IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1741 Filed December 4, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANDREW RAYMOND KARVEL, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County, Alan Heavens,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his second-degree murder conviction. AFFIRMED.
Shea M. Chapin of The Chapin Center, PLC, Dubuque, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. 2
GREER, Presiding Judge.
The death of Daniel Lundy, Andrew Karvel’s roommate, was ruled a
homicide. Following an investigation into the cause of Lundy’s death, Karvel was
charged with first-degree murder. Ultimately a jury found Karvel guilty of murder
in the second degree, a class “B” felony, after a three-day trial. Before trial, the
district court ruled evidence of Karvel’s prior conviction for an assault against
Lundy was admissible at trial. After the jury’s verdict, Karvel moved for a new trial,
claiming the State committed Brady violations,1 the weight of the evidence did not
support the jury’s verdict, and the verdict form was improper and prejudicial.
Karvel now appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict
and that the district court abused its discretion admitting evidence of Karvel’s prior
bad act and by denying his motion for new trial. After our review, we affirm Karvel’s
conviction.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
For many years, Lundy lived in the old Allamakee County courthouse with
his roommate, Karvel. But shortly after Lundy returned home from a winter stay at
a nursing home, he was found dead on the floor. On May 9, 2022, at 7:30 a.m.,
Karvel called 911, requesting medical attention for Lundy and telling the dispatch
operator that Lundy was not breathing. First responders entered the residence,
checked for Lundy’s pulse, and noted that his extremities were “cool to the touch.”
Karvel alerted the responders that Lundy had been lying on the floor, unable to sit
up, for up to two days. Within the last day, Lundy had been struggling to breathe
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding due process requires the
prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused). 3
through his own phlegm. After briefly discussing the nature of the scene with
Karvel, first responders removed Lundy from the residence. Contrary to Karvel’s
statements to the dispatch operator that he was performing life saving measures
on Lundy, law enforcement and the responders on scene observed otherwise, and
Karvel could not logically explain why he did nothing to help Lundy where he had
been left immovable on the ground for days. Only after the autopsy was completed
was Lundy’s death ruled a homicide. At the time of his death, Lundy was septic,
but based on bruising, internal hemorrhaging, and fracturing, and the fact Lundy
had not been in a “high velocity” accident before his death, the medical examiner
found Lundy’s cause of death to be strangulation.
Karvel was charged with the first-degree murder of Lundy, a class “A”
felony. Before trial, Karvel moved in limine, seeking to bar the admission of his
prior criminal behavior, specifically a simple assault against Lundy that occurred in
2019, which Karvel pled guilty to through an Alford2 plea agreement. The district
court reserved ruling on the motion in limine, giving both parties an opportunity to
brief the issues.
Shortly before the trial, the State moved for a ruling based on Iowa Rule of
Evidence 5.104(a), asking the court to admit evidence of Karvel’s prior assault on
Lundy, including Lundy’s statements to law enforcement during the investigation
of that simple assault and statements of observations by an eyewitness. Karvel
resisted, asserting several evidentiary challenges to the admission of evidence of
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding “express admission of
guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty”). 4
the prior assault. After conducting the appropriate analysis, the district court ruled
that the complaint, affidavit, and order of disposition were admissible.
At the trial, evidence of the prior simple assault by Karvel against Lundy
was admitted. Additional evidence, including time stamps from Lundy’s
pacemaker and a traffic camera showing Karvel’s travel around the time of Lundy’s
death, were admitted to partially corroborate the timeline of events on May 9. The
jury found Karvel guilty of second-degree murder, one of the lesser-included
offenses of murder included in jury instructions. On October 2, 2023, before
sentencing, Karvel filed a motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment.
Karvel alleged that the district court allowed unduly prejudicial prior-bad-act
evidence to be admitted into evidence at trial, the verdict was contrary to the weight
of the evidence, the State committed Brady violations, and the verdict form was
improper and prejudicial. The district court found each of these claims meritless.
Karvel was sentenced to fifty years in prison, with a mandatory minimum of thirty-
five years. Karvel appeals.
