IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED State of Indiana, Dec 01 2025, 8:36 am
CLERK Appellant-Plaintiff Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
Mitchell Jay Bozarth, Appellee-Defendant
December 1, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-978 Appeal from the Wayne Superior Court The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 89D02-2012-F2-24
Opinion by Judge Tavitas Judges DeBoer and Scheele concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 1 of 14 Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary [1] The State of Indiana charged Mitchell Bozarth with dealing in a narcotic drug,
a Level 2 felony, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a
person, a Class A misdemeanor. Bozarth moved to dismiss the charges against
him on the ground that the State failed to preserve video evidence from inside
the patrol car in which Bozarth was placed when he was arrested and
transported to jail. The trial court granted Bozarth’s motion to dismiss, and the
State appeals. The State claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting the motion to dismiss because: (1) the video was not materially
exculpatory; and (2) there was no evidence that the State destroyed the video in
bad faith. We agree with the State and, accordingly, reverse and remand.
Issue [2] The State presents one issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Bozarth’s motion to dismiss.
Facts [3] On the evening of October 29, 2020, Officers Logan Schneider and Matt
Smarrelli of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department responded to the scene of
a single-vehicle accident at the intersection of U.S. Highway 35 and Davis
Meyer Road. At the scene, Officer Schneider observed Bozarth pulling himself
out of his wrecked car, which had struck a guardrail. Witnesses informed the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 2 of 14 officers that Bozarth had been swerving his vehicle, almost struck another
vehicle head-on, lost control of his vehicle, and hit the guardrail.
[4] Officer Schneider observed Bozarth stumbling and slurring his words. Bozarth
failed the field sobriety tests administered by Officer Schneider. Officer
Schneider patted Bozarth down for weapons and contraband but noticed
nothing at that time. Officer Schneider placed Bozarth in handcuffs, put
Bozarth in the front passenger seat of his patrol car, and transported Bozarth to
the hospital to conduct a blood draw and urine screen.
[5] Officer Schneider’s patrol car was equipped with a dashboard video camera
(“dashcam”), which captured video of the front passenger from “roughly right
around the waist, mid-thigh possibly, and then up.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. A video
could be manually saved and uploaded to cloud storage. But if a video was not
manually saved, it would be automatically deleted in 180 or 190 days.
[6] After the blood draw was conducted, Officer Schneider had to leave the
hospital because of a medical emergency involving his wife. Accordingly,
Officer Schneider took the blood sample kit to the Sheriff’s office and went
home before the urine screen was completed. 1 After he went home to get his
wife, Officer Schneider went to his patrol car to retrieve his computer. When
he did so, he discovered a clear plastic bag that contained a tan, rock-like
1 Bozarth’s urine tested positive for cannabis, PCP, amphetamines, opiates, benzodiazepines, and MDMA.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 3 of 14 substance on the floorboard of the front passenger seat. A field-test of the
substance, which consisted of 111.9 grams, tested positive for heroin.
[7] Officer Schneider informed the other officers of the substance he found in his
car, and these officers spoke with Bozarth after advising him of his Miranda
rights. Bozarth admitted that the heroin belonged to him and stated that he had
hidden it under his genitals; the heroin had fallen out of his pants while he was
in the patrol car; and he had attempted to kick it under the seat.
[8] Officer Schneider went on paternity leave shortly after this incident, and he
forgot to mark the dashcam video so that it would be saved past the automatic-
deletion period. Because of this, the video was deleted after 180 or 190 days.
[9] On December 30, 2020, the State charged Bozarth with dealing in a narcotic
drug, a Level 2 felony, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a
person, a Class A misdemeanor. The State subsequently amended the charging
information to add an allegation that Bozarth was an habitual offender.
