686 (emphasis added). Thus, “a ‘weapon’s physical

proximity to narcotics may be sufficient to provide the nexus required between

the weapon and the drug [dealing] charges.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v.

Johnson, 60 F.3d 422, 423 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), a case in which a drug

dealer was arrested with a firearm, crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in his

home). Despite the differences between dealing drugs and possessing drugs for

personal use, the Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded that a sufficient nexus was 45

shown between the firearm and possession of a personal-use-quantity of illegal

drugs in that case. Id. at 686–87. The court explained:

The firearm may not be a ‘tool of the trade,’ because possession for use is not a ‘trade’ like drug trafficking. But when a drug user chooses to carry his illegal drugs out into public with a firearm, there are many ways in which the weapon can facilitate the drug offense and dangerously embolden the offender.

Id. Carrying a loaded firearm in close proximity to illegal drugs in public was not

a mere happenstance.

The Eighth Circuit distinguished Regans in a subsequent case where a

firearm was found near a personal-use-quantity of illegal drugs, but the drugs

were in the defendant’s home rather than out in public. See United States v.

Smith, 535 F.3d 883, 885–86 (8th Cir. 2008).

This case is distinguishable from Regans where the defendant was found in a car possessing a small amount of drugs for personal use and a firearm. The Regans court rejected the defendant’s argument of coincidence, stating that “when a drug user chooses to carry his illegal drugs out into public with a firearm, there are many ways in which the weapon can facilitate the drug offense and dangerously embolden the offender.” In our case, Smith did not venture into public with either the methamphetamine residue or the firearms; he simply possessed them in his home. This combination of factors makes an emboldenment theory impermissible in this case.

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Regans, 125 F.3d at 687). These cases shed light

on the specific facts that help determine whether or not carrying a loaded firearm

in close proximity to even a personal-use-quantity of drugs is for an unlawful

purpose.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, the potential for a firearm to

facilitate the underlying criminal offense is sufficient to say it was used “during

and in relation to [a] . . . drug trafficking crime” for purposes of federal law. See

Smith, 508 U.S. at 238. This focus on the potential to facilitate is consistent with 46

historical restrictions. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 56 (“[A]n individual’s carrying of

arms was ‘sufficient cause to require him to give surety of the peace’ only when

‘attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear that he purposes to make

an unlawful use of them.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Rawle 126)).

Given this understanding of the interplay between firearms and illegal

drugs, the facts surrounding Woods’s conviction are closer to Regans than to

Smith. Cf. People v. Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 132 (Ct. App. 2022) (“[I]t is

reasonable to assume a person armed with a loaded, operable firearm . . . may

be willing to resort to use of that weapon to avoid arrest and—in the case of

section 11370.1, specifically—to maintain possession of their illicit stash.”),

abrogated in part by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1. In other words, the facts of this case do

not suggest that Woods’s conduct of carrying his loaded firearm in the same

backpack as his illegal drugs was merely happenstance or coincidence. Woods

has therefore failed to show that his conduct of carrying his readily accessible,

loaded firearm out into public in the same backpack as his illegal drugs was

protected by either the Second Amendment or article I, section 1A.

I agree with the plurality that Woods’s as-applied constitutional challenge

fails, and I join in the judgment. 47

McDermott, Justice (dissenting).

Both the Federal and State Constitutions preserve “the right of the people

to keep and bear Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II; Iowa Const. art. I, § 1A. The

restriction on Kevin Woods’s right to bear arms in this case is attached to

possession of a personal-use quantity of marijuana—a nonviolent misdemeanor

offense. Although we accept a legislature’s power to restrict the right to bear

arms when it’s imposed against people who are dangerous, in this case, the

plurality upholds a firearm restriction even though the element of danger is

absent.

Although the plurality repeatedly says that there’s no right to carry a gun

while committing a crime, the plurality offers nothing to convince the reader that

simply possessing a personal-use amount of marijuana presents any semblance

of danger to justify abridging Woods’s right to bear arms. And if any

crime—dangerous or not—will do to support a gun restriction, then restricting

the right to bear arms when committing other nondangerous crimes gets the

constitutional green light under the plurality’s reasoning too.

But the constitutional right to bear arms is not so easily dispensed with.

The plurality’s failure to distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous

activities leads it to uphold a firearm restriction that in this case has no anchor

in our historical traditions. Because the plurality gets the analysis wrong under

both the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,

section 1A of the Iowa Constitution, I must respectfully dissent.

I. Factual Background.

Some expansion of the plurality’s recitation of facts is necessary. Because

Woods brings an “as applied” challenge—where we look to whether the particular 48

application of the challenged statute to him under the facts of this case deprived

him of his constitutional right—the factual particulars are relevant to the

analysis. See Singer v. City of Orange City, 15 N.W.3d 70, 76 (Iowa 2024).

When the trooper stopped the truck that Woods was driving to investigate

a nonfunctioning taillight on the truck’s trailer, it was just after 6:00 a.m. on a

Tuesday morning in late July. The pickup’s doors displayed company decals for

a parking lot maintenance company based in nearby Carlisle. Woods, it appears,

was simply driving to work in a work truck pulling a trailer.