II. Discussion.
In this sequence, we tackle Karvel’s challenges to the (1) admission of the
prior simple assault evidence, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction and (3) the denial of his motion for new trial.
A. Admission of Prior-Bad-Acts Evidence.
The State sought to admit evidence of Karvel’s previous assault against
Lundy. Karvel moved to exclude the evidence. After a hearing on the motion, the
district court found the criminal complaint, affidavit, and dispositional order
pertaining to Karvel’s simple assault conviction were admissible at the trial under 5
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b)(1). We review the district court’s admission of
prior-bad-acts evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136,
152 (Iowa 2015).
At the onset, we consider that under rule 5.404(b)(1), the use of prior bad
acts is prohibited when used to prove someone’s character to show they acted in
accordance with that character on a particular occasion. However, evidence “may
be admissible for another purpose such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2). We are required to evaluate the admissibility of prior-
bad-act evidence under a three-step analysis: whether (1) the evidence of prior
bad acts “relevant to a legitimate, disputed factual issue”; (2) there is clear proof
that Karvel committed the prior bad act; and (3) the evidence’s probative value
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”
State v. Putnam, 848 N.W.2d 1, 8–9 (Iowa 2014).
Applying the test, we first consider whether the previous assault was
relevant to a disputed issue of fact in this trial. The State had the burden to prove
Karvel acted with malice aforethought for both first-degree murder and the lesser
included charge of second-degree murder. Malice aforethought may be found
through the “express or implied acts and conduct of the defendant.” State v.
Gramenz, 126 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Iowa 1964). As to the first step of the test, Karvel
argues that while the district court found the evidence could be used to show
motive, the State only introduced the evidence “to prove that [the chief of police]
was familiar with Karvel’s address” and not to prove Karvel acted with malice
aforethought. During the chief of police’s testimony, after confirming he was 6
familiar with Karvel’s address, he stated “[i]n 2019 I responded to a report of an
assault at that address.” After admitting copies of the complaint, affidavit, and
disposition over Karvel’s objection, the chief of police continued and described the
events of the 2019 assault. The timing and circumstances related to how the
information was introduced at trial is of no consequence to whether the evidence
being offered is relevant to a central factual issue. And, in the pre-trial discussions
before the exhibit was admitted at trial, the State reasoned that Karvel’s prior
assault conviction could be admitted “for purpose of proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, and going to the elements of the case.” See Iowa R.
Evid. 5.404(b)(2). “Evidence of bad feelings or quarrels between the defendant
and the victim are circumstances that may be used to support a finding of malice
aforethought.” State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 49 (Iowa 2003). Because
the evidence was relevant to an issue at trial—whether Karvel acted with malice
aforethought—and was not used for prohibited purposes, for example, improper
character evidence, the admission of the prior bad act met the first step of the test.
Next, we ask whether the district court found clear proof that Karvel
committed simple assault. “[P]roof of prior bad acts is clear if it prevents the jury
from speculating or inferring from mere suspicion.” State v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d
1, 13 (Iowa 2014). Karvel entered an Alford guilty plea to the underlying prior bad
act, the simple assault. An Alford guilty plea may only be accepted by the court
upon a showing of strong evidence of actual guilt and requires a defendant to
accept the consequences of pleading guilty while allowing the accused to maintain
their claim of innocence. State v. Siner, No. 17-0993, 2018 WL 1098948, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018) (emphasis added) (“The court must determine 7
whether a guilty plea has a factual basis before it can accept it, even where the
plea is under Alford.” (citation omitted)). During the earlier assault investigation,
Lundy reported that Karvel pushed him on the shoulder and threatened to throw a
plastic container at him. Karvel, at the time, admitted “it was possible he put his
hands on [Lundy].” The reported statements describing the assault and the Alford
plea, taken together, are clear proof that Karvel assaulted Lundy in 2019.