[10] On February 19, 2025, Bozarth moved to dismiss the charging information
under Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-4(a)(11), which provides that “[t]he [trial]
court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the indictment or
information upon any . . . other ground that is a basis for dismissal as a matter
of law.” Bozarth claimed that the State’s failure to preserve the dashcam video
violated his due process rights as set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 4 of 14 [11] The trial court held a hearing on Bozarth’s motion to dismiss on February 25,
2025, and granted the motion on March 30, 2025. The trial court’s order
provides in relevant part:
The Court finds that the in-car dash-cam video and audio coverage would have been exculpatory. Again, evidence is exculpatory if it possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was lost or destroyed and must be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. The now lost or destroyed footage would show Bozarth in the front passenger seat of the patrol car with his hands in handcuffs behind his back and show and demonstrate from its video coverage any movements in his torso caused by his legs kicking the drugs under his seat. The Court finds this potentially exculpatory evidence to be readily apparent before it was lost or destroyed by the Richmond Police Department. Indeed, it was known to exist by law enforcement prior to it being lost or destroyed. The Court also finds that Bozarth would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by any other reasonably available means. The Court understands that Bozarth can testify that he never moved his legs or kicked the drugs under his seat. The reality, however, is that the jury would in all likelihood find such testimony to be self- serving and unbelievable. It is only the car dash-cam video and audio coverage that can provide the proof of what actually did or did not occur in Officer Schneider’s patrol car. The Court finds the lost or destroyed car dash-cam video to be materially exculpable evidence.
When the State fails to preserve materially exculpable evidence, a due process violation occurs regardless of whether the State acted in bad faith. Preservation of evidence is fundamental for all law enforcement to ensure fairness and accountability. While, admittedly, the Court finds there to be no foul play here, it remains that the best evidence of whether or not Bozarth kicked
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 5 of 14 or otherwise somehow placed the drugs under the seat affront passenger seat of the patrol car would be shown by the car dash- cam video coverage as to his upper body movement resulting from kicking or using his feet to move the drugs under the seat. There is no other comparable evidence from any other reasonably available means.
Appellant’s App. Vol II pp. 170-72 (emphases added, citations omitted). The
State now appeals. 2 See Ind. Code § 35-38-4-2(a)(1) (“Appeals to the supreme
court or to the court of appeals, as provided by court rules, may be taken by the
[S]tate as of right . . . [f]rom an order granting a motion to dismiss one (1) or
more counts of an indictment or information.”).
Discussion and Decision Standard of Review
[12] The State claims that the trial court erred by granting Bozarth’s motion to
dismiss. 3 We generally review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 440 (Ind. 2022). A trial
court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
2 We held oral argument in this case on November 5, 2025, at Chesterton High School. We extend our thanks to the faculty and staff of the school for their hospitality, and we thank the students who attended the oral argument for their attention and insightful questions after the argument. We also thank counsel for both parties for the quality of their arguments and for remaining after the argument to answer the students’ questions. 3 Bozarth conceded at oral argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, which was not based on the heroin found in the patrol car.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 6 of 14 the facts and circumstances or if the court misinterpreted the law. Id. (citing
Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 440). We review any questions of law de novo. See id.
[13] The trial court granted Bozarth’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
State violated Bozarth’s due process rights by failing to preserve the video from
Officer Schneider’s dashcam in violation of Brady v. Maryland. This Court
recently summarized Brady and its progeny as follows:
In Brady[], the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 [] (1988). “The State’s failure to preserve materially exculpatory evidence is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Bennett v. State, 175 N.E.3d 331, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. “[T]he failure to preserve ‘potentially useful evidence’—as opposed to material[ly] exculpatory evidence—violates the Fourteenth Amendment only when the defendant can show bad faith on the part of police.” Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 2000) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58[]).
Alexander v. State, 197 N.E.3d 367, 369-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).
[14] There seems to be a slight difference between evidence that the State withholds
from the defendant (which is governed by Brady) and evidence that the State
fails to preserve (which is governed by Youngblood). See 6 LaFave, Israel, King
& Orr, CRIM. PROC. § 24.3(e) (4th ed. 2024 Update) (noting that the Court in
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486 (1984), observed that “the question of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 7 of 14 ‘the government’s duty to take affirmative steps to preserve evidence’ was only
roughly analogous to the question presented in ‘nondisclosure cases’” such as
Brady). We, therefore, address Bozarth’s claim as one of failing to preserve
evidence, not the failure to disclose evidence.
A. The dashcam video was not materially exculpatory.
[15] “To determine whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated by
the State’s failure to preserve evidence, we must first decide whether the
evidence in question was ‘potentially useful evidence’ or ‘materially exculpatory
evidence.’” Land v. State, 802 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
Chissell v. State, 705 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied), trans.
denied. As set forth above, if the evidence was materially exculpatory, the good
faith of the police is immaterial; but if the evidence is merely potentially useful,
then the defendant must also show that the police acted in bad faith in failing to
preserve the evidence. Alexander, 197 N.E.3d at 369-70.