In his initial visit to the driver’s window, the trooper informed Woods about

the reason for the stop. Woods was unaware of any problem with the trailer’s

lights, so the trooper walked with Woods to the rear of the trailer to show him.

The trooper asked Woods for the registrations for the truck and trailer and,

because the truck was a commercial vehicle, the annual vehicle inspection

reports. Woods wasn’t immediately able to locate the inspection reports, so he

called his boss for help. Woods soon located some of the paperwork, provided it

to the trooper, and returned to the truck. After reviewing the paperwork, the

trooper began his own equipment inspection of the truck and trailer.

At some point, the trooper returned to the driver’s window to return the

paperwork. The officer reports that at this point, he detected the odor of

marijuana. But the trooper didn’t say anything about it. Instead, he continued

with the equipment inspection. He walked around the vehicle to perform the

inspection. He even asked Woods to assist with some inspection-related tasks,

such as testing the parking brake.

While standing outside the passenger window during the inspection, the

trooper looked inside and saw a THC vape pen in the truck’s center console. A

THC vape pen is a portable pen-shaped device used to vaporize and inhale THC, 49

the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana. The trooper took the vape pen, telling

Woods it was illegal to possess one in Iowa or to have one in a commercial vehicle.

He then informed Woods that he was going to search Woods’s person and the

truck for other contraband.

When the trooper asked Woods whether he had any other contraband,

Woods responded that he had another vape pen in his pocket. After searching

Woods’s person and finding nothing else, the trooper began searching the truck.

When the trooper was about to search a backpack inside the truck, Woods

informed the trooper that the backpack contained marijuana and a firearm. In

the backpack, the trooper found a pistol, three additional magazines (two full

and one empty), a small cylindrical container containing some marijuana, and a

scale. Although the record does not disclose the precise amount of marijuana in

the container, it’s undisputed that the amount was, at most, a personal-use

quantity.

The State charged Woods with two counts: (1) possession of a controlled

substance under Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (2023) and (2) being a person ineligible

to carry a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code § 724.8B. Both charges are

serious misdemeanors. Woods was separately charged with various commercial

vehicle infractions that are not at issue here. Woods was never alleged to have

been under the influence of THC or any other intoxicants on the morning in

question. The trooper’s report described Woods’s condition as “sober.”

Woods filed a motion to dismiss the second count, arguing that § 724.8B

was unconstitutional under both the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. The State resisted.

The district court denied the motion. Woods thereafter pleaded guilty to both

counts, but on the second count, he entered a conditional guilty plea to preserve 50

his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. As to count I, the district

court fined Woods $430 and sentenced him to 180 days’ imprisonment. As to

count II, the district court again imposed a $430 fine and sentenced Woods to

365 days’ imprisonment. The district court ordered both terms of imprisonment

to run concurrently but then suspended both sentences. This appeal of Woods’s

conviction under the second count followed.

II. The Restriction is Unconstitutional Under the Second Amendment.

Woods argues that Iowa Code § 724.8B is an unconstitutional deprivation

of his right to bear arms under both the Federal and Iowa Constitutions. Iowa

Code § 724.8B criminalizes “carrying dangerous weapons” by (1) “[a] person

determined to be ineligible to receive a permit to carry weapons,” (2) “a person

who illegally possesses a controlled substance included in chapter 124,

subchapter II,” or (3) “a person who is committing an indictable offense.” The

statute makes a violation of this section a serious misdemeanor.

Woods’s conduct falls within two categories of the statute: illegally

possessing a controlled substance and committing an indictable offense. An

“indictable offense” is simply “an offense other than a simple misdemeanor.” Iowa

Code § 801.4(8). Simple misdemeanors include, for instance, speeding violations,

id. § 321.285(8), underage possession of alcohol, id. § 123.47(2)(b), and

disorderly conduct, id. § 723.4(1). An “indictable offense” thus includes other

misdemeanors (specifically, “serious” and “aggravated” misdemeanors). See id.

§ 903.1. But since this is an as-applied challenge, and since Woods’s possession

of marijuana (a serious misdemeanor) constitutes the indictable offense in

question, the focus necessarily centers on Woods’s possession of marijuana.

Although courts have found a historical tradition of disarming people who have

committed felonies, as Justice Oxley elaborates in her opinion concurring in the 51

judgment, there appears to be little historical basis to disarm people who have

committed nonviolent misdemeanors.

The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being

necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear

Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In New York State Rifle &

Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the United States Supreme Court described a two-part

inquiry for analyzing challenges to firearm regulations under the Second

Amendment. 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). First, the challenger bears the burden of

showing that “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s

conduct.” Id. Once a challenger makes that showing, “the Constitution

presumptively protects [his] conduct,” and the burden shifts to the State to prove

that the restriction “is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm

regulation.” Id. If the State fails to meet this burden, the restriction is

unconstitutional. See id. at 30.

A. “Plain text” Analysis Under the First Inquiry. The plurality decides

this case on the first part of the inquiry, concluding that marijuana possessors

forfeit any Second Amendment rights. But it’s not easy to get to the plurality’s

result through analysis of the plain text, as Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, instructs. The

text provides that the right to bear arms is held by “the people.” U.S. Const.

amend. II. The plurality instead asserts that the right to bear arms applies only

to “an ordinary, law-abiding citizen,” a reference made elsewhere in Bruen.

