IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1327 Filed August 5, 2020
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JANE DOE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Terry Rickers,
Judge.
A citizen appeals from the denial of her motion to expunge a 2011 criminal
case. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Adrienne Loutsch of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Katie Krickbaum, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Doyle and Schumacher, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
This appeal arises from a district court order denying a motion to expunge
a criminal case dating from 2011. The charges originally present in the case were
consolidated into a different case number in which the appellant pleaded guilty to
several but not all of the counts charged. On appeal, we consider whether the
language of Iowa’s expungement statute, codified at Iowa Code chapter 901C
(2019), treats a transfer of charges from one case to another as a dismissal of the
charges from the transferor case for purposes of a motion to expunge the
transferor case. We conclude a complete “transfer” or “merger” of charges from
one case number into another results in the charges in the transferor case being
“otherwise dismissed” within the meaning of Iowa Code section 901C.2(1)(a)(1).
Background Facts and Proceedings
On September 28 and 29, 2010, two fraudulent checks were passed at a
gas station in Indianola, Iowa. Officer Brian Sher of the Indianola Police
Department met with the gas station company’s investigator. Using video
surveillance and a driver’s license photo, Officer Sher identified the person passing
the checks as the defendant here, Jane Doe.1 Officer Sher requested and received
a warrant for Doe’s arrest. Doe was charged with two counts of forgery, which
were given the case number that is the focus of this appeal. We refer to this case
as case A. The defendant accumulated additional forgery charges around the
same time, for a total of seven charges. In a second case number, which we refer
to as case B, a single additional count of forgery was charged for an offense
1 We use a pseudonym to refer to the defendant due to the nature of this case, and for similar reasons, we refrain from specifying the case numbers. 3
allegedly committed on September 25, 2010. A third case number, which we refer
to as case C or the “omnibus case,” held an additional four counts of forgery. Case
A, which holds two counts of forgery, was initiated on October 19, 2010. Case B
was initiated on October 20, 2010. Case C was initiated on October 25, 2010.
On July 20, 2011, the State filed a motion in case C with the caption
“Application to Merge.” The motioned requested that the court “merge” cases A
and B into case C. In support of the motion, the State asserted that cases A and
B “originated from a common scheme” and that “[j]udicial economy warrants the
merger” of the first two cases into the third. The motion tracked the language of
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.6(1), which provides that,
Two or more indictable public offenses which arise from the same transaction or occurrence or from two or more transactions or occurrences constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, when alleged and prosecuted contemporaneously, shall be alleged and prosecuted as separate counts in a single complaint, information or indictment, unless, for good cause shown, the trial court in its discretion determines otherwise.
The court granted the motion the next day, saying that cases A and B “are merged
into” case C. Case C then became the omnibus case in which a global disposition
was reached. The court’s order for merger was filed in case A.
On September 6, 2011, the State filed a trial information in case C charging
only six, not seven, counts of forgery. The 2010 dates of these offenses were:
Count I, September 25; Count II, September 25; Count III, September 28; Count
IV, September 28; Count V, September 29; and Count VI, September 29.
On October 10, 2011, Doe pleaded guilty to counts I, II, and III in case C.
Counts IV, V, and VI were dismissed. 4
In 2015, the Iowa Legislature enacted new legislation, codified at Iowa Code
chapter 901C, that allows a defendant to apply for expungement of charges in
certain circumstances. 2015 Iowa Acts ch. 83, § 1; see also 2016 Acts ch. 1073,
§§ 183–84, 188 (making clarifying amendments). Seeking to take advantage of
chapter 901C, Doe filed a motion, dated June 8, 2019, to expunge case A. Doe’s
motion was based on a form created by Iowa Legal Aid. One of the statements in
the form motion was “My charges were dismissed, or I was acquitted, on
7/21/2011.” Doe supplied the date in her own hand.
On July 10, 2019, the district court issued an order denying Doe’s motion
seeking expungement of case A. The court said,
This case was never dismissed. Instead, it was merged into [case C]. Code section 901C.2(1)(a)(1) states that expungement is permissible only if “[t]he criminal case contains one or more criminal charges in which an acquittal was entered for all criminal charges, or in which all criminal charges were otherwise dismissed.” Neither an acquittal nor a dismissal was ever entered in this case. Although a charge or charges from this case may have been ultimately dismissed in [case C], expungement of those charges is not permitted because not all charges in that case were ultimately dismissed. Consequently, the motion is hereby denied.
