State of Iowa v. Douglas Neal Warburton

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 24-1143
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–1143

Submitted December 16, 2025—Filed January 30, 2026

State of Iowa,

Appellee,

vs.

Douglas Neal Warburton,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Gregg R.

Rosenbladt, judge.

The defendant seeks further review of the court of appeals decision that it

lacked appellate jurisdiction to address the district court’s denial of defendant’s

motion for resentencing because the denial was not specifically identified in his

notice of appeal. Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated

in Part; District Court Judgment Affirmed.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Karmen Anderson, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee. 2

McDonald, Justice.

Douglas Warburton pleaded guilty to lascivious acts with a child, in

violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(a) (2023), and the district court sentenced

him to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years plus a special sentence of

lifetime supervision. Warburton contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing

hearing because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider at

the time of sentencing a later-filed statement allegedly written by the victim that

advocated for a probationary sentence. We affirm.

I.

In June of 2023, the State charged Warburton in Worth County with

sexual abuse in the second degree, lascivious acts with a child, sexual abuse in

the third degree, and indecent contact with a child arising out of the alleged

sexual abuse of his grandchild E.W. The State filed a separate case in Mitchell

County for acts of sexual abuse allegedly occurring in that county. The parties

entered into a plea agreement to resolve all of the charges in April 2024. The

defendant agreed to plead guilty to lascivious acts with a child in the Worth

County case by way of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), and the

State agreed to dismiss all remaining charges in both cases and adopt the

sentencing recommendation as contained in the presentence investigation report

(PSI).

The matter came on for a sentencing hearing on June 24. The prosecutor

informed the court that he had been in contact with the guardian ad litem

appointed for the child, and the guardian ad litem “indicated there is no victim

impact statement.” The department of correctional services prepared a PSI. The

PSI recommended incarceration for an indeterminate term not to exceed ten

years. The PSI noted that “[a]t the time of this report, a Victim Impact Statement 3

has not been received.” The defendant was given an opportunity to object to the

PSI, but he did not lodge any objection to it. He did note one factual item that

needed correction, and the district court made the correction. The defendant

then waived any motion to arrest judgment and confirmed there were no reasons

not to proceed with sentencing and judgment. The defendant called two

witnesses to testify on his behalf. The first was his son, E.W.’s father, and the

second was his daughter, E.W.’s aunt and legal guardian. Both testified that

Warburton, age sixty-six at the time of sentencing, was not a risk to the greater

community and should be placed on probation rather than incarcerated. The

defendant gave his allocution and argued for a probationary sentence. The

district court sentenced the defendant to incarceration and gave a robust

explanation for the sentencing decision. The district court filed its written

judgment and sentence later the same day.

The following day, on June 25th, Warburton moved for resentencing. In

the motion, Warburton claimed that E.W.’s guardian ad litem advised Warburton

that no one reached out to E.W. regarding a victim impact statement. The motion

claimed that E.W. provided Warburton with a written victim impact statement

after the sentencing hearing. Among other things, the undated statement

provided, “[Warburton] should be able to have his job back and be in our

community. I don’t think he should go to prison.” Warburton claimed that the

victim was entitled to make a statement to the court. Because the court was not

able to consider the victim’s statement at the time of sentencing, Warburton

argued, he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing where the court could hear

from the victim and consider her advocacy for a probationary sentence.

The prosecutor resisted Warburton’s motion. The prosecutor’s resistance

stated that, prior to sentencing, the victim advised that she did not wish to make 4

a statement. The resistance further stated that the written victim impact

statement was given to the prosecutor two days after the sentencing hearing. As

far as the prosecutor knew, “the victim impact statement was not in existence at

the time of sentencing.” The resistance further stated that if someone associated

with the case knew differently, they could advise the court of the same.

No one advised the court of anything different, and the district court

denied the motion. The district court explained that the defendant made no

objections to the PSI or the lack of victim impact statement at the time of

sentencing. The court noted that the victim impact statement “may have been

generated post-sentencing.” If the parties had requested a continuance to allow

the preparation and presentation of a victim impact statement, the court stated

it likely would have granted such a request; however, “no such request was

made.” The court concluded that “the defendant and perhaps defendant’s

supportive family members wish to have a second attempt at sentencing in order

to present additional information to the Court.” The court denied the defendant’s

second attempt at sentencing.

Two days after the district court denied the motion for resentencing,

Warburton filed a notice of appeal. Warburton raised two challenges to his

sentence. He first claimed that the district court abused its discretion in failing

to suspend his sentence and place him on probation. In particular, Warburton

argued that the district court placed undue weight on the PSI recommendation

and statements in the PSI and that the court did not properly balance all of the

other relevant factors. Warburton next claimed the district court abused its

discretion in denying his motion for resentencing, thereby disallowing the victim

to present an impact statement during a new sentencing hearing. 5

We transferred the case to the court of appeals. As to the first issue, the

court of appeals rejected Warburton’s challenge to the district court’s exercise of

discretion. As to the second issue, the court of appeals, at the State’s urging,

concluded that it did “not have jurisdiction to address the . . . issue because it

originates from a post-sentencing order from which Warburton did not appeal.”

