IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-2029 Filed February 19, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES KELLY CORRON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Clinton R. Boddicker,
Judge.
James Corron appeals from his conviction for delivery of less than five
grams of methamphetamine as a habitual offender. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
James Corron appeals from his conviction for delivery of less than five
grams of methamphetamine as a habitual offender under Iowa Code sections
124.401(1)(c)(6), 902.8, and 902.9 (2022). Corron’s sole claim on appeal is that
the district court improperly denied his mid-trial request for substitution of counsel
because of a “complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship,” giving rise
to a “personal conflict of interest” with his defense counsel. We reject Corron’s
claim on appeal and affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In June 2021, Corron purchased methamphetamine from a confidential
informant. The State charged Corron with delivery of less than five grams of
methamphetamine as a habitual offender. Corron’s trial commenced in September
2023. On the second day of trial, Corron requested a new attorney.
The district court conducted a hearing on the request. Corron stated that
he was displeased with counsel’s representation because counsel had offered
multiple times to withdraw from the case and the two had reached an impasse
about several aspects of trial strategy. Noting Corron had changed counsel
several times and that they were in the middle of the trial, the district court offered
Corron a choice between continuing with his current counsel or representing
himself. When Corron declined to represent himself, the district court overruled
the motion, stating, “To the extent that there was a motion for change of counsel,
that motion will be overruled.” The trial proceeded, and Corron was convicted as
charged. He was sentenced to an indeterminate fifteen-year term of incarceration
with a mandatory minimum period of three years. Corron appeals. 3
II. Standard of Review
We review a ruling on a motion for substitution of counsel for abuse of
discretion. See State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 2004). “We will only
find an abuse of discretion if the trial court exercised its discretion on clearly
untenable or unreasonable grounds.” State v. Petty, 925 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Iowa
2019).
III. Analysis
Corron argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for substitute counsel. Corron alleges a complete breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship and asserts the breakdown was so great as to cause a “personal
conflict of interest” between himself and his defense counsel.1 But the right to
counsel “does not guarantee a ‘meaningful relationship between an accused and
his counsel.’” State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 744, 778 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).
“The grounds to justify the appointment of substitute counsel include a conflict of
interest, irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication
between the defendant and counsel.” State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 506 (Iowa
2007).
Additionally, to succeed on a challenge to a ruling on a motion for substitute
counsel, “[a] defendant must ordinarily show prejudice, unless . . . counsel has a
1 The State argues that Corron’s request for new counsel on the second day of
trial did not constitute a motion, and thus the district court’s statement that “to the extent there was a motion for change of counsel, that motion will be overruled” shows error was not preserved. Despite the lack of a formal motion, this court will liberally construe statements and writings made by a defendant when they intend to request substitute counsel. See State v. Leonhard, No. 16-1318, 2017 WL 3279147, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2017). 4
conflict of interest.” State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1995). The later
the request for substitution of counsel is made, the more heavily it weighs against
the defendant. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d at 506.
Corron does not address an irreconcilable conflict, so we address only
whether there was a complete breakdown in communication or a conflict of
interest.
A. Complete Breakdown in Communication
To prove a complete breakdown in communication, Corron must show that
contact with his attorney was so minimal that it was impossible for the two to
meaningfully communicate. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 752. We conclude Corron has
not made such a showing. See State v. Awino, No. 23-0928, 2024 WL 4220580,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2024).
Corron and defense counsel disagreed about various aspects of pre-trial
and trial strategy. The record reflects that Corron asked for the deposition of a
certain witness, which counsel determined would not help Corron’s defense. And
Corron equivocated on counsel’s advice to take a plea bargain from the State.
Despite these disagreements, defense counsel also created a strategy for Corron
if he chose to proceed to trial. In a communication between the two just before
trial, defense counsel informed Corron that he would still “make sure [Corron] get[s]
a fair jury” if he declined the plea bargain. Counsel stated that despite not taking
the deposition of Corron’s challenged witness, counsel advised of Corron’s option
to “take the stand . . . so we could discuss it with him as a witness.” And counsel
confirmed his position that “he can do a good job” in representing Corron if he
continued representation. After the hearing on Corron’s request, the court 5
recessed and independently analyzed the correspondence between Corron and
defense counsel. In reviewing emails between the two, the district court found
discussion regarding pleas, evidence, possible defenses, and witness credibility.
Corron’s arguments are best summarized as disagreeing with the defense
counsel’s methods rather than being unable to communicate. See State v.
Hagenow, No. 22-1958, 2024 WL 2042137, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024)
(“Most importantly, [the defendant’s] arguments lack merit and suggest more
generally a distaste for his attorney’s methods than a real communication issue.”).
Although Corron and defense counsel’s emails show disagreements about trial
strategy and some general distaste for one another, “general frustration and
dissatisfaction with counsel” is not enough to establish a communication
breakdown. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d at 506. Corron has not demonstrated a complete
breakdown in communication.
B. Conflict of Interest
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-2029 Filed February 19, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES KELLY CORRON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Clinton R. Boddicker,
Judge.