597 U.S. at 9. The plurality’s approach short-circuits the “dangerousness”

determination that generally falls within the second inquiry in Bruen’s two-part

test. (More on this below.) Woods is not law-abiding because he possessed

marijuana, the argument goes, and he thus cannot claim a Second Amendment

right. 52

But the commission of a criminal act, without more, does not extinguish

one’s constitutional right to bear arms. The Second Amendment, like the Fourth

Amendment, uses the phrase “right of the people.” Compare U.S. Const.

amend. II, with id. amend. IV. Both uses thus “unambiguously refer to individual

rights.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008). In applying the

Fourth Amendment, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and

seizures doesn’t turn on whether a person has been engaging in a criminal act;

even people engaged in crimes retain their search-and-seizure protections. See

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (“This guarantee of

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the innocent

and guilty alike.”). “[C]onstruing the Second Amendment to apply only to

[law-abiding] citizens is inconsistent with both Heller and the individualized

nature of the right to keep and bear arms.” United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th

637, 646 (6th Cir. 2024).

The State fails to offer a persuasive rationale to conclude that “the people”

excludes marijuana possessors. “The people,” the Supreme Court has said,

“unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an

unspecified subset.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 580. Under the plain text of the Second

Amendment, Woods is a “person” who, in carrying a firearm in his truck, was

“bear[ing] Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. And Woods—with or without marijuana

in his backpack—is a member of the political community to whom the Second

Amendment’s text applies. Section 724.8B’s restriction thus implicates Woods’s

Second Amendment right to bear arms. The plurality is wrong to stop after prong

one. We thus move to Bruen’s second inquiry.

B. Historical Traditions Analysis Under the Second Inquiry. Under the

second inquiry, we consider whether § 724.8B is consistent with this Nation’s 53

history and tradition of firearm regulation as applied to Woods. “Only if a firearm

regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court

conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s

‘unqualified command.’ ” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar

of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 n. 10 (1961)). Woods argues that no historical precedent

exists to justify prohibiting someone who possesses a personal-use amount of

marijuana from carrying a firearm.

The State bears the burden of showing that the challenged regulation is

“relevantly similar” to restrictions that our nation has traditionally permitted.

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). The State need not

provide a “dead ringer” or “historical twin” to the challenged law. Id. (quoting

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30). A historical analogue is sufficient. Id. The challenged law

and the historical law must share a common “why”—that they both address a

comparable problem—and a common “how”—that they both place a similar

burden on the person. United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269, 274 (5th Cir.

2024) (citing Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692).

First, we consider the “why” inquiry. As the State acknowledges,

“founding-era legislatures did not regulate the possession, use, manufacturing,

or trading of drugs like marijuana at all.” Other courts have explained that the

historical evidence shows “very little regulation of drugs (related to firearm

possession or otherwise) until the late 19th century”—long after the Second

Amendment’s ratification. Id. at 279. The State thus does not present firearm

restrictions tied to the use or possession of controlled substances as historical

analogues for § 724.8B.

The State instead presents historical restrictions that prohibited firearm

possession by groups deemed to be dangerous. It cites law review articles that 54

describe a seventeenth-century British law denying the right to bear arms based

on religion or class; a Maryland law barring Catholics, slaves, or indentured

servants from possessing firearms; “colonial gun laws” limiting access to firearms

by Native Americans and slaves; and some Revolution-era laws prohibiting the

possession of firearms by people who refused to declare an oath of loyalty. See

Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of Firearms

Ownership, 1607–1794, 16 Law & Hist. Rev. 567, 571–74, 578–79, 584–85

(1998). The unifying thread in each of these restrictions, the State argues, is the

denial of the right to possess firearms to groups viewed as a danger to public

safety.

To justify disarming a person for public safety reasons under the Second

Amendment, the firearm restriction must address a material danger that the

restricted person presents. See United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 915–16

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 304 (2024). Again, § 724.8B disarmed Woods

because he unlawfully possessed marijuana. In this case, whether the State has

proved that the restriction satisfies Bruen’s historical test turns on whether

Woods’s possession of marijuana poses a danger to others.

Federal cases addressing challenges to a similar federal firearm restriction

are instructive. That statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), prohibits anyone “who is an

unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” from possessing a

“firearm or ammunition.” In United States v. Connelly, the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals considered an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3)’s restriction by a

defendant who was a nonviolent marijuana user. 117 F.4th at 272. The

Government offered several historical analogues for the firearm restriction,

including (1) laws disarming the mentally ill, (2) laws disarming “dangerous”

people, and (3) intoxication laws. Id. at 274–75. 55

The court reasoned “that marijuana intoxication is . . . most analogous to

short-term mental impairment” but that the historical laws only disarmed the

mentally ill while they were actually incapacitated. Id. at 275–76. The court thus

found “no historical justification for disarming sober citizens not presently under

an impairing influence.” Id. at 276. Because the government had presented no

evidence of some present impairment from marijuana use, the panel concluded

that historical bans based on mental illness could not justify § 922(g)(3)’s ban

on all users. Id.

