State of Iowa v. Elijah Allen Covington

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-1790

Filed September 2, 2026

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State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

Elijah Allen Covington, Defendant–Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, The Honorable Patrick R. Grady, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Des C. Leehey, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.

Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

This appeal reduces to a single exchange at sentencing. After both sides argued their sentencing positions, the district court turned to Elijah Covington and said, “First, I want to address the defendant. And does the defendant have anything he wishes to say?” Through counsel, Covington answered that he was “good with” what had been said on his behalf and later declined a further invitation before sentence was pronounced. That is allocution. Because Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(3) demands no magic words—only that the court personally afford the defendant an opportunity to speak in mitigation—and substantial compliance satisfies it, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The State charged Covington by amended trial information alleging six offenses, each involving the same child, M.S., and each occurring at the same Cedar Rapids address: three counts of lascivious acts with a child (counts I, II, and IV), one count of sexual abuse in the second degree (count III), one count of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse (count V), and one count of indecent contact with a child (count VI). Together, the counts spanned from February 2018 through December 2021.

The minutes of testimony described repeated sexual contact between Covington and M.S., who lived in the same household. During the earlier charged period, M.S. was between eight and ten years old and Covington was sixteen or seventeen. During the later period, M.S. was eleven or twelve and Covington was nineteen. The minutes alleged that the later conduct included sexual intercourse.

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The parties reached a plea agreement under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10. On June 12, 2025, Covington appeared with his two attorneys and entered Alford pleas1 to counts I, II, IV, V, and VI. The State agreed to dismiss count III—a charge for sexual abuse in the second degree, the only class “B” felony among the charges. The agreement fixed the total term of incarceration at an indeterminate period not to exceed twenty-two years and left open only whether that term would be imposed or suspended. The district court confirmed with Covington that the sentencing judge would decide nothing else. Covington acknowledged that a jury would likely convict him if the witnesses testified as the minutes described. The court found the minutes established a factual basis, accepted the pleas as knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and ordered a presentence investigation report.

Sentencing occurred before the same judge who had taken the pleas.

Defense counsel confirmed he had reviewed the presentence investigation report with Covington and offered a single correction to it. The State recommended that the court impose the twenty-two-year term, emphasizing the span of years over which the conduct continued and the failure of a prior juvenile sex offender treatment program to prevent Covington from reoffending.

The defense called the probation officer who had prepared the presentence investigation report. He testified that he had prepared such reports for more than thirty years, that the Iowa risk revised assessment scored Covington low for risk of future violence and very low for risk of future victimization, and that sex offender treatment is available both in

1 Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970), a defendant may enter a plea accepting a conviction while still maintaining their innocence on the understanding that the State’s evidence would likely persuade a jury of their guilt.

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prison and in the community. He also confirmed that the Iowa Department of Corrections recommended a prison term. Covington filed seven letters written on his behalf by family members and others, and counsel argued at length that the court should suspend the sentence. When counsel finished, the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: [Prosecutor], do we have victim impact statements? Excuse me, I’m sorry. I got out of order here.

First, I want to address the defendant.

And does the defendant have anything he wishes to say before the impact statements?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I believe Mr. Covington is good with what we have spoken on his behalf for him.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Now, [Prosecutor], you may proceed.

Three people then delivered victim impact statements: M.S.’s father, her mother, and M.S. herself. Their statements occupy roughly eight pages of the sentencing transcript. Covington said nothing during this portion of the hearing. After the last statement, and immediately before the court pronounced judgment and sentence, this exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Thank you. [Prosecutor], anyone else?

PROSECUTOR: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from the defense?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, Your Honor.

The court then explained its decision. It observed that cases of this kind are difficult because so much is at stake for everyone involved. It recounted having heard from the attorneys, from M.S., and from her family,

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and having reviewed the presentence investigation report, the letters submitted on Covington’s behalf, and the rest of the court file. Two considerations proved decisive: the length of time over which the conduct continued, and the earlier attempt at rehabilitation in the juvenile system.

The court imposed indeterminate terms not to exceed ten years on each of counts I, II, and IV, and not to exceed two years on each of counts V and VI. It ordered the terms on counts I, II, and V served consecutively, and the terms on counts IV and VI served concurrently with one another and with the rest, for a total term not to exceed twenty-two years. The court imposed the special sentence under Iowa Code section 903B.1, for life on counts I, II, and IV and for ten years on counts V and VI. 2 It also imposed fines and surcharges, suspending the fines on counts I, II, and IV; waived category “B” restitution on the State’s concession that Covington lacked the reasonable ability to pay; entered a five-year no-contact order; and advised Covington of his appeal rights. No part of the term of incarceration was suspended.

Covington appeals and raises one issue: that the district court failed to afford him the right of allocution guaranteed by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(3). He asks that we vacate his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

2 On December 9, 2025, the district court entered an order nunc pro tunc amending the fourth paragraph on page two of the judgment entry. The amendment conformed the written special sentence provisions to the court’s oral pronouncement, so that the lifetime special sentence attaches to counts I, II, and IV and the ten-year special sentence to counts V and VI. Every other provision of the sentencing order, including the twenty-two-year term of incarceration, remained unchanged.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

DISCUSSION

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(3) requires the sentencing court to “[a]ddress the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to make a statement or present any information to mitigate the defendant’s sentence.” Substantial compliance with the rule is sufficient. State v. Jackson- Douglass, 970 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2022). “In affording the defendant the right of allocution, the district court need not utter any particular words or phrases. . . . The important thing is whether the defendant is given an opportunity to volunteer any information helpful to the defendant’s cause.” State v. Davis, 969 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).

The record shows that opportunity was afforded. After both attorneys argued their sentencing positions, the court announced, “First, I want to address the defendant,” and asked whether “the defendant ha[d] anything he wishes to say.” That is a personal, open-ended invitation materially the same as the questions Iowa courts have repeatedly approved. See Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W.2d at 258; Craig, 562 N.W.2d at 637. Covington’s objection to the third-person phrasing reflects the ordinary formality of courtroom speech, not a redirection away from him, and demanding the precise second person is the “hyperliteral reading” our supreme court has rejected. Jackson- Douglass, 970 N.W.2d at 258. His argument that the court narrowed the inquiry by inviting him to speak “before the impact statements” is untenable: he could not have understood himself invited to comment on statements not yet made.

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That defense counsel answered for Covington does not establish a violation. On nearly identical facts, we held that where the court “expressly offered the chance to make a statement of allocution” and the defendant “gave a response through his attorney declining that opportunity,” the rule was satisfied—because “nothing in [case law] or the text of rule 2.23(2)(d)(3) requires that [the defendant] himself decline rather than speaking through his attorney.” State v. Childress, No. 24-1833, 2025 WL 2538694, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2025). So too here: the court offered Covington the chance to speak, and through counsel. He declined, indicating he was “good with” what counsel had presented.

Covington’s opposing authorities are distinguishable because each involved a record with no personal invitation to speak on punishment. In State v. Yankoon the court aimed its question only at defense counsel, so the defendant “was not directly addressed by the court.” No. 11-0500, 2011 WL 6740210, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011). In State v. Millsap the court posed only a single “are you ready to be sentenced” interrogative with no response and no “process of engagement.” 547 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). And in State v. Lumadue, the defendant was afforded no opportunity to address punishment at all. 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001). Here, by contrast, the court named and personally addressed Covington after a full sentencing colloquy, and then—immediately before pronouncing sentence— asked once more, “Anything else from the defense?”

Taken together, the two exchanges establish that Covington was given the opportunity the rule guarantees. The district court substantially complied with rule 2.23(2)(d)(3), and the sentence should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.