State of Iowa v. Jonathan Johnson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 6, 2023
• Docket: 22-1302
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1302 Filed December 6, 2023

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JONATHAN JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,

Judge.

Jonathan Johnson appeals from his convictions and sentence for stalking

in violation of a no-contact order and criminal mischief in the third degree.

AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023). 2

VOGEL, Senior Judge.

Jonathan Johnson appeals from his convictions and sentence for one count

of stalking in violation of a no-contact order, under Iowa Code

section 708.11(3)(b)(1) (2021), and two counts of criminal mischief in the third

degree, under sections 716.1 and 716.5(1)(a). He argues the State breached the

plea agreement by recommending a harsher sentence than that provided in the

agreement.

The State initially charged Johnson with five counts: stalking in violation of

a no-contact order, criminal mischief in the second degree, attempted burglary in

the second degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, and domestic abuse

assault causing bodily injury. In February 2022, Johnson signed a written plea

agreement, under which he pleaded guilty to one count of stalking in violation of a

no-contact order and two counts of criminal mischief in the third degree. The State,

in turn, agreed to dismiss all other charges. The parties agreed to jointly

recommend he be sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration of five years

for stalking and two years for each criminal-mischief charge, suspended, plus three

years of probation and other provisions. The agreement also provided “the [S]tate

is not bound by the agreement if, between plea and sentencing, probable cause

exists to believe [Johnson] committed a new crime or violated a court order.” The

court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea, granted him pretrial release with supervision,

and ordered him to appear for sentencing in March. The order granting pretrial

release provided “[a]ny violation of Pretrial Release Services will be considered a

violation of this Court’s Order” and “[f]ailure to appear [for the March sentencing]

will further constitute a violation of this order.” 3

About two weeks later, pretrial services filed a report stating Johnson

repeatedly violated his curfew. In response, the district court revoked his pretrial

status and issued a bench warrant. After Johnson failed to appear for his March

2022 sentencing, the court continued sentencing and issued another bench

warrant. He was eventually taken into custody, and a sentencing hearing was held

in July. When the court asked the parties for their sentencing recommendations,

Johnson’s counsel first raised the issue of whether he violated the plea agreement,

arguing he did not violate the agreement and, even if he violated the agreement

and it does not apply, the agreement’s recommended sentence was still

appropriate. The State then argued the agreement did not apply because Johnson

breached it by violating the conditions of pretrial release and failing to appear for

sentencing. The State recommended the court impose the consecutive terms of

incarceration described in the agreement without suspending the sentence. After

both parties presented their arguments, the court found Johnson breached the plea

agreement by “failing to obey the conditions of that pretrial release order [and]

failing to appear for sentencing,” so the State was not bound by the agreement.

The court followed the State’s recommendation and sentenced Johnson to the

three terms of incarceration served consecutively without suspending them, for a

total term of incarceration of nine years. Johnson appeals.

The State concedes Johnson’s appeal is a challenge to his sentence, which

he may raise for the first time on direct appeal. See State v. Davis, 971 N.W.2d

546, 555 (Iowa 2022). A claim the State breached an agreement to recommend a

certain sentence is a type of sentencing defect, which we review for correction of

errors at law. Id. at 553. 4

When a plea agreement requires the State to recommend a certain

sentence, the prosecutor has a duty “to ‘present the recommended sentence[ ]

with his or her approval, to commend the sentence[ ] to the court, and to otherwise

indicate to the court that the recommended sentence[ ] [is] supported by the State

and worthy of the court’s acceptance.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State

v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 173 (Iowa 2015)). However,

If a defendant fails to uphold his or her end of the agreement, the State has no obligation to provide the defendant the anticipated benefits of the bargain. The State has the burden to show the defendant has failed to live up to his or her end of the bargain. Whether the State has carried its burden is determined by examining the record made at the time of sentencing.

State v. Foy, 574 N.W.2d 337, 339–40 (Iowa 1998) (internal citations omitted).

“[P]lea agreements are contracts, and accordingly, they are subject to general

principles of contract law.” State v. Beres, 943 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Iowa 2020).

At the sentencing hearing, the State argued Johnson breached the plea

agreement by violating multiple court orders, and it thus recommended a sentence

outside the agreement. The district court then ruled Johnson breached the

agreement and imposed his sentence consistent with the State’s recommendation.

Johnson does not argue on appeal that the State failed to prove he violated the

agreement, so he waives any argument on the issue. See Iowa R. App.

P. 6.903(2)(g)(3). Instead, he focuses on the timing of these issues, arguing the

State breached the plea agreement by recommending a harsher sentence before

the court ruled he had breached the agreement. He notes “it is a basic precept of

contract law that one side is not free to unilaterally withdraw and go back to the

beginning just because it wants to do so.” Id. at 585. 5

The plea agreement explicitly provided the State was not bound by its terms

upon probable cause Johnson violated a court order. The State pointed to at least

two instances of Johnson violating a court order and argued for a harsher

sentence. In doing so, the State followed the language of the agreement instead

of unilaterally withdrawing “just because it wants to do so.” Id. Nothing requires

the State to obtain court approval before withdrawing from the agreement, so long

as the State carries its burden to show Johnson first breached the agreement when

called to do so. See Foy, 574 N.W.2d at 339–40. This conclusion is consistent

with contract law, where “once one party to a contract breaches the agreement,

the other party is no longer obligated to continue performing his or her own

contractual obligations.” Kelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa

2000) (citation omitted). Additionally, before the court issued its decision, Johnson

had a full opportunity to address both his alleged violations and his recommended

sentence before the State’s argument and afterwards in rebuttal.

Because the plea agreement allowed the State to withdraw upon

reasonable cause to believe Johnson violated a court order, and because the State

provided proof of such violations, the State did not breach the plea agreement

when it recommended a harsher sentence. We thus find no error in his sentence.