[16] “‘Materially exculpatory evidence’ is evidence that ‘possesses an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed’ and must ‘be of
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means.’” Taylor v. State, 236 N.E.3d
700, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). In contrast,
“‘[p]otentially useful evidence’ is evidence about ‘which no more can be said
than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have
exonerated the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489).
“Although a defendant is not required to conclusively prove the destroyed Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 8 of 14 evidence was materially exculpatory, ‘there must be some indication that the
evidence was exculpatory.’” Id. at 712-13 (quoting Johnson v. State, 507 N.E.2d
980, 983 (Ind. 1987)). “‘[W]e cannot assume that the destroyed evidence
contained exculpatory material when the record is devoid of such indication.’”
Id. (quoting Johnson, 507 N.E.2d at 983).
[17] We agree with the State that nothing suggested that the dashcam video was
exculpatory before it was destroyed. For it to be exculpatory, the video would
have had to depict someone else dropping the heroin on the floorboard of the
patrol car. But Officer Schneider testified that no one else other than himself
and Bozarth were in the patrol car at the relevant time. Moreover, Bozarth
later admitted that he had hidden the heroin in his pants, the heroin fell out of
his pants while he was in the patrol car, and he attempted to kick the heroin
under the seat to hide it. Thus, given Bozarth’s admissions, the video could
have been potentially useful to the State.
[18] We find this case to be similar to Chissell v. State, 705 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999). There, the defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle while
intoxicated and argued on appeal that he had been denied due process because
the police failed to preserve videotapes of him performing field sobriety tests at
the scene and at the jail. Although the arresting officer’s vehicle was equipped
with an in-car camera, Chissell’s stop and arrest were not recorded “for some
reason.” Id. at 504. Chissell argued that the videotapes would be materially
exculpatory if they contained evidence of him passing the field sobriety tests.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 9 of 14 But nothing in the record supported Chissell’s contention that the videotapes
might show him passing the tests.
[19] On appeal, this Court refused to speculate that the videotapes contained any
such footage and held that the missing videotapes were, therefore, not
materially exculpatory. Id. Instead, the Court held the videotapes were
potentially useful evidence. Id. Because there was “no showing that the tapes
were erased intentionally or negligently by the police in order to suppress
material evidence,” Chissell could not show bad faith on the part of the police.
Id. Thus, he was not denied due process. Id.; see also Ko v. State, 243 N.E.3d
1153, 1159-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss on
grounds that police failed to preserve jail video showing defendant speaking
with undercover officer and other inmate where, despite defendant’s claims that
video would have depicted the other inmate “‘grooming’ [defendant] to make
murderous solicitations,” there was no evidence supporting this theory, the
evidence was, at best, potentially useful, and there was no showing of bad
faith), trans. denied; Taylor, 236 N.E.3d at 713 (affirming denial of defendant’s
motion to set aside verdict on grounds that police failed to preserve arresting
officer’s body camera video because defendant offered “nothing more than
speculation about the possible exculpatory value of [the officer]’s body camera
footage,” and there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police).
[20] We agree with the State that Chissell, Ko, and Taylor are on all fours with the
present case. Nothing in the record suggests that the dashcam video here would
have shown someone else dropping and hiding the heroin. To the contrary,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 10 of 14 Bozarth admitted that he dropped the heroin and attempted to hide it. Thus,
the dashboard video was, at most, potentially useful evidence, not materially
exculpatory. 4
B. The dashcam video was not destroyed in bad faith.
[21] Because the dashcam video was only potentially useful, Bozarth was required
to demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith to establish a violation of his
due process rights. See Alexander, 197 N.E.3d at 369-70. To show bad faith, it is
not enough to show mere bad judgment or negligence. Land v. State, 802
N.E.2d 45, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Instead, “‘[b]ad faith . . . implies the
conscious doing of wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.’”
Id. (quoting Wade v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
[22] Here, Bozarth did not argue before the trial court that the police acted in bad
faith, and the trial court specifically found that there was no “foul play” on the
part of the police. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 172. Moreover, there is evidence
to support the trial court’s finding. Officer Schneider left his shift early on the
night he arrested Bozarth because the officer’s wife had a medical emergency.