James Corron appeals from his conviction for delivery of less than five
grams of methamphetamine as a habitual offender. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
James Corron appeals from his conviction for delivery of less than five
grams of methamphetamine as a habitual offender under Iowa Code sections
124.401(1)(c)(6), 902.8, and 902.9 (2022). Corron’s sole claim on appeal is that
the district court improperly denied his mid-trial request for substitution of counsel
because of a “complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship,” giving rise
to a “personal conflict of interest” with his defense counsel. We reject Corron’s
claim on appeal and affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In June 2021, Corron purchased methamphetamine from a confidential
informant. The State charged Corron with delivery of less than five grams of
methamphetamine as a habitual offender. Corron’s trial commenced in September
2023. On the second day of trial, Corron requested a new attorney.
The district court conducted a hearing on the request. Corron stated that
he was displeased with counsel’s representation because counsel had offered
multiple times to withdraw from the case and the two had reached an impasse
about several aspects of trial strategy. Noting Corron had changed counsel
several times and that they were in the middle of the trial, the district court offered
Corron a choice between continuing with his current counsel or representing
himself. When Corron declined to represent himself, the district court overruled
the motion, stating, “To the extent that there was a motion for change of counsel,
that motion will be overruled.” The trial proceeded, and Corron was convicted as
charged. He was sentenced to an indeterminate fifteen-year term of incarceration
with a mandatory minimum period of three years. Corron appeals. 3
II. Standard of Review
We review a ruling on a motion for substitution of counsel for abuse of
discretion. See State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 2004). “We will only
find an abuse of discretion if the trial court exercised its discretion on clearly
untenable or unreasonable grounds.” State v. Petty, 925 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Iowa
2019).
III. Analysis
Corron argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for substitute counsel. Corron alleges a complete breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship and asserts the breakdown was so great as to cause a “personal
conflict of interest” between himself and his defense counsel.1 But the right to
counsel “does not guarantee a ‘meaningful relationship between an accused and
his counsel.’” State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 744, 778 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).
“The grounds to justify the appointment of substitute counsel include a conflict of
interest, irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication
between the defendant and counsel.” State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 506 (Iowa
2007).
Additionally, to succeed on a challenge to a ruling on a motion for substitute
counsel, “[a] defendant must ordinarily show prejudice, unless . . . counsel has a
1 The State argues that Corron’s request for new counsel on the second day of
trial did not constitute a motion, and thus the district court’s statement that “to the extent there was a motion for change of counsel, that motion will be overruled” shows error was not preserved. Despite the lack of a formal motion, this court will liberally construe statements and writings made by a defendant when they intend to request substitute counsel. See State v. Leonhard, No. 16-1318, 2017 WL 3279147, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2017). 4
conflict of interest.” State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1995). The later
the request for substitution of counsel is made, the more heavily it weighs against
the defendant. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d at 506.
Corron does not address an irreconcilable conflict, so we address only
whether there was a complete breakdown in communication or a conflict of
interest.
A. Complete Breakdown in Communication
To prove a complete breakdown in communication, Corron must show that
contact with his attorney was so minimal that it was impossible for the two to
meaningfully communicate. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 752. We conclude Corron has
not made such a showing. See State v. Awino, No. 23-0928, 2024 WL 4220580,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2024).
Corron and defense counsel disagreed about various aspects of pre-trial
and trial strategy. The record reflects that Corron asked for the deposition of a
certain witness, which counsel determined would not help Corron’s defense. And
Corron equivocated on counsel’s advice to take a plea bargain from the State.
Despite these disagreements, defense counsel also created a strategy for Corron
if he chose to proceed to trial. In a communication between the two just before
trial, defense counsel informed Corron that he would still “make sure [Corron] get[s]
a fair jury” if he declined the plea bargain. Counsel stated that despite not taking
the deposition of Corron’s challenged witness, counsel advised of Corron’s option
to “take the stand . . . so we could discuss it with him as a witness.” And counsel
confirmed his position that “he can do a good job” in representing Corron if he
continued representation. After the hearing on Corron’s request, the court 5
recessed and independently analyzed the correspondence between Corron and
defense counsel. In reviewing emails between the two, the district court found
discussion regarding pleas, evidence, possible defenses, and witness credibility.
Corron’s arguments are best summarized as disagreeing with the defense
counsel’s methods rather than being unable to communicate. See State v.
Hagenow, No. 22-1958, 2024 WL 2042137, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024)
(“Most importantly, [the defendant’s] arguments lack merit and suggest more
generally a distaste for his attorney’s methods than a real communication issue.”).
Although Corron and defense counsel’s emails show disagreements about trial
strategy and some general distaste for one another, “general frustration and
dissatisfaction with counsel” is not enough to establish a communication
breakdown. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d at 506. Corron has not demonstrated a complete
breakdown in communication.
B. Conflict of Interest
To support his claim of a conflict of interest, Corron points to statements
made by defense counsel before trial, including, “I don’t need your rudeness; and
there were more deserving clients whose cases needed my attention” and, “If you
don’t want to have me depart your defense, then I expect you to take a respectful
tone when you are talking to me.” Corron also alleges that defense counsel lied
to him. The sum of these incidences, Corron claims, rises to a conflict of interest,
which, if true, would exempt Corron from the need to establish prejudice. See
Brooks, 540 N.W.2d at 272.
Corron likens this allegation to a defendant filing an ethical complaint
against his own attorney, such as in Connor v. State, 630 N.W.2d 846, 847–49 6
(Iowa Ct. App. 2001). But the record suggests that Corron either misspoke or later
recanted his initial accusation. While Corron initially claimed defense counsel lied
to him by “sa[ying] he was going to [schedule a deposition of Corron’s challenged
witness],” Corron seemed satisfied with the court’s recollection that the record
showed Corron and defense counsel had discussed the fact that a decision on
whether to take depositions would be made after Corron decided whether or not
he was taking a plea deal.. In short, while there were differences of opinion
between Corron and defense counsel, “conflict” is not a “conflict of interest.” See
Awino, 2024 WL 4220580, at *4 n.3.
IV. Conclusion
We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Corron’s mid-
trial request for substitute counsel, as Corron failed to establish a complete
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship or a conflict of interest.2 We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
2 Because we have determined that Corron has not demonstrated either a complete breakdown in communication or a conflict of interest, we do not address prejudice.