The court explained that the notice of appeal specified that the appeal was from

the final judgment entered on June 24, 2024. The notice did not mention

Warburton’s motion for resentencing or the district court’s order denying the

motion. The court of appeals concluded that because Warburton did not file a

separate “notice of appeal disputing that order, [it did] not have jurisdiction to

consider challenges to it.”

We granted Warburton’s application for further review. On further review,

this court has the discretion to review any issues raised in the appeal. State v.

Hawkins, 27 N.W.3d 562, 567 (Iowa 2025). We exercise that discretion in this

case to address the court of appeals’ jurisdictional ruling and Warburton’s claim

regarding his request for resentencing. The court of appeals decision is final with

respect to Warburton’s challenge to the district court’s exercise of discretion.

II.

We first address the jurisdictional issue. An appeal is the right of the

defendant to have the actions of the district court reviewed by an appellate court.

Iowa Code § 814.1. A defendant convicted of a nonclass “A” criminal offense

following the entry of a guilty plea has an appeal as a matter of right only upon

establishing good cause to appeal. Id. § 814.6(1)(a)(3). Good cause means a

legally sufficient reason. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020). A

legally sufficient reason means a reason that could allow an appellate court to

provide the defendant some relief. State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 6

2021). We have held “that good cause exists to appeal from a conviction following

a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the

guilty plea.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105.

A defendant with an appeal as a matter of right invokes this court’s

appellate jurisdiction by timely filing a signed notice of appeal with the clerk of

the district court where the challenged order or orders were filed. See Iowa Rs.

App. P. 6.101(1)(b); 6.102(2); State v. Davis, 969 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 2022).

Jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to act. See State v. Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d

142, 144 (Iowa 2023). Once an appellate court has jurisdiction over a case, it

has jurisdiction over all of the issues presented in the case. Appellate courts have

jurisdiction over cases, not separate issues within a case. See State v. Wilbourn,

974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022) (“An appellate court either has jurisdiction over

a criminal appeal or it does not.”).

This court has jurisdiction over Warburton’s appeal and all of the issues

raised on appeal. Warburton challenges his discretionary sentence and

sentencing hearing and has thus established good cause to appeal as a matter

of right. “Once good cause is established under section 814.6(1)(a)(3) as to one

issue, we have jurisdiction over the entire appeal . . . .” Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d

at 146; see also Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66 (“Once a defendant crosses the good-

cause threshold as to one ground for appeal, the court has jurisdiction over the

appeal.”). This includes all issues raised in the appeal even if there are other

legal reasons why the court may not have the authority or ability to reach a

particular issue. See Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d at 146 (explaining the court had

jurisdiction over a criminal appeal even if other provisions of the Code limited

this court’s “authority with respect to specific issues raised in the appeal”); 7

Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66 (“We may lack authority to consider all issues, but

that is a different matter.”). The court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.

While this case, properly understood, does not present a question

regarding the acquisition of appellate jurisdiction over a case, it does present a

question regarding the scope of the issues and district court decisions available

for review within the case. The scope of issues and district court decisions

available for appellate review is framed by the content of the notice of appeal.

“The notice of appeal must specify the parties taking the appeal and the decree,

judgment, order, or part of the decree, judgment, or order appealed from.” Iowa

R. App. P. 6.102(2)(a). Appellate courts must “liberally construe notices of appeal

so as to preserve the right of review and, if possible, permit consideration of the

merits.” In re L.H., 890 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016).

The content of the notice of appeal in this case was sufficiently broad to

bring Warburton’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for

resentencing within the scope of appeal. The notice of appeal provided that “the

defendant hereby appeals from the final judgment entered on June 24, 2024,

and sentencing entered on June 24, 2024, and all adverse rulings therein.”

Warburton’s motion for resentencing challenged the validity of the sentencing

proceeding and the resultant final judgment. A motion that seeks to vacate a

final judgment and sentence based on an alleged error in the sentencing

proceeding is a direct challenge to the final judgment and sentence. The district

court’s denial of the motion is thus an adverse ruling affirming and inhering in

the final judgment and sentence. Because the notice of appeal expressly stated

it was an appeal from the judgment of conviction and “all adverse rulings

therein,” the notice was sufficient to bring the order denying the motion for

resentencing within the scope of our review. 8

It is true that in some circumstances a party must specifically identify a

postjudgment order in the notice of appeal to bring a challenge to the order

within the scope of appeal. It is also true that in some circumstances a party

must file a separate notice of appeal when the district court enters a

postjudgment order after one of the parties has filed a notice of appeal. These

rules apply, however, to postjudgment orders collateral to the judgment being

challenged on appeal. We have explained those rules in numerous cases, most

recently in State v. Smith, 17 N.W.3d 355, 363–64 (Iowa 2025) (holding that a

challenge to a postjudgment notice of firearm prohibition was collateral to and

not part of the judgment and sentence specifically identified in the notice of

appeal and was not “properly before us on direct appeal”). See, e.g., Den Hartog v.