(First alteration in original). Doe timely appealed from the denial of her motion to
expunge case A.
Standard of Review
“We review issues of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law.”
State v. Doe, 903 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 2017) (Doe I) (quoting Rhoades v. State,
848 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2014)). 5
Discussion
The narrow issue presented on appeal is whether a district court’s order
“merging” charges from one case into another case results in the charges in the
transferor case being “otherwise dismissed” within the meaning of Iowa Code
section 901C.2(1)(a)(1). The relevant provisions of section 901C.2(1)(a)(1)
provide:
Except as provided in paragraph “b”, upon application of a defendant or prosecutor in a criminal case, or upon the court’s own motion in a criminal case, the court shall enter an order expunging the record of such criminal case if the court finds that the defendant has established that all of the following have occurred, as applicable: (1) The criminal case contains one or more criminal charges in which an acquittal was entered for all criminal charges, or in which all criminal charges were otherwise dismissed.
Since the enactment of Iowa Code section 901C.2(1), the Iowa Supreme
Court has been called upon to interpret such on three separate occasions. State
v. Doe, 943 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 2020) (Doe III); State v. Doe, 927 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa
2019) (Doe II); Doe I, 903 N.W.2d 347. Doe argues that, in light of the Iowa
Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, which held that expungement inquiries must be
conducted on a case-number-by-case-number basis, the State’s abandonment of
the charges in case A results in those charges being “otherwise dismissed” within
the meaning of section 901C.2(1)(a)(1). See Doe I, 903 N.W.2d at 354–55. The
State not only disagrees that the court’s treatment of the charges in the instant
case should be considered dismissal, it asserts that Doe never even received
charges in this case, since only a criminal complaint was filed prior to the “merger,”
not a trial information. 6
We reject the State’s argument that because no trial information was filed
prior to the transfer of the charges to case C Doe was never “charged” in the instant
case. Section 901C.2 forms part of Title XVI of the Iowa Code, definitions for which
are codified at section 801.4. Section 801.4(3) defines the word “charge” for
purposes of Title XVI: “‘Charge’ means a written statement presented to a court
accusing a person of the commission of a public offense, including but not limited
to a complaint, information, or indictment.” (Emphasis added). We conclude that
based on this definition a criminal complaint suffices to bring “charges” against a
defendant for purposes of section 901C.2. The complaints filed by Indianola Police
Officer Sher alleging Doe committed forgery in violation of Iowa Code section
715A.2 (2009) suffice to have brought “charges” against Doe within the meaning
of that word as used in section 901C.2 (2019).
We next turn to consider the practical effect of the district court’s July 21,
2011 order “merging” three cases under the number of the omnibus case.
Following the order, the State never moved to dismiss or further prosecuted the
instant case. The case was essentially closed by the court’s order “merging” the
cases. Doe motioned for expungement, filing her motion just weeks shy of nine
years after the court’s “merging” order. Cases A, B, and C remain searchable
under Doe’s true name on the Iowa’s public court records database, available at
the web address iowacourts.state.ia.us. The “Disposition Status” of cases A and
B are listed as “TRANSFERRED.” In case A, the two charges for forgery, a class
“D” felony, have the “adjudication” designation of “not filed.”
Thus, although the State’s “Application to Merge” motion and the court’s
order granting that motion both used the term “merger,” the use of the term 7
“merger” does not precisely reflect the reality of the court order’s effect. The
consequence of the order was an amendment of case C’s trial information adding
several counts of forgery and the application of the designation “transferred” to
cases A and B. The charges in cases A and B are still visible under their original
case numbers with an “adjudication” status of “not filed,” and the case numbers
are still searchable.
We now consider the question of statutory interpretation presented on
appeal, one of first impression. Does the transfer of charges from one case to
another—an action which may alternatively be called an amendment, modification,
or merger—result in those charges being “otherwise dismissed” from the transferor
case for purposes of section 901C.2? We hold that such a transfer results in the
charges in the transferor case being “otherwise dismissed” for purposes of section
901C.2.
At the outset, we recognize that section 901C.2 “has the patina of prior
judicial interpretation.” Doe III, 943 N.W.2d at 612. In Doe I, 903 N.W.2d at 351,
the Iowa Supreme Court considered the very subparagraph disputed in this
appeal, section 901C.2(1)(a)(1). Calling the provision, “not a model of precise
drafting,” the court summed it up thusly: “[section 901C.2(1)(a)(1)] says that the
record of a case shall be expunged only if ‘an acquittal was entered for all criminal
charges, or . . . all criminal charges were otherwise dismissed.’” Doe I, 903 N.W.2d
at 351 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 901C.2(1)(a)(1)).