Finally, we look to whether the district court sufficiently weighed the
evidence to determine if the probative value of the underlying bad act was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Sullivan,
679 N.W.2d 19, 30 (Iowa 2004). The State argues that the details of the simple
assault were not so inflammatory to be prejudicial but instead offered details
related to motive, intent, or lack of accident under rule 5.404(b)(2). The district
court agreed. Following that argument, the district court also found the Alford plea
was “highly probative” to the matter at hand. See State v. Bassett, No. 21-0923,
2022 WL 16630788, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2022) (citation omitted) (finding
that evidence of the relationship was relevant to establish intent and lack of
accident); State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 131 (Iowa 2004) (concluding prior-bad-
acts evidence was admissible to prevent the defendant from falsely characterizing
his relationship with the victim as “peaceful and friendly.” (citation omitted)). And
like in Bassett, the district court added that any prejudice caused by the nature of
the bad acts could be curtailed by a limiting jury instruction, and one was given
here. 2022 WL 16630788, at *5.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
admitting evidence of Karvel’s prior bad act. 8
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Karvel argues “sufficient evidence does not exist to support the jury’s guilty
verdict” for second-degree murder. Specifically, Karvel urges there was
insufficient evidence that (1) he strangled Lundy, (2) Lundy even died because of
strangulation, and (3) he acted with malice aforethought. We review sufficiency-
of-the-evidence claims for errors at law. State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 116
(Iowa 2004). We review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably
be deduced from the record evidence.” State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa
2005) (cleaned up). We are bound by the jury’s verdict if we find substantial
evidence to support the guilty verdict. See State v. Slaughter, 3 N.W.3d 540, 546
(Iowa 2024).
The State charged Karvel with the crime of first-degree murder. The jury
was instructed that if it did not find Karvel guilty of that charge, it must consider the
lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. The jury followed the
instructions and, after consideration, found Karvel guilty of murder in the second
degree. To convict Karvel of second-degree murder, the State had to prove three
elements:
1. On or about May 9, 2022, the [Karvel] strangled Daniel Lundy. 2. Daniel Lundy died as a result of being strangled. 3. [Karvel] acted with malice aforethought.
For Karvel’s claim to be successful, the evidence underpinning one or more
elements of second-degree murder must be such that it could not convince “a
rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 9
Quinn, 691 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). The district court
found that sufficient evidence exists for each of the three prongs. We address
each element individually.
Elements one and two go hand in hand because strangulation does not
occur in isolation. The medical examiner, Dr. Michele Catellier, offered substantial
evidence of strangulation as the causation of his death. And, Karvel’s own timeline
from his appellate brief undercuts his argument that he could not have strangled
Lundy. He points to timeline evidence from videos showing his travel and parts of
the autopsy evidence related to Lundy’s pacemaker. First, the timeline described
by Karvel showed that shortly before 7:11 a.m. Karvel left the residence to travel
to the store to purchase cold medicine. Video footage showed Karvel purchasing
over-the-counter medications and then leaving the store around 7:20 a.m.
According to the pacemaker interrogator, Lundy’s heart went into ventricular
tachycardia at 6:59 a.m., with his heart stopping at 7:37 a.m. Even with this
documented evidence, Karvel admits that after he returned from the store, Lundy
was conscious, he gave Lundy the purchased medicine and then shortly after
Lundy stopped breathing. All of which establishes that Karvel was with or near
Lundy before and at the time of his death. This timeline, although muddled by
inaccurate timestamps, was partially corroborated by a store receipt and a traffic
camera. The sequence of events, taken in the light most favorable to the State, is
enough for a reasonable jury to conclude that Karvel was with Lundy before and
after his death, with no other person on site. A jury could reasonably infer from
this substantial evidence that Karvel was an actor in Lundy’s homicide. 10
Testimony from Dr. Catellier, who performed the autopsy on Lundy,
observed internal bleeding on both sides of Lundy’s neck, under the outside area
where she noted bruising. Damage to Lundy’s carotid arteries offered another sign
of strangulation, along with a broken larynx. Dr. Catellier opined that it was more
likely that “hands” cause the injury because “both sides and the back of both sides
were injured.” And other damage to the neck area documented during the autopsy
provided strong evidence that Lundy’s cause of death was strangulation and the
manner of death was homicide. For the jury’s consideration, Dr. Catellier
explained why Lundy’s death was suspicious by presenting autopsy photos and
pointing out irregularities, like hemorrhaging, in various anatomical structures.
