IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1514 Filed October 15, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DAJONISS DEPREE MORMAN-JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M.
Fangman, Judge.
A criminal defendant argues his due process rights were violated when the
district court denied his request for a transcript of the plea hearing and that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in arrest of judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SANDY, Judge.
DaJoniss Morman-Jenkins argues his due process rights were violated
when the district court denied his request for a transcript of the plea hearing. He
further argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in
arrest of judgment. Because the due process claim is being brought for the first
time on appeal, error was not preserved. And because Iowa Code section 814.6A
(2023) prohibits us from considering Morman-Jenkins’s pro se letter purportedly
requesting a motion in arrest of judgment, such claim also fails. Finally, because
the motion in arrest of judgment that was eventually filed by counsel was not
compliant with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(b), the court did not abuse
its discretion in not considering it.
I. Background Facts and Procedural Posture.
On the morning of December 10, 2023, police in Waterloo responded to a
shooting on Glenwood Street. The victim, identified as R.S., was found in his
vehicle suffering multiple gunshot wounds. Investigators reviewed residential
surveillance footage showing a white Chevrolet Avalanche arriving at the scene.
Three men, later identified as Morman-Jenkins, Marqwane Smith, and Karondius
Kelly, exited the vehicle. The video depicted Morman-Jenkins confronting R.S. in
the driver’s seat, reaching inside the vehicle, physically assaulting him, and
ultimately firing several rounds. Afterward, the group rifled through the victim’s
pockets and took his belongings before fleeing.
The minutes of testimony prepared by the State indicated that numerous
witnesses—including the victim, bystanders, police officers, and medical
professionals—would corroborate the events, with the surveillance recording 3
providing critical corroboration of Morman-Jenkins’s role as the shooter. The State
relied on this evidence to support charges of first-degree robbery, first-degree
burglary, willful injury causing serious injury, and attempted murder.
In January and February 2024, prosecutors filed trial informations in two
separate cases. The first charged Morman-Jenkins with robbery, burglary, and
willful injury. The second, filed shortly after, charged him with attempted murder.
In March the district court consolidated the cases, determining they arose from the
same occurrence.
On May 21, Morman-Jenkins appeared with court-appointed counsel for a
plea hearing. Under a negotiated agreement, he entered guilty pleas to all
charges. During the hearing, he confirmed his understanding of the rights he was
giving up and, under an Alford framework,1 acknowledged that the evidence would
likely convince a jury of his guilt. The court accepted the pleas after finding a
factual basis and properly advised him of the requirement to file a motion in arrest
of judgment within forty-five days of the hearing and no later than five days before
sentencing.
The court initially scheduled sentencing for July 25. Before that date, on
June 27, Morman-Jenkins sent a handwritten letter to the court stating he rejected
the plea agreement, claimed dissatisfaction with his attorney, and requested new
counsel. Counsel later moved to withdraw, and following an August 12 hearing,
the court granted the motion and appointed replacement counsel. At that hearing,
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“[A]n express admission of
guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty.”). 4
the district court informed Morman-Jenkins that his guilty pleas remained binding
because more than forty-five days had passed since entry.
New counsel entered an appearance in mid-August and, on September 10,
filed a formal motion in arrest of judgment, asserting that the pleas lacked an
adequate factual basis and were the product of deficient representation. Counsel
also requested transcripts of the May plea hearing. A separate motion for
transcript was filed on September 13.
The district court considered the motions at the September 16 sentencing
hearing. It ruled the pro se letter was not a proper motion in arrest of judgment
and that the September motion was untimely under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.24(3)(b). The court also denied the request for transcripts, noting that
it had presided over the plea colloquy and found the pleas voluntary and supported
by evidence.
The court proceeded to sentencing, imposing concurrent terms: twenty-five
years with a mandatory minimum of seventeen and one-half years for robbery,
twenty-five years with a five-year minimum for burglary, ten years with a five-year
minimum for willful injury, and twenty-five years with a seventeen-and-a-half-year
minimum for attempted murder. Written judgments were entered on
September 16. Morman-Jenkins timely filed notices of appeal on September 20.