The first question in interpreting a statute is whether the provision contains
an ambiguity. Id. “A statute is ambiguous ‘if reasonable minds can disagree on
the meaning of particular words or the statute as a whole.’” State v. Nall, 894 8
N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. McIver, 858 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa
2015)). “Ambiguity may arise not only from words themselves but ‘from the general
scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.’” Young v.
Iowa City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 934 N.W.2d 595, 604 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Carolan v.
Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996)). “If a statute is ambiguous we may look to
the legislative history, the object to be accomplished, the evils to be remedied, and
the purpose for which the statute was enacted.” In re G.J.A., 547 N.W.2d 3, 6
(Iowa 1996); see Iowa Code § 4.6. We conclude the phrase “all criminal charges
were otherwise dismissed” may reasonably be construed to mean that the latter
part of section 901C.2(1)(a)(1) is met either by only strict dismissal or by the
situation presented here, where a case’s criminal charges are transferred to a
different case and the transferor case is abandoned.
In determining the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue, we take into consideration the language’s relationship to other provisions of the same statute and other provisions of related statutes. See Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language . . . .”); Doe [I], 903 N.W.2d at 351 (stating we consider the “relevant language, read in the context of the entire statute”). If the “text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, we will not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute or resort to rules of construction.” In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1996); see State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 2017) (“If the language is unambiguous, our inquiry stops there.”). If the language of the statute is ambiguous or vague, we “may resort to other tools of statutory interpretation.” Doe [I], 903 N.W.2d at 351.
Doe III, 943 N.W.2d at 610.
“We seek to advance, rather than defeat, the purpose of the statute.”
Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 447 (Iowa 2016). The Iowa Supreme Court
has discussed the purpose of chapter 901C at length: 9
[A] driving concern behind chapter 901C was that a member of the general public—such as an employer doing an informal background check—could access our computerized docket and potentially draw inappropriate inferences from the mere presence of a criminal file relating to an individual, even though the criminal charges were dismissed or the individual was acquitted. This same member of the general public, though, would not likely be familiar with the ins and outs of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, if two separate case files show up in a records search, such as AGIN****** and SMSM******, this hypothetical member of the public might well conclude that the dismissed domestic abuse assault charge in SMSM****** related to a different incident, not the same incident as to which the defendant entered a guilty plea in AGIN******. In other words, instead of being necessary to give the public the full picture of an alleged criminal incident that resulted in a conviction, disclosure of a separate numbered legal proceeding involving a simple misdemeanor could instead give the public the misimpression that the defendant was involved in another alleged criminal incident—a misimpression we presume the legislature wanted to avoid. If the public is likely to assume the existence of an additional alleged criminal incident whenever the public records show an additional criminal proceeding, then Doe’s interpretation of the statute does a better job of avoiding undue stigma.
Doe I, 903 N.W.2d at 354. In this statement, the court discerned the legislature’s
concern that members of the general public may have “misimpression[s]” or “draw
inappropriate inferences” from “separate numbered legal proceeding[s],” where
one or more of those separately numbered proceedings saw the criminal charges
dismissed or the individual acquitted. See id.
Additionally, the Doe I court noted that the expungement legislation now
codified at chapter 901C originally contained language pertaining to related cases
that might be relevant here and which required that:
“(1) the defendant has not been charged with a crime in a related case”; and “(2) if the defendant was charged with a crime in one or more related cases, no charges are pending in a related case, the defendant has not been convicted of a crime in a related case, and the dismissal of the case was not part of a plea bargain.” S.F. 385, 86th G.A., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2015) (introduced). 10
Id. at 352. However, the court found informative that this language was ultimately
removed by legislative amendment. Id. at 352–53 (citing House Amendment 1176
to S.F. 385, 86th G.A., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2015)).
The question before the Doe I court was whether the term “case” in section
901C.2(1)(a)(1) referred to either a numbered legal proceeding or to “all the
charges arising out of a single transaction or set of circumstances.” Id. at 351.