Although the medical examiner explained that Lundy was not a healthy man—
bacteria in his infected bed sores had entered his blood stream causing sepsis—
sepsis was not Lundy’s ultimate cause of death. Even though some injuries
suffered by Lundy could have resulted from a high-velocity accident, like a motor
vehicle accident, the evidence suggested that Lundy’s injuries were “recent” as
she could not see evidence of “healing per se.” Based upon the medical
examiner’s learned opinion and on the totality of the evidence, there was
substantial evidence that Lundy died by strangulation. The expert testimony, along
with autopsy photos, is sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that
Lundy’s death was caused by strangulation.
The final element of murder in the second degree requires malice
aforethought. Malice aforethought is described as:
[A] fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another existing prior to the act complained of; it need not be shown to have existed for any length of time before, but only requires such 11
deliberation as makes a person appreciate and understand at the time the act is committed its nature and probable consequences as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion.
State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 469 (Iowa 2010) (emphasis omitted) (citation
omitted). Malice aforethought is not usually shown by direct evidence; it is often
inferred by circumstantial evidence or conduct. Id. Here, both the act of
strangulation and past conduct support a showing of malice aforethought. See id.;
see also Powell v. State, No. 18-0542, 2019 WL 2524264, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
June 19, 2019) (concluding use of strangulation supports a finding of malice
aforethought on its own).
It was the medical examiner’s testimony that the most likely mode of
strangulation was strangulation by hands. The act of strangulation may imply
malice aforethought because it takes time. See State v. Gary, No. 21-1476, 2023
WL 3856427, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2023) (“The fact that asphyxiation takes
several minutes is also evidence that supports a finding that [the defendant] acted
with a fixed purpose to do harm.”). The medical examiner testified that it can take
only three to ten seconds for an individual to lose consciousness but four to five
minutes of constant oxygen deprivation for an individual to experience permanent
and irreversible brain damage, ultimately causing death.
Malice aforethought may also be implied by evidence of bad feelings or
quarrels. See State v. Kellogg, 263 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 1978). Prior crimes
between the accused and the victim can show the relationship between the two.
See State v. Hilleshiem, 305 N.W. 2d 710, 714 (Iowa 1981) (“The prior injuries
were circumstantial evidence bearing on defendant’s relationship with [victim] and
the credibility of his version of the occurrence which led to her death.”). The prior 12
altercation between Lundy and Karvel adds to the permissible inference by the jury
that Karvel acted with malice aforethought.
Overall, the violent nature of strangulation, the time required to cause brain
death, the testimony of the associate medical examiner, and the history of an
altercation between Karvel and Lundy are all sufficient grounds to imply malice
aforethought. As a result, we find sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable
juror to find malice aforethought, the third element of second-degree murder. We
reject Karvel’s challenges to sufficiency of the evidence.
C. Denial of Motion for New Trial.
On Karvel’s last challenge, we review his motion for a new trial under Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(5), (7), and (8). He claims the verdict is
contrary to the weight of the evidence, the State committed a Brady violation, and
the jury was improperly instructed on a material matter. We address each of his
arguments in turn.
i. Verdict Contrary to the Weight of the Evidence.
“On a weight-of-the-evidence claim, appellate review is limited to a review
of the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not of the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” State v. Reeves, 670
N.W.2d 199, 203 (Iowa 2003). “A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence
only when ‘a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or
cause than the other.’” State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016) (citation
omitted). A motion for a new trial should only be granted in exceptional
circumstances. Id. at 705. 13
Karvel argues the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence because
the fact finder relied upon inadmissible evidence—the prior bad act—and that there
was reasonable doubt because the medical examiner did not consider Lundy’s
high velocity injury in her testimony. Having determined that Karvel’s evidentiary
claims are meritless, we decline to address them again.
In this case, the district court found “the weight of credible evidence
overwhelmingly supports the verdict that this jury reached” after weighing the
testimony of the medical examiner, identifying significant holes in Karvel’s alleged
alibi, and acknowledging Karvel’s history with Lundy. Relying on the district court’s
determination that the medical examiner’s testimony was credible and persuasive
and consistent with the district court’s ruling that Karvel’s alibi was “full of holes”—
leaving Karvel with or near Lundy, before, during, and immediately after his death,
we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when concluding the
weight of the evidence supported the jury verdict. Karvel is not entitled to a new
trial.
ii. Claim of Brady Violation.