On appeal, Morman-Jenkins argues his due process rights were violated
when the district court denied his request for a transcript of the plea hearing and
the court abused its discretion in denying his motion in arrest of judgment. 5
II. Standard of Review.
Constitutional due process claims are normally reviewed de novo. State v.
Edwards, 571 N.W.2d 497, 501 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). “We review challenges to
plea proceedings for correction of errors at law.” State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d
397, 401 (Iowa 2017). The denial of a motion in arrest of judgment is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002). The
court “will reverse only if the ruling was based on reasons that are clearly
unreasonable or untenable.” Id. Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(f) authorizes
discretionary review of “[a]n order denying a motion in arrest of judgment on
grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”
III. Analysis.
A. Denial of Motion for a Transcript
Morman-Jenkins argues that his new trial counsel needed the plea hearing
transcript so that he could provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment. The State argues that such argument was not
preserved. We agree that Morman-Jenkins did not preserve error.
A request of a transcript to review for “possible further grounds” to arrest
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1514 Filed October 15, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DAJONISS DEPREE MORMAN-JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M.
Fangman, Judge.
A criminal defendant argues his due process rights were violated when the
district court denied his request for a transcript of the plea hearing and that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in arrest of judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SANDY, Judge.
DaJoniss Morman-Jenkins argues his due process rights were violated
when the district court denied his request for a transcript of the plea hearing. He
further argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in
arrest of judgment. Because the due process claim is being brought for the first
time on appeal, error was not preserved. And because Iowa Code section 814.6A
(2023) prohibits us from considering Morman-Jenkins’s pro se letter purportedly
requesting a motion in arrest of judgment, such claim also fails. Finally, because
the motion in arrest of judgment that was eventually filed by counsel was not
compliant with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(b), the court did not abuse
its discretion in not considering it.
I. Background Facts and Procedural Posture.
On the morning of December 10, 2023, police in Waterloo responded to a
shooting on Glenwood Street. The victim, identified as R.S., was found in his
vehicle suffering multiple gunshot wounds. Investigators reviewed residential
surveillance footage showing a white Chevrolet Avalanche arriving at the scene.
Three men, later identified as Morman-Jenkins, Marqwane Smith, and Karondius
Kelly, exited the vehicle. The video depicted Morman-Jenkins confronting R.S. in
the driver’s seat, reaching inside the vehicle, physically assaulting him, and
ultimately firing several rounds. Afterward, the group rifled through the victim’s
pockets and took his belongings before fleeing.
The minutes of testimony prepared by the State indicated that numerous
witnesses—including the victim, bystanders, police officers, and medical
professionals—would corroborate the events, with the surveillance recording 3
providing critical corroboration of Morman-Jenkins’s role as the shooter. The State
relied on this evidence to support charges of first-degree robbery, first-degree
burglary, willful injury causing serious injury, and attempted murder.
In January and February 2024, prosecutors filed trial informations in two
separate cases. The first charged Morman-Jenkins with robbery, burglary, and
willful injury. The second, filed shortly after, charged him with attempted murder.
In March the district court consolidated the cases, determining they arose from the
same occurrence.
On May 21, Morman-Jenkins appeared with court-appointed counsel for a
plea hearing. Under a negotiated agreement, he entered guilty pleas to all
charges. During the hearing, he confirmed his understanding of the rights he was
giving up and, under an Alford framework,1 acknowledged that the evidence would
likely convince a jury of his guilt. The court accepted the pleas after finding a
factual basis and properly advised him of the requirement to file a motion in arrest
of judgment within forty-five days of the hearing and no later than five days before
sentencing.
The court initially scheduled sentencing for July 25. Before that date, on
June 27, Morman-Jenkins sent a handwritten letter to the court stating he rejected
the plea agreement, claimed dissatisfaction with his attorney, and requested new
counsel. Counsel later moved to withdraw, and following an August 12 hearing,
the court granted the motion and appointed replacement counsel. At that hearing,
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“[A]n express admission of
guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty.”). 4
the district court informed Morman-Jenkins that his guilty pleas remained binding
because more than forty-five days had passed since entry.