Next, the court considered historical laws targeting “dangerous” groups,

such as Catholics and colonists who refused to take an oath of loyalty. Id. at

277. The panel observed that these laws had “unique socio-political motivations”

beyond merely protecting public safety. Id. at 278. “The Founders did not disarm

English Loyalists because they were believed to lack self-control; it was because

they were viewed as political threats to our nascent nation’s integrity.” Id. (citing

Joseph G.S. Greenlee, Disarming the Dangerous: The American Tradition of

Firearm Prohibitions, 16 Drexel L. Rev. 1, 60–63 (2024)). “So too with laws

disarming religious minorities—the perceived threat was as political as it was

religious, if not even more so.” Id. Marijuana users, the Connelly court reasoned,

are not dangerous because they present a risk of political or religious

insurrection. Id. at 278–79. These laws thus did not establish a historical

tradition protecting public safety to make them analogues to § 922(g)(3). Id.

Finally, the court considered historical laws barring the carrying of

weapons while under the influence. Id. at 279–80. The court observed that these

laws principally sought to maintain the sobriety of members of the armed

services who might be called to duty since service members can’t perform their

duties (or can’t perform them well) while intoxicated. Id. at 281. The court hit 56

upon no relevant Founding-era tradition or regulation that disarmed ordinary

citizens who consumed alcohol, and it concluded that laws that came about

much later were entitled to limited weight under the Bruen analysis. Id. at

281–82.

The Connelly court thus held in favor of the nonviolent marijuana user in

her as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3). Id. at 283. In rejecting each of the

Government’s proposed historical analogues for the firearm restriction, the court

concluded that “[t]he analogical reasoning Bruen and Rahimi 2024 prescribed

cannot stretch that far.” Id. at 282.

The statute challenged in this case, Iowa Code § 724.8B, addresses a lesser

danger than the one targeted in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Section 922(g)(3) bars

possession by a marijuana user or addict—someone likely to be under the actual

influence of the intoxicant. A law that prohibits someone actually under the

influence of drugs from possessing a firearm presents a much closer case. But

§ 724.8B criminalizes the carrying of a firearm by someone merely possessing

marijuana, even if the person is sober, as Woods was.

If a marijuana user is not considered dangerous unless they are under the

actual influence of marijuana, there’s no reason to conclude that someone who

similarly is not actually under the influence of marijuana but merely possesses

marijuana is somehow dangerous. Neither the State nor the plurality offers

anything to suggest that a sober marijuana possessor presents a danger to

public or officer safety. The question isn’t whether recreational marijuana

possession is unlawful; in Iowa, it is. (Under Iowa law, dispensaries are allowed

to sell cannabidiol products that contain the active ingredients in

marijuana—THC and CBD—for medicinal purposes. See Iowa Code § 124E.9.)

The question is whether recreational marijuana possession presents a danger 57

consistent with our historical analogues to outlaw the carrying of a firearm while

doing so.

The historical laws targeting “dangerous” groups that the State offers in

this case are simply not relevantly similar. Whatever the danger Woods posed by

possessing recreational marijuana, it has little in common with the

insurrection-based justification offered for the Founding-era disarmament of

groups based on religious, political, and class affiliations. The State “identifies

no class of persons at the Founding who were ‘dangerous’ for reasons

comparable to marijuana users.” Connelly, 117 F.4th at 278; see also United

States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794, 805 (6th Cir. 2024) (Bush, J., concurring except

for Sections III.A–B, and in the judgment) (“This history and tradition of

disarming ‘dangerous’ political groups and religious minorities seems too far

afield to provide supporting precedent for disarmament based on substance

abuse, at least when, as here, the defendant has no history of violence through

firearm misuse.”). The State’s proffered analogues thus fail to offer the same

answer to Bruen’s “why” test. When a challenged regulation burdens the right to

bear arms for different reasons than our historical laws, that difference in why

the burdens were imposed points toward the modern regulation being

unconstitutional. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692.

The plurality never explains the danger presented by someone merely

possessing a personal-use amount of marijuana to justify § 724.8B’s

disarmament beyond a claim that the risk of danger intensifies anytime someone

carries a firearm while unlawfully possessing a controlled substance. The

plurality asserts that because people usually obtain illegal drugs from others,

and firearms are often involved in drug transactions, drug possession always

makes for a dangerous connection with firearms. But the conclusion we’re asked 58

to draw from these loose premises in this case doesn’t work. We know nothing

about how Woods obtained the marijuana; the State, for its part, summoned no

evidence on this point. Yet we do know that many states, including three states

that border Iowa (Missouri, Illinois, and Minnesota), have legalized the sale of

marijuana for recreational use. Woods easily could have lawfully purchased it

from a dispensary in any of these states—without a firearm or the hint of any

violence. The plurality’s suggestion that possession of recreational marijuana

necessarily entails an illegal drug transaction and is therefore dangerous fails to

take into account the lawful, peaceful means now readily available for someone

like Woods to obtain marijuana.

Again, although plenty of evidence supports the notion that carrying a

firearm while presently intoxicated may present a danger, see Connelly, 117 F.4th

at 282; United States v. Harrison, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1200–03 (W.D. Okla.

2023), and that carrying a firearm while engaging in drug distribution may

present a danger, United States v. Carter, 802 F. Supp. 2d 180, 184 (D.D.C.