He then went on paternity leave shortly thereafter and forgot to mark the video
4 Bozarth cites no Indiana case holding that withheld or destroyed evidence was, in fact, materially exculpatory. Nor has our research found any case where an Indiana court has so held. Even federal cases that so hold seem few and far between. See, e.g., Ballinger v. Kirby, 3 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1993) (habeas petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the prosecution’s failure to produce an allegedly exculpatory photograph because photograph would have provided additional impeachment of the codefendant which could have destroyed the codefendant’s credibility); Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1995) (prosecution’s withholding from murder defendant of evidence tending to show that another person had committed the crime was sufficiently material to have violated habeas petitioner’s right to due process).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 11 of 14 so that it would be saved past the automatic-deletion period. Because of this,
the video was deleted after 180 or 190 days. We, therefore, conclude that there
is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police in failing to preserve the
dashcam video. The absence of bad faith is fatal to Bozarth’s claim that the
failure to preserve the video denied him due process. 5
C. Bozarth was not denied due process under the Indiana Constitution.
[23] Bozarth also argues that the trial court properly dismissed the charges based on
a violation of due process under Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana
Constitution, which Bozarth claims provides broader protection than the
federal Constitution. Specifically, he claims that earlier Indiana case law allows
for the dismissal of criminal charges when police merely negligently destroy
evidence. Appellee’s Br. p. 10 (citing Birkla v. State, 323 N.E.2d 645 (Ind.
1975); Hale v. State, 230 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. 1967)). In Birkla, our Supreme Court
wrote, “Prior to any request for discovery by the defendant, the negligent
destruction or withholding of material evidence by the police or the prosecution
may present grounds for reversal.” 323 N.E.2d at 648 (citing Hale, 230 N.E.2d
at 435) (emphasis added).
5 Bozarth argues that the policy to automatically delete videos after 180 or 190 days, unless the videos were manually tagged to be saved, is itself evidence of bad faith. He claims that the State presented no evidence or rationale as to why the videos were not kept for a longer time or why they were not manually reviewed to ensure they did not contain exculpatory evidence. He also claims that, although Officer Schneider may have been on paternity leave, several other officers were involved in the case, yet not one of them marked the video to be saved. Thus, he claims that “at some point, police action is so negligent that it becomes bad faith.” Appellee’s Br. p. 16. We need not decide whether gross negligence could ever suffice to satisfy the requirement of bad faith because the police action here was, at most, mere negligence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 12 of 14 [24] In its reply brief, the State claims that Indiana courts have since expressly
adopted the federal standard requiring bad faith, not merely negligence, citing
Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279, 299 (Ind. 1988), and Holder v. State, 571
N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ind. 1991). But neither of these cases appears to have
involved a claim under the Indiana Constitution. Cases from this Court,
however, have expressly stated that, when reviewing a claim of improperly
preserved evidence, “[t]he analysis under the Indiana Constitution is identical
to the federal analysis.” Terry v. State, 857 N.E.2d 396, 406 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Stoker v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
(“[T]his court has previously concluded that the standard for evidence
preservation under the Indiana Constitution is consistent with the federal
analysis.”)).
[25] Regardless, cases from our Supreme Court since Birkla and Hale have clarified
that, even under a negligence standard, a defendant is not “required to
conclusively prove that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory,” but “there
must be some indication that the evidence was exculpatory[,] and we cannot
assume that the destroyed evidence contained exculpatory material when the
record is devoid of such indication.” Johnson v. State, 507 N.E.2d 980, 983 (Ind.
1987) (citing Wilson v. State, 432 N.E.2d 30, 32-33 (Ind. 1982)). Thus, even
under a negligence standard, there must be some indication that the evidence
that was destroyed was indeed exculpatory. As we held above, here, not only
was there no evidence that the dashcam video was exculpatory, but there was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 13 of 14 evidence in the form of Bozarth’s own statement that the video was not
exculpatory. Accordingly, Bozarth’s Indiana Constitution argument also fails.
Conclusion [26] The dashcam video was not materially exculpatory and was at most potentially
useful given that Bozarth admitted that the heroin belonged to him. Because
the evidence was merely potentially useful, Bozarth was required to show bad
faith on the part of the police in failing to preserve the video, and there was no
evidence of bad faith. The trial court abused its discretion in granting Bozarth’s
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand
for further proceedings.
[27] Reversed and remanded.
DeBoer, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Peter Capofari Capofari Law, LLC Noblesville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-978 | December 1, 2025 Page 14 of 14