New counsel entered an appearance in mid-August and, on September 10,
filed a formal motion in arrest of judgment, asserting that the pleas lacked an
adequate factual basis and were the product of deficient representation. Counsel
also requested transcripts of the May plea hearing. A separate motion for
transcript was filed on September 13.
The district court considered the motions at the September 16 sentencing
hearing. It ruled the pro se letter was not a proper motion in arrest of judgment
and that the September motion was untimely under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.24(3)(b). The court also denied the request for transcripts, noting that
it had presided over the plea colloquy and found the pleas voluntary and supported
by evidence.
The court proceeded to sentencing, imposing concurrent terms: twenty-five
years with a mandatory minimum of seventeen and one-half years for robbery,
twenty-five years with a five-year minimum for burglary, ten years with a five-year
minimum for willful injury, and twenty-five years with a seventeen-and-a-half-year
minimum for attempted murder. Written judgments were entered on
September 16. Morman-Jenkins timely filed notices of appeal on September 20.
On appeal, Morman-Jenkins argues his due process rights were violated
when the district court denied his request for a transcript of the plea hearing and
the court abused its discretion in denying his motion in arrest of judgment. 5
II. Standard of Review.
Constitutional due process claims are normally reviewed de novo. State v.
Edwards, 571 N.W.2d 497, 501 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). “We review challenges to
plea proceedings for correction of errors at law.” State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d
397, 401 (Iowa 2017). The denial of a motion in arrest of judgment is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002). The
court “will reverse only if the ruling was based on reasons that are clearly
unreasonable or untenable.” Id. Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(f) authorizes
discretionary review of “[a]n order denying a motion in arrest of judgment on
grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”
III. Analysis.
A. Denial of Motion for a Transcript
Morman-Jenkins argues that his new trial counsel needed the plea hearing
transcript so that he could provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment. The State argues that such argument was not
preserved. We agree that Morman-Jenkins did not preserve error.
A request of a transcript to review for “possible further grounds” to arrest
judgment and “to pursue certain motions in this matter” is not specific to a
constitutional argument. Morman-Jenkins did not argue that his constitutional right
to due process entitled him to a transcript. Appellate courts are “court[s] of review,
not of first view.” State v. Hanes, 981 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2022) (citation
omitted). Because Morman-Jenkins did not make his argument below and
preserve error, there is nothing for us to review. See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d
56, 60 (Iowa 2002). 6
B. Denial of Motion in Arrest of Judgment
Morman-Jenkins argues the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion in arrest of judgment. He advances two arguments: 1) that his June 27
letter to the court was a timely motion in arrest of judgment that should have been
granted; and 2) that because his second attorney filed the motion in arrest of
judgment more than five days before sentencing was scheduled it was timely. We
disagree.
Morman-Jenkins’s June 27 pro se letter to the court stated as follows:
To Judge . . . . I do not accept and plea offers from the state concerning these case’s [sic]. Also I do not feel as if my lawyer . . . has provided substantial and or effective aid. According to my sitxth [sic] amendment constitutional right. I do not want him as my legal representation.
Iowa Code section 814.6A strips the court of authority to consider pro se filings by
defendants who are “currently represented by counsel” other than motions for
appeal or disqualification of counsel. See State v. Manirabaruta, No. 20-0025,
2021 WL 4890937, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021) (citation omitted). Thus,
there is no need to decide whether Morman-Jenkins’s letter should be interpreted
as a substantive pro se motion in arrest of judgment because we cannot consider
it even if it were.
Morman-Jenkins next contends that the district court erred in denying the
motion in arrest of judgment filed by his second attorney because it was submitted
more than five days before sentencing. This argument likewise fails. Under Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(b), such a motion must be filed within forty-five
days of the plea and at least five days before sentencing. Noncompliance with 7
either deadline makes the motion untimely. See State v. Smith, 753 N.W.2d 562,
564 (Iowa 2008).