2011), the danger of carrying a firearm while simply possessing a personal-use

amount of marijuana is never established.

The State cites no authority connecting the dots between someone

possessing recreational marijuana and any risk of danger in carrying a firearm

deriving from that mere possession. See also United States v. Daniels, 124 F.4th

967, 975 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied

because the government “was not required to convince a jury that Daniels was

presently or even regularly intoxicated at the time of arrest”). As the

Eighth Circuit recently recognized in addressing an as-applied challenge to

§ 922(g)(3), attempts to justify firearm restrictions must fail when it is

exceedingly unlikely that the restriction will prevent violence or terror from 59

happening. See United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092, 1096 (8th Cir. 2025).

“[A]nalogues make clear that ‘disarming all drug users,’ regardless of the

individual danger they pose, is not comparable to anything from around the time

of the Founding.” Id. at 1097 (quoting Veasley, 98 F.4th at 912). The same

applies to Woods, who, by simply possessing a personal-use amount of

marijuana, posed no danger.

We turn to the “how” inquiry, which requires us to examine how the

historical regulation burdened the right to bear arms compared to the modern

regulation. The State cites as analogues laws that increased the severity of

punishment for certain crimes if the defendant possessed a weapon during the

commission of the crime, offering a Massachusetts law from 1806, see

Commonwealth v. Hope, 39 Mass. 1, 22 Pick. 1 (1839), and a Louisiana law from

1875, see State v. Morris, 27 La. Ann. 480 (1875). Both enhanced the penalty for

burglary if the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon. The State also

cites a Sixth Circuit case that includes other examples of laws that applied

enhancements to the degree of the underlying crime (for example, making a

second-degree charge a first-degree charge) or to the crime’s sentence when a

defendant used a weapon while committing the underlying crime. See

United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part on

other grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1.

But the plurality’s enhancement argument misses an important feature of

§ 724.8B: it doesn’t make carrying a firearm an enhancement to another crime

but rather makes the carrying itself a separate crime. This is different than the

Massachusetts and Louisiana laws that the State recites. The Massachusetts law

did not prohibit anyone from possessing a firearm. Instead, it only affected

punishment, stating that “if the person was armed with a dangerous weapon, 60

[the person] was punished by death; if not armed, by hard labor for life.” Hope,

39 Mass. at 10, 22 Pick. at 7. Similarly, the Louisiana law provided that a

defendant who committed a burglary with a dangerous weapon “shall suffer

death.” Morris, 27 La. Ann. at 481. But if a burglary was committed without a

dangerous weapon, the punishment was “hard labor not exceeding fourteen

years.” Id. Under both the Massachusetts and Louisiana laws, a defendant could

not be convicted based solely on their possession of a firearm. Instead, the

firearm possession only came into play at sentencing, after the defendant was

first convicted of committing burglary.

Section 724.8B is different. Again, it provides that “a person who illegally

possesses a controlled substance . . . is prohibited from carrying dangerous

weapons. Unless otherwise provided by law, a person who violates this section

commits a serious misdemeanor.” Iowa Code § 724.8B. It does not matter

whether a defendant is actually charged with or convicted of the separate offense

of possession of a controlled substance. Possession of a controlled substance is

simply an element of the offense of unlawful carrying in § 724.8B. The statute

does not, contrary to the plurality’s assertion, provide an enhancement in

sentencing or severity for any other crime.

The sentence imposed in this case makes this point clear. The district

court in its sentencing order treated the convictions for the two counts

separately. On the possession of marijuana charge (count I), the district court

fined Woods $430 and sentenced him to 180 days’ imprisonment. On the

unlawful carrying charge (count II), the district court fined Woods $430 and

sentenced him to 365 days’ imprisonment. The district court ordered the two

terms of imprisonment to run concurrently but then suspended both sentences. 61

A different drug statute not at issue in this case, Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(e),

shows what an enhancement for carrying a firearm while possessing a controlled

substance looks like. Iowa Code § 124.401(1) criminalizes the possession of a

controlled substance with the intent to manufacture or deliver it.

Subsection (1)(e) provides an enhancement to the crime, stating: “A person in

the immediate possession or control of a firearm while participating in a violation

of this subsection shall be sentenced to two times the term otherwise imposed

by law, and no such judgment, sentence, or part thereof shall be deferred or

suspended.” Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(e). This is an example of an enhancement

(albeit for drug distribution, not possession) akin to the historical examples the

State offers; § 724.8B, by contrast, is not.

The State’s enhancement argument thus fails Bruen’s “how” test—the

historical statutes do not place a similar burden on firearm possession as

§ 724.8B. Under the “how” test, if historical laws “addressed the societal

problem, but did so through materially different means,” the difference in

approach offers “evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.”

Veasley, 98 F.4th at 911 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26–27). Section 724.8B,

with its creation of a separate crime for unlawful carrying independent of any

other conviction, is not analogous to how our laws have traditionally burdened

the right to bear arms. Contrary to the plurality’s conclusion, this points further

in the direction that § 724.8B is not “relevantly similar” to Founding-era laws.