The court determined the former interpretation was correct. Id. at 354–55. In so
holding, the court cautioned that any interpretation “must apply across the board”
and noted that the “one case per case number” interpretation it adopted “does a
better job of avoiding undue stigma.” Id. at 353–54. The court contrasted its
decision with states that adopt a “factual-relatedness” test and found it was not
unfair to deprive the public of information regarding a dismissed case factually
related to the charge on which the defendant was ultimately convicted. Id. at 354.
Following the decision of Doe I, our interpretation of the portion of the
statute here at issue is guided by the supreme court’s explanation that
expungement inquiries are conducted on a case-number-by-case-number basis.
We review a district court’s order denying expungement by considering only the
case number in which the motion was filed. However, the Doe I decision did not
evaluate the phrase “otherwise dismissed,” nor has the legislature defined it.
Therefore, with respect to a determination of the phrase’s meaning, we “refer to
prior decisions of this court and others, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and
common usage” to aid in our inquiry. See Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd., 822 N.W.2d
511, 516 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569,
571 (Iowa 2002)). 11
In surveying other states’ expungement statutes, we have found only the
language of Virginia’s statute to be similar to Iowa’s. See Va. Code § 19.2-
392.2(a)(1), (2) (2020). Under the Virginia Code, a person may file a petition
requesting expungement if he or she was acquitted, a nolle prosequi was taken,
“or the charge is otherwise dismissed.” Id.
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered the phrase “otherwise
dismissed” in Dressner v. Commonwealth, 736 S.E.2d 735, 736–38 (Va. 2013);
see also A.R.A. v. Commonwealth, 809 S.E.2d 660, 662–63 (Va. 2018). In
Dressner, the court took up the question of whether an amendment of a charge to
a “separate and unrelated charge” amounted to the former charge being “otherwise
dismissed” for the purposes of Virginia’s expungement statute. 736 S.E.2d at 736–
37. The court answered the question in the affirmative, holding “that when a
criminal charge is amended to a separate and unrelated charge, and the elements
of the amended charge are not subsumed within the original charge, the petitioner
occupies ‘the status of innocent’ with respect to the original charge.” A.R.A., 809
S.E.2d at 662 (explaining the holding of Dressner). The court’s interpretation of
“otherwise dismissed” was broad enough to encompass a situation in which a
charge was functionally, although not explicitly, dismissed.
Interpreting the phrase “otherwise dismissed” to include functional
dismissals is in accord with the broad definition of the word “otherwise.” Otherwise,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The term otherwise tends to be quite
broad in scope.”). Included among the word’s definitions are: “1. In a different way;
in another manner”; “2. By other causes or means”; and “3. In other conditions or
circumstances.” Id. The term should be interpreted according to its ordinary 12
meaning. See State v. Davis, 922 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019) (“We give words
their ordinary meaning absent legislative definition.”). We think the modification of
“dismissed” by “otherwise” allows for cases such as the instant appeal in which a
case number becomes functionally dismissed.
Our conclusion is buttressed by an examination of other states’
expungement statutes. Several states use more specific language than that found
in section 901C.2(1)(a)(1). See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)
(West 2019) (“dismissed or quashed”); see also Ala. Code § 15-27-1(a)(1), (4)
(2019) (allowing expungement where “the charge is dismissed with prejudice” or
“dismissed without prejudice . . . has not been refiled, and the person has not
been convicted of any other . . . crime” within a given time period).
Similarly, a few states give thorough lists of the instances in which
expungement may be granted. See Fla. Stat. § 943.0585(1)(b) (2019) (“An
indictment, information, or other charging document was filed or issued in the case
giving rise to the criminal history record, was dismissed or nolle prosequi by the
state attorney or statewide prosecutor, or was dismissed by a court of competent
jurisdiction or a judgment of acquittal was rendered by a judge, or a verdict of not
guilty was rendered by a judge or jury.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.105 (“1. If the person
arrested is charged but the case is subsequently nolle prossed, dismissed, or the
accused is found not guilty or imposition of sentence is suspended in the court in
which the action is prosecuted, official records pertaining to the case shall
thereafter be closed records when such case is finally terminated except as
provided in subsection 2 of this section and section 610.120 and except that the 13
court's judgment or order or the final action taken by the prosecutor in such matters
may be accessed.”).