We turn to Karvel’s argument that the State committed a Brady violation by
suppressing exculpatory evidence; he contends the State failed to produce the
pacemaker report and the traffic camera video. “Due process claims asserting a
Brady violation are reviewed de novo.” State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19, 27 (Iowa
2022). For his Brady claim to succeed, Karvel must show by a preponderance of
the evidence, “(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was
favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.”
DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2011). Karvel asserts he requested 14
the pacemaker report, but the State indicated it did not exist until the medical
examiner “proceeded to pull out a report while she was on the stand and consulted
the report before giving specific timeline evidence regarding the information
extracted from Daniel Lundy’s pacemaker.” Likewise, Karvel points to testimony
from the chief of police that conflicted with the State’s assertion there was no traffic
camera footage. On cross-examination, for the first time, the police chief stated
the footage was preserved, he had access to it, and he had given it to the State.
In response, the State argues Karvel failed to prove the second prong of the
Brady test. In that path, even if the State suppressed evidence, unless Karvel can
show the evidence was favorable to him, a claimed Brady violation fails. As the
district court explained in its ruling on the motion for new trial:
The pacemaker indicated that Lundy’s heart began beating erratically at 6:59 a.m. and stopped beating entirely around 7:38 a.m. Karvel claims that he “was not physically present in the apartment with Daniel Lundy from approximately 7:06 a.m. until he returned from [the store] around 7:25 a.m.” But the medical examiner testified that it takes four to six minutes to strangle a person. So the timeline gives Karvel enough time to strangle Lundy before Karvel left for the store, or after he returned, or before and after. The timeline is a “semi-abili” instead of an alibi. Also, the State never disputed Karvel’s timeline. The pacemaker report and traffic camera video would only corroborate something that was uncontested to begin with. A new trial with the pacemaker report and the traffic camera video as exhibits does not create a new timeline that helps Karvel given the relatively short time it takes to strangle someone. And Karvel told the chief of police that he administered cold medicine to Lundy, left the room, and came back minutes later to find Lundy dead. Karvel’s statement puts himself at the residence immediately before Lundy died and eliminates the possibility that someone else strangled Lundy when Karvel was at the store. 15
Karvel failed to prove the second prong of the Brady analysis by
preponderance of the evidence, thus, we find no Brady violation. See DeSimone,
803 N.W.2d at 103.
iii. Jury Instruction Issue.
Our standard of review on issues of jury instructions is for errors at law.
State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Iowa 2001). Jury instructions are in error
when the “instructions are misleading and confusing.” State v. Ross, 986 N.W.2d
581, 586 (Iowa 2023). “In determining whether an instruction is inaccurate,
misleading, or confusing, we look to the instructions as a whole and do not require
perfection.” Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 865 N.W.2d 887, 902 (Iowa 2015).
When the jury is wrongly instructed, “[w]e presume prejudice ‘unless the record
affirmatively establishes there was no[ne].’” Ross, 986 N.W.2d at 585 (alteration
in original) (citation omitted). But reversal of the conviction and a new trial is only
warranted if the error was prejudicial to the complaining party. See State v. Hanes,
790 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Iowa 2010).
The issue presented before this court is not the substance of the jury
instructions, or even the order of the instructions, but rather, the order of the verdict
options. Karvel’s argument boils down to his belief that the order of the verdict
form materially changed the ultimate verdict of the jury—because “Not Guilty” was
listed last, the jury chose not to find him not guilty. We find no case or authority
that either directly or tangentially supports finding a verdict form “inaccurate,
misleading, or confusing” based on the order of the responses. Our analysis is in
line with the district court’s, “Karvel’s complaint here is a direct attack on the
competence and integrity of the jury. . . . Karvel’s argument here assumes that 16
none of those instructions mattered because the jury will, and did, ignore all
instructions and instead base their verdict on the order of verdict options.” Karvel’s
argument is meritless. We affirm the decision of the district court on this challenge.
III. Conclusion.
We affirm Karvel’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.