The plurality’s reliance on State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 1997),

and State v. Mehner, 480 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1992), are unhelpful. We decided

Brecunier twenty-five years, and Mehner thirty years, before the Supreme Court

decided Bruen. Neither case considers the questions that Bruen asks courts to

answer about whether the challenged restriction fits within “this Nation’s 62

historical tradition.” 597 U.S. at 17. Neither case discusses traditional firearm

regulations nor engages in any historical analysis of Founding-era analogues.

See id. In fact, the opinion in Brecunier expresses uncertainty about how the

Second Amendment operates in general, stating that “[t]he law may be unsettled

as to the precise scope of what rights the Second Amendment protects.”

564 N.W.2d at 370. And we footnoted cases that suggest the Second Amendment

might only apply to regulations that “would interfere with the preservation or

efficiency of the militia.” Id. at 370 n.4 (quoting United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d

1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992)). As we now know, the Supreme Court would

establish a different analysis for challenges under the Second Amendment in the

intervening decades. Suffice it to say the plurality’s reliance on these pre-Bruen

cases is misplaced.

Stated simply, the analogues that the State offers (and that the plurality

relies on) “stray[] too far from the ‘how and why’ of ‘historical regulations.’ ”

Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1095 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). Section 724.8B is not

“relevantly similar” to Founding-era laws. By restricting Woods’s right to carry a

firearm based on his mere possession of a personal-use amount of marijuana,

§ 724.8B inflicts “a far greater burden on [his] Second Amendment rights than

our nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation can support.” Connelly,

117 F.4th at 282. To steal a line from Judge Friendly, the State’s proposed

analogues are “so far away that resort to them would [be] rationalization rather

than reasoning—the lines of force [are] too remote to exert any real pull.” Henry

J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become a Judge, 71 Yale L.J. 218,

226 (1961). I would hold § 724.8B unconstitutional under the Second

Amendment as applied to Woods. 63

III. The Restriction is Unconstitutional Under Article I, Section 1A.

The plurality also concludes that § 724.8B is constitutional under article I,

section 1A (or “Amendment 1A”) of the Iowa Constitution. Amendment 1A, like

the Second Amendment, declares that “[t]he right of the people to keep and bear

arms shall not be infringed.” But Amendment 1A also provides that “[a]ny and

all restrictions of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny.” So whereas the

Second Amendment requires courts to analyze firearm restrictions under Bruen’s

test, Amendment 1A requires courts to apply the familiar strict scrutiny test.

Strict scrutiny, both as a concept and an analytical tool, is well-established

in our caselaw. It is the most exacting standard of constitutional review, placing

“all the burden of justification on the State.” Planned Parenthood of the

Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 975 N.W.2d 710, 731 (Iowa 2022). It

requires the state to show that the challenged action is “narrowly tailored” to

achieve “a compelling state interest” and requires the state to use “the least

restrictive means” in doing so. Mitchell County v. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1, 16

(Iowa 2012).

The State argues that it has a compelling interest in preserving public and

officer safety and that § 724.8B is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.

But showing that a statute offers the “least restrictive means” to achieve its aim

is no easy task. Consider Mitchell County v. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d at 4. In that

case, the plaintiff challenged a county ordinance that banned driving vehicles

with wheels having steel cleats on paved roadways. Id. A member of the

Mennonite Church, which forbids members from driving tractors without steel

cleats, challenged the ordinance as a violation of his constitutional right to free

exercise of his religion. Id. The county argued that the ordinance was necessary

to protect hard-surfaced roads. Id. at 5. We held that the county failed to 64

establish that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to achieve the stated objective

of road preservation because, among other reasons, “[a] more narrowly tailored

alternative” to the county’s ordinance “might allow steel wheels on county roads

in some circumstances, while establishing an effective mechanism for recouping

the costs of any necessary road repairs if damage occurs.” Id. at 17.

In strict scrutiny analysis, if a less restrictive law would achieve the same

compelling government interest, the more restrictive one fails the test. In this

way, strict scrutiny, by design, cuts with a sharp blade. It’s not hard to conceive

of a less restrictive means to achieve the public- and officer-safety goal advanced

in this case: Instead of making it a crime to carry a firearm while possessing a

personal-use quantity of marijuana as § 724.8B does, the law might instead

make it a crime to possess distribution quantities of marijuana. Although there’s

virtually no danger in simple possession of marijuana—a product that adults

can now lawfully purchase in several states that border Iowa—there are well-

recognized dangers associated with drug trafficking. See, e.g., United States v.

Jackson, 782 F.3d 1006, 1008 (8th Cir. 2015) (describing the shooting death of

a drug dealer while attempting to sell half a kilogram of cocaine); U.S. Sent’g

Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 cmt. 11(A), at 168 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024) (noting

“the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons”). This

is why the overwhelming bulk of the cases that the plurality relies on address

drug trafficking (often of “hard” drugs), not personal-use possession of

marijuana. See, e.g., United States v. Risner, 129 F.4th 361, 364 (6th Cir. 2025)

(involving a restriction prohibiting the use of a firearm during the commission of

a drug trafficking crime and where the defendant admitted to possessing a

firearm in connection with trafficking methamphetamine). Unlike drug 65

trafficking, carrying a firearm does nothing to facilitate the personal-use

possession of marijuana.