Three states specify that a defendant may expunge a case where no
disposition has been reached. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-57(2) (West 2019) (“Upon
petition therefor, the court shall expunge the record of any case in which an arrest
was made, the person arrested was released and the case was dismissed or the
charges were dropped, there was no disposition of such case, or the person was
found not guilty at trial.” (emphasis added)); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:5(II-a)(a)
(2018) (“For an offense disposed of on or after January 1, 2019, any person whose
arrest has resulted in a finding of not guilty on all charges that resulted from the
arrest, or whose case was dismissed or not prosecuted, shall have the arrest
record and court record annulled[.]” (emphasis added)); 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 9122(a) (West 2019) (“Criminal history record information shall
be expunged in a specific criminal proceeding when: (1) no disposition has been
received or, upon request for criminal history record information, no disposition
has been recorded in the repository within 18 months after the date of arrest and
the court of proper jurisdiction certifies to the director of the repository that no
disposition is available and no action is pending. Expungement shall not occur
until the certification from the court is received and the director of the repository
authorizes such expungement[.]). The statutes of these three states lend support
to the notion that by using broad language in section 901C.2 the Iowa Legislature
could have contemplated that cases such as the one here on appeal would satisfy
the section’s broad language. In case A, the “disposition” of the case is listed as
“transferred.” 14
We find further support for the appellant’s urged interpretation by examining
the practical results of the two interpretations. Although we are to observe “a strict
rule of ‘one case per case number’” when reviewing expungement cases, Doe I,
903 N.W.2d at 353, we may consider “[t]he consequences of a particular
construction” when interpreting an ambiguous statute. Iowa Code § 4.6(5).
In considering the consequences of adopting either the appellant’s or the
State’s proposed interpretations, we note that the “merger” of three cases under
one case number left behind three publicly searchable case numbers, two of which
were defunct. These three case numbers exist despite the court’s granting of a
motion to “merge” based on a determination that the cases originated from “a
common scheme or plan.” See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.6(1).
It is unclear what precisely happened to Doe’s charges from case A. Case
C had four charges prior to the “merger,” and after the “merger” Doe pleaded guilty
to counts I–III of case C. There is discord between the calendar dates of the counts
listed on the trial information and the counts as reflected in the public database.
Furthermore, the trial information only charged six counts, even though the
“merger” applied to seven total counts. Thus, presuming at least one of the
charges from case A made it onto the trial information in case C, we cannot discern
whether that case was one to which Doe pleaded guilty, and neither can the parties
tell us this information.
Because the State may not always seek to consolidate, the State’s
proposed interpretation could lead to uneven availability of expungement for
defendants since defendants who have charges in one case dismissed as a result
of a plea bargain in another case can take advantage of expungement where a 15
similarly situated defendant could not if a motion to “merge” or “consolidate” had
been granted in his or her cases. Although in its routing statement the State
asserts “the resolution of [this] case is unlikely to affect a wide swath of
defendants,” we do not think consolidations such as the one here are so rare as to
mitigate the concerns surrounding the State’s interpretation.
Additionally, were we to adopt the State’s position, even defendants who
were never convicted of any crime in the transferee case would be unable to
expunge a transferor case where the transferred charges were dismissed upon
reaching the transferee case. If we were to hold that the instant case cannot be
expunged because the charges, by virtue of their “transfer,” were not dismissed,
then a defendant who achieved dismissal of all claims would be able to expunge
the transferee case in its entirety but not the transferor case, because the charges
in the transferor case were not dismissed. This would result in a case being visible
to the public even if all charges were dismissed and expunged in a separate file.
No clear public policy militates in favor of the State’s position. The State’s
interest in retaining public access to case A is at a low ebb considering that the
case’s former charges are publicly viewable in case C. By allowing for the
expungement of the now-empty case A, we further the purpose behind chapter
901C of limiting the ability of the public to draw inappropriate inferences from
disclosure of multiple separate numbered legal proceedings. See Doe I, 903
N.W.2d at 324.
Conclusion
“Generally, we try to interpret statutes so they are reasonable and
workable.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 889 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2017). In the Iowa 16
Supreme Court’s 2017 decision interpreting section 901C.2(1)(a)(1), the court
adopted “[a] strict rule of ‘one case per case number’” that it said could “be applied
predictably, quickly, and in a ministerial way.” Doe I, 903 N.W.2d at 353. Today,
we hold that the phrase “otherwise dismissed” in section 901C.2(1)(a)(1)
encompasses the situation in which a case number becomes inactive because all
charges have been “transferred” to another case number. This interpretation
maintains ministerial efficiency and “does a better job of avoiding undue stigma”
than its alternative. See id. at 354. We remand with instructions to grant Doe’s
motion for expungement.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.