City of Waterloo, 926 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2019) (stating the “failure to file a

separate notice of appeal” on a collateral matter “precludes our appellate

review”); State v. Letscher, 888 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 2016) (“Our rule is that

matters following the imposition of sentence are collateral and must be

addressed separately.”); Iowa State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Michel, 683 N.W.2d 95, 111

(Iowa 2004) (“The defendants failed to file a separate notice of appeal from the

district court’s post-judgment and post-appeal ruling on the bank’s motion for

attorney fees. Therefore, that issue is not before us.”); State v. Formaro, 638

N.W.2d 720, 727 (Iowa 2002) (holding that a postjudgment ruling on appeal bond

filed after the notice of appeal was “not properly before us on this appeal”

because it was collateral to the judgment identified in the notice of appeal); Bd.

of Water Works Trs. v. City of Des Moines, 469 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Iowa 1991)

(“Rulings deciding collateral and independent claims are separately

appealable . . . .”). As we explained in State v. Formaro, “rulings on collateral or

independent issues after final judgment are separately appealable as final 9

judgments. . . . A defendant cannot rely upon the notice of appeal from the

judgment and sentence of the district court” to bring a collateral issue to the

court’s attention. 638 N.W.2d at 727 (citation omitted).

These cases are inapplicable here, however. Warburton filed his notice of

appeal after the district court filed its order denying Warburton’s motion for

resentencing, and the district court’s order was an adverse ruling intertwined

with the judgment and sentence and not collateral thereto. To hold otherwise

would defeat the liberal rule of construction we give to notices of appeal. See

Hawkeye Sec. Ins. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972) (stating

that in reviewing “the sufficiency of the content of the notice,” we will entertain

an issue on appeal if the decision or issue can be fairly inferred from the notice

and the appellee has not been misled or prejudiced by the notice); Schrader v.

Sioux City, 167 N.W.2d 669, 672–73 (Iowa 1969) (holding the notice of appeal

will be deemed sufficient to bring an issue within the scope of appeal so long as

there is no doubt as to the identity of the proceeding, order, or judgment being

challenged on appeal).

III.

Having concluded that we have jurisdiction over this case and that

Warburton’s challenge to the sentencing hearing is within the scope of the appeal

as defined by the notice of appeal, we turn to the merits of Warburton’s

sentencing challenge. We readily conclude that the district court did not err or

abuse its discretion in denying Warburton’s motion for resentencing.

First, the defendant generally has no entitlement to a second sentencing.

June 24 was the date of Warburton’s sentencing, and it was the date when the

parties needed to present all relevant information and arguments to the court.

The Iowa Code offers a specific path for a defendant in a felony case to obtain 10

reconsideration of a sentence from the district court. See Iowa Code § 902.4.

Warburton seeks to open another path to reconsideration not authorized by the

legislature.

Second, this case highlights why there is no general entitlement to

resentencing. Like the district court, we conclude that the circumstances

indicate the alleged victim impact statement here was most likely generated after

sentencing. Warburton does not dispute this point. Nothing prevented

Warburton’s counsel from reaching out to the guardian ad litem before

sentencing. Warburton and his counsel had received notice that as of the date

of preparation of the PSI, there had been no victim impact statement. Allowing

postsentencing victim impact statements to be submitted presents certain risks,

including the risk that a defendant’s relatives or associates may have put

pressure on the victim after the original sentence had been ordered.

Third, even if the victim impact statement existed prior to the time of

sentencing and was an authentic statement but simply did not get filed by the

time of sentencing, the defendant lacks any right or standing to insist that the

victim be allowed to present a victim impact statement to the sentencing court

at the time of sentencing. Iowa Code section 915.21(1) provides that “[a] victim

may present a victim impact statement to the court.” As is apparent from the

text, the statute gives the victim a right to present a statement to the court, at

the victim’s discretion. See id. The victim is not required to give such a statement,

and the defendant cannot compel a victim to provide an impact statement. The

victim’s statutory right to be heard creates an entitlement for the victim; it does

not confer an entitlement upon the defendant to have the victim’s views

considered in mitigation. Consequently, any violation of the victim’s right to

make a statement to the sentencing court cannot serve as grounds for relief for 11

the defendant. See People v. Smith, 447 N.W.2d 847, 848 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)

(“Simply put, a violation of the Crime Victim’s Rights Act does not inure to the

benefit of the defendant.”).

IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part;

District Court Judgment Affirmed.