But the plurality doesn’t differentiate between the dangers present in

trafficking and personal-use possession. Indeed, as mentioned, the plurality

suggests that the “dangerousness” threshold is met any time a firearm might be

present during any interaction with an officer pertaining to a violation of law.

“There is no category of crime where the perpetrator’s possession of a pistol

during the commission of the crime makes the situation safer,” the plurality

declares, before suggesting that infractions resulting in traffic stops would be

enough to justify a firearm restriction.

But if every crime that might result in an interaction with an officer

presents a sufficient danger to justify a firearm restriction, then the right to bear

arms becomes illusory. After all, people are subject to a dizzying array of criminal

laws, many of them “reach[ing] far beyond what common sense and generally

accepted moral principles would forbid.” Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,

Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 725,

734 (2012). People are subject to so many criminal laws that they routinely

violate them—some estimates suggest as often as three times a day. See

generally Harvey A. Silverglate, Three Felonies A Day (2009). Estimates suggest

there are “over 300,000 different types of conduct that are prohibited either by

statute or regulation in the federal system for which a person could be

imprisoned and prosecuted as a criminal”—and this number doesn’t include

state criminal laws. Edwin Meese III, Overcriminalization in Practice: Trends and

Recent Controversies, 8 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 505, 510 (2012); see also Neil

Gorsuch & Janie Nitze, Over Ruled: The Human Toll of Too Much Law 21 (2024)

(“How many federal crimes do you think we have these days? It turns out no one 66

knows.”). The sheer volume of criminal laws creates “a formidable task for the

average person to know what the law forbids.” Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice

Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 715, 720 (2013).

The constitutional right to bear arms becomes an empty promise if any

criminal act that creates an interaction with law enforcement—regardless of the

act’s dangerousness—is enough to justify a firearm restriction. Speeding, failing

to use a turn signal, driving with a malfunctioning taillight, fishing without a

license—all are examples of crimes that might bring about an interaction with

law enforcement. And despite the lack of danger inherent in any of them that

might be enhanced by carrying a firearm, each would justify a firearm regulation

under the plurality’s reasoning.

Indeed, Congress has seemingly acknowledged that firearm restrictions

associated with nondangerous crimes—even felonies—are unwarranted. In the

Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, for instance, Congress

limited a prohibition on convicted felons’ possession of firearms by exempting

certain nondangerous crimes, including felony offenses “pertaining to antitrust

violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses

relating to the regulation of business practices.” Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197

(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3)); Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1216

(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)). Yet, unlike these federal statutes, the

restriction in § 724.8B makes no differentiation between dangerous and

nondangerous crimes.

The plurality also suggests that firearm regulations on the books when

voters ratified Amendment 1A should survive a constitutional challenge because

we can assume that voters were familiar with existing restrictions when they

ratified the amendment. But as an initial matter, the record contains no evidence 67

of voters’ knowledge about existing firearm restrictions when they voted for

Amendment 1A, let alone what knowledge they might have had about § 724.8B.

I am perplexed by the notion that we would presume voters knew every firearm

restriction on the books when they voted on Amendment 1A. On the contrary, if

we are going to speculate about voters’ intentions, it’s just as conceivable to me

that voters ratifying Amendment 1A preferred instead to do away with all existing

restrictions that violated the new amendment without some laborious

statute-by-statute repeal. In this way, voters might have concluded that it was

better to address existing restrictions through a single constitutional

amendment. Regardless, we should not embrace the notion that every existing

firearm restriction passes strict scrutiny based on the fiction that voters knew

about and endorsed every such restriction in the Iowa Code’s eight volumes.

More to the point, voters’ understanding of existing statutes simply can’t do the

analytical work that Amendment 1A requires regarding whether § 724.8B

satisfies a strict scrutiny analysis.

When the “compelling interest” under our strict scrutiny analysis is public

or officer safety, as it is here, then the key inquiry must be whether bearing a

firearm heightens the danger that the underlying crime creates. Restricting

carrying a firearm while possessing a personal-use amount marijuana simply

doesn’t meet this test. The plurality focuses on the fact that possession of

marijuana is a crime but disregards any actual danger that the crime presents.

In doing so, the plurality points its spotlight in the wrong place. If we’re

concerned about safety, it doesn’t matter whether an act happens to violate a

criminal statute; what matters is whether the act is dangerous. The element of

danger in personal-use possession of marijuana is absent. 68

IV. Conclusion.

Under both the Second Amendment and Amendment 1A, the State failed

to meet its different burdens to establish the constitutionality of § 724.8B. That

statute, as applied in this case, abridged Woods’s right to bear arms. I fear that

the upshot from the plurality’s opinion today, which in my view focuses too much

on whether an act has been labeled a crime and not enough on whether that act

is in fact dangerous, will not make communities or officers safer, but will only

make it less likely that people will avail themselves of their constitutional right

to bear arms.

Waterman and May, JJ., join this dissent. 69

#24–0261, State v. Woods May, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I join Justice McDermott’s well-reasoned opinion. I

write separately to address Justice Oxley’s thoughtful opinion concurring in the

judgment. Although the concurrence makes many proper observations about the

law and, indeed, identifies the correct rule for deciding this case, the

concurrence’s failure to correctly apply that rule leads to the wrong result.

As noted, I agree with many of the concurrence’s points, including (1) its

emphasis on the “fundamental” nature of our right to “keep and bear arms”

under the Second Amendment and article 1, section 1A of the Iowa

Constitution,4 (2) its acknowledgement that some gun regulation is nevertheless

allowable, and (3) its emphasis on the need for courts to identify “limiting

principles” on gun regulation so we “avoid obliterating” the Second

Amendment right. I also agree with the concurrence that—in this case—the

appropriate limiting principle is whether or not the weapon is carried “for an

unlawful purpose.” And so the key question is this: Has the State shown that

Woods carried the handgun at issue for an unlawful purpose?

But the concurrence does not answer that question. The concurrence does

not explain whether Woods was carrying the gun “for an unlawful purpose” or

not. His “purpose” is not identified.

Instead, the concurrence substitutes a “nexus” analysis that requires no

inquiry into purpose. This nexus analysis asks only whether the firearm has “the

potential to facilitate” a drug crime. This test is satisfied, the concurrence says,

if the person possesses a firearm “in close proximity to illegal drugs” and the

4For ease of reference, I will refer to these state and federal protections together as the

“Second Amendment.” 70

person is in public. So, because Woods carried “his readily accessible, loaded

firearm out into public in the same backpack as his illegal drugs,” the test is

satisfied, and Woods enjoys no Second Amendment protection.

I disagree. Again, as the concurrence says, the crucial question is whether

Woods was carrying his gun “for an unlawful purpose.” But the substituted

nexus approach does not answer this question. Indeed, the nexus approach

could justify punishing a citizen for carrying firearms even when it is known

that the citizen has no “unlawful purpose” for carrying.

To illustrate how this could happen, consider the hypothetical person

described in the State’s brief: “the 80-year-old grandmother who uses marijuana

for a chronic medical condition and keeps a pistol tucked away for her own

safety.” See United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 917–18 (8th Cir. 2024). The

State seems to assume—or, at least, I will assume—that this grandmother does

not possess a firearm for an unlawful purpose. Rather, the gun is just to protect

her against a violent world, a core justification for the Second Amendment right.

Even though she lacks an unlawful purpose for arming herself, the

concurrence’s approach would allow the grandmother to be jailed for arming

herself. For instance, suppose she chooses to drive to Fareway to pick up baking

supplies. Suppose also that she brings her purse with her, and that she always

keeps her “pistol tucked away” in that purse “for her own safety.” Id. at 918.

Naturally, she keeps it loaded—so she can use the gun to protect her own safety.

Finally, suppose that the purse also contains crumbs from her homemade

marijuana brownies, the ones she uses “for a chronic medical condition.” Id.

In that scenario, there would be no meaningful daylight between the

grandmother’s situation and Woods’s. The grandmother’s gun would be just as

accessible—and, therefore, would have the same “potential to facilitate” a 71

crime—as Woods’s handgun. Indeed, the facts of the two cases would be

effectively identical because in both: (1) the gun is in a bag and loaded, (2) the

marijuana is in the bag, (3) the gun is “readily-accessible,” and (4) all of this

occurs in public. And so, under the concurrence’s nexus approach, the

grandmother should be treated just like Woods. Even though we know (as part

of the hypothetical) that the grandmother has no unlawful purpose for

possessing the gun, she still lacks any constitutional right to carry, and she

could still be sent to jail for doing so. Her lack of an unlawful purpose doesn’t

matter at all.

This is not the way. Instead, if the proper test is whether Woods was

carrying “for an unlawful purpose,” we should require the State to show that

Woods was carrying “for an unlawful purpose.” The concurrence would shift the

burden of proof over to Woods, but that can’t be correct. Bruen makes it clear

that because Woods’s conduct of carrying a firearm falls squarely within the

Second Amendment’s textual protection for keeping and bearing arms,

“the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol

Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). So it is the State’s burden to justify any

restriction on Woods’s exercise of that constitutional right. One court has

suggested that a case that the concurrence relies on for placing the burden on

the defendant, State v. Adams, 914 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2019), was abrogated

by Bruen on this very point. See United States v. Le, 669 F. Supp. 3d 754, 756

(S.D. Iowa 2023) (discussing Adams, 914 F.3d 602). Nothing in Bruen suggests

that Woods would need to prove that he lacked an unlawful purpose for

exercising his textually guaranteed fundamental constitutional right to carry. 72

So, again, the question is whether the State has shown that Woods was

carrying a gun “for an unlawful purpose.” And on my review, I see no reason to

conclude that the State has carried that burden. I agree with the concurrence

that Woods wasn’t engaged in drug dealing, much less carrying a gun for the

purpose of drug dealing. Moreover, although he possessed marijuana unlawfully,

I see no reason to conclude that he possessed the gun for the purpose of

possessing the marijuana. Rather, as with the hypothetical grandmother, it

seems just as likely that Woods had independent reasons for possessing each:

the marijuana for recreation or similar uses, and the firearm for self-protection.

In any event, because the State hasn’t shown that Woods was carrying the

firearm “for an illegal purpose,” the Second Amendment prevents him from being

punished for doing so. I respectfully dissent.

Waterman and McDermott, JJ., join this dissent.